Morality and Subjectivity

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Precisely! One Supreme Being is far simpler than the convolutions of NeoDarwinism which do not satisfy many specialists in biological evolution…
Postulating a supreme being as the one who did it does not get us anywhere toward an explanation of HOW biological evolution was accomplished. “One Supreme Being” is not a simpler explanation. It is adding an extra term that doesn’t explain anything unless the answer to the “how” issue is simply divine magic.

By the way, do you have any thoughts pertaining to the topic of this thread?

Best,
Leela
 
Sair;6075015:
The formulation of purpose does not entail the reality of purpose. In the context of purposeless processes it remains an illusion unless you can explain what is entailed by purposeful activity.
This is a problematic statement, from your point of view - you claim that purpose cannot be formulated, but is not that exactly what you do when you infer purpose to life in general?
You misunderstand me. I am referring to the ability to establish purposes deliberately by reflection entailing hindsight, insight and foresight. That is the ability that needs to be explained. The attribution of purpose to life is based on our observation of the exquisite adaptation of means to ends - which is unconscious purpose in the case of non-human beings.
Again there is the problem of verifying the consciousness that creates purpose.
Many individuals, both religious and secular, have had mystical experiences but obviously most people do not have such direct experience What we do know is that Design cannot exist without a Designer. Atheists have the problem of verifying the source of their own consciousness. It is not sufficient to say we believe it is caused by brain activity. The only convincing proof would be the construction of a conscious machine.
From that point of view, the only purpose we can verify in any way is that which we formulate for ourselves.
And that also excludes the purposes of others - which we take for granted but cannot verify.
Purposeful activity is that which is premeditated for the achievement of certain goals, and we only retain this purpose if we are committed to those goals. If we have a divinely preordained purpose - in other words, if our existence is preordained for the achievement of certain goals - does not this also negate the concept of free will?
No, because our basic preordained goal is to shape our own destiny by using our free will to choose what to believe and how to live. There are other preordained goals such as the pursuit of love and perfection which we may fail to varying degrees to achieve but that is an inevitable consequence of having free will.
You are using “subject” in two different senses! You seem to suggest that values are subjective in the sense that we as subjects determine what those values are but also that values are subject to (i.e. determined by) our needs as social beings.
These are not necessarily different contexts - we discern our needs and desires, both physical and psychological, and infer what is required to fulfil those needs; therefore we determine value based upon experience of need. Either way, value is a subjective concept, not a metaphysically objective component of beings or things. If anything, our subjective desires often make us more willing to ascribe value than our objective, physical needs, unless our physical needs become pressing.The fact remains that the basis of a fundamental value shared by all is a need. Without needs there could be no values.
Since we cannot be sure that we know what all our needs are (given different philosophical and psychological theories about the nature of the mind) they may well be waiting to be discovered. The need to love and be loved - in a fuller sense than your sexual interpretation of love - is a good example…

Even most Christians acknowledge the primacy of physical needs - that no-one is open to conversion if they are starving!Both Christians and Atheists recognise the primacy of some needs which are more important than physical ones… Christians certainly recognise the importance of the body.
However, our needs are discerned by experience, and often accompanied by desire. The need for love - which, if you noticed a post I made on a previous thread, means complete acceptance of others and the knowledge that we are accepted in turn (and not only sexually, which is but one - admittedly significant - aspect of love) - is a social need, a need that implies everything we can possibly hope to achieve through the society of our own kind. It is explicable in terms of social and biochemical bonding processes, but that does not lessen its importance to we who experience it.
I remember that in one post you seemed to equate love with sexual attraction. I’m glad you interpret it in a wider sense, although the bonding explanation overlooks the spiritual nature of love which is not restricted to persons we know and is not determined by our background but is due to a voluntary decision. True love is not compelled but freely chosen.
We have established that responsibility is an intangible, objective reality that cannot be observed empirically. For you the question remains as to whether we choose to care - or do so as the result of the way we have been formed by events. If choice is only an illusion so too is responsibility… We have also established that values have an objective basis in the needs we have in common and that we discover them rather than invent them.

