Morality and Subjectivity

[tonyrey]

I assume you mean that since God’s nature is objectively good, he either cannot or will not command anything that is not also objectively good.

Since God is the source of all goodness it does not make sense to say that He
cannot or will not command anything that is not also objectively good.

When you say that God is objectively good, what objective standard for goodness are you applying?

The immense value of existence is a good starting point!

 

[tonyrey]

Reel him in slowly now…

It’s only a question of time before you’re dispatched for constantly making irrelevant comments…

 

[Leela]

Since God is the source of all goodness it does not make sense to say that He
cannot or will not command anything that is not also objectively good.

The triple negative has me very confused here. Can you restate your position?

The immense value of existence is a good starting point!

So you judge God to be objectively good by the standard of the “immense [objective?] value of existence”? I’m not sure I follow you. Is existence independent of God so that the objective value of existence can be used as a standard by which to judge God to be either good or bad? Is the value of existence really objective? Objective means that it is the same for everyone. Don’t some place a higher or lower value on existence?

 

[tonyrey]

Since God is the source of all goodness it does not make sense to say that He cannot or will not command anything that is not also objectively good.

You used a double negative:
“I assume you mean that since God’s nature is objectively good, he either **cannot **or will not command anything that is **not **also objectively good.” I simply added “it does not make sense”!
In other words goodness is not the result of a divine fiat but inherent in the divine nature. Moral laws are similar to physical laws in that respect. An analogy is that a parent tells the child what is good and evil but good and evil are not determined by what the parent thinks or decides. If we think of God as Love, i.e. creative, positive energy it is logically impossible for God to be evil, i.e. negative or destructive. Negativity is the result of finitude.

The immense value of existence is a good starting point!

So you judge God to be objectively good by the standard of the “immense [objective?] value of existence”? I’m not sure I follow you. Is existence independent of God so that the objective value of existence can be used as a standard by which to judge God to be either good or bad?

Not at all! Since God creates everything He sustains everything. He** is** existence! “In God we live, move and have our being”. God is infinitely good and therefore infinitely valuable.
Everything that is created is finite and therefore is good but has only a finite value - with one exception. A person, human or non-human, is infinitely valuable because he or she
is created in the image of God with the capacity for reason, emotion, choice and love.

Is the value of existence really objective? Objective means that it is the same for everyone.

The value of existence is fundamentally the same for everyone. That is why everyone has the **same **inalienable right to life. But since some obviously have more opportunities than others they have incidental values in addition to the fundamental value of life.

Don’t some place a higher or lower value on existence?

The value people place on existence is beside the point. Life does not cease to be valuable because some one rejects its value. It is still a source of opportunities for activity, development, pleasure, enjoyment and fulfilment even if that fact is not recognised. The very ability to reject the value of life and to kill oneself is valuable! That does not mean it is good to commit suicide (even though it may be the lesser of two evils) but, paradoxically, the power to choose to do so is good…

 

[Sair]

So the common humanity between the enslaved and the masters is the factual basis for the injustice of slavery. Whether it is recognised or not is beside the point.
Where does emotional experience come into the moral decision?

It is objectively true that both the slavers and the enslaved are members of the human species. That is a matter of cold, hard fact.

Where the emotional engagement comes in is when we go from merely observing the fact to caring about the implications of that fact - to recognising the suffering of fellow sentient beings. It’s the same kind of emotive response that leads many people to become vegetarian, or to shun factory-farmed meat and eggs. They recognise that other animals are subject to suffering, and care about it to the extent that they will act, even if that action is to simply opt out of participating in the situation that causes the suffering (conscientious objection).

A good explanation of the importance of emotional engagement is provided in Hauser’s article (linked in a previous post) where he talks about those people classified as psychopathic - it isn’t that they don’t intellectually know the difference between constructive, beneficial acts and destructive, malicious acts; it’s that they don’t care. They don’t engage with others on an emotional level, so it doesn’t matter to them if they cause someone else to suffer.

I tend towards the conclusion that it is our subjectivity that actually motivates our moral behaviour. Reason allows us to identify actions or situations as either beneficial or detrimental, but emotion is what makes us care enough to act.

 

[tonyrey]

So the common humanity between the enslaved and the masters is the factual basis for the injustice of slavery. Whether it is recognised or not is beside the point.

