Morality and Subjectivity

[Sair]

Understanding that this subject has been addressed both directly and indirectly on several threads, but hoping that I can perhaps bring something new to the discussion, it is with some trepidation that I start this thread, as I’m aware that - appropriately, perhaps - passions tend to run high when it comes to morality.

I have given this quite a lot of thought recently, and I feel I can now post a fairly coherent summation of my beliefs in this regard - and for that I thank those who have challenged me to explain and clarify my ideas on other threads. Credit where credit is due, after all :tiphat:

So, on to the topic of the thread. A question that has come up indirectly on occasion is whether I am an ethical subjectivist, or a moral relativist. If by that is meant, do I think that any ethical system is as valid as any other, then no - I firmly believe any moral system must be able to prove its worth in terms of the observable and experiential consequences of adhering to it. If however, to be a moral relativist or ethical subjectivist means that I think the morality of actions is informed by subjectivity, and is relative to the circumstances in which any moral decision is made, then the answer must be yes.

I often find that people speak of objective morality as though morality is a thing that has an existence of its own, independent of sentient beings. Theists often believe that morality comes from the mind of God, and is therefore independent of human subjectivity. However, my contention is that morality springs from and depends upon the experience of sentient beings - that morality is inextricably bound to subjectivity.

Lest I be accused of meaning that there is no grounding for morality in the reality of life and human experience, I must emphatically point out that there are a few obvious factors that make morality necessary to us. There are things that are objectively harmful to our health and life, and there are likewise things that are objectively beneficial. It is likewise an objective fact that humans are, in general, wired for subjective experience - that’s just the way our brains work. It is, furthermore, objectively true that humans are social animals, with an innate need to form bonds with our own kind - not even the most misanthropic loner can get by completely independently of others. Given these facts, it is not difficult to see why morality is necessary - we have to be able to pursue harmonious relations with others, because of the kind of creatures we are. It is for this reason, I think, that morality as a conceptual construct has its source in human relationships, and why it cannot be divorced from subjectivity.

As far as my own view of ethics is concerned, I am, broadly speaking, a utilitarian. Although I think utilitarianism, as a system, has its flaws (which I won’t go into in detail here) it does at least centre upon the goal of maximising happiness and minimising suffering (upon which the maximisation of happiness depends), which, in terms of the reality of our lives, seems to me to be a worthy goal, and one that takes subjectivity seriously. For one thing, without subjectivity, happiness would not be possible. We would have no reason to care about others, no reason or ability to feel compassion or empathy or love. These are the very things that inform our moral choices, and I believe that to deny the role of subjectivity in a moral system is as much as to say that any such system has as its end goal something other than human happiness.

There is, of course, a lot more to be said on this subject, but I think the above will serve as an adequate introduction to the thread, so for now I shall leave it open to comment.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

If all you say is true, then …

Imagine a person who honestly forms an opinion that slavery is justified, because (in their estimation) it tends to lead to the best consequences. What would you say to them? They have a different viewpoint from yours, but you have no rational way to distinguish your position from his. You can argue all day about how to calculate best consequences, but he always has a sensible answer.

If you were arguing about a fact, like whether the earth is round, then you could clearly appeal to some standard of truth. But when you’re arguing about a moral claim, it seems like neither you nor the slavery supporter can criticize each other’s views. At least, that’s what happens if you say that moral claims are not rooted in reality.

 

[wanstronian]

If all you say is true, then …

Imagine a person who honestly forms an opinion that slavery is justified, because (in their estimation) it tends to lead to the best consequences. What would you say to them? They have a different viewpoint from yours, but you have no rational way to distinguish your position from his. You can argue all day about how to calculate best consequences, but he always has a sensible answer.

If you were arguing about a fact, like whether the earth is round, then you could clearly appeal to some standard of truth. But when you’re arguing about a moral claim, it seems like neither you nor the slavery supporter can criticize each other’s views. At least, that’s what happens if you say that moral claims are not rooted in reality.

I completely agree with Sair’s conclusions. The advancement of morals throught the ages is testament to the fact that morals are rooted in the subjective opinion of the era.