. Caring is generally a combination of emotions - which are often beyond rational influence
I’m not sure we’re on the same page with this- and rational assessment of a situation. Even the law courts recognise cases of diminished responsibility, and crimes of passion rather than premeditation.They are merely unusual cases which highlight the rational norm.
Furthermore, I’m not certain that the intangibles to which you refer can be claimed to have a metaphysically objective existence. If we discover values based upon objective physical needs, how do you explain the difference between someone who shovels in fast food whenever they feel hungry, and an epicurean gourmet?
Individual variations of behaviour due to idiosyncracies do not affect the objectivity of the need for food!
 
And you mean to imply what, exactly? Again you are assuming that your interpretations are universal understandings. Please explain yourself.
How on earth is this question of yours related to the issue at stake: …“how often have you encountered a philosopher rather than a chaplain in a prison?” With equal irrelevance I could ask you “How often have you encountered a chaplain rather than a philosopher in a prison?” :rolleyes:
 
Postulating a supreme being as the one who did it does not get us anywhere toward an explanation of HOW biological evolution was accomplished.
The concept of One Supreme Being is a simpler and more adequate explanation of the development of rational persons from atomic particles for the simple reason that it integrates consciousness, truth, goodness, freedom, beauty, love and purpose - recognising them as fundamental realities rather than rejecting them as either illusions or “efficacious human concepts”. The success of science is ample evidence that we have direct knowledge and experience of the power with which a valuable, complex system is designed and created even though we cannot emulate the exquisite harmony, beauty and co-ordination of living organisms in the biosphere.
“One Supreme Being” is not a simpler explanation. It is adding an extra term that doesn’t explain anything unless the answer to the “how” issue is simply divine magic.
Do you regard your consciousness, power of reason and decision-making, free will and capacity for love as magical? How do you explain and integrate them? Or do you too reject them as merely efficacious human concepts?
By the way, do you have any thoughts pertaining to the topic of this thread?
If you take the trouble to read through my posts you will find plenty… with some recent ones specifically on the subjectivity and objectivity of values.
 
]Do you regard the contents of your mind as an observed reality?
So your mind and its contents are “less real” than “observed reality”, i.e. physical reality?
I have no doubt that you believe in the possibility of miracles and the efficacy of prayer, based on your experience - but that is your experience and interpretation, not metaphysically objective reality.
It follows that your starting and finishing point is always external reality even though you know it only by inference.
Chance and necessity - the factors which govern the processes of evolution. They are enough to explain our existence, and are a less complex explanation than the notion that we were created by a being infinitely more complex than the known universe.
Why so convinced Chance and Necessity suffice to explain our existence? You are extremely complex but you are one being…
We are moral beings through the necessity of maintaining relationships within human communities.
Not all morality deals with relationships… Moral integrity is also a private affair.
Does this imply, to you, that morality is necessarily less important than it would be if it were divinely ordained?
Morality is not less important but it becomes a human artifice without categorical imperatives, divorced from its physical context and doomed to frustration because of the frequent success of evil and injustice.
Such love as you seem to be inferring can be explained in terms of preferences - the people in question were following preferences that were not selfish preferences, but social preferences.
I need an entire page to deal with this subject but I have broached it in a recent thread.
I have met people who have everything they need physically and psychologically yet they know there is something missing in their lives
Then they do not have everything they need, psychologically.

Philosophy cannot be reduced to psychology…
It is a metaphysical conjuring trick to produce free will, purpose and love out of inanimate objects.
What we experience as free will, purpose and love, amongst other subjective experiences, are in all probability products of the molecular properties of our brains and bodies - there is no metaphysically objective evidence that suggests otherwise.