Prior to the emotional engagement there is another factor: the principle of equality. Even if we lack emotion it is unreasonable to deny that others have human rights simply because they are different. Of course if we are subjectivists and the ones who determine who has rights it is not unreasonable - and that is the weakness of subjectivism. The fact remains that all human beings are in the same existential boat. To regard oneself as the judge of who should be free and who should be slaves is preposterous. It reveals a preconceived notion of superiority which has no rational foundation. No one asked for, or deserves to have, life and freedom. So why should some be deprived of either through no fault of their own? Or merely because they have been born into slavery? Life is an immensely valuable gift for which we should be grateful and have reverence. That is the “cold, hard fact” which is the foundation of morality. We did not create ourselves so we have no obvious right to deprive others of a fundamental human need like freedom - unless we have no moral principles at all.

It’s the same kind of emotive response that leads many people to become vegetarian, or to shun factory-farmed meat and eggs. They recognise that other animals are subject to suffering, and care about it to the extent that they will act, even if that action is to simply opt out of participating in the situation that causes the suffering (conscientious objection).

Here again the emotion is based on the same rational consideration. The life of an animal is intrinsically valuable regardless of what we think. We did not create it nor can we replace it. So why should we regard ourselves as having absolute power over its fate? We should treat it with care and respect simply because it is unique, irreplaceable, endowed with purpose, feeling and needs like freedom.

A good explanation of the importance of emotional engagement is provided in Hauser’s article (linked in a previous post) where he talks about those people classified as psychopathic - it isn’t that they don’t intellectually know the difference between constructive, beneficial acts and destructive, malicious acts; it’s that they don’t care. They don’t engage with others on an emotional level, so it doesn’t matter to them if they cause someone else to suffer.

It is a mistake to regard all malice as pathological. It implies that whether you are good or evil is not a matter of choice but of chance - in the sense that it is determined by what sort of person you happen to be and the circumstances in which you were born.

I tend towards the conclusion that it is our subjectivity that actually motivates our moral behaviour. Reason allows us to identify actions or situations as either beneficial or detrimental, but emotion is what makes us care enough to act.

If that is true we are never responsible for our moral behaviour because our emotions are caused by the situation we are in! I think you need to clarify what you mean by “our subjectivity”. Do you identify it with emotion? Because our power of reason is also a part of our individuality.

 

[Sair]

Prior to the emotional engagement there is another factor: the principle of equality. Even if we lack emotion it is unreasonable to deny that others have human rights simply because they are different.

This is all part of the recognition of common humanity, which is a factual recognition. The slave owners back in the day assuaged their consciences (assuming they had them) by what amounted to special pleading - that the skin colour and the ‘primitive’, unchristian culture of the slaves rendered them less human than the white (hence more ‘pure’), christianised, more technologically advanced slave owners. They stood to gain a lot from doing this, in economic terms, and so were prepared to reason away any moral objections based on common humanity.

The fact remains that all human beings are in the same existential boat. To regard oneself as the judge of who should be free and who should be slaves is preposterous. It reveals a preconceived notion of superiority which has no rational foundation. No one asked for, or deserves to have, life and freedom. So why should some be deprived of either through no fault of their own? Or merely because they have been born into slavery?

How do we understand these things other than through empathy? If one is born into a world where slavery is the accepted norm, it is likely one has absorbed the reasoning behind it. Let’s take, for example, a social structure in which slavery or indentured labour are the result of nonpayment of debts, as opposed to based on the arbitrary distinction of skin colour. This is a little harder to argue against from a purely rational perspective - it could be said that the slaves brought it on themselves. What, other than empathy with the subjective experience of the slaves would mark this as immoral?

Subjective morality is not, by definition, arbitrary, as you seem to suggest. In essence, subjective morality as I understand it means that morality is based upon human faculties and experience, not accounted for by any externally-existing entity.

Here again the emotion is based on the same rational consideration. The life of an animal is intrinsically valuable regardless of what we think. We did not create it nor can we replace it. So why should we regard ourselves as having absolute power over its fate? We should treat it with care and respect simply because it is unique, irreplaceable, endowed with purpose, feeling and needs like freedom.

Unfortunately there are plenty of people in the world who assume that other animals’ lives are not valuable except in the sense that humans can make use of them. Such people tend to deny that animals are capable of suffering or of experiencing emotion, or to think that people’s desire to eat chicken every other day, for example, is enough to justify the mass suffering of factory-raised birds. More often than not, of course, people don’t think about the consequences of their consumer habits.

