Motives and Intentions

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  1. In terms of morality, what is the difference between a person’s motives and a person’s intentions in performing a certain action?
  2. What kind of impact (if any) do these differences have on the morality of a specific action?
 
  1. In terms of morality, what is the difference between a person’s motives and a person’s intentions in performing a certain action?
  2. What kind of impact (if any) do these differences have on the morality of a specific action?
CCC said:
1750 The morality of human acts depends on:
  • the object chosen;
  • the end in view or the intention;
  • the circumstances of the action.
The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the “sources,” or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.

In this context it seems that motive and intention are the same, because both explain why something is done, or not done.

If the object and circumstance are moral, the morality of the intent determines the morality of the action.
 
In this context it seems that motive and intention are the same, because both explain why something is done, or not done.

If the object and circumstance are moral, the morality of the intent determines the morality of the action.
Hi David,

Thanks for the reply. But I don’t think that motives and intentions are the same thing in morality… let me explain with an example.

My mortal enemy is drowning in a river. I wish for nothing more but for him or her to endure the most excruciating pain possible before they die. So, I decide that I will save my enemy from drowning, in order that I may inflict further suffering upon them before I throw them back in the river. My intention (wanting to save my mortal enemy) is good, and totally opposite of my motive (which is to save that person only so that I may inflict further suffering).

I’m having trouble distinguishing between intentions and motives, particularly when it comes to the utilitarian theories of morality.
 
Hi David,

Thanks for the reply. But I don’t think that motives and intentions are the same thing in morality… let me explain with an example.

My mortal enemy is drowning in a river. I wish for nothing more but for him or her to endure the most excruciating pain possible before they die. So, I decide that I will save my enemy from drowning, in order that I may inflict further suffering upon them before I throw them back in the river. My intention (wanting to save my mortal enemy) is good, and totally opposite of my motive (which is to save that person only so that I may inflict further suffering).

I’m having trouble distinguishing between intentions and motives, particularly when it comes to the utilitarian theories of morality.
It seems to me what you called intention (saving your enemy) is actually the moral object. So in your scenario your wrong intention (continue the torture) converts a moral good (saving someone from drowning) into a moral evil.
 
  1. In terms of morality, what is the difference between a person’s motives and a person’s intentions in performing a certain action?
  2. What kind of impact (if any) do these differences have on the morality of a specific action?
Pcg:

One can know the intent of someone who breaks into one’s house, without knowing the intruder’s motive. For example, an intruder may be carrying an empty portfolio holder and it might appear that his intention is to steal a priceless oil painting. While the motive might be the paying off of a potentially life-threatening debt with the money gained by selling the painting. An intent seems to be more closely related to the action itself and may actually determine the ‘action’, while a motive seems to be closer to the action’s purpose, and may be for something ulterior. In any event, they seem to be less than the width of a hair apart.

God bless,
jd
 
I wrote this in another thread:

The true is the known or the intelligible, any beings at least possibly in and relative to an intellect (and upon an intellectual act of reflection, the true transforms into knowledge); and the good is the desired or the desirable, any beings at least possibly wanted by and relative to a will (and upon an act of volition, the good transforms into virtue). Both truth and goodness, it seems, are rooted in actuality, or the respective potential acts of existing things/substances. [The substantial mode of x (that is, x insofar as it’s called a thing) =df x’s merely potential existence – x taken as a being only in its power to stand forth and exist, either in reality or to some mind – i.e., x solely in potency without any actuality.]

So the existence of all things, taken strictly as such, is true insofar as it stands forth to the intellect and good insofar as it stands forth to the will. Anything that’s either true or good necessarily exists already. The intellect is naturally inclined to intentionality, existence within the mind (a.k.a. intentions, or the ideal, as distinct from real things). The will is naturally inclined toward reality, to the real, beings existing outside the mind. [The reality of x =df the aspect of x which actually stands forth externally (and potentially exists internally) – x’s mode of existing beyond the intellect in a definite act. The intentionality of x =df the ideal mode of x, i.e., the aspect of x which stands forth internally and only potentially stands forth externally – x’s (merely) being by itself in the act of an intellect.]

I suppose an intention is the ideal essence of the potentially good end in the mind. The motive is the cause of definite motion toward it externally, whichever particular means that the will chooses in order to realize that precise goodness through action. The virtue of a moral act pertains to how well the ideal existence of the intention corresponds to the ultimate reality it causes in the end goal. *Virtuous *means tend to and eventually cause the perfection of actually good means through unity with their end – the final excellent reflection of true conformity between intellect and thing within reality. Virtuous habits, therefore, are those by which the will perfects its intellectual intention by giving it reality outside the mind, thus fully reflecting the goodness of the ideal.

Moral virtue pertains to the strength of true goodness in the will’s acts, the power of its habits.
Goodness, to the truth of intentions within the intellect’s knowledge.
Truth, to the conformity of the intellect’s active existence (its judging) with the external existence of real things.

(I hope that actually made any kind of sense.)
 
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