Morality and Subjectivity

[Betterave]

Betterave;6045663:

Empathy is an inevitable consequence of being a fully developed person.

Okay, but again, do you want to say that empathy is just a consequence…? Or an essential element in being and becoming a fully developed (moral) person?

Again I take it for granted that a more civilised point of view is that which we have reached in our present society with the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Some of the societies which accepted slavery were highly civilised but less enlightened. Otherwise there has been no moral progress…

I think moral progress is very difficult to gauge. There may be facts about the matter, but they tend not to be “simple” facts. (I think here of Aristotle’s comment that the point of ethics is to become good, not to know about goodness.)

I’m sure you would agree that if there is moral disagreement about whether we should kill people for entertainment someone must be mistaken! How would you prove the Romans were mistaken? I take this extreme case to illustrate that morality is not simply a matter of opinion. Disagreement does not entail moral relativity. If we determined what is right or wrong we would be morally infallible! Do you really believe that?

I tend to reserve the term “mistaken” for occasions where someone has explicitly taken things to be a certain way but has made an error. I think that if everyone just accepts a certain practice and no one ever thinks about it and takes it to be morally good, then there is no actual mistake being made. If it never occurs to someone that her view is mistaken, and this is not the result of her simply ignoring those around her to whom she should have listened, then we are mistaken if we call her mistaken - she is just ignorant (just as all of us are in many ways). I think Sair, at least, agrees with you that morality is not simply a matter of opinion (there are others here who seem to be less reasonable), and also that disagreement does not entail moral relativism. As for myself, of course I don’t believe people are morally infallible. (Give me some credit!)

 

[Betterave]

Found a very good article that I think helps clarify some of the issues raised in this thread.

instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/subjective_objective.html

It’s called ‘Thinking Critically About the Subjective-Objective Distinction’, and I found that it cleared a lot of things up for me.

May I ask for some details about what it cleared up for you? Have you realized that you’re a moral objectivist after all? (That had seemed to me to be the case even before reading the article.)

Quite a nice article, btw. I’d certainly recommend it for certain dogmatic moral subjectivists that I’ve dialogued with on this forum. (Not that I’m confident they would be persuaded.)

 

[Sair]

May I ask for some details about what it cleared up for you? Have you realized that you’re a moral objectivist after all? (That had seemed to me to be the case even before reading the article.)

Quite a nice article, btw. I’d certainly recommend it for certain dogmatic moral subjectivists that I’ve dialogued with on this forum. (Not that I’m confident they would be persuaded.)

I must say I probably was one of those who had a simplistic understanding of objective and subjective as just being opposites.

Having read that article, however, I think I’m right in saying that morality is metaphysically subjective (existing through experience) but epistemologically objective (in that we have more than just our own experience to consult, and can reach consensus on certain ethical concepts).

 

[Sair]

I’m sure you would agree that if there is moral disagreement about whether we should kill people for entertainment someone must be mistaken! How would you prove the Romans were mistaken? I take this extreme case to illustrate that morality is not simply a matter of opinion. Disagreement does not entail moral relativity. If we determined what is right or wrong we would be morally infallible! Do you really believe that?

It occurs to me that your use of an extreme example to illustrate the point about moral opinion is problematic.

We are talking here about very grave matter indeed, and as such there is less room to prevaricate. It’s clear that real harm is going to be done to the potential victim, and a case could be made for it being harmful to the observers as well, in terms of brutalising their senses. I guess what I’m saying is that the consequences of making a ‘wrong’ moral decision in this instance are very serious, a matter of objective damage.

However, I don’t think this principle of “I’m right, you’re wrong” can be made to apply all the way down the ladder of possible moral choices. In cases where it’s not clear that harm is being done, how does one determine the right of a moral choice? Religious prohibitions about certain sexual acts are a good example, as are the multifarious rules observed by Orthodox Jews - in this case, if one does not believe in a god who will be offended by one’s action or inaction, whence the impetus for the moral decision? I remember my brother telling me once, when he was doing a course in theology in preparation for a job as a religious education teacher, about the numerous mortal sins a priest could commit in the act of saying mass - such things as stepping up the altar steps with the wrong foot first, or handling the host incorrectly, and the like. These were classified as mortal sins - but surely we’re not talking about grave matter here?

It seems obvious to me that there are many instances in which there just isn’t a clear-cut reason for choosing one action over another, and that it comes down to personal preference or belief. I’m aware that this is the kind of remark that often draws derisive accusations of moral relativism, but there it is.