It is a mistake to regard all malice as pathological. It implies that whether you are good or evil is not a matter of choice but of chance - in the sense that it is determined by what sort of person you happen to be and the circumstances in which you were born.
If that is true we are never responsible for our moral behaviour because our emotions are caused by the situation we are in! I think you need to clarify what you mean by “our subjectivity”. Do you identify it with emotion? Because our power of reason is also a part of our individuality.

Certainly not all malice is pathological - some people commit malicious acts because they really feel that way, really want to inflict harm upon another. In the case of the psychopath, at least as indicated in Hauser’s article, they don’t have the empathic response that enables them to care about the suffering of others, a response that might give a psychologically healthy person pause before they act to hurt someone.

I think it’s a mistake to speak of reason and emotion as if they are entirely separate faculties, rather than considering the human mind as an integrated whole, each aspect affecting the others. Certainly in terms of morality, I don’t think our moral judgements are based either entirely on reason or entirely on emotion, but are dependent on the interplay between the two. I regard ‘subjectivity’ as the entirety of what we experience as human animals, and subjective morality, therefore, as a product of the way we engage with our environment (which includes, of course, other people); as opposed to what I’ve often heard touted as ‘objective’ morality, ie: a moral ‘law’ subsisting as a discoverable, observable aspect of the universe, independent of sentient experience.

 

[tonyrey]

Prior to the emotional engagement there is another factor: the principle of equality. Even if we lack emotion it is unreasonable to deny that others have human rights simply because they are different.

Indeed. Without reason morality cannot exist…

To regard oneself as the judge of who should be free and who should be slaves is preposterous. It reveals a preconceived notion of superiority which has no rational foundation. No one asked for, or deserves to have, life and freedom. So why should some be deprived of either through no fault of their own? Or merely because they have been born into slavery? How do we understand these things other than through empathy? If one is born into a world where slavery is the accepted norm, it is likely one has absorbed the reasoning behind it.

Faulty reasoning! In other words one is being unreasonable! Empathy is not required to understand or establish that fact.

Let’s take, for example, a social structure in which slavery or indentured labour are the result of nonpayment of debts, as opposed to based on the arbitrary distinction of skin colour. This is a little harder to argue against from a purely rational perspective - it could be said that the slaves brought it on themselves. What, other than empathy with the subjective experience of the slaves would mark this as immoral?

The simple fact that a human being is not a chattel that can be bought or sold but a person whose objective value is not conferred by an individual or society.

Subjective morality is not, by definition, arbitrary, as you seem to suggest. In essence, subjective morality as I understand it means that morality is based upon human faculties and experience, not accounted for by any externally-existing entity.

If morality is based upon human faculties and experience it is objective because the faculties are objective facts not subjective opinions.

Here again the emotion is based on the same rational consideration. The life of an animal is intrinsically valuable regardless of what we think. We did not create it nor can we replace it. So why should we regard ourselves as having absolute power over its fate? We should treat it with care and respect simply because it is unique, irreplaceable, endowed with purpose, feeling and needs like freedom.

Unfortunately there are plenty of people in the world who assume that other animals’ lives are not valuable except in the sense that humans can make use of them. Such people tend to deny that animals are capable of suffering or of experiencing emotion, or to think that people’s desire to eat chicken every other day, for example, is enough to justify the mass suffering of factory-raised birds. More often than not, of course, people don’t think about the consequences of their consumer habits.

We agree that this exploitation of animals is unreasonable and unjust. The sense of fairness is deeply ingrained into our nature because we are fundamentally rational, moral beings.

It is a mistake to regard all malice as pathological. It implies that whether you are good or evil is not a matter of choice but of chance - in the sense that it is determined by what sort of person you happen to be and the circumstances in which you were born.
If that is true we are never responsible for our moral behaviour because our emotions are caused by the situation we are in! I think you need to clarify what you mean by “our subjectivity”. Do you identify it with emotion? Because our power of reason is also a part of our individuality.

Certainly not all malice is pathological - some people commit malicious acts because they really feel that way, really want to inflict harm upon another. In the case of the psychopath, at least as indicated in Hauser’s article, they don’t have the empathic response that enables them to care about the suffering of others, a response that might give a psychologically healthy person pause before they act to hurt someone.

