I’m sorry - what are you trying to say here?
That you’re being deliberately obtuse, deflecting the intention of my post, and misunderstanding the point of the thread.
You are confused. Morality is not the name we give to questions of how one ought to live. The name for such questions is “moral questions.” Morality is not the same as moral questioning. Moral questioning takes morality as the object which it seeks to understand. Moral philosophy obviously includes moral questioning, but is not restricted to it - it also includes moral answers, for example.
“Questions of how we ought to live” constitutes the study of morality, its substance and its object. The purpose of morality is to consider how we ought to conduct ourselves in terms of negotiating and navigating our complex interrelationships with each other and the world around us. Elizabeth Anderson sums up morality as “a system of reciprocal claim making, in which everyone is accountable to everyone else”. Understood thus, as a system, one may say that morality is an object; but the substance of that object is made up entirely of subjective experience.
Now this notion you’ve outlined above, in opposition to which you claim “the whole notion that morality is subjective” is built: who do you take to espouse such a notion? (I really don’t know what you mean by it.)
Those who tend to objectify morality are the ones who think of it in terms of moral rules laid down by some higher authority than those who are subject to the rules. For the most part, such people tend to be religious believers. My original argument in this thread was that there is no other source for morality than human experience, and hence it is subjective.
Subjectivity refers to ideas which do not exist in an objective realm for which empirical investigation can identify facts? Where did you get this notion from? I think the name for what your referring to here would be “non-empirical, irrational propositions.” Subjectivity, on the other hand, is an abstract term that has multiple possible references, but not the one you suggest. In general it refers to the qualitative aspect of being a subject. Subject, in turn, can mean a number of things in this context (the grammatical subject of a sentence isn’t relevant here): the subject as a bearer of actual being (i.e., any real thing - also called objects); or the subject as a bearer of mental states (usually including conceptualized self-consciousness - these latter are also objects - they form a subset of the objects (real things) just mentioned - such subjects are capable of reflection, meaning they can grasp themselves as objects).
The point being that as a subject, you alone experience things from your point of view. If you have a headache, for example, your doctor may be able to identify objective, empirical causes for your headache (such as dehydration, a bump on the head, etc) but can’t experience the headache from your point of view.
This relationship between objective, empirical facts and subjective experience of those facts is exactly the point I was making in my previous posts, (had you taken the time to think about my point rather than quibble over word choices) and it applies to the whole concept of morality. I make claims upon those around me to respect my preferences (such as remaining alive, being spared unnecessary suffering, maintaining the freedom to act in ways that lead to my happiness) and those around me make the same claims upon me. I can understand the reciprocal nature of this relationship, but I can’t experience anyone else’s preferences in anything more than a nebulous way, by assuming that they are at least comparable to my own.
It’s obvious that if someone is killed, that violates their preference for staying alive (assuming they have such a preference); if someone is tortured, that violates their preference for being spared unnecessary suffering; and if someone is physically restrained, or threatened, or in some other way prevented from undertaking actions that lead to their happiness (for example, women in Afghanistan being restricted on pain of beatings or death from leaving their homes unaccompanied by a male chaperone) that also violates a subjective preference.
Your claim in a previous post that you might just as well speak of human beings as many-faceted subjective entities missed completely my point about the relationship between objective, externally-existing and observable things and events, and the nature of our subjective experience of such things and events. It is the subjective experience that leads to purely practical considerations becoming moral considerations.