This is most graphic and beautifully detailed expression of your materialism. I shall discuss it in my next post as it is now 1.00 a.m.
The only way violence, injustice and suffering can be dealt with is through disinterested recognition of human needs and preferences, independent of differences in religious faith.
The problem is to motivate people to become disinterested: telling them their values are products of the molecular properties of our brains and bodies will not do the trick…
Your points are difficult to refute simply because they are nebulous - you can say one thing and then, when challenged, claim you were saying something else.
Please give precise examples to substantiate your allegations.
Your single-minded disparagement of atheism does not suggest, to me, that your dedication and sheer hard work have produced a disinterested, impartial assessment of whatever data you have collected.
Do you really believe you are disinterested and impartial? People often accuse others of faults they themselves have. The truth is that you strongly object to my analysis of atheism because it reveals flaws you do not wish to consider. I am not so attached emotionally as you are to my philosophical position because after many years of discussions I am acutely aware of how fallible we are and of how little our thoughts matter in the long run. I couldn’t care less if I am mistaken on specific issues. The basis of my serenity is my unshakable conviction that life is a struggle between good and evil - and that ultimately we all receive precisely what we deserve. Beside that fact, which I regard as indisputable, everything else fades into insignificance…
I can imagine no atheist who takes morality seriously who would have cause to fear any empirical proof of a god; the trouble is, no such empirical proof exists.
Another dogmatic statement! You obviously reject the teaching of Christ and medical records of miraculous cures outright without the slightest reservation.
Where did I state that atheism cannot possibly be valid?
No reply!
If I have become more aggressive, it is in response to attempts to portray my beliefs as uninformed and lacking in understanding.
You are reading into my statements motives which I do not harbour. I may respond to your sarcasm in similar fashion but you are simply getting a taste of your own medicine… One thing I do not do - of which you are clearly guilty - is to make comments about you and what you may have or have not done… For that there is no excuse.
Your closed-mindedness to the possibility of naturalistic, atheistic understandings is demonstrated by the following:
You dismiss with scorn the idea that materialism does not inevitably lead to nihilism but that is because you do not follow it through to its logical conclusion.
That is not closed-mindedness to the possibility of athism but belief in the logical implications of materialism which deprives existence of its value and purpose. You have actually stated that the universe is valueless and purposeless!
.
.and the fact that your rejection of the possibility that atheism is a valid worldview is implicit in much of your writing.
A false deduction! I do not reject the theoretical possibility of atheism being true but believe it is a highly inadequate interpretation of reality.
 
The concept of One Supreme Being is a simpler and more adequate explanation of the development of rational persons from atomic particles for the simple reason that it integrates consciousness, truth, goodness, freedom, beauty, love and purpose - recognising them as fundamental realities rather than rejecting them as either illusions or “efficacious human concepts”.
How does the God hypothesis explain the things that you say it explains? How did God supposedly go about creating a universe that includes truth, goodness, beauty, etc if not through natural selection?
Do you regard your consciousness, power of reason and decision-making, free will and capacity for love as magical?
No. I am not the one proposing that claiming “goddidit with his magical powers” adds anything to biological evolutionary theory.
How do you explain and integrate them? Or do you too reject them as merely efficacious human concepts?
You keep saying that I don’t think any of those things are real. Since you believe in them and believe that your God hypothesis explains them, perhaps you could support your claim by explaining how God created free will and love and stuff.

Best,
Leela
 
My questions, then, are as follows. The very use of the term ‘reductionist’ implies that there is something from which to be reduced. What is that something, in the case of humans? What is personhood, if not the combination of properties we find in human animals? Those who object to the notion that consciousness might ultimately have a materialist, naturalistic explanation obviously feel that this would make it something different to what we experience as consciousness. Supposing that all our subjective experiences arise from molecular activity in our brains - would this be different from what we do experience, and if so, how, and does this matter to our concept of personhood?
I am willing to concede, provisionally, that consciousness arises from molecular activity alone. It is an emergent property. But I’m just saying that you can’t reduce an entity to its properties or processes. Perhaps we should talk about *teleology *here. When you look at a computer program, the relevant question is not “what is the code?” but rather “what does it do?” Perhaps we’re on the same page here?
If we experience the act of differentiating between preferences as free will, why should our understanding of it as free will be altered by the knowledge that our brains are managing this differentiation at a molecular level?
I agree that it wouldn’t. But if we did have a teleology, a purpose over and above our “programming”, then that would make a **big **difference. (Interesting that our computer scientists spend so much time trying to give a computer free will. We call that “playing God”, don’t we?)
And why, oh why, do immaterialists insist upon distinguishing between us and our brains? Are not brains a key part of persons? It makes no practical sense to say, “my brain made this decision” as if that were a different claim to “I made this decision”.
(If functioning brain, then person.) Yes.
(If person, then functioning brain.) Highly speculative metaphysical claim. Science has no way to study this.
 
