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Matthias123
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aquinasonline.com/Topics/firstway-assess.pdf
In a debate with someone I responded to the claim that the First Way is flawed. The above pdf is bascially what I responded to. Would anyone care to review my analysis, and tell me if I am correct or not?
The link I posted is not this person’s paper:
In a debate with someone I responded to the claim that the First Way is flawed. The above pdf is bascially what I responded to. Would anyone care to review my analysis, and tell me if I am correct or not?
The link I posted is not this person’s paper:
My response:The first paper I wrote was about Aquinas’s five ways and how easily defiable they are. I encourage you net to use his arguments to support your claims.
This I find highly unlikely. Antony Kenny, the famous expert on medieval philosophy, known as the “Analytic” Thomist wrote extensively on the five ways, and asserted that they in fact were flawed. The reason he came to this conclusion is he fell into the error that Thomas Aquinas warned in the beginning of De ente et essentia. He rejected the Thomistic theory of being because he said Thomas failed to connect the different types of beings into one unified theory. Antony Kenny ultimately failed to dethrone Thomas’s theory of being, and therefore we do not recognize the conclusions he come to as valid. As without the Thomistic understanding of beings the proofs fail, not due to the fault of the proofs, but due to the fact that one starts their reasoning with an error.
The problem today with the First way in Summa Theologica, is it is not easily compatible with modern theoretical physics. This is not because the First way is faulty, but because it modern physics operates on mechanism. Physics is operating on a flawed understanding of being, in order to gain more specific knowledge of beings in reality. The reason for this is that the Scholastics of the 17th century abused the idea of the substantial form, by explaining any new phenomenon by assigning it yet another accidental property. Thus the old joke “The poppy makes the man sleep because it has the sleep inducing property” becomes apparent.
Therefore the new philosophers, in response to the legitimate problems with the substantial form at the time, attacked the notion with great success. The response of the Aristotelian philosophers was to further physicalize the substantial form thus preventing from acting as a formal cause, which was the reason it was postulated in the first place. They asserted they could describe things much better with mechanism, and there was no need for the substantial form. This was true, they could explain the specifics much better, but mechanism wrought its own ruin when it claimed it could explain all of objective reality. Since then there have been some developments, as mechanism came under attack at the beginning of the 20th century. One of the main objections was that if a particle could move from A to B, then it should also sometimes move from B to A. Therefore you should, in some isolated circumstances see causality going backwards – the idea of a man being killed by a gunshot before the assailant pulled the trigger is absurd. The substantial form in contrast does not suffer from this difficulty because the are immutable. Also according to the mechanists the particle per se, was indestructible. With the advent of advanced particle physics, we know this to be completely false. We know that the smallest elementary particle is a quark, and we also know they it are not indestructible. So therefore if the quark can be destroyed, we need to explain this destruction. The substantial form would be able to explain such a phenomenon, as we can describe it as the destruction of the substantial form of the substance (quark). Or even if you are a fan of M-Theory, that postulates the existence of “Strings”, which are one dimensional bisects of two dimensional objects vibrating in 11th dimensional space – you are still faced with the reality that the strings are not indestructible… Read More
Now because modern physics operates on methodological mechanism (which it should, because it is the best method for explaining specific characteristics of matter), it becomes hard to use the First way, because modern physics does not have the concept of formal causality. As you must know, Aristotelian motion is the process of the efficient cause imposing a formal cause on a material cause to obtain a final cause. Now when you take out the formal cause, the proof does not work as intended. Next this brings as back to the issue of being, because Thomas described being per se as the fusion of the “act of existing” and essence”. So if you do not start with the proper understanding of being, you are going to error.
Now this was a valid critique that Anthony Kenny pointed out – Aristotelian motion is problematic in modern physics. Now this doesn’t mean either one of them is flawed, it just means that there are issues.
Other then this, I don’t really know what you could say about them. They do not even assume the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The only thing they assume is that something cannot come out of nothing. Now perhaps you pointed to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics to prove that something does come out of nothing, for we can see that virtual particles appear seemingly out of nowhere in a vacuum. This however would be false because what they are doing is quantum tunnelling from quantum nothingness into our universe. This “quantum nothingness” is often mistaken for metaphysical nothingness. Now this is not the case – although this is the greatest nothing we can imagine, it is not “nothingness” per se. The first reason is that the laws of physics exist in this quantum nothingness. The second reason is that metaphysically “nothingness” per se cannot exist, because it is a metaphysical evil. If nothing existed, then something would exist, and that something would be nothing. So we must come to the conclusion that what the particle physics are talking about when they say “tunnelling” from nothing, is really tunnelling from something to something else.