If morals were entirely objective, then we would have had a situation in the US during the 18th century where the elite classes were knowlingly immoral in keeping slaves, but knowingly perpetuated evil.

What is far more likely is that in that less-enlightened age, negros were considered inferior and therefore it was not a breach of ‘human’ rights to keep them. This situation, distasteful and shocking as it is to us now, was clearly not so back then. So has objective morality changed since then? No, how could it, if it is objective and constant? But subjective morality clearly has, as we now understand that the colour of somebody’s skin is no differentiator.

So to take your example, you may not have an objective basis for/against slavery. That’s kind of the point Sair was making, I think. You would, however, have a rational basis for the argument, because the modern developed moral sense hasn’t abolished slavery on a whim, but because of a recognition that it subjugates our continually advancing concept of what constitutes human rights. However, if this view was held by only a tiny minority, with the majority believing it was okay to keep slaves, then we’d probably still have them. This minority view was undoubtedly the case at the beginning of the end of slavery in the US (and elsewhere, of course). There wasn’t a wholesale overnight adoption of new morality and a mass freeing of slaves. A few people pointed out the immorality of the situation, this opinion grew until it became ubiquitous. The same is true of voting rights for women - it’s unthinkable these days that women should not have the vote. But in our fairly recent past - and still so in some countries - this was absolutely the case.

I think that recorded history absolutely supports Sair’s point of view. Moreover, I have no doubt that our morality will evolve further over the next decades, until our descendants look back upon us as barbarians.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

But subjective morality clearly has, as we now understand that the colour of somebody’s skin is no differentiator.

Let me clarify. Do you mean:

a) But subjective morality clearly has, as we now understand that we now believe that the colour of somebody’s skin is no differentiator.

or

b) But subjective morality clearly has, as we now understand that the colour of somebody’s skin is actually no differentiator.

 

[hatsoff]

If all you say is true, then …

Imagine a person who honestly forms an opinion that slavery is justified, because (in their estimation) it tends to lead to the best consequences. What would you say to them? They have a different viewpoint from yours, but you have no rational way to distinguish your position from his. You can argue all day about how to calculate best consequences, but he always has a sensible answer.

If you were arguing about a fact, like whether the earth is round, then you could clearly appeal to some standard of truth. But when you’re arguing about a moral claim, it seems like neither you nor the slavery supporter can criticize each other’s views. At least, that’s what happens if you say that moral claims are not rooted in reality.

Yes, that is true. That’s just one reason why morality is such a tough cookie.

Perhaps we would like to be able to appeal to an objective standard, but unfortunately there exists no such standard. And that’s just the curveball life pitches us.

 

[Sair]

If all you say is true, then …

Imagine a person who honestly forms an opinion that slavery is justified, because (in their estimation) it tends to lead to the best consequences. What would you say to them? They have a different viewpoint from yours, but you have no rational way to distinguish your position from his. You can argue all day about how to calculate best consequences, but he always has a sensible answer.

If you were arguing about a fact, like whether the earth is round, then you could clearly appeal to some standard of truth. But when you’re arguing about a moral claim, it seems like neither you nor the slavery supporter can criticize each other’s views. At least, that’s what happens if you say that moral claims are not rooted in reality.

Ah, but it seems you missed the part where I asserted that morality is rooted in the reality of what humans are - sentient, subjective, social animals. In fact, I don’t think I can cite a completely objective reason to be against slavery in principle, especially if the hypothetical slavery supporter advocated treating the slaves with the utmost care and attention to their physical welfare. It may even be argued that said slaves were better off, as regards their physical health and longevity, being ‘owned’ than they would be if left to their own devices.

No, the argument I would pose to the hypothetical slavery supporter would be a subjective one - no less than the golden rule (or its negatively-phrased sister, the silver rule - don’t do unto others what you would not have done to yourself). If the slavery supporter were put in the position of being a slave, with its necessary consequences - not being able to choose what he would do from day to day, not having ownership of his own life, having to seek permission to form relationships, having to put his master’s needs ahead of his own or that of friends or family - I think it would be a relatively easy matter to make him understand why slavery is morally unacceptable, in subjective terms.

 

[stenlis]

However, my contention is that morality springs from and depends upon the experience of sentient beings - that morality is inextricably bound to subjectivity.

