Myth of evolution and new drug discovery

[itinerant1]

As you say, this is not the place for this and we’ll have to pick this up elsewhere, but you will have to lay out in detail what you claim to be Descartes’ error, and how Enlightenment and modern philosophers attempted (and failed) to escape it, because so far you have merely opined that these errors exist without demonstrating what they are or why you believe them to be errors. I give you fair warning that I am a philosophical naturalist who holds with what I believe to be good reason the idea that the brain/mind can attain a reasonably accurate knowledge of some aspects of physical reality and I do not think that it is difficult to show that, for example, Plantinga’s EAAN fails.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

Okay then. I need no warnings from you about your views. I’ve been around the block. And Plantinga does not represent the last word on the subject.

We can agree, it seems, that the mind can attain truth about the external world. It is foolish to deny that the human mind can know external reality existing independently of the mind. The crux of the matter is whether your explanation of the fact the mind attains truth has any real merit. Descartes, and most modern philosophers utterly failed. It would have been much easier for subsequent philosophers to have corrected the Cartesian error than to spin off a multitude of elaborate responses one way or another.

Historically, it is just a textbook example of Aristotle’s dictum that a little error in the beginning amounts to a colossal one in the end. As important as they are, adding brain studies to the mix does not alter the fundamental philosophical problems, nor does it resolve them in the least.

I am just putting your view in its proper historical context. But then again, I look greatly look forward to arguing my seemingly arrogant position in another thread.

 

[itinerant1]

This is false, as the Quiroga work is precisely that - evidence that a single concept is embodied in a specific network.

Now who’s being dogmatic? I understand that you think you’re talking to a fellow-traveller here, but what this reveals is an a priori view, a prejudice, that assumes your preferred position.

But in all seriousness, I am very interested in understanding the argument that you would use to show that the inability to explain consciousness using scientific methods logically entails the conclusion that mind exists in a non-material domain.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

Nothing at all here that is a priori. Your statement reveals a total lack of knowledge of literally centuries of reflection and debates by countless thinkers addressing these matters…Try *a posteriori * and you will approach closer to the truth of the matter.

To re-assert “Quiroga” is to refuse to address or respond to anything contrary to your own position. You need to explain how particular and limited matter and energy can account for what is not particular but universal in intention or meaning. That brain states are involved in mental states is a given. Now let’s move beyond the basics. The medievals realized that even without sophisticated brain studies. It seems you have not gotten off of first base.

The intellect uses the phantasms and percepts of the brain. Hence, we have an intimate interaction. What is valid in Quiroga’s research proves nothing more. Interpretations of the significance of data is an entirely different matter. I do not see that you are progressing one iota in proving your position.

Again, human perception is enlightened by universal concepts. Perception of an individual person or the written name of a person involves both percepts and concepts. Of course, there will be corresponding changes in brain states. I know that without brain studies. It seems you are arguing in a circle without addressing the issues I have discussed.

You are most welcome to show how my perception of your discussion is in error.

 

[hecd2]

I will attempt to define a critical problem and lay some ground for further discussion. It’s a challenge for me to present my ideas withouth using all of the technical terms I am used to working with. Simply put there is the modern *sensist *or radical empericist challenge to the traditional understanding of concepts. This is one of the areas where ancient and medieval psychology exhibit more perceptive and accurate insights than does modern psychology, each school basically influenced by a particular school of philosophy.

Sensists categorically deny the immateriality of the intellect by denying the evidence. They maintain that there is no intellect distinct from sensation and imagination, and that all acts of the mind are sensory in nature. Ideas are asserted to be sensory signs of the objects intended or meant. There are different lines of argument with various contemporary philosophical naturalists, but the fundamental distinctions made below between images, percepts and ideas or concepts is likewise denied.

Sensists deny that we have any universal or abstract ideas. These they say are merely sensory images or phantasms of the imagination. However, a brief comparison of ideas and images will show why ideas cannot be “embodied” in the brain.

The elements that costitute an image or phantasm are qualities of material objects as perceived by the external senses of the body. They are qualities such as shape, temperature, color, size, weight, tone, loudness, motion, rest, and so on. These qualities are represented in the image with the concreteness they have in particular physical things in the environment. We imagine a color, and it is a concrete thing or surface of a particular color possessing a particular shade, tone, and hue. It is not the abstract notion of color, or the essence of color. The three distictinctive features of images are materiality, concreteness, and particularity.

On the other hand, universal ideas are essentially different from percepts and images. Ideas have universal signification. An image has only particular reference. For example, the concept of “building” refers to any of millions of structures in that class. By concepts we are able to classify. The notion of "building can refer equally to the Empire State Building, the no longer extant Twin Towers (and the third tower), St. Patrick’s Cathedral, and Colonel Sanders KFC facility.

Clearly, concepts and images have different content. Concepts represent the essence or nature, the “whatness” of a thng. My abstract idea of a three-sided enclosed geometric figure, the triangle, has no determinate length, color, size, etc. Every image of a triangle, though, as with every triangle existing outside the mind, has determiniate lines, angles, length, color, position, etc.

Every physical thing in nature is and must be a particular thing. One will never encounter a universal thing in nature. Existing universals are radically beyond the nature of physical matter and energy. Hence, we must posit their mode of being as extra-natural or non-physical. The physical brain, constituted as it is of matter and energy, has not the ability as matter and energy to produce what is not matter and energy, i.e. the universal concept.