The difficulty again arises that if people commit malicious acts solely because of their feelings and desires they are not responsible for what they do. The element of choice is absent.

I think it’s a mistake to speak of reason and emotion as if they are entirely separate faculties, rather than considering the human mind as an integrated whole, each aspect affecting the others. Certainly in terms of morality, I don’t think our moral judgements are based either entirely on reason or entirely on emotion, but are dependent on the interplay between the two.

There is certainly interplay but I believe morality is primarily rational rather than emotional. This is certainly how a person on trial is regarded because emotion is not a foundation for responsibility.

I regard ‘subjectivity’ as the entirety of what we experience as human animals, and subjective morality, therefore, as a product of the way we engage with our environment (which includes, of course, other people); as opposed to what I’ve often heard touted as ‘objective’ morality, ie: a moral ‘law’ subsisting as a discoverable, observable aspect of the universe, independent of sentient experience.

Morality obviously cannot exist without personality! It presupposes an intellect which recognises the difference between good and evil. We cannot assume that we are the only rational beings. To do so gives us a false perspective of good and evil. The distinction is not invented or imagined by us. If unnecessary suffering occurs it occurs regardless of what we think and if it is unnecessary it is evil regardless of when or where it happens. Why is it evil? Because the purpose of life is not to suffer unnecessarily but to develop and enjoy all that life offers…

 

[Betterave]

Faulty reasoning! In other words one is being unreasonable! Empathy is not required to understand or establish that fact.

[vs.]

There is certainly interplay but I believe morality is primarily rational rather than emotional. This is certainly how a person on trial is regarded because emotion is not a foundation for responsibility.

Hi Tony. It strikes me that there is some tension between these statements.

The simple fact that a human being is not a chattel that can be bought or sold but a person whose objective value is not conferred by an individual or society.

But this is simply not a fact in many cases, right? The simple fact is that human beings can be bought and sold in some circumstances. By definition such human beings are chattels, are they not? (One definition of “chattel” actually just is slave, bondman.)

If morality is based upon human faculties and experience it is objective because the faculties are objective facts not subjective opinions.

Perhaps you could rephrase thusly:
If morality is based upon human faculties and experience it is objective** to the extent that** these faculties are objective facts [phenomena?] not subjective opinions .

 

[Betterave]

I assume you mean that since God’s nature is objectively good, he either cannot or will not command anything that is not also objectively good.

When you say that God is objectively good, what objective standard for goodness are you applying?

This reminds me of Wittgenstein’s comments on the standard meter. How do we know that the standard meter in Paris is one meter long?

 

[Biggie]

Jumping in late. My offering - if no God, then subjectivity follows since the human rationale has no superior. If God exists, morality must be objective, because if God exists a higher will exists. That will becomes a rationale for those subordinate to it. The difficulty then becomes knowing that will.

I think an individual’s answer as to objective morality must therefore be a two stage answer. Does one believe God exists? Then, how can I know his will.

I also think the knowledge of God’s will becomes confused with the subjectivity of morality when the actual problem is the potential subjectivity of knowledge even if one accepts the existence of God and the objective moral standard that implies.

 

[tonyrey]

**Faulty reasoning! In other words one is being unreasonable! **

Not if we consider that human beings vary their responses to moral issues! Some are more emotional than others and rely on intuition - at least to begin with. Others are more logical in their approach although that does not mean emotion is totally absent. The main point is that morality has a rational foundation. The immense value of life stems from the fact that it is a source of opportunities for development, creativity, enjoyment and fulfilment.

The simple fact that a human being is not a chattel that can be bought or sold but a person whose objective value is not conferred by an individual or society.

But this is simply not a fact in many cases, right? The simple fact is that human beings can be bought and sold in some circumstances. By definition such human beings are chattels, are they not? (One definition of “chattel” actually just is slave, bondman.)

I meant that **from a civilised point of view **a human being is not a chattel! I took it for granted that everyone on this forum shares that view.

If morality is based upon human faculties and experience it is objective because the faculties are objective facts not subjective opinions.

Perhaps you could rephrase thusly:
If morality is based upon human faculties and experience it is objective** to the extent that** these faculties are objective facts [phenomena?] not subjective opinions *. * Your qualification is more accurate to the extent that it allows for differences of moral opinion! But would you agree that when people differ about what is right or wrong some must be mistaken? Otherwise we are all morally infallible!!