 

[tonyrey]

[

I’m sure you would agree that if there is moral disagreement about whether we should kill people for entertainment someone must be mistaken! How would you prove the Romans were mistaken? I take this extreme case to illustrate that morality is not simply a matter of opinion. Disagreement does not entail moral relativity. If we determined what is right or wrong we would be morally infallible! Do you really believe that?

I think your use of the term “prevaricate” gives the game away! Moral issues may be about less serious issues but are not insignificant. Where do we draw the line? It is the thin end of the wedge if children are taught that deception and theft on a small scale don’t matter. Either such actions are right or wrong.
It is also clear that in every moral issue there is the risk of objective damage - which you have rightly pointed out - of the physical, psychological and spiritual effects on everyone. Morality is not a luxury but a necessity for personal and social development and harmony.

However, I don’t think this principle of “I’m right, you’re wrong” can be made to apply all the way down the ladder of possible moral choices. In cases where it’s not clear that harm is being done, how does one determine the right of a moral choice?

The Church teaches that our ultimate authority is our conscience. We are not morally infallible but we cannot spend our lives passing the buck. Ignorance is no excuse for inaction - which, as Sartre observed, is a form of commitment. A woman faced with the problem of whether to have an abortion has to decide for herself in the end whether it is justified or not but she also has to consider the teaching of the Church, the law of her country, the opinions of others and, above all, the rights of the unborn child.

Religious prohibitions about certain sexual acts are a good example, as are the multifarious rules observed by Orthodox Jews - in this case, if one does not believe in a god who will be offended by one’s action or inaction, whence the impetus for the moral decision? I remember my brother telling me once, when he was doing a course in theology in preparation for a job as a religious education teacher, about the numerous mortal sins a priest could commit in the act of saying mass - such things as stepping up the altar steps with the wrong foot first, or handling the host incorrectly, and the like. These were classified as mortal sins - but surely we’re not talking about grave matter here?

Legalistic attitudes persist in religion as in other walks of life but it is going to the other extreme to regard the details of important ceremonies as insignificant. Care and precision often reflect the pursuit of perfection - which tends to be neglected in modern society. We have to strike a balance between scrupulosity and decadence in every walk of life. All the great artists, composers, scientists and saints had self-discipline in their vocation - although not always in other respects!

It seems obvious to me that there are many instances in which there just isn’t a clear-cut reason for choosing one action over another, and that it comes down to personal preference or belief. I’m aware that this is the kind of remark that often draws derisive accusations of moral relativism, but there it is.

You are dead right! It is a misguided criticism which overlooks the fact that we exist precisely in order to choose what to believe and how to live…

 

[Sair]

I think your use of the term “prevaricate” gives the game away!

That may not have been the best choice of term for my intent - I had meant to say merely to-ing and fro-ing over the decision; however, on reflection, ‘prevaricate’ may have been an appropriate term in the context - I suspect anyone who thinks killing and maiming are justified for entertainment purposes is evading a few home truths, don’t you?

Moral issues may be about less serious issues but are not insignificant. Where do we draw the line? It is the thin end of the wedge if children are taught that deception and theft on a small scale don’t matter. Either such actions are right or wrong.

This is beginning to get into the territory where it makes a big difference if you believe morality is black-and-white or shades of grey. Part of the point in my previous post was that some actions, by their nature, have more serious consequences than others. It’s difficult to imagine how one could commit murder on a small scale! However, if we take an action like theft, is such a thing permissible in order to prevent a worse consequence - for example, the old favourite of the man stealing bread to feed his family? This is where moral relativism, in a very real sense, comes into play. The morality of an action is often relative to the circumstances in which that action is performed. It’s one thing to say that ‘theft is wrong’, but quite another to insist that it is to be avoided at all costs, even starvation. In the 18th century, the British legal system took a very black-and-white view of such matters, and tended to hang people for theft over a certain monetary value (something like two shillings, if I recall correctly). Social reformers objected to this on the grounds that if the punishment was the same for a relatively minor offence as for a major crime, what was there to prevent the thief from committing murder as well? The penalty couldn’t be any worse, and the murder might serve to prevent the discovery of the theft! Of the gravity of actions, of the degrees of harm to be caused or averted, there is clearly a sliding scale.

It is also clear that in every moral issue there is the risk of objective damage - which you have rightly pointed out - of the physical, psychological and spiritual effects on everyone. Morality is not a luxury but a necessity for personal and social development and harmony.

