My discussion of the Ontological Argument

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St_Gregory

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I would like your opinions of my discussion:
(I could add a Christian appendix that I’ve written, which shows how the God is the Ontological Argument is perfectly compatible with the God of Christianity, if people would also like to see.)

I will present my version of (St) Anselm of Canterbury’s Ontological Argument for the existence of God. I have included the key ideas of both forms of his argument and drawn greater attention to the precise meaning and connection of the premises. I will then look at the many criticisms of the argument which serves two purposes: to evaluate the argument, and to draw attention to the strict laws of logic that come into play and see if they are used validly in the argument. Finally I will make a conclusion.​

My phrasing of Anselm’s Ontological Argument for the existence of God:

(Premise 1) take idea x: x is the absolute greatest object logically possible (and logic is the strict principles of validity)

(P2) all categories (such as mammal, triangle and language) must always be connected with any necessary properties (such as suckling the young, having three sides and an expression of meaning)

(P3) if we attempt to deduce the necessary properties of x we struggle since absolute greatest greatness is beyond our experience and potential of understanding. However where a binary option is suggested we can confidently determine which option is greater and thus which would be connected with x: thus x is good, since goodness is greater than evil, x is knowing, since knowledge is greater than ignorance, x has power since power is greater than weakness, and x has actual and real existence, since actual and real existence is greater than non-existence or mealy mental, or anti-real, existence (especially because x is good) – and this must also be necessary since necessity is greater than contingency

(P4) where any logical absolute law is valid, such as (P2), such a law must be valid in the real world as well as in the world of ideas. (Thus a mammal must suckle their young, triangles have three sides and language expresses meaning is the real world as well as in the world of ideas)

(Conclusion) x must be connected with actual and real existence in the real world; as well as goodness, knowledge and power (x = ”God”.) Furthermore once God is deduced as a necessary Being then logically every other object (or event) is relatively contingent (except logic and maths which exist necessarily as absolute valid laws) for the simple reason that it is greater the have conditioning power over other objects than not.​

Criticisms (C) and replies (R):

Gaunilo:
(C1) If I substitute “absolute greatest island” into (P1) x, I would absurdly conclude that it exists in the real world
(R) No because its existence would have to be contingent since a property of an actual physical island is contingent existence. So if you applied the logical procedures of the argument to an absolute greatest island then it would have to deduce in (P3) the property of “existence conditioned by God” and it would be flawed to deduce “necessary existence” of the island. Nothing has the property of necessary existence except God because God has it because S/He is the absolute greatest object logically possible.

(C2) Something may exist in mentality but not in reality: a picture can exist in the artists mind without being instantiated
(R) But there is no logical absurdity in suggesting a non-existent and mealy mental picture because it is only a contingent object: God is a being which necessarily exists in reality and so it really would be absurd to suggest that S/He only exists in the mind.

T. Aquinas:
(C1) We cannot know God’s nature: it’s a mystery. So using God’s nature to deduce that S/He exists is foolish and vanity.
(R) True we cannot know God’s nature but we can know of it and thus deduce some things about it (i.e. conceive of a mysterious hypothetical x and then deduce some properties that necessarily must be connected with x), just like we do not know what aa is but we do know of it and then deduce that it is positive (because, if* a *is -ve then aa is +ve since -ve times -ve equals +ve, and if a is +ve then aa is again positive since +ve times +ve equals +ve.) Similarly, we cannot know what God is but we can know of Him/Her and then deduce God’s existence.

I. Kant:
(C1) While you may not be able to separate necessary existence from God, if you remove God then God’s existence is removed naturally; just like you cannot separate three sides from a triangle but you can remove the triangle and be confident the three sides no longer exist.
(R) But you cannot remove God because S/He has necessary existence so your criticism is null.
God exists – nothing can change that – just like triangles have three sides. Yes you can remove a triangle along with its sides but only because it does not have necessary existence – if it did then you could never remove it at all – but it is meaningless to think of removing something which does have necessary existence.