 

[Betterave]

Not if we consider that human beings vary their responses to moral issues! Some are more emotional than others and rely on intuition - at least to begin with. Others are more logical in their approach although that does not mean emotion is totally absent. The main point is that morality has a rational foundation. The immense value of life stems from the fact that it is a source of opportunities for development, creativity, enjoyment and fulfilment.

So empathy is or is not required?

I meant that **from a civilised point of view **a human being is not a chattel! I took it for granted that everyone on this forum shares that view.

Hmmm… “civilized point of view” seems to mean “our point of view” here (not its usual meaning ). I think it’s obvious that many highly civilized societies have accepted slavery in various forms.

Your qualification is more accurate to the extent that it allows for differences of moral opinion! But would you agree that when people differ about what is right or wrong some must be mistaken? Otherwise we are all morally infallible!!

I’m not sure if I’d want to agree to the claim that someone must be mistaken if there is a moral disagreement - the meaning of this claim and your grounds for making it are not clear to me, and I think I’d still prefer to qualify it with some sort of “to the extent that” clause. Do you have positive grounds to offer by which we can see the necessity of characterizing one or the other of your disputants as “mistaken”; or just “otherwise…”-type reasoning, which might not be so persuasive on its own?

 

[Betterave]

I completely agree with Sair’s conclusions. The advancement of morals throught the ages is testament to the fact that morals are rooted in the subjective opinion of the era.

If morals were entirely objective, then…

If we say that the roots of morality are in subjective opinion, we have identified the soil out of which morality grows - we have not identified what morality is, whether as to its roots or to its full blooming.

Is there anyone who claims that “morals are entirely objective”? What would this even mean?

 

[Betterave]

If however, to be a moral relativist or ethical subjectivist means that I think the morality of actions is informed by subjectivity, and is relative to the circumstances in which any moral decision is made, then the answer must be yes.

(As any good Catholic’s answer should be.)

I often find that people speak of objective morality as though morality is a thing that has an existence of its own, independent of sentient beings.

Who are these people? Do they believe that God is not a sentient being?

Theists often believe that morality comes from the mind of God, and is [not(?)] therefore independent of human subjectivity [which also comes from that same mind of God(?)].

Don’t theists usually believe that human subjectivity also comes from the mind of God? And in this case they would be committing a non sequitur by holding the belief you describe (of course it might just be that you are committing a straw man).

However, my contention is that morality springs from and depends upon the experience of sentient beings - that morality is inextricably bound to subjectivity.

And who could seriously dispute such a contention?

 

[Sair]

If we say that the roots of morality are in subjective opinion, we have identified the soil out of which morality grows - we have not identified what morality is, whether as to its roots or to its full blooming.

Is there anyone who claims that “morals are entirely objective”? What would this even mean?

Claims that I have seen made - and I’m not asserting that these are necessarily Catholic claims, by any means - are that objective morality means a set of rules established by God (the Ten Commandments, for starters) that are objective principally because they are laid down by a being who is presumed to be external to humans. Ergo, what humans feel or desire or need is not the basis for moral action - the rules are. It is this interpretation of objective - meaning ‘external to humans’ - as applied to morality, that I am principally arguing against in my OP.

Another claim regarding the objectivity of morality is that emotions - the popular interpretation of ‘subjectivity’ - should not enter into moral decisions. This is one of the aforementioned flaws that I find in utilitarian systems of ethics. If one is to do the greatest good for the greatest number, it may be necessary to set aside personal feelings, and this is not something that generally comes easily to people. Peter Singer, one of the great utilitarian philosophers of our times, was faced with exactly this dilemma when obtaining care for an aged and infirm parent: if the money had been spent elsewhere, it may have done more good for more people, who may have stood to benefit from treatment, rather than mere palliative care. However, to most people’s feelings, I suspect, it would seem monstrous to be in a position to help one’s elderly parent and then not do so. Even for Peter Singer, emotions won the day.

As an aside, I must say that I am quite encouraged by some of the responses on this thread. It seems that it may indeed be possible to find some common ground between theistic and atheistic interpretations of morality - if we can get past the debate over the source of moral action, we may find out that we all arrive at much the same place.