I guess we then have the problem of deciding what constitute moral decisions and what are simply decisions. There are situations where it is by no means clear that any harm is being done. Let’s take the case of a husband and wife who engage in nonprocreative sexual acts, for example, as part of their normal marital intercourse. Is this a moral issue? I understand that the church teaches that every sexual act must be open to procreation, and that foreplay is morally suspect, at best, and a mortal sin at worst. But it is not obvious who stands to be harmed in such a case, nor what precisely the harm is.

Legalistic attitudes persist in religion as in other walks of life but it is going to the other extreme to regard the details of important ceremonies as insignificant. Care and precision often reflect the pursuit of perfection - which tends to be neglected in modern society. We have to strike a balance between scrupulosity and decadence in every walk of life. All the great artists, composers, scientists and saints had self-discipline in their vocation - although not always in other respects!

Certainly perfectionism has its place, and is to be commended. But is it really a matter of morality? I find it difficult to comprehend how, for example - in the case of the priest saying mass - using the wrong hand to pick up the host should be considered on a level with rape and murder, to be classified as mortal sin.

 

[Leela]

This reminds me of Wittgenstein’s comments on the standard meter. How do we know that the standard meter in Paris is one meter long?

Exactly. It is one meter long simply because we define it to be one meter.

When a Christian says that God is good, do they mean anything more than to define good as being what God is like? Or do they mean to be describing God as good? Is saying God is good supposed to say something about God or about goodness or is it a meaning less tautology.

 

[tonyrey]

            Moral issues may be about less serious issues but are not insignificant. Where do we draw the line? It is the thin end of the wedge if children are taught that deception and theft on a small scale don't matter. Either such actions are right or wrong.

I interpret moral relativism to mean relative to an individual rather than circumstances, i.e. the individual decides what is right or wrong regardless of what others believe and is a law unto himself.

In the 18th century, the British legal system took a very black-and-white view of such matters, and tended to hang people for theft over a certain monetary value (something like two shillings, if I recall correctly). Social reformers objected to this on the grounds that if the punishment was the same for a relatively minor offence as for a major crime, what was there to prevent the thief from committing murder as well? The penalty couldn’t be any worse, and the murder might serve to prevent the discovery of the theft! Of the gravity of actions, of the degrees of harm to be caused or averted, there is clearly a sliding scale.

I agree.

It is also clear that in every moral issue there is the risk of objective damage - which you have rightly pointed out - of the physical, psychological and spiritual effects on everyone. Morality is not a luxury but a necessity for personal and social development and harmony.

I guess we then have the problem of deciding what constitute moral

decisions and what are simply decisions. There are situations where it is by no means clear that any harm is being done.Whether decisions are moral or not is not really important. What matters is whether they are reasonable or unreasonable. There is good reason to think morality is based on rational principles. Can we do what is right if we behave unreasonably?

Even though there are situations where no obvious harm is done - as in the case of petty theft - we may find ourselves on a slippery slope. It is easy to make excuses and gradually become too lax. Probably all criminals start with small offences… The safest principle is to be a person with principles! And that means having to draw a line somewhere… in advance.

Let’s take the case of a husband and wife who engage in nonprocreative sexual acts, for example, as part of their normal marital intercourse. Is this a moral issue? I understand that the church teaches that every sexual act must be open to procreation, and that foreplay is morally suspect, at best, and a mortal sin at worst. But it is not obvious who stands to be harmed in such a case, nor what precisely the harm is.

I have always understood that sex is regarded by the Church as a beautiful gift and a deep expression of love which unites a couple both physically and spiritually. That is why promiscuity is harmful and degrading. It puts pleasure before commitment and lasting happiness. Sex only becomes sinful if it entails perversion and selfishness. It is unnatural for a couple not to have children but they are justified in choosing the most appropriate time because it is one of the most important decisions we ever have to make. If they are desperately poor they are entitled not to have any children…

Legalistic attitudes persist in religion as in other walks of life but it is going to the other extreme to regard the details of important ceremonies as insignificant. Care and precision often reflect the pursuit of perfection - which tends to be neglected in modern society. We have to strike a balance between scrupulosity and decadence in every walk of life. All the great artists, composers, scientists and saints had self-discipline in their vocation - although not always in other respects!

Certainly perfectionism has its place, and is to be commended. But is it really a matter of morality? I find it difficult to comprehend how, for example - in the case of the priest saying mass - using the wrong hand to pick up the host should be considered on a level with rape and murder, to be classified as mortal sin.