(C2) Existence is not a predicate
(R) From our subjective position existence is a predicate because it describes the object’s effect (weight, size, usefulness, threat etc) and state (instantiated or not).
Furthermore when we consider something having necessary existence (i.e. it’s existence is key to it’s nature) it quite clearly becomes an objective predicate: if we take two similar objects x and y, where x and y are like each other but x has necessary existence and y has only contingent existence, then x and y have fundamentally different natures and x’s necessary existence is certainly a predicate.
 
continued:

D. Hume:
(C1) However much a concept contains, we must go further than the concept to determine whether it exists or not: we cannot define something into existence.
(R) But if valid logic tells us that a concept must be instantiated then we can know it exists: it’s not about defining God into existence but rather deducing that S/He does exist.

B. Russell:
(C1) Concept + Instance = Realisation, but this argument fails to demonstrate an instance of God and so God’s existence cannot be realised using the Ontological Argument.
(R) While an instance has not be sensibly (of the senses) demonstrated, nevertheless a logical necessity that there is an instance of God has been validly deduced from the initial concept.​

Conclusion:

I cannot ultimately fault the logic of the argument and so I think the argument should be taken more seriously than it has been so far. It may well be that our current understanding of logic is flawed and so there may be a subtle error with the argument – but until this is identified the argument holds strong.
We shouldn’t make the mistake of thinking of the Ontological Argument as just playing around with semantics which labels “God” as “something which exists” - it works on logical laws to reach a valid conclusion.

What do you think?
 
I had the pleasure of going over this in a few of my undergrad philosophy courses, and we broke it down to the following:
  1. A property ‘P’ is essential to a thing ‘T’, if and only if T cannot be clearly conceived of without P. (Your example of the triangle is what we used, i.e. you cannot conceive of a triangle with anything other than 3 sides, it has the essential property ‘3-sidedness’).
  2. An absolutely perfect being (APB) would not be so without the property “existence”, for it cannot be clearly conceived of without it (i.e. it cannot be perfect without the property ‘existence’).
  3. God is an APB.
  4. Therefore, God must exist.
An error we discussed, similar to Guanilo’s example, is that it seems we can call any being an APB. For example, we can use Descartes Evil Deceiver. We can call a being an APB, but logic does not dictate that it MUST be omnibenovolent. For all intents and purposes it could be omni-malevolent. Given that it is not a contingent being, like the island, it seems we have proof of the Evil Deceiver. Further, we do no have to make even that absurd assumption. We can also say Shiva, goddess of destruction, is an APB, therefore she must exist. We can use any godhead, so as the saying goes, it proves too much, therefore it proves nothing at all.
Furthermore, even if, for some reason, we can throw those criticisms aside, there is still another problem. There is a necessary component that comes with belief in God: faith. Even if we accepted Anselm’s Ontological argument we do not necessarily get God, we just get god. That is, it is faith that tells Christians that God the Father is the one and only God. Natural reason can take us to God, but it is faith that tells us who and what God is.
Fascinating topic. It is good to see this argument is still alive, even if I am wrong.
 
Thanks for your reply.
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SumEns:
An error we discussed, similar to Guanilo’s example, is that it seems we can call any being an APB. For example, we can use Descartes Evil Deceiver. We can call a being an APB, but logic does not dictate that it MUST be omnibenovolent. For all intents and purposes it could be omni-malevolent. Given that it is not a contingent being, like the island, it seems we have proof of the Evil Deceiver.
But surely goodness is greater than evil since evil is falling short of good? Goodness = bringing fulfillment, while, evil = causes corruption and so I’d say goodness is undoubtably greater than evil.
Further, we do no have to make even that absurd assumption. We can also say Shiva, goddess of destruction, is an APB, therefore she must exist. We can use any godhead, so as the saying goes, it proves too much, therefore it proves nothing at all.
But once God is deduced then everything else is necessarily contingent relative to God’s conditioning. Shiva cannot exist unless God conditions her existence which means there’s nothing ultimately “Absolute” about her.
Or else we could say Shiva does exist but that she is mealy a flawed understanding of God.
Furthermore, even if, for some reason, we can throw those criticisms aside, there is still another problem. There is a necessary component that comes with belief in God: faith. Even if we accepted Anselm’s Ontological argument we do not necessarily get God, we just get god. That is, it is faith that tells Christians that God the Father is the one and only God. Natural reason can take us to God, but it is faith that tells us who and what God is.
Well I agree with you, but firstly I am primarily just concerned with exploring the argument rather than proving God to atheists and secondly even if we prove that “god” exists, that’s still a significant step towards true Theism.
 
