For example, you might think that contraception is wrong but I don’t. That is, I personally know I’m right.
https://dl.dropbox.com/sh/5no66brqf...AGW4sxvpQGOLB1Pv51H9D5W1UT-oS6angGkl-phvYbFAA
You personally know that you are. And in this case never the twain. I can’t determine your views for you and vice versa. That is what is meant by ‘moral standards are not binding on all moral agents’. To be specific, it means that ‘my’ moral standards are not binding on ‘all other’ moral agents. That is, you. I can’t decide for you what is right or wrong (unfortunately, you think you can for me).
This, I suspect, is the crux of the problem. We have a different concept of what
moral standards mean.
Moral principles, following traditional ethical thinking, are those which, by definition, are binding on all moral beings. If specific codes are not universally binding then they are not moral codes because they are not obligatory. So the question is, “Which rules of behaviour are those which are absolutely obligatory and which are not?” The former being moral standards, the others perhaps not, unless they can be shown to be otherwise.
From my POV there is no such thing as “
my moral standards,” there are only moral standards. Again, the question is which codes are worthy of being classed as “moral” and therefore obligatory to all and which are not?
I think the ethical water is muddied when we begin to speak of “my standards” because by doing so all dialogue ceases to be productive. The assumption then becomes that each person has an absolute right to their own view. This is problematic precisely because it removes the ground rules for what “moral” is, i.e., incumbent on all moral beings to follow, and makes morality an optional buy in. That, in turn, replaces the authority of morality with human fiat. All possibility for settling contentious moral issues is removed.
To dialogue effectively, the terms have to be clear.
Moral must definitionally mean
obligatory for all moral beings. At that point we can begin to delineate between which rules are moral rules and which fit some other class. Rules of behaviour may be pragmatic, happifying, codes of etiquette, customary, culturally appropriate, conducive to some end, etc., but these are not necessarily considered to be “moral” rules.
In fact, to properly engage in dialogue, I would insist that only those “rules” of behaviour that we would insist are obligatory for all moral agents be called “moral.” That means, by definition, moral standards are universally binding, and you are simply mistaken that your “moral standards” are not. If they are rightfully thought to be moral standards by anyone, then they are universally binding. If the person cannot envision them as universally binding then they are not. The burden of proof, then, is to demonstrate which rules are rightfully moral rules and which are not.
That is the only way that a discussion of moral values can proceed. If that basic definition can’t be agreed upon then there is no point in discussing the matter further.
It is like defining basketball by the fundamental “goal” of the game: to put the ball into the basket. All other procedural rules of basketball hinge upon that one.
If we can’t say “moral” means obligatory for all, then there is no point in bringing up the issue. Once that is agreed upon then we can discuss which “rules” ought to be mandatory and which are merely preferable or pragmatic.