Mutually Assured Destruction

[consumedconvert]

And with what will you replace it?

Pushing the envelope on the development of sharable a global missile shield (perhaps in ten or twenty years?), drastic bilateral reductions in stockpiles, a freeze on new nuclear arms development, standing down alerts on the vast majority nuclear missiles–especially those aimed at Russia and China, because the risk of accidental nuclear war exists; and real steps toward progressive, verifiable nuclear disarmament.

 

[vern_humphrey]

For the system to work, there has to be a belief by the other side that we will retaliate. We have to have a policy of retaliation. The more believable we are, the better.

Correct.

So, it would be wrong of us to say here that we should claim we will retaliate, but not actually retaliate. Because by saying such a thing, it makes our retaliation policy sound like a bluff, and make the other side more willing to respond.

Again, correct

So, we have to claim we will retaliate, and be convincing. But, if there ever is a first strike on the way, … We can’t discuss it because we have to maintain the bluff for security reasons.

For the system to work, it can’t be a bluff.

In fact, I think we should extend MAD, and announce that a nuclear attack, on any nation, by any other nation, for any reason, will be regarded as a nuclear attack on the United States, and we will respons accordingly. I suspect the British and possibly the Russians and French would join us in this.

Here’s how it would work – nuclear weapons are mostly useful for blackmail. For example, when India developed nuclear weapons, their chief rival in the West, Pakistan had to follow suit – otherwise the balance between the two rivals would have been drastically altered in India’s favor.

But with a policy such as I outlined above, a nation in Pakistan’s situation could say, “Ho, hum. So you got 'em. You can’t use 'em.”

Non-nuclear nations would no longer feel pressured to develop nuclear weapons, and small nuclear nations would see that the maintenance of a nuclear arsenal was a wholly unnecessary expense.

We would then have leverage to start creating nuclear-free zones – with lots of help from other nations. And as a result, the danger of both nuclear war and of nuclear weapons falling into terrorist hands would be dramatically reduced.

 

[DL82]

What you effectively have in the world today, unlike during the Cold War, is a situation where the threat to the peace comes from completely irrational sources.

MAD only works when you’re rational.

In the Cold War, the NATO powers cared about the value of human life (at least in theory) while the Soviet Union at least cared (in theory) about their own population and the international proletariat.

What you have with groups like Al Qaeda or the North Korean dictatorship, is a tiny group of madmen who only care about themselves and their own crackpot ideas. Killing 99% of their own population and the rest of the world to achieve those ends would be acceptable to them.

That makes US Nuclear deterrence completely powerless against them.

You also have to realise that the fallout and radiation from a major global nuclear bombardment of the kind envisaged by NATO/USSR MAD strategies would trigger a nuclear winter and epidemic radiation sickness that would likely destroy all mammal life on Earth. Once you let off 100+ nukes, it doesn’t really matter how many more you let off, it’s just speeding up the inevitable.

From a purely theoretical point of view, does complicity matter when it comes to ‘civilian’ casualties in wars of mass destruction. E.g. were the people of Nazi Germany legitimate targets because they’d voted for Hitler in 1933? Were the people of the USSR legitimate targets because they were all members of the Communist Party and 99.5% of them had ‘voted’ for Stalin in a one-candidate election? What about the people of Israel, who are all (except the conscientious objectors) conscript reserves in the Israeli Army (even the women)?

 

[consumedconvert]

What you effectively have in the world today, unlike during the Cold War, is a situation where the threat to the peace comes from completely irrational sources.

MAD only works when you’re rational.

In the Cold War, the NATO powers cared about the value of human life (at least in theory) while the Soviet Union at least cared (in theory) about their own population and the international proletariat.

What you have with groups like Al Qaeda or the North Korean dictatorship, is a tiny group of madmen who only care about themselves and their own crackpot ideas. Killing 99% of their own population and the rest of the world to achieve those ends would be acceptable to them.

That makes US Nuclear deterrence completely powerless against them.

I completely agree. The only thing that pointing nukes toward Russia and China accomplishes is encouraging them to point nukes toward us, being divisive in international relations, and inching closer to an accidental exchange.

You also have to realise that the fallout and radiation from a major global nuclear bombardment

of the kind envisaged by NATO/USSR MAD strategies would trigger a nuclear winter and epidemic radiation sickness that would likely destroy all mammal life on Earth. Once you let off 100+ nukes, it doesn’t really matter how many more you let off, it’s just speeding up the inevitable.

