S
St_Gregory
Guest
I would like your opinions of my discussion:
(I could add a Christian appendix that I’ve written, which shows how the God is the Ontological Argument is perfectly compatible with the God of Christianity, if people would also like to see.)
(Premise 1) take idea x: x is the absolute greatest object logically possible (and logic is the strict principles of validity)
(P2) all categories (such as mammal, triangle and language) must always be connected with any necessary properties (such as suckling the young, having three sides and an expression of meaning)
(P3) if we attempt to deduce the necessary properties of x we struggle since absolute greatest greatness is beyond our experience and potential of understanding. However where a binary option is suggested we can confidently determine which option is greater and thus which would be connected with x: thus x is good, since goodness is greater than evil, x is knowing, since knowledge is greater than ignorance, x has power since power is greater than weakness, and x has actual and real existence, since actual and real existence is greater than non-existence or mealy mental, or anti-real, existence (especially because x is good) – and this must also be necessary since necessity is greater than contingency
(P4) where any logical absolute law is valid, such as (P2), such a law must be valid in the real world as well as in the world of ideas. (Thus a mammal must suckle their young, triangles have three sides and language expresses meaning is the real world as well as in the world of ideas)
Gaunilo:
(C1) If I substitute “absolute greatest island” into (P1) x, I would absurdly conclude that it exists in the real world
(R) No because its existence would have to be contingent since a property of an actual physical island is contingent existence. So if you applied the logical procedures of the argument to an absolute greatest island then it would have to deduce in (P3) the property of “existence conditioned by God” and it would be flawed to deduce “necessary existence” of the island. Nothing has the property of necessary existence except God because God has it because S/He is the absolute greatest object logically possible.
(C2) Something may exist in mentality but not in reality: a picture can exist in the artists mind without being instantiated
(R) But there is no logical absurdity in suggesting a non-existent and mealy mental picture because it is only a contingent object: God is a being which necessarily exists in reality and so it really would be absurd to suggest that S/He only exists in the mind.
T. Aquinas:
(C1) We cannot know God’s nature: it’s a mystery. So using God’s nature to deduce that S/He exists is foolish and vanity.
(R) True we cannot know God’s nature but we can know of it and thus deduce some things about it (i.e. conceive of a mysterious hypothetical x and then deduce some properties that necessarily must be connected with x), just like we do not know what aa is but we do know of it and then deduce that it is positive (because, if* a *is -ve then aa is +ve since -ve times -ve equals +ve, and if a is +ve then aa is again positive since +ve times +ve equals +ve.) Similarly, we cannot know what God is but we can know of Him/Her and then deduce God’s existence.
I. Kant:
(C1) While you may not be able to separate necessary existence from God, if you remove God then God’s existence is removed naturally; just like you cannot separate three sides from a triangle but you can remove the triangle and be confident the three sides no longer exist.
(R) But you cannot remove God because S/He has necessary existence so your criticism is null.
God exists – nothing can change that – just like triangles have three sides. Yes you can remove a triangle along with its sides but only because it does not have necessary existence – if it did then you could never remove it at all – but it is meaningless to think of removing something which does have necessary existence.
(C2) Existence is not a predicate
(R) From our subjective position existence is a predicate because it describes the object’s effect (weight, size, usefulness, threat etc) and state (instantiated or not).
Furthermore when we consider something having necessary existence (i.e. it’s existence is key to it’s nature) it quite clearly becomes an objective predicate: if we take two similar objects x and y, where x and y are like each other but x has necessary existence and y has only contingent existence, then x and y have fundamentally different natures and x’s necessary existence is certainly a predicate.
(I could add a Christian appendix that I’ve written, which shows how the God is the Ontological Argument is perfectly compatible with the God of Christianity, if people would also like to see.)
I will present my version of (St) Anselm of Canterbury’s Ontological Argument for the existence of God. I have included the key ideas of both forms of his argument and drawn greater attention to the precise meaning and connection of the premises. I will then look at the many criticisms of the argument which serves two purposes: to evaluate the argument, and to draw attention to the strict laws of logic that come into play and see if they are used validly in the argument. Finally I will make a conclusion.