With respect to whether goodness or evil trumps one or the other, I agree good ought to be the better. However, logically speaking, Anselm’s argument could be used to support a deistic ideal of a god, or, possibly, that God , being perfect, is perfectly neutral. In other words, it may make sense to us that good trumps evil, but is there logical support for it? If yes, then Anselm’s argument will get a great boost, but it will need a larger argument that presents good as logically/necessarily tied to God. If not, then we have a proof that works for God just as much as it works for the Evil Deceiver, or maybe the APB which is apathetic. Hence, he is right back at proving too much…

I think Anselm has a convincing argument, but there needs to be some logical additions in order to come to his conclusion, not to mention a healthy dose of faith.

One of the criticisms you mentioned was predication of ‘existence’ to God. I think predicating existence to God may be difficult. Aquinas tells us in the Summa Theologica that God is existence, or God is ‘esse’ (being itself), so it seems that even if we could use ‘existence’ to refer to a property of ‘a’ being, would we really want to say ‘existence’ is a PROPERTY of God, if God IS existence? Aquinas says that in a sense we can think of God as ‘a’ being (Latin: ens), in as much as we can ‘think’ about God as a thing, but this is metaphorical only because God is esse, being itself.

As far as atheists go, this could be a 100% valid/sound logically rigorous argument and they would still deny it. Augustine was right, people will choose their own ‘truth’ so long as it serves them.
 
With respect to whether goodness or evil trumps one or the other, I agree good ought to be the better. However, logically speaking, Anselm’s argument could be used to support a deistic ideal of a god, or, possibly, that God , being perfect, is perfectly neutral. In other words, it may make sense to us that good trumps evil, but is there logical support for it? If yes, then Anselm’s argument will get a great boost, but it will need a larger argument that presents good as logically/necessarily tied to God. If not, then we have a proof that works for God just as much as it works for the Evil Deceiver, or maybe the APB which is apathetic. Hence, he is right back at proving too much…
I think Anselm has a convincing argument, but there needs to be some logical additions in order to come to his conclusion, not to mention a healthy dose of faith.
I agree.
So the argument needs greater work on a more Christian God.
One of the criticisms you mentioned was predication of ‘existence’ to God. I think predicating existence to God may be difficult. Aquinas tells us in the Summa Theologica that God is existence, or God is ‘esse’ (being itself), so it seems that even if we could use ‘existence’ to refer to a property of ‘a’ being, would we really want to say ‘existence’ is a PROPERTY of God, if God IS existence? Aquinas says that in a sense we can think of God as ‘a’ being (Latin: ens), in as much as we can ‘think’ about God as a thing, but this is metaphorical only because God is esse, being itself.
Well I accept that God is pure existence philosophically, but I don’t see why we still cannot consider existence, or at least necessary existence, as a predicate. After all I am Gregory Joseph Fenn, and it will be fine to predicate me with the property of Gregory Joseph Fenn-ness.
As far as atheists go, this could be a 100% valid/sound logically rigorous argument and they would still deny it. Augustine was right, people will choose their own ‘truth’ so long as it serves them.
True
 
You said: “Well I accept that God is pure existence philosophically, but I don’t see why we still cannot consider existence, or at least necessary existence, as a predicate. After all I am Gregory Joseph Fenn, and it will be fine to predicate me with the property of Gregory Joseph Fenn-ness.”

We can say that God is a necessary being, for without him there is no foundation for other beings (this is one of Aquinas’ Quinque via, or the 5 ways/proofs, i.e. from contingency and necessity). All other beings are contingent upon Him, who is necessary. When we speak about a person or object we understand that ‘being/existence’ is not a part of that objects essence, whereas it is for God. The Fenn-ness, is your essence (or form as Aquinas refers to it), that which makes you what you are, or the essential characteristics that, without which, you would not be you, aka a mind. Aquinas says our essence is our form/soul/mind which actualizes the matter thus making us who/what we are. After the union of form to matter we can say that Fenn is ‘A’ being. Therefore, we can refer to Fenn as having the contingent property existence. God, on the other hand, is form only, or, as Aquinas says, pure actuality (or non-contingent). It is not a property, but His essence. It does not really make sense to say that something is, essentially, a property that it possesses. Rather, it does make sense to refer to ‘a’ being having property ‘p’.
 