As always it depends on the priest’s intention and attitude. Why did he use the left hand? If he is left-handed it is an understandable mistake. If it is through carelessness it is obviously not a serious sin. If it is to assert his lack of concern, after it has been pointed out to him, that is obviously a different matter. Since celebrating Mass is the greatest privilege a person can have it is not an event to be taken lightly. In some cultures the left hand is regarded as unclean. That is an indication that the Church’s rule is not arbitrary…

 

[tonyrey]

Moral issues may be about less serious issues but are not insignificant. Where do we draw the line? It is the thin end of the wedge if children are taught that deception and theft on a small scale don’t matter. Either such actions are right or wrong.

I interpret moral relativism to mean relative to an individual rather than circumstances, i.e. the individual decides what is right or wrong regardless of what others believe and is a law unto himself.

 In the 18th century, the British legal system took a very black-and-white view of such matters, and tended to hang people for theft over a certain monetary value (something like two shillings, if I recall correctly). Social reformers objected to this on the grounds that if the punishment was the same for a relatively minor offence as for a major crime, what was there to prevent the thief from committing murder as well? The penalty couldn't be any worse, and the murder might serve to prevent the discovery of the theft! Of the gravity of actions, of the degrees of harm to be caused or averted, there is clearly a sliding scale.

I agree.

It is also clear that in every moral issue there is the risk of objective damage - which you have rightly pointed out - of the physical, psychological and spiritual effects on everyone. Morality is not a luxury but a necessity for personal and social development and harmony.

          I guess we then have the problem of deciding what constitute *moral* decisions and what are simply decisions. There are situations where it is by no means clear that any harm is being done.

Whether decisions are moral or not is not really important. What matters is whether they are reasonable or unreasonable. There is good reason to think morality is based on rational principles. Can we do what is right if we behave unreasonably?
Even though there are situations where no obvious harm is done - as in the case of petty theft - we may find ourselves on a slippery slope. It is easy to make excuses and gradually become too lax. Probably all criminals start with small offences… The safest principle is to be a person with principles! And that means having to draw a line somewhere… in advance.

   Let's take the case of a husband and wife who engage in nonprocreative sexual acts, for example, as part of their normal marital intercourse. Is this a moral issue? I understand that the church teaches that *every* sexual act must be open to procreation, and that foreplay is morally suspect, at best, and a mortal sin at worst. But it is not obvious who stands to be harmed in such a case, nor what precisely the harm is.

I have always understood that sex is regarded by the Church as a beautiful gift and a deep expression of love which unites a couple both physically and spiritually. That is why promiscuity is harmful and degrading. It puts pleasure before commitment and lasting happiness. Sex becomes sinful only if it entails perversion and selfishness. It is unnatural for a couple not to have children but they are justified in choosing the most appropriate circumstances because it is one of the most important decisions they ever have to make. If they are desperately poor they are entitled not to have any children at all…

Legalistic attitudes persist in religion as in other walks of life but it is going to the other extreme to regard the details of important ceremonies as insignificant. Care and precision often reflect the pursuit of perfection - which tends to be neglected in modern society. We have to strike a balance between scrupulosity and decadence in every walk of life. All the great artists, composers, scientists and saints had self-discipline in their vocation - although not always in other respects!

Certainly perfectionism has its place, and is to be commended. But is it really a matter of morality? I find it difficult to comprehend how, for example - in the case of the priest saying mass - using the wrong hand to pick up the host should be considered on a level with rape and murder, to be classified as mortal sin.

As always it depends on the priest’s intention and attitude. Why did he use the left hand? If he is left-handed it is an understandable mistake. If it is through carelessness it is obviously not a serious sin. If it is to assert his lack of concern, after it has been pointed out to him, that is obviously a different matter. Since celebrating Mass is the greatest privilege a person can have it is not an event to be taken lightly. In some cultures the left hand is regarded as unclean. That is an indication that the Church’s rule is not arbitrary…

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Exactly. It is one meter long simply because we define it to be one meter.

When a Christian says that God is good, do they mean anything more than to define good as being what God is like? Or do they mean to be describing God as good? Is saying God is good supposed to say something about God or about goodness or is it a meaning less tautology.

Try this:

Being = Good.