I disagree. Mathematics springs from the experience of sentient beings, but it’s not subjective. If you agree on the proposition (what is a ‘plane’, what is a ‘line’ and what is a ‘triangle’) than you logically must agree on the conclusions (the sum of the internal angles of the triangle is always 180 degrees).

I think there is a similar ‘objectivity’ to morals. If you think that stealing is alright (proposition) and you manage to enforce this notion in the society then you’ll live in a world where people can steal your things (conclusion). People might have different preferences about what kind of society they want to live in but the ways (or rules) to get to a particular kind of society are straight forward.

Then it all boils down to the question of whether by ‘morals’ you mean the preferences or the rules. If it’s the preferences then christians are subjectivists as well - because most of the would prefer to have sex before marriage if it did not violate the biblical rules.

 

[Thing]

Understanding that this subject has been addressed both directly and indirectly on several threads, but hoping that I can perhaps bring something new to the discussion, it is with some trepidation that I start this thread, as I’m aware that - appropriately, perhaps - passions tend to run high when it comes to morality.

I have given this quite a lot of thought recently, and I feel I can now post a fairly coherent summation of my beliefs in this regard - and for that I thank those who have challenged me to explain and clarify my ideas on other threads. Credit where credit is due, after all :tiphat:

So, on to the topic of the thread. A question that has come up indirectly on occasion is whether I am an ethical subjectivist, or a moral relativist. If by that is meant, do I think that any ethical system is as valid as any other, then no - I firmly believe any moral system must be able to prove its worth in terms of the observable and experiential consequences of adhering to it. If however, to be a moral relativist or ethical subjectivist means that I think the morality of actions is informed by subjectivity, and is relative to the circumstances in which any moral decision is made, then the answer must be yes.

I often find that people speak of objective morality as though morality is a thing that has an existence of its own, independent of sentient beings. Theists often believe that morality comes from the mind of God, and is therefore independent of human subjectivity. However, my contention is that morality springs from and depends upon the experience of sentient beings - that morality is inextricably bound to subjectivity.

Lest I be accused of meaning that there is no grounding for morality in the reality of life and human experience, I must emphatically point out that there are a few obvious factors that make morality necessary to us. There are things that are objectively harmful to our health and life, and there are likewise things that are objectively beneficial. It is likewise an objective fact that humans are, in general, wired for subjective experience - that’s just the way our brains work. It is, furthermore, objectively true that humans are social animals, with an innate need to form bonds with our own kind - not even the most misanthropic loner can get by completely independently of others. Given these facts, it is not difficult to see why morality is necessary - we have to be able to pursue harmonious relations with others, because of the kind of creatures we are. It is for this reason, I think, that morality as a conceptual construct has its source in human relationships, and why it cannot be divorced from subjectivity.

As far as my own view of ethics is concerned, I am, broadly speaking, a utilitarian. Although I think utilitarianism, as a system, has its flaws (which I won’t go into in detail here) it does at least centre upon the goal of maximising happiness and minimising suffering (upon which the maximisation of happiness depends), which, in terms of the reality of our lives, seems to me to be a worthy goal, and one that takes subjectivity seriously. For one thing, without subjectivity, happiness would not be possible. We would have no reason to care about others, no reason or ability to feel compassion or empathy or love. These are the very things that inform our moral choices, and I believe that to deny the role of subjectivity in a moral system is as much as to say that any such system has as its end goal something other than human happiness.

There is, of course, a lot more to be said on this subject, but I think the above will serve as an adequate introduction to the thread, so for now I shall leave it open to comment.

Would it be fair to say that a subjective morality is based on the individuals own particular view of reality; ie. each individual is the highest judge of what is moral based on how it benefits or detracts from that individual persons happiness?

 

[Thing]

I completely agree with Sair’s conclusions. The advancement of morals throught the ages is testament to the fact that morals are rooted in the subjective opinion of the era.

If morals were entirely objective, then we would have had a situation in the US during the 18th century where the elite classes were knowlingly immoral in keeping slaves, but knowingly perpetuated evil.