I have no idea what your problem might be. Do you deny the **fact **that when uranium atoms reach a critical mass, a qualitative chage (explosion) will occur? And substituting carbon atoms, no such event will take place? Or the fact, that overpopulation will result in excessive stress and massive die-out of the population? Or maybe you deny that these are **qualitative **changes? That new properties will occur due to some quantitative changes? Or what? Since you have a science degree, you sure must be aware of the difference between graphite and diamond. The difference is due to the different arrangement of the six carbon atoms which compose the molecule. Again, just an example of emerging attributes.
I deny that you can simply add one more shovelful or atom or whatever you have in mind to your initial pile of uranium and it will go “boom!” (insofar as this is *only *true of highly refined weapons-grade U-235, produced specifically for that purpose), but mainly I deny that there is a qualitative change rather than a quantitative change (the *same *qualitative thing occurring at an exponentially increased rate) in a nuclear explosion. Nuclear engineers relied on knowing what happens in nuclear fission and increasing the rate of its occurrence based on knowledge of this mechanism in order to produce nuclear explosions. I’m pretty sure they weren’t surprised by this amazing new ‘emergent property’ of “boom!” when they first created a critical mass of weapons-grade uranium. Do you think I’m mistaken? If so, where did I go wrong?
Any conjecture needs to be substantiated in some manner to be taken seriously. This is what is happening with the experiments of construting an AI, which will (hopefully) pass the Turing test - thus substantiating the hypothesis. If you - personally - agree that the mind is simply the function of the brain (and not some “supernatural” phenomenon), we have nothing to argue about.
Why not just try to be a reasonable person and respond reasonably to reasonable queries that are put to you, then we’ll see what it is that we have to argue about. 🙂
Quote:
Originally Posted by Betterave
I’m still saying what I said: “God is good” describes both God and goodness. What is the problem with this? (What would you say to the claim that “the standard meter is a meter long” describes both the standard meter and all meter sticks/meter measurements?)
The “meter” is an arbitrarily selected distance. The proposition “God is good” does not describe either God, or good, it equates two undefined “things”. The dilemma cannot be solved by arbitrarily equating God with goodness. If “goodness” cannot be defined apart from God, then (“God is good”) lacks meaning. Elementary, my dear Watson.
The “meter” is…? Elementary? Are you quite sure you’re not being too hasty here? Do you know what the standard meter in Paris is? Do you really think that what it is is “an arbitrarily selected distance”? Can you think of any other relevant description for what it might be?
 
How on earth is this question of yours related to the issue at stake: …“how often have you encountered a philosopher rather than a chaplain in a prison?” With equal irrelevance I could ask you “How often have you encountered a chaplain rather than a philosopher in a prison?” :rolleyes:
To clarify - which I probably didn’t do, on reflection, in the post this came from - what I intended in posting this was to make a point about your claim that the belief in a heavenly father carried more weight with ‘thugs’ than an argument about human equality and fellowship based on other factors. I took your ‘thug’ reference to mean those who convert to Christianity either in prison or in church youth programs - where one is not likely to come across atheist philosophers! My point was that what one is exposed to makes a big difference to what one ends up believing.
 
…what one is exposed to makes a big difference to what one ends up believing.
That’s the truest thing I’ve heard all day. It’s exactly why I generally believe scientists, but I don’t believe people who tell me what science means. Whenever anyone tells me that they’re not interpreting, they’re just looking at the facts, I get suspicious. We always look at the facts through lenses, and we have no procedures for figuring out which lenses are most accurate.

Rationality is valuable precisely because it is scarce. It’s much more about “being in the right place, at the right time” than following a certain procedure. But what is the right place? And when is the right time?

There must be some set of conditions that lines up with epistemological accuracy, but how can we possibly figure out what those conditions are?
 
I don’t think choosing either horn makes sense, either. In saying that it is obvious to you that Christians mean both that they are describing God by saying God is good and also describing goodness at the same time you are saying that you accept both horns. If accepting neither horn makes sense, how could it make sense to accept both? Are you really saying that you accept neither and argue that the question is senseless? If so it seems senseless to say that God is good, but if you can’t say that, Christians can’t claim to have a foundation for morality. That’s fine with me. I don’t buy into foundationalism. I just wish Christians didn’t see foundationalism as a useful cudgel for attacking nonbelievers and their views in morality. The Euthyphro dilemma shows a significant problem with foundationalist ethics.
First of all, we have two claims:
(1) Does (a) God determine what is good by his very choosing or (b) do God’s determinations conform to the good which he recognizes external to himself? (Euthyphro)
(2) Does “God is good” describe (a) God or (b) goodness?
It seems to me that these claims are very clearly different but that you are conflating them. How do you see it?