From a purely theoretical point of view, does complicity matter when it comes to ‘civilian’ casualties in wars of mass destruction. E.g. were the people of Nazi Germany legitimate targets because they’d voted for Hitler in 1933? Were the people of the USSR legitimate targets because they were all members of the Communist Party and 99.5% of them had ‘voted’ for Stalin in a one-candidate election? What about the people of Israel, who are all (except the conscientious objectors) conscript reserves in the Israeli Army (even the women)?

With these truths in mind, this most holy synod makes its own the condemnations of total war already pronounced by recent popes,(2) and issues the following declaration.

Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation.

A civilian is any person who is not currently a part of the armed forces. It doesn’t matter who they voted for or who they’re rooting for, or even if they are veterans; to target them would be illicit.

 

[vern_humphrey]

What you effectively have in the world today, unlike during the Cold War, is a situation where the threat to the peace comes from completely irrational sources.

MAD only works when you’re rational.

You assume your “irrational sources” are truly irrational. They are not.

And we must understand that these sources – rational or not – cannot make nuclear weapons. If they are to use them, they must get them ready-made from some source.

In the Cold War, the NATO powers cared about the value of human life (at least in theory) while the Soviet Union at least cared (in theory) about their own population and the international proletariat.

What you have with groups like Al Qaeda or the North Korean dictatorship, is a tiny group of madmen who only care about themselves and their own crackpot ideas. Killing 99% of their own population and the rest of the world to achieve those ends would be acceptable to them.

You assume your “irrational sources” are truly irrational. They are not.

And we must understand that these sources – rational or not – cannot make nuclear weapons. If they are to use them, they must get them ready-made from some source.

That makes US Nuclear deterrence completely powerless against them.

You assume your “irrational sources” are truly irrational. They are not.

And we must understand that these sources – rational or not – cannot make nuclear weapons. If they are to use them, they must get them ready-made from some source.

You also have to realise that the fallout and radiation from a major global nuclear bombardment of the kind envisaged by NATO/USSR MAD strategies would trigger a nuclear winter and epidemic radiation sickness that would likely destroy all mammal life on Earth. Once you let off 100+ nukes, it doesn’t really matter how many more you let off, it’s just speeding up the inevitable.

That is why we have MAD – to prevent nuclear war.

From a purely theoretical point of view, does complicity matter when it comes to ‘civilian’ casualties in wars of mass destruction. E.g. were the people of Nazi Germany legitimate targets because they’d voted for Hitler in 1933? Were the people of the USSR legitimate targets because they were all members of the Communist Party and 99.5% of them had ‘voted’ for Stalin in a one-candidate election? What about the people of Israel, who are all (except the conscientious objectors) conscript reserves in the Israeli Army (even the women)?

That is why we have MAD – to prevent nuclear war.

 

[consumedconvert]

You assume your “irrational sources” are truly irrational. They are not.

And we must understand that these sources – rational or not – cannot make nuclear weapons. If they are to use them, they must get them ready-made from some source.

You assume your “irrational sources” are truly irrational. They are not.

And we must understand that these sources – rational or not – cannot make nuclear weapons. If they are to use them, they must get them ready-made from some source.

You assume your “irrational sources” are truly irrational. They are not.

And we must understand that these sources – rational or not – cannot make nuclear weapons. If they are to use them, they must get them ready-made from some source.

That is why we have MAD – to prevent nuclear war.

That is why we have MAD – to prevent nuclear war.

You don’t think Kim Jong Il made his own nukes?

 

[vern_humphrey]

You don’t think Kim Jong Il made his own nukes?

So Kim Il Jong = Osama Bin Laden?

You just killed your own argument – Kim Il Jong does have something to lose, which is why pressure works on him.

 

[consumedconvert]

Kim Jong Il doesn’t have that much to lose.

But even if we keep the deterrent against NK, I would argue that it’s darn near insane to keep weapons aimed at Russia, on high alert. This is not the cold war era, and I think we need to recognize that.

Which is why I favor steps toward bilateral reductions in nuclear stockpiles, taking the vast majority of nukes and all nukes designated for Russia and China off alert status, and toward progressive disarmament.

 

[vern_humphrey]

Kim Jong Il doesn’t have that much to lose.

Enough to bend to pressure.

But even if we keep the deterrent against NK, I would argue that it’s darn near insane to keep weapons aimed at Russia, on high alert.