No problem. Let me know if there is anything else I can clear up, or make more confusing (as the case may be). Peace.
 
Hi guys,

Charles Hartshorne’s book Anselm’s Discovery is very good on this subject. As I recall, the consensus is that the first form of the argument fails, but the version from Prosl. III is a considerably stronger argument which was only rediscovered in the last century.

This is my layman’s understanding of it. If we take the religious idea of God (the One Who is Worshipped), then the logic of worship compels us to exalt only the greatest. God then must be the greatest conceivable being. Harthorne also uses “unsurpassible” with reference to deity.

Assuming this definition of God is meaningful, what consequences flow from that? Well, looking first at different modes of existence, we see two types: necessary and contingent existence. Which is greater? Necessary existence. This must therefore be an attribute of God who is the greatest and unsurpassable being by definition.

Therefore, if our idea of God makes sense, he must exist necessarily.

I’ve always thought this is compelling argument for God’s existence.
 
So, according to Hartshorne, what was Anselm’s great discovery? Just this: If we define God as the the Greatest Conceivable Being or the Unsurpassable Being, necessary existence is entailed in that definition.

As St. Greg said in the first post:
all categories (such as mammal, triangle and language) must always be connected with any necessary properties (such as suckling the young, having three sides and an expression of meaning)
(P3) if we attempt to deduce the necessary properties of x we struggle since absolute greatest greatness is beyond our experience and potential of understanding. However where a binary option is suggested we can confidently determine which option is greater and thus which would be connected with x: thus x is good, since goodness is greater than evil, x is knowing, since knowledge is greater than ignorance, x has power since power is greater than weakness, and x has actual and real existence, since actual and real existence is greater than non-existence or mealy mental, or anti-real, existence (especially because x is good) – and this must also be necessary since necessity is greater than contingency
If we define God as the greatest, his necessary existence turns out to be one of his necessary properties.
 
Now is that cool or what?

The only way to argue agin this argument is to attack the definition and say it “dunna make no sense.”

Framed this way, the OA demonstrates conclusively, IMHO, that we really have only two choices when it comes to God. Either He exists, or the very idea of God is meaningless.
 
Greg,

I agree with SumEns and Kant that existence cannot be a predicate. That is what spoils Anselm’s first formulaton of the OA in Prosl. II. But if we keep our focus on the principle that necessary existence is the greater mode of existence (see Prosl. III), then the argument works.
 
I believe God is beyond existence and non-existence. God is beyond everything. Imagine any concept, including existence and necessary existence, and know that the gap between God and that concept is infinite such that that concept is more false of God than it is true of God.

Only thing we can say is God is God. Actually we can’t even say that b/c we are saying God “is” God and our concept of “is” and the reality which is God are so far apart that you can’t say “is” of God. So all we can do is utter under our breath:

God.

In an act of awe, i.e. worshipful love. As human poets, we expand on this in song and religion.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_theology
 
Hi jf,

The Western Christian tradition, while it has produced its share of mystics, has a healthy respect for reason. Following Anselm and St. Tom, I agree that reason can lead us to knowledge of God’s existence and maybe some of his attributes (e.g. necessary existence). But the vast bulk of what we know about God comes from revelation.

Your position, however, seems to abandon reason altogether. Dat don’t make no sense, IMHO.
 
When we define something such as God, or that-than-which-no-greater-can-be-coceived we run into logical errors. If we say that it is in the definition of God to exist we are making an analytical statement: God exists. That statement can be restated as: If God exists, then God exists. This is a tautology, a logical fallacy.

I think Aquinas was right about this. We should not think of God as having the property ‘existence’, becuase ‘existence’ is His essence. This may be a bad analogy, but it would be akin to saying that I am my ‘arm’, because an arm is in the definition of what a human being is (although this is clearly fallicious, the form/essence of a human being, as Aquinas says, is our soul/mind).

Further more, as I have mentioned earlier, that even if we accepted this as a valid argument for the existence of god, we still do not get God. That is where faith comes in. No proof no matter how logically rigorous will not tell us that God is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as Frank pointed out (“But the vast bulk of what we know about God comes from revelation.”). Proofs will only open the door to faith. After the door is open it is our resposibility to either walk through it, or ignore it.