A note on the Euthyphro dilemma: it appears to ignore the concept of *aseitas *(from-itselfness) which is said to characterize God, certainly in monotheistic religions. The same concept is in fact applied by people like yourself, it seems to me. Don’t you use the same allegedly problematic conceptual scheme but replace foundationalism of God with a foundationalism of the dynamic and collective constituting activity of the human (moral) community?
 
I am willing to concede, provisionally, that consciousness arises from molecular activity alone. It is an emergent property. But I’m just saying that you can’t reduce an entity to its properties or processes. Perhaps we should talk about *teleology *here. When you look at a computer program, the relevant question is not “what is the code?” but rather “what does it do?” Perhaps we’re on the same page here?
That seems correct to me - I guess my problem with notions of reductionism is that to me, explaining how something - or someone! - works is not an attempt to break down the whole into its component parts, but an effort to better understand and appreciate the whole. If consciousness exists as an emergent property of molecular activity in the brain, that does not decrease my sense of wonder at its existence. Quite the contrary, in fact. Perhaps this attitude has its basis in years of studying and analysing literature - I must admit I had little time for the notion that close textual analysis reduced one’s enjoyment of the text as a whole. The opposite was true for me.

Are we more than the sum of our parts? The emergent property hypothesis of consciousness would seem to suggest we are. But the particular collections of parts are still essential to the overall effect.
I agree that it wouldn’t. But if we did have a teleology, a purpose over and above our “programming”, then that would make a **big **difference. (Interesting that our computer scientists spend so much time trying to give a computer free will. We call that “playing God”, don’t we?)
The problem I find is in the insistence that there must be a divinely ordained purpose to our lives. I agree that if this were so, it would make a big difference to the way many people behave, and would certainly alter our understanding of how and why we exist (or perhaps I should say it would change our understanding back to the notion of divine creation). The difficulty is this - if, somehow, it were proved beyond doubt that humans were not created, either specially or through guided evolution, but that we did arise purely by the accidents of genetic mutation and the processes of natural selection, how would this affect our understanding of what we are, or our faith in our abilities? If a person stakes their faith on divinely ordained purpose, and then finds there is none, what do they have to fall back on? Is it despair and internal anarchy, as some think is logically necessary? Or is there hope to be found in embracing our biochemistry, our nature as conscious, rational animals with the ability to choose how we act and which preferences we pursue?
 
Well, I’m not saying that free will is supernatural; in fact, I’ve been arguing against the claim that what we experience as free will is necessarily unable to be explained in naturalistic terms. That is a claim I have encountered from a few posters to this forum.
Do you think you’re being consistent when you say this (or is it a dodge)? Before, I was under the impression that you associated free will with a particular kind of metaphysical reality that might not exist, and presumably doesn’t exist if it is merely an epiphenomenon of particular physical (‘naturalistic’) phenomena. Now you seem to be equating free will with “what we experience as free will,” a formulation that precludes doubt about the existence of free will.
 
Well, here goes.

In an effort to rope this bolting thread and drag it back to the corral of the OP, I feel I need to say a few things.

Firstly, to my mind, the notion that morality is metaphysically subjective is beyond question. If there is a gap between is and ought, as many ethical philosophers insist there is, it can only be bridged with recourse to reason and emotion, which are metaphysically subjective properties of sentient minds. Because there is commonality to be found in human experience, though, we can speak of morality as though it were an object, thus it is epistemologically objective.

Secondly, the essence and importance of morality are not, as far as I am concerned, reduced by supposing that morality arose through the evolution of humans as social animals. Our experiences of free will, of fellowship, of love, of compassion and empathy, are not lessened through having their basis in our biochemistry. They are still experiences integral to the life of the human animal.

Finally, I think it is a mistake to suppose that the logical end of grounding morality firmly in human biology and experience is a lack of commitment to it. My experience has been that those who arrive at their own moral conclusions through experience and rational analysis carry their convictions more firmly than those who follow a preordained moral code.
 