My phrasing of Anselm’s Ontological Argument for the existence of God:(Premise 1) take idea x: x is the absolute greatest object logically possible (and logic is the strict principles of validity)
(P2) all categories (such as mammal, triangle and language) must always be connected with any necessary properties (such as suckling the young, having three sides and an expression of meaning)
(P3) if we attempt to deduce the necessary properties of x we struggle since absolute greatest greatness is beyond our experience and potential of understanding. However where a binary option is suggested we can confidently determine which option is greater and thus which would be connected with x: thus x is good, since goodness is greater than evil, x is knowing, since knowledge is greater than ignorance, x has power since power is greater than weakness, and x has actual and real existence, since actual and real existence is greater than non-existence or mealy mental, or anti-real, existence (especially because x is good) – and this must also be necessary since necessity is greater than contingency
(P4) where any logical absolute law is valid, such as (P2), such a law must be valid in the real world as well as in the world of ideas. (Thus a mammal must suckle their young, triangles have three sides and language expresses meaning is the real world as well as in the world of ideas)
(Conclusion) x must be connected with actual and real existence in the real world; as well as goodness, knowledge and power (x = ”God”.) Furthermore once God is deduced as a necessary Being then logically every other object (or event) is relatively contingent (except logic and maths which exist necessarily as absolute valid laws) for the simple reason that it is greater the have conditioning power over other objects than not.
Criticisms (C) and replies (R):Gaunilo:
(C1) If I substitute “absolute greatest island” into (P1) x, I would absurdly conclude that it exists in the real world
(R) No because its existence would have to be contingent since a property of an actual physical island is contingent existence. So if you applied the logical procedures of the argument to an absolute greatest island then it would have to deduce in (P3) the property of “existence conditioned by God” and it would be flawed to deduce “necessary existence” of the island. Nothing has the property of necessary existence except God because God has it because S/He is the absolute greatest object logically possible.
(C2) Something may exist in mentality but not in reality: a picture can exist in the artists mind without being instantiated
(R) But there is no logical absurdity in suggesting a non-existent and mealy mental picture because it is only a contingent object: God is a being which necessarily exists in reality and so it really would be absurd to suggest that S/He only exists in the mind.
T. Aquinas:
(C1) We cannot know God’s nature: it’s a mystery. So using God’s nature to deduce that S/He exists is foolish and vanity.
(R) True we cannot know God’s nature but we can know of it and thus deduce some things about it (i.e. conceive of a mysterious hypothetical x and then deduce some properties that necessarily must be connected with x), just like we do not know what aa is but we do know of it and then deduce that it is positive (because, if* a *is -ve then aa is +ve since -ve times -ve equals +ve, and if a is +ve then aa is again positive since +ve times +ve equals +ve.) Similarly, we cannot know what God is but we can know of Him/Her and then deduce God’s existence.
I. Kant:
(C1) While you may not be able to separate necessary existence from God, if you remove God then God’s existence is removed naturally; just like you cannot separate three sides from a triangle but you can remove the triangle and be confident the three sides no longer exist.
(R) But you cannot remove God because S/He has necessary existence so your criticism is null.
God exists – nothing can change that – just like triangles have three sides. Yes you can remove a triangle along with its sides but only because it does not have necessary existence – if it did then you could never remove it at all – but it is meaningless to think of removing something which does have necessary existence.
(C2) Existence is not a predicate
(R) From our subjective position existence is a predicate because it describes the object’s effect (weight, size, usefulness, threat etc) and state (instantiated or not).
Furthermore when we consider something having necessary existence (i.e. it’s existence is key to it’s nature) it quite clearly becomes an objective predicate: if we take two similar objects x and y, where x and y are like each other but x has necessary existence and y has only contingent existence, then x and y have fundamentally different natures and x’s necessary existence is certainly a predicate.