What is far more likely is that in that less-enlightened age, negros were considered inferior and therefore it was not a breach of ‘human’ rights to keep them. This situation, distasteful and shocking as it is to us now, was clearly not so back then. So has objective morality changed since then? No, how could it, if it is objective and constant? But subjective morality clearly has, as we now understand that the colour of somebody’s skin is no differentiator.

So to take your example, you may not have an objective basis for/against slavery. That’s kind of the point Sair was making, I think. You would, however, have a rational basis for the argument, because the modern developed moral sense hasn’t abolished slavery on a whim, but because of a recognition that it subjugates our continually advancing concept of what constitutes human rights. However, if this view was held by only a tiny minority, with the majority believing it was okay to keep slaves, then we’d probably still have them. This minority view was undoubtedly the case at the beginning of the end of slavery in the US (and elsewhere, of course). There wasn’t a wholesale overnight adoption of new morality and a mass freeing of slaves. A few people pointed out the immorality of the situation, this opinion grew until it became ubiquitous. The same is true of voting rights for women - it’s unthinkable these days that women should not have the vote. But in our fairly recent past - and still so in some countries - this was absolutely the case.

I think that recorded history absolutely supports Sair’s point of view. Moreover, I have no doubt that our morality will evolve further over the next decades, until our descendants look back upon us as barbarians.

In the interests of fairness;

Muslims Kidnap 107 Irish Villagers Date: 30 April 2009
It now features regularly on our television screens and causes havoc at worldwide airports, the ongoing threat of Islamic terrorism by fundamentalists and the recent kidnappings, among these Irish, teacher Brian Keenan and aid worker Margaret Hassan.

There is no doubt many of this country’s Muslims condemn these atrocities, but few realise that in the 17th century the biggest Islamic invasion to these Irish or UK shores kidnapped 107, mainly women and children. In the transatlantic slave trade to Britain and the Americas two out every three were men utilised as workers.

But to the Islamic world two out of every three slaves were women who were sent to harems for sexual pleasure and if there were male children, castrated and used as eunuchs in these harems also.The fate of the few men to brutalised galley slaves and quarry workers or tradesmen.

In the early hours of 20th June, 1631, an invasion force of pirates from Africa’s Barbary Coast, supported by Turkish soldiers in several ships stormed ashore at the quiet West Cork village of Baltimore, Ireland, killing several and abducting most of the villagers to be sold at slave markets.

Within a few hours 107 people, mostly women and children were herded like animals onto the beach and shipped away to a life of slavery and abuse in the notorious strongholds of Algiers.

When we watch movies like ‘Roots’, European and American slave traders immediately come to mind dragging African prisoners off to captivity.
But this was a story when the opposite happened with African slave traders sailing north to abduct white slaves.

On this quiet Sunday morning as the village lay sleeping, the invaders thrust blazing torches into thatched roofs, wielding scimitars and cursing the Infidel, the sight of bearded attackers in their flowing robes must have seemed like figures from a nightmare.

Entire families were torn apart. One man lost his wife and seven sons, another his pregnant wife and two children.

It’s quite likely that their descendants may live in North Africa today, as living proof of the greatest ever Islamist terror attack in this part of the western world, many years before 9/11 !!.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Ah, but it seems you missed the part where I asserted that morality is rooted in the reality of what humans are - sentient, subjective, social animals. In fact, I don’t think I can cite a completely objective reason to be against slavery in principle, especially if the hypothetical slavery supporter advocated treating the slaves with the utmost care and attention to their physical welfare. It may even be argued that said slaves were better off, as regards their physical health and longevity, being ‘owned’ than they would be if left to their own devices.

No, the argument I would pose to the hypothetical slavery supporter would be a subjective one - no less than the golden rule (or its negatively-phrased sister, the silver rule - don’t do unto others what you would not have done to yourself). If the slavery supporter were put in the position of being a slave, with its necessary consequences - not being able to choose what he would do from day to day, not having ownership of his own life, having to seek permission to form relationships, having to put his master’s needs ahead of his own or that of friends or family - I think it would be a relatively easy matter to make him understand why slavery is morally unacceptable, in subjective terms.