God is good, then, becomes redundant; it is an existential statement akin to “God is.” And yet, when we say that God is, are we not ascribing to God a property by which He is judged – that is, existence? If we are to say that we are accurate in ascribing our concept “existence” to God, then we must either say that that property is made possible by (i.e. contained within) God or is a standard to which God is compared. If we say the former, then “God is” is analytic and tautological. If we say the latter, then (gasp!) there is something – namely, the form of everything – that God is bound by.

I opt for the latter, since I consider that God is likely, at very least, bound by the laws of logic (not that I presume we know these, entirely). But to say that God is bound by the nature of the universe is not any meaningful limit on God, and it is far preferable to saying that God **is **the nature of the universe (which seems both meaningless and problematic).

So “God is good” means that God is, entirely – whereas other “beings” *could *not be (contingency). We find our being in Him. Existence is a property that God has, but it is not true to say “Existence is God”, only that “God exists”. (The parallel, with goodness: It is not true to say that “Goodness is God”, but only that “God is good.”) God doesn’t “happen to” be good, but goodness is not synonymous with God.

(By the way, I know that describing existence as a predicate is controversial, but the fact that a view is controversial does not determine the matter. Oh, and also, I admit that I am quite puzzled and delighted by the Euthyphro question. It brings out the limitations of human thought, which I am glad to throw my meagre intellectual resources against.)

 

[Sair]

I interpret moral relativism to mean relative to an individual rather than circumstances, i.e. the individual decides what is right or wrong regardless of what others believe and is a law unto himself.

That certainly does appear to be the standard, correct definition of moral relativism. The circumstances in which I have found there are problems - and I guess we could call them problems of clarity - is when there is a person who insists that certain actions are never permissible, regardless of circumstances, who will not admit any degree of plasticity in their morality. If it is argued that there may be some circumstances in which these ‘wrong’ actions are in fact the best course of action to take, the person with the immovable moral code, I have observed, will often attempt to dismiss the argument as ‘moral relativism’, as though this serves to completely nullify all objections to their black-and-white moral code.

Whether decisions are moral or not is not really important. What matters is whether they are reasonable or unreasonable. There is good reason to think morality is based on rational principles. Can we do what is right if we behave unreasonably?

By accident, perhaps. But I think it is also possible to do wrong, or at least make some grave errors, when acting entirely rationally (depending, of course, how one defines right and wrong actions). To dismiss emotion is, after all, to deny an important part of what humans are. I touched on this notion in an earlier post, by way of explaining why I think utilitarianism is a flawed (if also very useful in many respects) ethical system. Once again we return to the idea of achieving a balance in how one behaves.

Even though there are situations where no obvious harm is done - as in the case of petty theft - we may find ourselves on a slippery slope. It is easy to make excuses and gradually become too lax. Probably all criminals start with small offences… The safest principle is to be a person with principles! And that means having to draw a line somewhere… in advance.

I absolutely agree that it’s important to have principles. However, I think the crucial point in forming the principles is - here it is again - finding the balance between a set of principles that give you too much room to move, and a set of principles that give you too little, or no room to move. I think a solid set of general principles is almost always more practical, more useful, certainly easier to adhere to than a rigid set of specific principles. General principles might include always considering the consequences of one’s actions, as far as they are foreseeable; always be prepared to own responsibility for one’s actions (this is a pretty good governing principle, actually, since it provides a good incentive for not putting onesself in the position of having to own up to acting badly); treat others as you would like to be treated (the ancient classic); and so on. Of course, applying general principles always takes more thought and consideration than following rigid rules…

As always it depends on the priest’s intention and attitude. Why did he use the left hand? If he is left-handed it is an understandable mistake. If it is through carelessness it is obviously not a serious sin. If it is to assert his lack of concern, after it has been pointed out to him, that is obviously a different matter. Since celebrating Mass is the greatest privilege a person can have it is not an event to be taken lightly. In some cultures the left hand is regarded as unclean. That is an indication that the Church’s rule is not arbitrary…

Speaking as a born left-hander, I have to protest that the classification of the left hand (sinister, from the Latin for the left, is not by accident used to indicate those with wicked intent) as inherently unclean or evil is completely arbitrary! Although I can see how, in the days of nib pens, it would have been practical to make left-handed children write with the right hand…

 

[Leela]

Try this:

Being = Good.

God is good, then, becomes redundant; it is an existential statement akin to “God is.” And yet, when we say that God is, are we not ascribing to God a property by which He is judged – that is, existence? If we are to say that we are accurate in ascribing our concept “existence” to God, then we must either say that that property is made possible by (i.e. contained within) God or is a standard to which God is compared. If we say the former, then “God is” is analytic and tautological. If we say the latter, then (gasp!) there is something – namely, the form of everything – that God is bound by.

