…To rephrase SAC’s old motto, if war ensues, they have failed at their job, because “peace is their profession.” And they maintain the peace by maintaining a credible deterrent.
Somebody’s got to do it.
…
And the three things that nuclear deterrence must avoid are: genocide, suicide, and surrender.
There certainly is a logic to it, don’t get me wrong. In the abstract it works indefinitely against rational opponents with an interest in their own survival. In reality it has worked for more than 60 years thus far, and I’m sure it will continue to work until it doesn’t.
A problem I see is that it locks one into actually using the weapons when “demanded” by the rules of the “game” (for lack of a better word), otherwise the instant you don’t retaliate, the jig is up, the credible deterrence is lost. So in a way we become servants of these weapons, or more properly servants to the strategy. The weapons and the strategy have become our masters. We are no longer truly free. Our enemies can force our hand, and the problem then is that the response demanded by the strategy is truly horrific.
Now I know there are many different scenarios for possible use of nuclear weapons, ranging from limited tactical strikes to massive strategic responses. We have in place real, concrete strategies for massive retaliation with long-range, high yield, strategic weapons in response to a first strike by our enemies. This inevitably involves killing millions of innocents. Sure we primarily target their missile sites and military installations which may be located outside of population centers. But another top priority, perhaps equal to the missile sites, is to decapitate the opponent’s leadership which has command and control of their nuclear arsenal. For the sake of taking out Breshnev, we would take out Moscow. And they would take out Washington for the sake of our leadership. We (and our enemies) also target militarily important things like industrial centers and transportation hubs, which are inevitably located near population centers. I recall hearing back in the day the freeway interchanges that the Soviets targeted (or likely targeted??) in and around my hometown of Detroit, and thinking wow, I drive that freeway every day… Sure I can see the military relevance of the target, but I also see children incinerated by the thousands for the sake of that target.
And these lists of targets, these scenarios for use, which I think are highly immoral, had to be devised by people. Even if the intention is for them to never be used, they must be formulated with full intent to use if necessary. We have full intent to do something gravely immoral - to commit genocide in half an hour - “if it ever comes to that”, and “God help us that it never comes to that”. That is the inherent paradox of nuclear strategy to me.
A side note as well, this has been a multi-trillion dollar enterprise over the years. And to continue a credible deterrence, simply the maintenance and stewardship of our stockpile continues as a multi-billion dollar enterprise in perpetuity. There will come a day, perhaps in 50-100 years, not exactly clear, when we’ll need to start making new plutonium pits, and then I guess the costs ramp up again. And as it is we need to keep a certain number (in the thousands I would guess) of the weapons designers and engineers gainfully employed at all times so we don’t lose those skills. In addition we have what I call the amortized cost of the weapons program, in superfund sites like Hanford and Oak Ridge, which will cost in the tens of billions of dollars to clean up, if we ever figure out how to do it. Or we can ignore that and conveniently shift those costs to public health or permanently non-productive land, however we prefer…
Another little real-world detail about this that is interesting to me is the role of intelligence, and our understanding of our enemies and their motives. I think one of the lessons of the Cold War is that both sides actually had a pretty poor understanding of the inner workings of the other side. By the early 1980s the Soviet system was crumbling and the dinosaurs in power were terrified that the west was going to launch a first strike, so they had KGB officers in the west monitor for silly things like blood drives and increased slaughtering of cattle for food as impending signs of a first strike. Meanwhile we didn’t really have much in the way of insiders to tell us how paranoid and dysfunctional the Kremlin was during that era. Both sides perceived possible intent to launch first strikes where there was none, but in general the higher the anxiety level (real or imagined), the greater the chance one side is going to flinch and force the other into action. Supposedly Nixon even played this up a bit back in the '70s, intentionally projected an image of being just a little bit unhinged, crazy enough to carry out a massive retaliation, but came across as provocative and raising tension levels.
Anyway, to sum up, my belief is that the logic of nuclear deterrence is flawless until one looks into the details, and in the details it is gravely immoral as well as dangerous.