The problem I find is in the insistence that there must be a divinely ordained purpose to our lives.
I think you’re quite right about this. Even if this view (no divinely ordained purpose) ‘objectively’ didn’t make sense, as Tony wants to argue, not making objective sense is irrelevant – humans are quite comfortable prosecuting all sorts of projects that ‘objectively’ speaking ‘don’t make sense.’ I think the more interesting question is whether or not it is intelligent to live as if we have no need to search out a divinely ordained purpose for our lives.
 
I deny that you can simply add one more shovelful or atom or whatever you have in mind to your initial pile of uranium and it will go “boom!” (insofar as this is *only *true of highly refined weapons-grade U-235, produced specifically for that purpose), but mainly I deny that there is a qualitative change rather than a quantitative change (the *same *qualitative thing occurring at an exponentially increased rate) in a nuclear explosion. Nuclear engineers relied on knowing what happens in nuclear fission and increasing the rate of its occurrence based on knowledge of this mechanism in order to produce nuclear explosions. I’m pretty sure they weren’t surprised by this amazing new ‘emergent property’ of “boom!” when they first created a critical mass of weapons-grade uranium. Do you think I’m mistaken? If so, where did I go wrong?
My friend, it was just a simplified description of the process, not the textbook description of how to create a nuclear explosion. Of course I did not go into technical details about U-235, it is not necessary for this discussion. The principle is what counts. (I could have brought up an example about the collapse of a star into a black hloe, where during the gradual cooling of the star the gravitational force will violently cause the star to collapse unto itself. Examples like this are endless.).

It seemes to me that your objection is the “sloppy” nature of the example given, but you agree that gradual, quantitative changes do lead (not always, but in certain circumstances) to qualitiatve changes, the emergence of new attributes, which cannot be simply reduced to the underlying “mass” of matter. Well, if so, it is just a minor disagreement.

I hope your lack of response to the other examples indicates basic agreement.
Why not just try to be a reasonable person and respond reasonably to reasonable queries that are put to you, then we’ll see what it is that we have to argue about. 🙂
I am trying. I hope I succedded above.
The “meter” is…? Elementary? Are you quite sure you’re not being too hasty here? Do you know what the standard meter in Paris is? Do you really think that what it is is “an arbitrarily selected distance”? Can you think of any other relevant description for what it might be?
The original definition of a meter was the 1/40,000,000th of the Equator. This was the basis for the length of the iridium rod in Paris. The new definition (accepted in 1983) is the distance what light covers in vacuum in 1/299,792,458th of a second. Tell me what is not arbitrary about this.

Again, the point was that equating God with goodness explains neither God, nor goodness. It is a meaningless tautology.
 
Do you think you’re being consistent when you say this (or is it a dodge)? Before, I was under the impression that you associated free will with a particular kind of metaphysical reality that might not exist, and presumably doesn’t exist if it is merely an epiphenomenon of particular physical (‘naturalistic’) phenomena. Now you seem to be equating free will with “what we experience as free will,” a formulation that precludes doubt about the existence of free will.
I’m pretty sure it’s not a dodge - or at least, it’s not intended to be so. I don’t believe I’m being inconsistent, either, in saying that we experience that which we take to be free will.

I’ll step a little to one side here and attempt to clarify (though please note that I say attempt - as a relatively new-at-it, self-taught amateur philosopher, I can’t guarantee the efficacy of my explanations…). Although I have yet to read Daniel Dennett’s Consciousness Explained (and am eager to get my hands on a copy), from various reviews I have read, his thesis seems to be that our self-awareness arises when we turn the mechanisms we use to understand others inward to ourselves. I think I’m correct in saying that free will must necessarily be a function of self-awareness.

The issue that seems to cause so much confusion in discussions such as this, is the idea that free will cannot exist as free will if it is the product of biological mechanisms. I don’t see how this necessarily follows. If conscious self-awareness is an emergent property of molecular activity in the brain - which I and several others hypothesise that it is - then our experience of conscious choice - free will - must also be a product of these biochemical interactions.

The thing is, we are almost never as free to choose as we might like to think we are - there are always constraints upon the choices we make, both external and perhaps to a greater extent, internal. Experience has been demonstrated to alter brain chemistry, such that certain activities and certain modes of thinking can become deeply ingrained. These are things that determine our personal preferences, and as such, shape and constrain our exercise of conscious choice.