I opt for the latter, since I consider that God is likely, at very least, bound by the laws of logic (not that I presume we know these, entirely). But to say that God is bound by the nature of the universe is not any meaningful limit on God, and it is far preferable to saying that God **is **the nature of the universe (which seems both meaningless and problematic).

So “God is good” means that God is, entirely – whereas other “beings” *could *not be (contingency). We find our being in Him. Existence is a property that God has, but it is not true to say “Existence is God”, only that “God exists”. (The parallel, with goodness: It is not true to say that “Goodness is God”, but only that “God is good.”) God doesn’t “happen to” be good, but goodness is not synonymous with God.

(By the way, I know that describing existence as a predicate is controversial, but the fact that a view is controversial does not determine the matter. Oh, and also, I admit that I am quite puzzled and delighted by the Euthyphro question. It brings out the limitations of human thought, which I am glad to throw my meagre intellectual resources against.)

I find it somewhat interesting, but never useful for convincing anyone on either side of the debate. I just like to pull it out when people claim that morality is irrational without a belief in God.

If you are interested in this dilemma you may enjoy this article:

theologyonline.com/forums/showthread.php?t=47024

The author takes a different tack to the problem than I’ve heard before. He argues that the dilemma is a problem for the Muslims but not for those who worship the Triune God.

He denies the second horn and takes the first horn of the dilemma that God recognizes goodness, but claims that the doctrine of the Trinity allows the Christian God to pass the test.

 

[tonyrey]

I interpret moral relativism to mean relative to an individual rather than circumstances, i.e. the individual decides what is right or wrong regardless of what others believe and is a law unto himself.

                            That certainly does appear to be the standard, correct definition of moral relativism. The circumstances in which I have found there are problems - and I guess we could call them problems of clarity - is when there is a person who insists that certain actions are *never* permissible, regardless of circumstances, who will not admit any degree of plasticity in their morality. If it is argued that there may be some circumstances in which these 'wrong' actions are in fact the best course of action to take, the person with the immovable moral code will often attempt to dismiss the argument as 'moral relativism', as though this serves to completely nullify all objections to their black-and-white moral code.Sometimes we are forced to choose the lesser of two (or more) evils. Killing is always evil but if it is in self-defence or the defence of others who are unjustly attacked it is justified. I think you will agree that interpretation of morality is reasonable even though it upholds the absolute value of life.

Whether decisions are moral or not is not really important. What matters is whether they are reasonable or unreasonable. There is good reason to think morality is based on rational principles. Can we do what is right if we behave unreasonably?

By accident, perhaps.In such cases we cannot claim to be virtuous!

But I think it is also possible to do wrong, or at least make some grave errors, when acting entirely rationally (depending, of course, how one defines right and wrong actions). To dismiss emotion is, after all, to deny an important part of what humans are.

I agree. Reason and emotion are inextricably linked when it comes to moral issues. What I am opposed to is emotivism which denies that morality is based on rational principles.

I touched on this notion in an earlier post, by way of explaining why I think utilitarianism is a flawed (if also very useful in many respects) ethical system. Once again we return to the idea of achieving a balance in how one behaves.

We seem to agree on quite a few issues.

Even though there are situations where no obvious harm is done - as in the case of petty theft - we may find ourselves on a slippery slope. The safest principle is to be a person with principles! And that means having to draw a line somewhere… in advance.

I absolutely agree that it’s important to have principles. However, I think the crucial point in forming the principles is - here it is again - finding the balance between a set of principles that give you too much room to move, and a set of principles that give you too little, or no room to move. I think a solid set of general principles is almost always more practical, more useful, certainly easier to adhere to than a rigid set of specific principles. General principles might include always considering the consequences of one’s actions, as far as they are foreseeable; always be prepared to own responsibility for one’s actions (this is a pretty good governing principle, actually, since it provides a good incentive for not putting oneself in the position of having to own up to acting badly); treat others as you would like to be treated (the ancient classic); and so on. Of course, applying general principles always takes more thought and consideration than following rigid rules… So where do we disagree?! If you accept the idea that other rational beings apart from us have the same fundamental values and rights, e.g. the right to life and happiness, then morality is independent of human subjectivity.Yet you are right in believing that it always has a subjective element. After all, Christians believe God is personal (otherwise we would be pantheists) and therefore a Subject! Moral “laws” are not arbitrary commands but rules for mental and spiritual health which often affect physical health and our relations with others. Integrity is wholeness whereas corruption leads to disintegration of the personality. Like the artificial division between reason and emotion the division between subjectivity and objectivity turns out to be a mistake! It all depends on how we look at ourselves - as agents or products - because we are both. We are responsible for what we choose but we are not responsible for our power of choice, let alone our existence… We did not make ourselves but we make our decisions, ultimately, by ourselves - and for me that is the most significant fact of all…

