My proof for God's existence

[fosio]

I’ve read all the arguments for God’s existence and I’ve found all of them to have significant flaws or weaknesses. But, I’ve developed my own argument for God’s existence and I think it works. Even if it doesn’t I’d still believe in God since I would believe no matter what the evidence; that’s what faith is all about.

Possibility here is metaphysical possibility.

It is possible for there to be something awesome.
It is possible for there to be something infinitely awesome.
For something to possibly be, there must be something actual that grounds that possibility of being.
There is something actual that grounds the possibility of there being something infinitely awesome.
Whatever grounds the possibility of there being something infinitely awesome, must itself be quite awesome.
So something quite awesome exists, i.e. a god since “god” just means something quite awesome.

 

[Eucharisted]

Faith is proof of things not seen (Hebrews 11:1)

 

[TheWhim]

I’d like to persuade you to reformulate your argument. As it stands now, it does not work.

There is quite an unexpected turn woven into the argument, or at least I felt it to be a turn.
Until the bottom line, I was convinced that the infinitely awesome being was to mean God, while the just awesome thing basically represented the universe. However, after the last line resolves this confusion, the argument leaves unadressed what it meant to have had understood with the term ‘infinitely awesome’ it introduced at the beginning. There’s even a contradiction here. For if God is only just awesome, how can anything more awesome than God himself, who is perfection himself, be imagined, that is, be possible? Well, I’ll recast my misguided interpretation of your argument here, and the astonishment I felt when reading the conclusion.

It is possible for there to be something awesome.

Ah, well, surely enough, there’re always some phenomenons in this universe that make us stand back and hold our breath in wonder, deference or sheer felicity.

It is possible for there to be something infinitely awesome.

Indeed, it is possible. Infinity, in my idea, always approaches the concept of God, thus I believe God to be implied here.

For something to possibly be, there must be something actual that grounds that possibility of being.
There is something actual that grounds the possibility of there being something infinitely awesome.
Whatever grounds the possibility of there being something infinitely awesome, must itself be quite awesome.

Well, to be sure. The stringent air of the causal principle is mixed with an appeal to basic human sentiment here. - It is a truth recognized ever since people have been looking out at the stars, and, overpowered by a sense of recognition of purposeful structure, drew the conclusion that there has to be someone more wonderful still and who had put this wondrous scenery of stars into place. - This is the aesthetic or emotional experience that accompanys even the dryest purely theoretical twist of the cosmological argument: the sense of wonder and of there being something greater still that made this awesome miracle we call the universe come true.

So something quite awesome exists, i.e. a god since “god” just means something quite awesome.

WHAT!??? (See my introductory explanations.)

 

[punkforchrist]

Hi fosio,

I think you’ve tapped into the same intuition that inspired St. Anselm’s ontological argument. In fact, the more I think about it, it seems that you’re defending something akin to Plantinga’s modal ontological argument:

1. There exists a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated.
2. An entity is maximally great if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and necessary (re: exists in all possible worlds).
3. Everything that is possibly necessary exists in all possible worlds.
4. Hence, a maximally great entity exists in all possible worlds.
5. Therefore, a maximally great entity exists.

The argument is logically valid, depending on the S5 axiom in premise (3), which is actually quite defensible. The key premise is therefore (1). There doesn’t appear to be any more reason to accept (1) than ~(1), at least prima facie. Nevertheless, Plantinga contends that this argument, at the very least, provides rationally acceptable reasons for belief in God.

I’m not defending or objecting to the argument, but it’s definitely something to chew on…

 

[Anthony_A]

A short reply before I head out the door:

Possibility here is metaphysical possibility.

It is possible for there to be something awesome.
It is possible for there to be something infinitely awesome.

I think you may be stuck here. Aside from premise one being incredibly vague (just what constitutes as being “awesome”?) your second premise is question begging. If all that exists is the physical universe (and its physical constituents) then premise 2 is false because everything in the universe is finite and could not be infinitely “awesome”. Now, being a theist, I don’t believe that the only thing that exists is the physical universe (as you know), but in order for your argument to be sound you would have to do more to convince me that there are other things in the metaphysical realm that exists that are not physical. So, you are stuck at premise 2 even if I grant you the vague premise 1.