As far as saying what God is, or is not, we hit a wall. Again, we can go with Aquinas with Negative Theology as jfhh pointed out, and we can also use analogical statements. When we think about it, an Absolutely Perfect Being seems to defy definition, another reason why Anselm’s argument falls short.
 
Hi SumEns,
When we define something such as God, or that-than-which-no-greater-can-be-coceived we run into logical errors. If we say that it is in the definition of God to exist we are making an analytical statement: God exists. That statement can be restated as: If God exists, then God exists. This is a tautology, a logical fallacy.
Is it really tautological to say:
God is the greatest conceivable being. Therefore, because he is the GCB, he must exist.
?
 
I think Aquinas was right about this. We should not think of God as having the property ‘existence’, becuase ‘existence’ is His essence. This may be a bad analogy, but it would be akin to saying that I am my ‘arm’, because an arm is in the definition of what a human being is (although this is clearly fallicious, the form/essence of a human being, as Aquinas says, is our soul/mind).
I agree. We should think of God as having the property of being necessarily existing as opposed to contingently existing. Existence itself isn’t a property.
 
When we define something such as God, or that-than-which-no-greater-can-be-coceived we run into logical errors. If we say that it is in the definition of God to exist we are making an analytical statement: God exists. That statement can be restated as: If God exists, then God exists. This is a tautology, a logical fallacy.
Well I’d argue that because in my version of the argument I used an arbitrary “x” and worked from there. I appreciate that defining something as that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived is defining it as existing - but we are still validly saying that there MUST exist a ttwngcbc because of the logical steps. I’m not saying I’d trust the argument with my religion but I do not see any real error in it.
 
I don’t think you need argumentation to show people God. You just need to make them aware of God. That’s not so much an intellectual effort as it is a spiritual and interpersonal effort. There is an aspiration for God, a desire to be God (or if you prefer “divine”) or be with God or be like God (God-like or God-ly) in every person’s heart. Once a person uncovers that aspiration in himself, that’s all that is needed. No arguments are necessary nor would they be helpful.

I agree that whatever relationship “existence” has with God is not that of being a property of God … that really is making God much smaller, much less holy and wondrous than he really is; it’s making him into like any other being when he is (to use poetry) Being itself and the ground of all being. But we cannot say he is Being since our concept of “Being” does not do him justice; there’s an infinite gap between any concept and God. Our concepts don’t just paint an imperfect picture; they paint a mere yearning and aspiration and are more false than true, God and the god of our understanding is infinitely different.

Even the concept of the Trinity is infinitely different from the reality that is God. IMO, the revelation of the Trinity is an accomodation. For the Trinity to be unveiled in human language in all its infinite glory would be impossible. So here too there is an infinite gap between our concept and the reality it yearns towards. I believe this is recognized in the West, with the Trinity being recognized as a mystery not only in the sense of it being necessary to be revealed (contra Anselm) but also in the sense of its reality infinitely surpassing human understanding and comprehension. In other words, I believe in the West it is recognized that there is more to the Trinity that we do NOT know than that we do know and that in fact there is infinitely more to it that we do NOT know than that we do know. Also, as someone alluded to above, in the West it is recognized that ALL our knowledge of God including Trinitarian knowledge is not knowledge in the strict sense but only in a looser sense.

We must have humility. Our concept of God is as distant from God as the concept pagans had of the Sun being God was as distant from God. The Sun may in an INFINITESIMAL way shine the glory of God. Likewise our concept of the good may shine in an infinitesimal way the glory of God. We cannot say that God is wise for we do not what true infinite wisdom is. I love these words

you are dust and to dust you shall return

Even if there should be no afterlife, we should trust in God that God knows best and everything is for the best. But as we have an aspiration to live forever, we can embrace and believe in that aspiration. Some here think scholastic-like intellectual thought is the only way to rightly come to a belief. But I disagree. Beliefs can arise from an aspiration or inspiration in one’s heart, one’s inner being. And IMO, that is the way to convince atheists and agnostics.

Think of all the creatures possible in the infinite gap between man and God. What wonders there may be out there in the universe? Scientists all share that wonder as do sci-fi fans. See my point?
 
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