Let us take morality, then, as rooted in the reality of what humans are. My point would be – and perhaps you agree with me – that what humans are contains normative concepts, though we must rationally figure out what those concepts are. We may disagree about those concepts, but generally in such a conversation, one person is right and another wrong.

The golden rule has holes in it; it does not specify what a person should want. What if a person wants to be enslaved? Wouldn’t that make him, according to subjective morality, justified in enslaving others? What if a person wants to die? Does that give him a license to kill?

But, you might say, people don’t naturally want to die. But how do you defend such a claim?

It seems that you are talking about the reality of what humans should be, not the reality of what humans are.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Yes, that is true. That’s just one reason why morality is such a tough cookie.

I appreciate your honesty.

 

[R_Daneel]

The golden rule has holes in it; it does not specify what a person should want. What if a person wants to be enslaved? Wouldn’t that make him, according to subjective morality, justified in enslaving others? What if a person wants to die? Does that give him a license to kill?

Very good observation. That is why the Golden Rule should be supplemented by the **inverse **Golden Rule: “Do **not **do unto others, what you would **not **want them do onto you”. The two should form a pair as a basis for a good ethical system.

 

[Leela]

I disagree. Mathematics springs from the experience of sentient beings, but it’s not subjective. If you agree on the proposition (what is a ‘plane’, what is a ‘line’ and what is a ‘triangle’) than you logically must agree on the conclusions (the sum of the internal angles of the triangle is always 180 degrees).

I think there is a similar ‘objectivity’ to morals. If you think that stealing is alright (proposition) and you manage to enforce this notion in the society then you’ll live in a world where people can steal your things (conclusion). People might have different preferences about what kind of society they want to live in but the ways (or rules) to get to a particular kind of society are straight forward.

Then it all boils down to the question of whether by ‘morals’ you mean the preferences or the rules. If it’s the preferences then christians are subjectivists as well - because most of the would prefer to have sex before marriage if it did not violate the biblical rules.

Good point. I think a hard objective/subjective ontological distinction is problematic. Pragmatically, once we drop that idea I think what we are left with is a continuum of intersubjectivity. Objective then refers to whatever all competent observers who inquire will come to agreement about. If we allow that such objectivity may be possible for morals we avoid relativism without invoking claims to revealed knowledge of the Moral Law

Best,
Leela

 

[wanstronian]

Let me clarify. Do you mean:

a) But subjective morality clearly has, as we now understand that we now believe that the colour of somebody’s skin is no differentiator.

or

b) But subjective morality clearly has, as we now understand that the colour of somebody’s skin is actually no differentiator.

It depends on how existentialist, or rather solipsist, you want to get. To all intents and purposes, the latter.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

It depends on how existentialist, or rather solipsist, you want to get. To all intents and purposes, the latter.

OK, so you picked: But subjective morality clearly has [changed], as we now understand that the colour of somebody’s skin is actually no differentiator.

In this case, you (once again) may be saying one of two things:

1. That the statement “The colour of somebody’s skin is no differentiator” is true. If it is true, it is true objectively – by which I mean that it would be true for any possible person, not that it would be true if there were no people.

(By the way, all moral laws would be trivially true if no people existed, just as “All unicorns are not justified in torturing babies” – *ex falso quod libet *-- is trivially true in ours. But this is a peculiarity of standard logic).

1. You could be saying that “We now understand that the colour of somebody’s skin is not considered by the rational people around us to be a differentiator.” But this seems to be an instance of the populist fallacy.

So do you pick door one, or door two?

 

[Dyonisus]

I interpreted the purpose of the thread being a discussion of different subjective philosophies of morals.

Within this purpose, I’ve seen some criticisms of the subjective moral rule thus far presented, and wanted to offer something “new” to the discussion.

I see that there is a middle way out of this:

Why not assert what Immanuel Kant asserted, that morality is absolute, and that it is subjective in one sense, and not subjective in another?

It is subjective in the sense that morality arises from the wills of all people. If there is but one person, that person’s will determines absolutely morality for all people, by a universal maxim, a maxim that holds for all people.

This of course would mean that morality is not subjective in the sense that it is not dependent on the arbitrary will of any single person or group of people, but rather dependent on the existence of the will.