 

[fosio]

Hi fosio,

I think you’ve tapped into the same intuition that inspired St. Anselm’s ontological argument. In fact, the more I think about it, it seems that you’re defending something akin to Plantinga’s modal ontological argument:

1. There exists a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated.
2. An entity is maximally great if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and necessary (re: exists in all possible worlds).
3. Everything that is possibly necessary exists in all possible worlds.
4. Hence, a maximally great entity exists in all possible worlds.
5. Therefore, a maximally great entity exists.

The argument is logically valid, depending on the S5 axiom in premise (3), which is actually quite defensible. The key premise is therefore (1). There doesn’t appear to be any more reason to accept (1) than ~(1), at least prima facie. Nevertheless, Plantinga contends that this argument, at the very least, provides rationally acceptable reasons for belief in God.

I’m not defending or objecting to the argument, but it’s definitely something to chew on…

Yes I am familiar with this argument. I am a little skeptical of whether possible worlds properties are real or just a mental construction. But I think usually they can correlate with some kind of real property so they are a convenient device. I think the weakness of the argument is as you have pointed out. My own I feel is stronger since it doesn’t realy on the possibility of any necessary being, but only the possibility of something infinitely awesome. Even if one doesn’t accept that something infinitely awesome can possibly exist, there is at least no finite upper bound to the awesomeness of possible things – so, I would argue that for each level of possible awesomeness, something actually awesome must ground its possibility. And since there’s no finite upper bound to possible awesomeness, it seems there cannot be a finite upper bound to the awesomeness of things needed to ground their possibility.

 

[fosio]

A short reply before I head out the door:

I think you may be stuck here. Aside from premise one being incredibly vague (just what constitutes as being “awesome”?) your second premise is question begging. If all that exists is the physical universe (and its physical constituents) then premise 2 is false because everything in the universe is finite and could not be infinitely “awesome”. Now, being a theist, I don’t believe that the only thing that exists is the physical universe (as you know), but in order for your argument to be sound you would have to do more to convince me that there are other things in the metaphysical realm that exists that are not physical. So, you are stuck at premise 2 even if I grant you the vague premise 1.

See my other post that would answer some of your objections. As for the remaining ones, if “awesome” is not to your liking, one can simply replace it with some other god-like property. The critical feature of the property is that it correspond to some hierachy of being – i.e. for the properpty P, some things are more P and other things are less P. Even those who deny that things like goodness are real would at least have hiearchy of being in terms of simplicity or complexity. I believe Richard Dawkins uses this hiearchy of being to argue against the existence of God. So we can use his use of it to make my argument work. For a complex thing to be possible (assuming complexity is higher in the hierachy as Richard Dawkins does – it works just as well with simplicity), something complex must ground its possibility. Since Richard Dawkins finds complex things awe-inspiring, the argument works. And I think if vagueness is an issue, it will be an issue that does not directly relate to the existence of god (I personally prefer lower case since it emphasizes the meaning of the word rather than making it a proper noun specific to a religion). For if there is vagueness in god-like properties, then you are taking issue not with my argument as such but the very concept of god. But as I said, any concept will work.

An additional comment on infinity – you seem to equate awesomeness of physical things to their size or at least constrained by their size. I don’t think that’s correct. A tiny diamond can be vastly more awesome than a vast desert. And besides that, there is nothing in physics that suggests the universe is finite in dimension. When physicists speak of the universe as finite, they mean only the visible universe (limited by the speed of light). And even if the universe in toto were finite in dimension, that does not mean there could not be infinite structures within that finitude of dimension. For example, if there are no fundamental particles but instead a never ending well of more and more elementary particles (like sets that are not well-founded), then there can be infinite structures in finite space. But more importantly, none of this matters since my premise is not that there is something infinitely awesome but only that something infinitely awesome is a metaphysical possibility. Not epistemic possibility. Just metaphysical possibility. Every scientist on earth recognizes that an infinite universe is a metaphysical possibility. And as I noted in my other reply, the issue of infinity can be skirted in another way.