As always it depends on the priest’s intention and attitude. Why did he use the left hand? If he is left-handed it is an understandable mistake. If it is through carelessness it is obviously not a serious sin. If it is to assert his lack of concern, after it has been pointed out to him, that is obviously a different matter. Since celebrating Mass is the greatest privilege a person can have it is not an event to be taken lightly. In some cultures the left hand is regarded as unclean. That is an indication that the Church’s rule is not arbitrary…

Speaking as a born left-hander, I have to protest that the classification of the left hand (sinister, from the Latin for the left, is not by accident used to indicate those with wicked intent) as inherently unclean or evil is completely arbitrary! Although I can see how, in the days of nib pens, it would have been practical to make left-handed children write with the right hand… The uncleanliness I was referring to was the Asian custom of using the left hand for toilet purposes. As far as I know it has no moral connotation!

 

[tonyrey]

Important correction:
Christians believe God is personal and therefore The Subject!

 

[tonyrey]

Christians believe God is personal and therefore The Subject!

 

[tonyrey]

After all, Christians believe God is personal (otherwise we would be pantheists) and therefore a Subject!

Important correction:

Christians believe God is personal and therefore The Subject!

 

[Sair]

Sair;6054405:

So where do we disagree?! If you accept the idea that other rational beings apart from us have the same fundamental values and rights, e.g. the right to life and happiness, then morality is independent of human subjectivity.Yet you are right in believing that it always has a subjective element. After all, Christians believe God is personal (otherwise we would be pantheists) and therefore a Subject! Moral “laws” are not arbitrary commands but rules for mental and spiritual health which often affect physical health and our relations with others. Integrity is wholeness whereas corruption leads to disintegration of the personality. Like the artificial division between reason and emotion the division between subjectivity and objectivity turns out to be a mistake! It all depends on how we look at ourselves - as agents or products - because we are both. We are responsible for what we choose but we are not responsible for our power of choice, let alone our existence… We did not make ourselves but we make our decisions, ultimately, by ourselves - and for me that is the most significant fact of all…

I think it ultimately comes down to the concepts we have of the source and the ultimate ends of morality, and that is something about which theists and atheists will perhaps eternally disagree.

Not wanting this particular thread to go off on an ‘atheist-vs-theist’ tangent (as it seems several recent threads have tended to) I shall now deftly draw the discussion back to the topic of subjectivity by addressing your point about distinguishing between subjectivity and objectivity, and between reason and emotion.

I’ve done a bit of reading up since my previous attempts to discuss moral subjectivity, and I think it’s been useful reading. It has led me to consider the idea that whilst morality may be epistemologically objective (meaning we can discuss it as a matter of common experience between different individuals, and that it is something most people can relate to - like talking about having a headache, or falling in love, or feeling depressed, and the like) it is metaphysically subjective (that is, its existence is dependent upon experience). I think this holds true, simply because in order for principles to exist, there must be a means for us to live out our principles, to experience what it means to have those principles affecting our actions. Whilst it may be said, if a principle is written down, that it has a metaphysically objective existence as a written text, it ultimately has no meaning, no existence as a principle unless it is put into practice. I suspect, though, that I’m not telling you anything you don’t know, here!

Where reason and emotion also exist, as such, through experience (although we can speak of them as though they are objects), both must inform and develop our moral principles, if we wish to claim that our morality is for the good of the whole person.

 

[tonyrey]

I think it ultimately comes down to the concepts we have of the source and the ultimate ends of morality, and that is something about which theists and atheists will perhaps eternally disagree.

I’m not so sure. Obviously the context is different but we agree that our existence is necessarily moral in which our values, aims and needs are interlinked because we are rational, sentient and social beings. Without morality we cannot live in harmony with ourselves and others - or develop normally.

Where we part company is over the question of free will which theists regard as an essential condition of morality. As Kant remarked, ought implies can. Atheists differ on whether we have free will but even those who recognise it cannot explain it. Neither can theists for that matter but we accept it as a fundamental reality. We believe persons are** essentially** different from things and exist at a higher level than impersonal processes.