 

[Sair]

Found a very good article that I think helps clarify some of the issues raised in this thread.

instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/subjective_objective.html

It’s called ‘Thinking Critically About the Subjective-Objective Distinction’, and I found that it cleared a lot of things up for me.

 

[tonyrey]

[

Some are more emotional than others and rely on intuition - at least to begin with. Others are more logical in their approach although that does not mean emotion is totally absent. The main point is that morality has a rational foundation. The immense value of life stems from the fact that it is a source of opportunities for development, creativity, enjoyment and fulfilment.

Empathy is an inevitable consequence of being a fully developed person.

I meant that **from a civilised point of view **

a human being is not a chattel! I took it for granted that everyone on this forum shares that view. Hmmm… “civilized point of view” seems to mean “our point of view” here (not its usual meaning ). I think it’s obvious that many highly civilized societies have accepted slavery in various forms.

Again I take it for granted that a more civilised point of view is that which we have reached in our present society with the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Some of the societies which accepted slavery were highly civilised but less enlightened. Otherwise there has been no moral progress…

Your qualification is more accurate to the extent that it allows for differences of moral opinion! But would you agree that when people differ about what is right or wrong some must be mistaken? Otherwise we are all morally infallible!!

I’m not sure if I’d want to agree to the claim that someone must be mistaken if there is a moral disagreement - the meaning of this claim and your grounds for making it are not clear to me, and I think I’d still prefer to qualify it with some sort of “to the extent that” clause. Do you have positive grounds to offer by which we can see the necessity of characterizing one or the other of your disputants as “mistaken”; or just “otherwise…”-type reasoning, which might not be so persuasive on its own?
I’m sure you would agree that if there is moral disagreement about whether we should kill people for entertainment someone is mistaken! How would you prove the Romans were mistaken? I take this extreme case to illustrate that morality is not simply a matter of opinion. Disagreement does not entail moral relativity. If we determined what is right or wrong we would be morally infallible! Do you really believe that?

 

[tonyrey]

Betterave;6045663:

[

Some are more emotional than others and rely on intuition - at least to begin with. Others are more logical in their approach although that does not mean emotion is totally absent. The main point is that morality has a rational foundation. The immense value of life stems from the fact that it is a source of opportunities for development, creativity, enjoyment and fulfilment.

So empathy is or is not required? Empathy is an inevitable consequence of being a fully developed person.

I meant that **from a civilised point of view **

a human being is not a chattel! I took it for granted that everyone on this forum shares that view. Hmmm… “civilized point of view” seems to mean “our point of view” here (not its usual meaning ). I think it’s obvious that many highly civilized societies have accepted slavery in various forms.Again I take it for granted that a more civilised point of view is that which we have reached in our present society with the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Some of the societies which accepted slavery were highly civilised but less enlightened. Otherwise there has been no moral progress…

Your qualification is more accurate to the extent that it allows for differences of moral opinion! But would you agree that when people differ about what is right or wrong some must be mistaken? Otherwise we are all morally infallible!!

I’m not sure if I’d want to agree to the claim that someone must be mistaken if there is a moral disagreement - the meaning of this claim and your grounds for making it are not clear to me, and I think I’d still prefer to qualify it with some sort of “to the extent that” clause. Do you have positive grounds to offer by which we can see the necessity of characterizing one or the other of your disputants as “mistaken”; or just “otherwise…”-type reasoning, which might not be so persuasive on its own?I’m sure you would agree that if there is moral disagreement about whether we should kill people for entertainment someone must be mistaken! How would you prove the Romans were mistaken? I take this extreme case to illustrate that morality is not simply a matter of opinion. Disagreement does not entail moral relativity. If we determined what is right or wrong we would be morally infallible! Do you really believe that?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

I pick door two, confirming what I said previously: that morals are subjective, and have undeniably and evidentially evolved over the course of documented history. If morality is subjective, then so are the moral ‘laws’ which are produced as a result. Perhaps you could explain what you mean by the Populist fallacy?

Delayed response…

The populist fallacy says that whatever rational people agree on must be true. But, to be honest, I’m not sure you’re committing it, unless you really think that the color of a person’s skin is an arbitrary reason to discriminate. It you just feel bad about racism, and other people feel bad too, then you’re rationally off the hook. But if you really want to say that it *is *bad (in any meaningful sense) to oppress people, then you’ve got a logical inconsistency.