 

[Anthony_A]

Let’s consider this argument in terms of philosophical zombies, a physically identical “person” to you, me, or anyone else, but who lacks conscious experience. I have edited your post to reflect a zombie possibility argument.

Possibility here is metaphysical possibility.

It is possible for there to be (zombies) (lacking conscious experience).
It is possible for there to be (zombies) infinitely (lacking conscious experience).
For something to possibly be, there must be something actual that grounds that possibility of being. (same)
There is something actual that grounds the possibility of there being (zombies) infinitely (lacking conscious experience).
Whatever grounds the possibility of there being (zombies) infinitely (lacking conscious experience), must itself be quite (lacking conscious experience).
So something quite (lacking conscious experience) exists, i.e. a (zombie) since “(zombie)” just means something quite (lacking conscious experience).

Since premise two may seem odd, it should be clarified that it would imply that there is no chance for the zombie to ever experience the world consciously. So, you have actually exceeding Chalmers’ intentions and “proved” that zombies aren’t just possible but that they do exist (or, at the very least, one zombie exists).

 

[Anthony_A]

See my other post that would answer some of your objections. As for the remaining ones, if “awesome” is not to your liking, one can simply replace it with some other god-like property. The critical feature of the property is that it correspond to some hierachy of being – i.e. for the properpty P, some things are more P and other things are less P.

…

An additional comment on infinity – you seem to equate awesomeness of physical things to their size or at least constrained by their size. I don’t think that’s correct. A tiny diamond can be vastly more awesome than a vast desert.

I never brought size into this. As for the more P and less P, consider the property of “being God” (having all traditional Judeo-Christian properties of Divinity). How could this principle of hierarchy apply to that instance? Wouldn’t something more God be God? And what of a less God? I don’t mean that in the sense that I am less than God or an angel is less than God, but for a being to simply be less God. “Less infinite” comes to mind, but how does that work?

 

[fosio]

Let’s consider this argument in terms of philosophical zombies, a physically identical “person” to you, me, or anyone else, but who lacks conscious experience. I have edited your post to reflect a zombie possibility argument.

The problem is your zombies are not metaphysically possible and apart from that, your argument does not follow the logic of my own. Lacking in consciousness first of all is not a real property but a negative property. Secondly, even if it were a real property, it is not a property that moves one higher in the hiearchy of being. Perhaps you misunderstood what I was saying about simplicity versus complexity – when I said it works just as well for simplicity, I was meaning that it works regardless of whether you choose to put simplicity or complexity as higher in the hiearchy of being (and then use one or the other accordingly in the argument).

 

[Anthony_A]

Why is a zombie not metaphysically possible? Why wouldn’t the property of being self-conscious put me on a higher level than, say, a piece of carpet?

Suppose the proposition “zombies lack conscious experience of the world” is analytic like the proposition “a perfect being lacks all imperfections”. Or, “An awesome being lacks all properties which would not make him/her awesome.” Why is this so troubling?

 

[praise_Jesus_1]

How do you suppose that it is possible for something to be “infinitely awesome”?

How are you defining ‘infinite’ here?

 

[Anthony_A]

another question: have you actually proved “god” in the sense of Divinity? I think someone might be willing to accept all of your premises and say that the conclusion yields the existence of a material being.

and, I apologize for scattering my objections over 3 posts. they simply didn’t come to me all at once.

 

[fosio]

Why is a zombie not metaphysically possible? Why wouldn’t the property of being self-conscious put me on a higher level than, say, a piece of carpet?

Let me address the second question first which is unrelated to the first. The properpty of being conscious DOES put you on a higher level. The problem with your argument is it supposed that being NOT conscious put you on a higher level – at least if your argument was to have any application to my own. I never claimed that if a possible object has any nameable property P that an actual object with P must ground its possibility. I never even claimed that for real properties. What I claimed is that if a possible object has in one degree/level a property P where P maps to some kind of hierachy of being, that an actual object with some degree of P must exist. Furthermore, I made use of the lack of finite upper bounds for degrees of P for the realm of possible objects to show that the same must be true of actual objects.