I’ve done a bit of reading up since my previous attempts to discuss moral subjectivity, and I think it’s been useful reading. It has led me to consider the idea that whilst morality may be epistemologically objective (meaning we can discuss it as a matter of common experience between different individuals, and that it is something most people can relate to - like talking about having a headache, or falling in love, or feeling depressed, and the like) it is metaphysically subjective (that is, its existence is dependent upon experience).

I think “experience” has two aspects. It is subjective because only the subject is directly aware of it. It is objective because it is real. It exists in the mind but that does not make it less real than material objects. It is a different kind of reality which is more valuable and significant than what happens beyond the mind. External events affect us but in this case it is the effect rather than the cause that matters. Ultimately what happens to us is more important than what happens to things. We can lose all our material possessions but that is better than losing our integrity! And what happens to us is less important than how we decide to live . To a great extent we become what we choose to become - saints or devils!

I think this holds true, simply because in order for principles to exist, there must be a means for us to live out our principles, to experience what it means to have those principles affecting our actions. Whilst it may be said, if a principle is written down, that it has a metaphysically objective existence as a written text, it ultimately has no meaning, no existence as a principle unless it is put into practice. I suspect, though, that I’m not telling you anything you don’t know, here!

Where reason and emotion also exist, as such, through experience (although we can speak of them as though they are objects), both must inform and develop our moral principles, if we wish to claim that our morality is for the good of the whole person.

All this is a far cry from materialism! I could have written it myself! All the world’s a stage and we are the actors - yes, but we write our own script…

 

[tonyrey]

Where reason and emotion also exist, as such, through experience (although we can speak of them as though they are objects), both must inform and develop our moral principles, if we wish to claim that our morality is for the good of the whole person.

Your words remind me of Kant:

“Two things awe me most, the starry sky above me and the moral law within me.”

 

[Sair]

Where we part company is over the question of free will which theists regard as an essential condition of morality. As Kant remarked, ought implies can. Atheists differ on whether we have free will but even those who recognise it cannot explain it. Neither can theists for that matter but we accept it as a fundamental reality. We believe persons are** essentially** different from things and exist at a higher level than impersonal processes.

I seem to recall seeing some stuff suggesting that chaos theory could be linked to an explanation of free will, but since I’ve not actually read anything specific about the connection, I can’t really comment. For now, I think it’s probably enough to say that we experience what we consider to be free will.

I don’t know whether or not free will is an illusion - in that, our decisions are directed by the physical/chemical functioning of the brain, and we experience the results as “making a decision” to act. What I have observed is that many animals are self-directed, and certainly appear to be making choices between various alternatives. It may be that they are simply following desires or instincts; but I think we humans are probably doing much the same, only our more sophisticated brains afford us a greater range of desires, interests, and preferences, thus a greater selection of possible alternatives, and allow us to consider things like long-term consequences. As such, I think the differences between humans and other animals (well, mammals, certainly) are of degree rather than kind.

Your mention of the “ought implies can” connection reminded me of the “is-ought” problem often encountered in ethical philosophy. I must admit that I don’t have a great deal of time for the notion that one can’t infer an “ought” from an “is” - what else do we have to infer what we ought to do, than the way things actually are? We humans are, by nature, social animals - whilst this may not confer obligation as a matter of logical necessity, I think there is a case to be made that it is certainly reasonable to suppose that we ought to do what we can to pursue harmonious relations with our fellows, rather than behaving in ways that are likely to result in ostracism or outright hostility. Sure, there are many shades of grey between harmony and hostility, but that is why the complex human brain has evolved (or so the theory goes) - the need for understanding other people and negotiating relationships.

I think “experience” has two aspects. It is subjective because only the subject is directly aware of it. It is objective because it is real. It exists in the mind but that does not make it less real than material objects.
{/QUOTE]

The article I linked to in another post explained the reality of subjective experience by means of the example of a headache - it could be said (perhaps even literally) that the headache exists only in the patient’s mind, but it is no less real in terms of its effects upon the person. I think the same is true of any experience, that while it is not an object existing independently of the individual consciousness, it has effects that can change the mind in question, affect the body, and also aspects of the world outside the body. This is again part of the difference between metaphysical and epistemological objectivity - we can’t directly participate in another person’s experience (as the article mentioned, you can’t have someone else’s headache for them!) but because of common elements in experiences that we can recognise and relate to, we are able to speak of such things as ‘objects’.