In this I don’t assert here that utilitarianism is wrong. I think it is wrong, but I don’t want to argue that. What I am arguing is that it is possible to construct an absolute moral framework completely from the existence of the will.

So morality is from God’s will, if God exists. It’s just as much from mine, and from yours, and from the wills of all people.

 

[AntiTheist]

If all you say is true, then …

Imagine a person who honestly forms an opinion that slavery is justified, because (in their estimation) it tends to lead to the best consequences. What would you say to them?

I’d say to them that they’re going to hve a pretty hard time owning slaves in 21st century America.

Now, essentially enslaving people (the working class) to corporations…that is possible. And many would argue that indeed such slavery leads to good consequences.

They have a different viewpoint from yours, but you have no rational way to distinguish your position from his. You can argue all day about how to calculate best consequences, but he always has a sensible answer.

That’s how it goes. Have you ever tried to actually argue with a racist, for example? They’ve always got an answer for everything. The problem is that they start from different premises. People like that are to be mocked and then ignored.

Stenlis:

Mathematics springs from the experience of sentient beings, but it’s not subjective.

Well, mathematics is the codification of demonstrable facts about the universe. If I have two computers and then buy two more, I have four computers. “2+2=4” is the label that we put on a demonstrable fact about the universe.

When we talk about morality, we’re not talking about demonstrable facts. Morals aren’t facts – they’re value judgments. They’re statements that we make about facts.

Sair:

there are a few obvious factors that make morality necessary to us.

We need to be clear about what we’re talking about here. There’s “morality” as in “the behaviors that humans exhibit that get labeled as ‘moral’ and that might serve a sociological/biological function” (empathy, kindness, cooperation, etc), and then there’s “morality” as in “absolute rules of conduct that do not depend on what humans think about them.”

“Morality” in the first sense obviously exists. “Morality” in the second sense does not. We don’t need some kind of “objective grounding” for treating each other nicely. Most people act nicely to others not out of obedience to some abstract rule, but out of their own values.

We also don’t need an “objective grounding” to morality to say that we don’t like some jerk who goes around making trouble for society.

 

[wanstronian]

OK, so you picked: But subjective morality clearly has [changed], as we now understand that the colour of somebody’s skin is actually no differentiator.

In this case, you (once again) may be saying one of two things:

1. That the statement “The colour of somebody’s skin is no differentiator” is true. If it is true, it is true objectively – by which I mean that it would be true for any possible person, not that it would be true if there were no people.

(By the way, all moral laws would be trivially true if no people existed, just as “All unicorns are not justified in torturing babies” – *ex falso quod libet *-- is trivially true in ours. But this is a peculiarity of standard logic).

1. You could be saying that “We now understand that the colour of somebody’s skin is not considered by the rational people around us to be a differentiator.” But this seems to be an instance of the populist fallacy.

So do you pick door one, or door two?

I pick door two, confirming what I said previously: that morals are subjective, and have undeniably and evidentially evolved over the course of documented history. If morality is subjective, then so are the moral ‘laws’ which are produced as a result. Perhaps you could explain what you mean by the Populist fallacy?

 

[stenlis]

Stenlis: Well, mathematics is the codification of demonstrable facts about the universe. If I have two computers and then buy two more, I have four computers. “2+2=4” is the label that we put on a demonstrable fact about the universe.

Yeah, and if you have one cloud and you add another two clouds to it, you’ll still have one cloud.

Just because you can use some parts of mathematics to describe some parts of the world, doesn’t mean that it isn’t conceptual only.

A mathematical statement is not validated by observation of the world. It is valid only if it can be derived from the axioms of the theory regardless of any real world demonstrations.

 

[John21652]

Perhaps we would like to be able to appeal to an objective standard, but unfortunately there exists no such standard. And that’s just the curveball life pitches us.

What about the Ten Commandments as objective morality?
Surely, the ten commandments are the standard.

As for Utilitarianism, well it is such a flawed set of ethics I am flabbergasted that Catholics would entertain it for a second. It is anti-Christian in so many ways and it has so many sub-branches it is almost an incoherent set of principles.

Subjective morality is a slippery slope of self justification for whatever standards of behaviour suit you at any given time.