Why?

And what do you mean by “aimed at Russia” and “on high alert?”

This is not the cold war era, and I think we need to recognize that.

Do you think the world is less dangerous?

Which is why I favor steps toward bilateral reductions in nuclear stockpiles,

How do you propose to do that, if you remove the disincentive for having nuclear weapons?

taking the vast majority of nukes and all nukes designated for Russia and China off alert status, and toward progressive disarmament.

How do you propose to do that, if you remove the disincentive for having nuclear weapons?

 

[consumedconvert]

Enough to bend to pressure.

Why?

And what do you mean by “aimed at Russia” and “on high alert?”

Do you think the world is less dangerous?

How do you propose to do that, if you remove the disincentive for having nuclear weapons?

How do you propose to do that, if you remove the disincentive for having nuclear weapons?

I don’t believe China or Russia want nuclear war any more than we do.

But since you ask…masterful diplomacy, international verification of disarmament, new and progressive ABM treaties. And if we get SDI off the ground, share it. Let the Russians and Chinese have the technology, help them develop their own ABM defenses, let them put their ABM base in Central America like we’re planning to put ours in Eastern Europe. Then, progressive reduction. I agree with the Vatican, that nuclear disarmament should be the ultimate goal of all nations.

 

[consumedconvert]

Enough to bend to pressure.

Why?

And what do you mean by “aimed at Russia” and “on high alert?”

As we know, the strategic nuclear forces of Russia and the United States possess all the three forms of combat capabilities: preventive (first) strike; launch-on-warning; and retaliatory strike capabilities. Deep ideological and political contradictions which developed between the two countries during the years of the Cold War gave rise to mistrust and suspicions which run just as deep and which have repeatedly brought about crisis situations. In the Cold War environment, both nations considered the launch-on-warning to be the primary form of combat, which determined the necessity to keep the forces on hair-trigger alert, ready to be employed literally in tens of seconds. Launch-on-warning, although significantly less topical now (compared to the Cold War period), continues to be the foundation of the nuclear policy of both Russia and the United States.

Attachment to launch-on-warning plays a more important role for Russia, whose primary strategic nuclear potential is concentrated on ground-launched missiles kept in silos. It is a known fact that given the modern-day precision and power characteristics of the U.S. strategic offensive arms, silo launchers can be destroyed by just one guided missile with a high degree of probability. If the United States abandoned the task of maintaining their SNF at high alert thus ceasing to pose a potential threat from the point of view of delivering a disabling strike, the launch-on-warning concept would become less important for Russia.

In order to assure a high degree of survivability, mobile missile systems must be in continuous random motion within the positioning area. However, in reality, they are kept most of the time in stationary shelters, thus increasing the probability of being hit in a surprise attack. At the same time, there can be no doubt that in the post-Cold War environment, both sides must take practical steps towards abandoning the launch-on-warning posture in favor of a purely retaliatory stance. This presupposes the extension of time required to prepare the missiles for launch, so that a nuclear war could not be started due to human or computer error.

ieer.org/russian/pubs/dlrtbk-e.html

Do you think the world is less dangerous?

I think it would be, if we multilaterally took serious and progressive steps toward nuclear disarmament. Besides, we have conventional weapons systems that are destructive enough.

 

[vern_humphrey]

I don’t believe China or Russia want nuclear war any more than we do.

Because why?

Why do they not want to attack us?

Could it be Mutual Assured Destruction?

But since you ask…masterful diplomacy, international verification of disarmament, new and progressive ABM treaties.

And you will personally teach our State Department how to conduct " masterful diplomacy?" And how to conduct “international verification” that will work even when countries throw the inspectors out?

And if we get SDI off the ground, share it. Let the Russians and Chinese have the technology, help them develop their own ABM defenses, let them put their ABM base in Central America like we’re planning to put ours in Eastern Europe.

That was Ronald Reagan’s idea.

Then, progressive reduction. I agree with the Vatican, that nuclear disarmament should be the ultimate goal of all nations.

Then we should not pursue strategies that will make nuclear war more, rather than less likely.

 

[consumedconvert]

Because why?

Why do they not want to attack us?

Could it be Mutual Assured Destruction?

Could it be that the Russian Federation recoils at destroying our population as we would recoil at destroying theirs?

And you will personally teach our State Department how to conduct " masterful diplomacy?" And how to conduct “international verification” that will work even when countries throw the inspectors out?