I’ll give you two separate arguments that show why your zombies are metaphysically impossible.

1. It is contrary to Christianity (IMO). Even if such were logically possible in themselves, God would never bring about such monstrosities so they cannot be metaphysically possible or logically compossible with God. Since God exists in every possible world, these monstrosities do not exist in every possible world. Ergo they are metaphysically impossible.
2. Information processing is something “reducible” to physical processes. This has already been demonstrated. But information processing cannot be comprehended apart from understanding the processing as a conscious process. For if something is processing information, it is ipso facto understanding it. And if it is understanding it, it is ipso facto conscious. Information processing=understanding; and understanding and consciousness are metaphysically joined in every possible world.

Suppose the proposition “zombies lack conscious experience of the world” is analytic

The proposition “the set of all sets not members of themselves is not a member of itself” is also “analytic” but we know that it is decidedly false. And moreover, analyticity just has to do with the consequences of our concepts. If the concept itself is metaphysically or even logically incoherent – like your zombies – then of course we are going to get contradictions from it.

Why is this so troubling?

Your zombies are not troubling to me since I don’t think they are metaphysically possible. If they were metaphysically possible, then I would have to deal with the fact that there are innumerable possible worlds out there with your monstrosities in them and that would be a disquieting thought. But I don’t think that is leading me here. I think I am grounded in reason in rejecting your zombies.

 

[fosio]

another question: have you actually proved “god” in the sense of Divinity? I think someone might be willing to accept all of your premises and say that the conclusion yields the existence of a material being.

and, I apologize for scattering my objections over 3 posts. they simply didn’t come to me all at once.

It proves that either there is a being with infinite awesomeness or for every being that is awesome, there is some being that is even more awesome such that there is no finite upper bound to the awesomeness that might inhere in some being or other. If this latter possibility is true, then we might then FURTHER argue: what grounds the actual existence of this collection of awesome beings where their awesomeness cannot be circumscribed to any finite bound? Well that actual thing can be grounded in either an infinite awesomeness or in a finite awesomeness (or collection thereof) – but if it’s grounded in a finite awesomeness then that level of awesomeness would ALREADY exist in that aforementioned collection of actual awesome beings and moreover there would be a level of awesomeness GREATER than it in that collection. Ergo, it must be grounded in an infinite awesomeness. So either way, something infinitely awesome must exist.

 

[Anthony_A]

Let me address the second question first which is unrelated to the first. The properpty of being conscious DOES put you on a higher level. The problem with your argument is it supposed that being NOT conscious put you on a higher level – at least if your argument was to have any application to my own.

Not really, I was given an argument for a “minimally awesome” being as it were. Couldn’t the argument be applied as a proof of an infinitely evil being? It doesn’t matter if puts you on a higher level, just that it clearly distinguishes the said being from other beings.

I’ll give you two separate arguments that show why your zombies are metaphysically impossible.

1. It is contrary to Christianity (IMO). Even if such were logically possible in themselves, God would never bring about such monstrosities so they cannot be metaphysically possible or logically compossible with God. Since God exists in every possible world, these monstrosities do not exist in every possible world. Ergo they are metaphysically impossible.

I respect your opinion that it conflicts with Christianity, but your reason for it is pure assertion. How do you know God would never bring zombies about? You have not presented any argument for your understanding of God’s will, so I don’t think you really have the privilege to assume God would be on your side of this debate.

1. Information processing is something “reducible” to physical processes. This has already been demonstrated. But information processing cannot be comprehended apart from understanding the processing as a conscious process. For if something is processing information, it is ipso facto understanding it. And if it is understanding it, it is ipso facto conscious. Information processing=understanding; and understanding and consciousness are metaphysically joined in every possible world.