A question I asked in a previous post, directed particularly at those who assume free will/conscious choice cannot be the result of biochemical functions, was as follows - if it is a product of such biochemical functions, how do they expect that it would feel any different to the experience they define as free will? This, as I said, is part of the problem of trying to understand ourselves from the inside. We can hypothesise that our thoughts and emotions are governed by molecular processes, but we can never be removed to an observer’s distance from those processes, in order to analyse them. It is also for this reason that I believe it is misleading to draw distinctions between brain, mind and self, unless we are to describe the mind as an emergent property of the brain. To me it seems spurious to declare that the mind - and thus consciousness - is an entity that has a separate existence to that of the physical brain.
 
So your mind and its contents are “less real” than “observed reality”, i.e. physical reality?
“Less real” is quite distinct from “independently existing”. To say that subjective experience is ‘less real’ than objective experience would be like saying that a flame is ‘less real’ than the candle it depends upon. Things that I experience - emotions, thoughts, understandings, exist in my mind, not outside of it. I can tell you about them, and you may be able to relate to them, but you cannot have my experiences for me, in the same way that you could visit the same building, drive the same car, handle the same object as I could. That is the difference between subjective and objective existence.
Why so convinced Chance and Necessity suffice to explain our existence? You are extremely complex but you are one being…
Because, as far as I can tell, they do suffice.
Morality is not less important but it becomes a human artifice without categorical imperatives, divorced from its physical context and doomed to frustration because of the frequent success of evil and injustice.
“Divorced from its physical context”? This seems to be confusing the issue. Morality is never independent of the physical existence of sentient beings. Morality, as a subjective construct, must exist upon an objective, physical substrate.

Also, I don’t see how the frequent success of evil and injustice are rendered any less frustrating by supposing morality to be divinely guided. The simple fact of the matter is that humans frequently fail to uphold ethical ideals, no matter what the source of those ideals may be.
Philosophy cannot be reduced to psychology…
So by spiritual needs, you meant philosophical insight?
The problem is to motivate people to become disinterested: telling them their values are products of the molecular properties of our brains and bodies will not do the trick…
Only if one automatically supposes that a biochemical source renders morality unimportant and uncompelling. If a person genuinely experiences value for something, I doubt they are going to stop valuing it if they understand the value as subjective.
Do you really believe you are disinterested and impartial? People often accuse others of faults they themselves have. The truth is that you strongly object to my analysis of atheism because it reveals flaws you do not wish to consider.
I don’t claim to be disinterested and impartial. As I have demonstrated, I strongly favour an atheistic worldview, based upon my own experience and research. And how is it that you claim to know the truth about me, while in previous posts you declared that it was foolish to make suppositions about the knowledge and experience of posters (which I have only ever done on the basis of what has been written). The fact of the matter is that if I had not considered the possibility that atheism necessarily implies hopelessness, I would not be here stating with confidence that it does not. On the contrary, your analysis reveals your own inherent bias towards theism, because that seems to be where you have found your own source of hope and moral certitude. My experience, as ought to be very clear from my posts, has been different.
You are reading into my statements motives which I do not harbour. I may respond to your sarcasm in similar fashion but you are simply getting a taste of your own medicine… One thing I do not do - of which you are clearly guilty - is to make comments about you and what you may have or have not done… For that there is no excuse.
Then please do not excuse yourself for stating earlier in this very post that I have failed to consider the implications of my own beliefs.
That is not closed-mindedness to the possibility of athism but belief in the logical implications of materialism which deprives existence of its value and purpose. You have actually stated that the universe is valueless and purposeless!
Value and purpose are metaphysically subjective qualities. If there were no sentient beings in the universe, there would be no-one to value it. It is not the existence of value I am disputing - it is the notion that value is inherent in entities, rather than ascribed by sentient valuers.
 