I hope we’ll have a president that lets the state department try harder–like renouncing pre-emptive nuclear strike for one, or renouncing nuclear retaliation for non-nuclear attacks. If we turn off our agressive stance on nukes, the world will be encouraged to do the same.

That was Ronald Reagan’s idea.

Good for him, I like Reagan, though he had his mistakes too.

Then we should not pursue strategies that will make nuclear war more, rather than less likely.

I’m confused–we persue the Vatican’s goal of universal nuclear disarmament by not taking steps to disarm?

 

[consumedconvert]

That was Ronald Reagan’s idea.

While we’re discussing Reagan’s ideas, let’s not forget that it was Reagan who proposed the bilateral dismantling of all ICBMs at Reykjavik. If Gorbechev had not insisted on the cancellation of SDI as a condition, we might not have ICBMs today.

 

[vern_humphrey]

While we’re discussing Reagan’s ideas, let’s not forget that it was Reagan who proposed the bilateral dismantling of all ICBMs at Reykjavik. If Gorbechev had not insisted on the cancellation of SDI as a condition, we might not have ICBMs today.

Let me get this straight – in order to dismantle all ICBMs, Gorbechev wanted us to abandon a system whose **only purpose **was to protect us against ICBMs?

 

[LRThunder]

Let me get this straight – in order to dismantle all ICBMs, Gorbechev wanted us to abandon a system whose **only purpose **was to protect us against ICBMs?

That sounds like a gang leader promising to stop sending in bank robbers if the bank dismantled its security systems. Sort of a fox guarding the chicken house so to speak.

 

[vern_humphrey]

Could it be that the Russian Federation recoils at destroying our population as we would recoil at destroying theirs?

Then disarmament should be easy, no?

But let’s not let our guard down while we go about it.

I hope we’ll have a president that lets the state department try harder–like renouncing pre-emptive nuclear strike for one, or renouncing nuclear retaliation for non-nuclear attacks. If we turn off our agressive stance on nukes, the world will be encouraged to do the same.

Let me get this straight – we first of all take off the gloves and then we step into the ring?

I’m confused–we persue the Vatican’s goal of universal nuclear disarmament by not taking steps to disarm?

Yes, you are confused. MAD is what keeps nuclear war at bay – which is what will allow us to eventually disarm.

 

[vern_humphrey]

That sounds like a gang leader promising to stop sending in bank robbers if the bank dismantled its security systems. Sort of a fox guarding the chicken house so to speak.

Sounds exactly like that.

And note that Reagan offered to share SDI with the USSR. Throw that into the mix and it looks even more like the fox agreeing not to steal chickens anymore – if the farmer sells his shotgun and leaves the hen house unlocked.

 

[pnewton]

The one thing that might destroy the effectiveness of MAD is if we end up with a president some day that other nations know is not capable of action. The “assured” part is essential. Without it, we are a target that will be hit one day.

 

[DL82]

One of the interesting ‘problems’ the US armed forces struggled with all through the Cold War was the so called ‘human deficit’.

The theory goes that a US soldier in a nuclear bunker was well-paid, raised in a country that valued individual freedom, protected by the law, and aware of the consequences of a nuclear war. By contrast a Soviet soldier in a nuclear bunker was poorly paid, could be shot on the orders of his political comissar, who could also put his family in the gulag, was raised in a country where following orders was the norm, and fed with propaganda. As a result, so the theory goes, a Soviet soldier was more likely to go ahead and execute the order to launch live warheads than an American soldier.

As a result, the US military went through all kinds of organisational gymnastics, including giving officers orders to shoot insubordinate colleagues in the event of a nuclear launch, and creating elaborate systems so that no one soldier knew whether he was loading a real or dummy warhead, or whether the launch codes were for a real launch or a drill, sort-of like a giant game of ‘Deal or No Deal’ but with deadly consequences.

In reality, the Russians were dealing with the exact same problem. In 1983, during a NATO exercise in West Germany, a Russian base commander used his authority to over-ride 5 warnings in 1 night from the Soviet satellite monitoring system. He knew the system well enough to know that it was just a glitch that created the warnings. Despite having saved the world from nuclear war, he was court-marshalled from the Soviet army for failing to follow procedures!

When you have a weapon so terrible that no human being, no matter how well trained, no matter what threats are made against his life, will willingly follow the order to launch it, that puts the whole notion of the nuclear deterrent up for question.