Wow. I really expected something much stronger. Computers process information, as does the iPhone, a television, etc, so are these devices consciously understanding these information process? A thermostat processes information, is it conscious? Chalmers has a section in his book called “What it’s like to be a thermostat” in which he says the thermostat does have consciousness. I doubt you are committed to that view. You mentioned Searle in my thread about AI as an attempted refutation of my functionalism. Searle would 100% disagree with what you just said. Though I’m not sure if you are a committed student of his theories, or if you just like using his objections when it’s convenient for you.

I really don’t see the logical necessity of information processing and conscious experience of it, but let’s suppose that your little argument actually does work (in some possible world because it certainly doesn’t work in this actual world) you, the physicalist, would still need to be able to reduce qualia. If qualia can’t be reduced, we have one instance of a non-physical thing in the world and physicalism is not true when even one immaterial fact surfaces.

 

[praise_Jesus_1]

I still don’t understand how you can just say something is infinitely awesome just because there exists something awesome.

There exists large numbers, but that doesn’t mean there is an infinitely large number. (Unless you specifically define the concept of infinity)

 

[wanstronian]

Possibility here is metaphysical possibility.

It is possible for there to be something awesome.
It is possible for there to be something infinitely awesome.
For something to possibly be, there must be something actual that grounds that possibility of being.
There is something actual that grounds the possibility of there being something infinitely awesome.
Whatever grounds the possibility of there being something infinitely awesome, must itself be quite awesome.
So something quite awesome exists, i.e. a god since “god” just means something quite awesome.

I think your ‘proof’ falls down before you get to your first statement.

The OED definition of ‘metaphysical’ is, amongst others:
“Excessively subtle or abstract”
“Not empirically verifiable”
“Immaterial, incorporeal, supersensible; supernatural”
“That transcends matter or the physical”
“Fanciful, imaginary”

So before you even start, you’re caveating your ‘proof’ by saying that it’s not based on anything verifiable - thereby defeating the argument before it begins. In fact, to distil your ‘proof’ down, you appear to be saying: “Based on my belief in something awesome, which I shall call God, God must exist. QED, goodnight.”

Leaving aside the subjectivity of what is awesome or not, your ‘proof’ is nothing of the kind - merely a circular affirmation of what you happen to believe.

I’m also amazed that you say:

Even if it doesn’t I’d still believe in God since I would believe no matter what the evidence

So even if it were proved that God doesn’t exist - to the same level of evidence as the law of Gravity… you’d still believe? (Would that be God just testing the faithful by ‘planting the evidence’ for his non-existence?) You may call that faith - I’d have another word for it.

 

[Anthony_A]

Fosio,

Some additional concerns:

It seems to me, upon further reflection, that your proof of God’s existence does nothing than prove the existence of a Platonic Form if it even succeeds. There’s nothing to suggest that the property of awesomeness entails a self-conscious entity that is the 3-O god.

It seems this a priori argument turns out to be false upon a posteriori reflection. And I think you even concede this when you say “Well that actual thing can be grounded in either an infinite awesomeness or in a finite awesomeness (or collection thereof) – but if it’s grounded in a finite awesomeness then that level of awesomeness would ALREADY exist in that aforementioned collection of actual awesome beings and moreover there would be a level of awesomeness GREATER than it in that collection”.

But there’s no logical way to jump from “well it doesn’t exist in finitude” to “okay so it must be an immaterial, infinite being”. Again, if it succeeds the conclusion sounds like a Platonic Form.

Also, are you familiar with the work of Christof Koch? He is a neurobiologist working in the field of consciousness. He specializes in the neural correlates of consciousness. Anyway, he discusses zombies throughout his works. He thinks that a lot of our everyday actions are done unconsciously (like when you drive on the highway for a long time and you aren’t consciously aware of what you are doing) and finds it perplexing that we even have consciousness because everything could be done without a subjective experience of the event.

Here’s an interesting article written by Koch and Crick: The Zombie Within

 

[Anthony_A]

Hmm, looks like my link won’t work. If can can proxy access Google Scholar through a school that pays for a subscription to Nature you will be able to read it.