Firstly, to my mind, the notion that morality is metaphysically subjective is beyond question.
It is self-evident that all our thoughts about morality, science and everything else come from ourselves. Why is science not metaphysically subjective given that it is based on **our interpretation **of sense data?
If there is a gap between is and ought, as many ethical philosophers insist there is, it can only be bridged with recourse to reason and emotion, which are metaphysically subjective properties of sentient minds.
There is no gap between is and ought because both are mental categories created by us. It is an artificial gulf devised by human beings.
Because there is commonality to be found in human experience, though, we can speak of morality as though it were an object, thus it is epistemologically objective.
In that case morality is in the same boat as science because the existence of physical objects is also inferred.
Secondly, the essence and importance of morality are not, as far as I am concerned, reduced by supposing that morality arose through the evolution of humans as social animals.
The status of morality is clearly affected by whether human beings are animals which exist by chance or rational beings who exist by Design.
Our experiences of free will, of fellowship, of love, of compassion and empathy, are not lessened through having their basis in our biochemistry.
If all our experiences stem from our biochemistry our “evaluation” of them is beyond our control. There is no reason to regard one evaluation as superior to another because they are all equally insignificant in the amoral context of biochemistry.
They are still experiences integral to the life of the human animal.
They cannot be otherwise! But since morality is not generally associated with animals it is necessary to explain why this particular species is different from all the rest. At this juncture it is also necessary to explain what you understand by the term “morality” because it has various interpretations… from Hobbes to Kant…
Finally, I think it is a mistake to suppose that the logical end of grounding morality firmly in human biology and experience is a lack of commitment to it.
Since it is possible for a person to have commitment to any version of morality - including undiluted egoism - there is no prima facie reason to suppose it is a mistake. The real question is whether the biological version is adequate and worthy of commitment. Why should a particular species be singled out?
My experience has been that those who arrive at their own moral conclusions through experience and rational analysis carry their convictions more firmly than those who follow a preordained moral code.
This is certainly true of those with a criminal mentality!
 
So your mind and its contents are “less real” than “observed reality”, i.e. physical reality?
You are presupposing that the mind cannot exist independently. How do you** know** this is the case? You cannot deny that you have knowledge of thoughts, etc. Yet you do not have direct knowledge of external reality. Why then do you conclude that what you infer from what you perceive causes you to exist?
Why are you so convinced Chance and Necessity suffice to explain our existence? You are extremely complex but you are one being…
Because, as far as I can tell, they do suffice.

Do you live as if all your thoughts and decisions are due to Chance and Necessity?
Morality is not less important but it becomes a human artifice without categorical imperatives, divorced from its physical context and doomed to frustration because of the frequent success of evil and injustice.
“Divorced from its physical context”? This seems to be confusing the issue. Morality is never independent of the physical existence of sentient beings. Morality, as a subjective construct, **must **exist upon an objective, physical substrate.

Must? The mind cannot be disposed of as easily as that.
Also, I don’t see how the frequent success of evil and injustice are rendered any less frustrating by supposing morality to be divinely guided.
Because their success is limited to this life…
The simple fact of the matter is that humans frequently fail to uphold ethical ideals, no matter what the source of those ideals may be.
Not surprising - if one believes in free will.
Philosophy cannot be reduced to psychology…
So by spiritual needs, you meant philosophical insight?

That is certainly an aspect of spirituality which concerned with the development and fulfilment of a person’s pursuit of truth, beauty, goodness, justice, freedom, love and perfection - all of which are beyond the scope of science.
The problem is to motivate people to become disinterested: telling them their values are products of the molecular properties of our brains and bodies will not do the trick…
Only if one automatically supposes that a biochemical source renders morality unimportant and uncompelling.

Biochemistry is usually considered amoral…
If a person genuinely experiences value for something, I doubt they are going to stop valuing it if they understand the value as subjective.
If the majority of people genuinely experience value it indicates that the experience has an objective cause which is valuable and that life itself is objectively valuable. Otherwise value exists in a vacuum…
That is not closed-mindedness to the possibility of atheism but belief in the logical implications of materialism which deprives existence of its value and purpose. You have actually stated that the universe is
valueless and purposeless! Value and purpose are metaphysically subjective qualities

Before human beings existed there was purposeful activity on this planet. Purpose is therefore an independent, objective fact. It is arbitrary to divorce value from purpose. To deny that life was valuable before humanity appeared is to make man the measure of all things…
If there were no sentient beings in the universe, there would be no-one to value it. It is not the existence of value I am disputing - it is the notion that value is inherent in entities, rather than ascribed by sentient valuers.
This implies that all sentient beings who do not recognise their value are valueless…
 
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