That is the beginning of my argument. Response?

It is too late for me and I am too tired to absorb this never mind to respond properly to it, so I hope you don’t mind waiting a day or two.

One thing jumps out at me though - I expected at some stage you would put forward a realist interpretation of universals as an argument. Well, I do not see why such an interpretation of universals is warranted. I am a nominalist - to put it simply, what you call universals are post hoc categories that we create based on similarities between particular things that exist in space and time. I deny that universals exist separate from particular things (and their properties and behaviour) which are constituted of matter-energy existing in space and time. Such “universals” are not truly universal, but are subject to individual interpretation, empirical modification, cultural perspective and so on.

Mathematical concepts is the one area in which a Platonic argument seems to carry some weight. I will argue however, that mathematical concepts are either a categorisation and abstraction of physical objects or their descriptors; or that they are based on the manipulation of a set of symbols according to strict rules set out as axioms and that they lack any realisable physical correlate - they are an extension of our ability to process language and are not separate entities possessing tropes at all.

I have already said more than I planned to.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[itinerant1]

I think you should be careful how you use this argument for it belongs to the same species as the arguments put forward by members of the Design Institute in a different area. If we were to agree that the mind belongs to a different non-material domain not accessible to science or amenable to analysis, then what should we do about neuroscience, human psychology, or psychiatry? Should we just abandon attempts to understand how abstractions, self-consciousness, theory of mind and free will are processed in the brain? Should we abandon the hard problem as fundamentally unsolvable?

Oh no! Me making an ID argument. I’d should be flogged without mercy if that were true. I have no sympathy with ID’s science killer ideology. My position differs from ID in that I recognize the proper limits of the particular sciences. Being a philosophical materialist you will not agree with my view of the legitimacy of philosophical psychology, only scientific psychology.

Philosophical psychology has a noble historical tradition. The not so noble tradition, in my view, is represented by the philosophical elements in Freudian psychology. For instance, the Freudian concepts of Ego, Superego, and Id are strictly philosophical. These philosophical concepts represents perversions via Brentano to Freud of the more accurate notions in Aristotelian psychology of Speculative and Practical Intellect and the non-rational Appetites.

Other areas of philosophical errors by Freud is his failure to recognize the philosophical distinction between potentiality and actuality. He treated the child as polymorphously perverse. In truth he should have said the child was polymorphously perversable. The difference is critical. I could go on with other philosophical elements in scientific schools of psychology, but I hope you see the point with these few examples.

The one thing the Discovery Institute lacks is philosophical awareness. It is certainly in short supply with ID theorists.

Yep - it’s too blunt. Just as a practical matter we have physics, but we also have inorganic chemistry, organic chemistry, biochemistry, biology as areas of study. Although the boundaries between these can be somewhat blurred, what characterises the boundaries is the emergence of properties which cannot be explained in detail from the principles of the more fundamental science. And that’s just within science. Music, art, poetry are not merely physics; ethics and morals are not merely physics; and love, honour and courage are not merely physics. To characterise all philosophical naturalists as extreme reductionists is to commit the “merely” fallacy.
Although I agree with you that that would be the situation now as a practical matter, you will have to produce a convincing argument why that should be so as a matter of principle, and then if you can do that, you will have to show how that entails a necessary spiritual dimension to mind. Given the evidence, I don’t see why a leap of imagination is required to say that brain processes are my experiences (on the contrary), but I’m sure you will expand on this.

I am not trying to characterize all philosophical naturalists. There are many in history who refused to reduce human thinking to brain states, yet were left without an explanation due to the limitations of their philosophical views. I have quoted Herbert Spencer, John Stuart Mill, and others on this matter in previous posts somewhere.

But where does the materialist go on this matter who realizes the inadequacy of his position. Certainly many brain researchers in the 20th century who were materialists realized late in their career the futility of the endeavor and moved on to other scientific pursuits. I have some choice quotes from top names if you want them. On the fundamental issues, current researchers are no closer to an answer along materialist lines than were early and mid 20th century researchers.

Free will. That has to be discussed soon. Matter and energy exhibiting free will. The return of Nietzsche, all matter exhibits the will to power. What are the laws of physics? Do they even apply to the physical brain in the materialist viewpoint? Apparently not.

 

[itinerant1]

It is too late for me and I am too tired to absorb this never mind to respond properly to it, so I hope you don’t mind waiting a day or two.

One thing jumps out at me though - I expected at some stage you would put forward a realist interpretation of universals as an argument. Well, I do not see why such an interpretation of universals is warranted. I am a nominalist - to put it simply, what you call universals are post hoc categories that we create based on similarities between particular things that exist in space and time. I deny that universals exist separate from particular things (and their properties and behaviour) which are constituted of matter-energy existing in space and time. Such “universals” are not truly universal, but are subject to individual interpretation, empirical modification, cultural perspective and so on.

Mathematical concepts is the one area in which a Platonic argument seems to carry some weight. I will argue however, that mathematical concepts are either a categorisation and abstraction of physical objects or their descriptors; or that they are based on the manipulation of a set of symbols according to strict rules set out as axioms and that they lack any realisable physical correlate - they are an extension of our ability to process language and are not separate entities possessing tropes at all.

I have already said more than I planned to.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

No problem. We should continue whenever you are ready. I had too much barbecue and wine this evening to continue myself. Good discussing with you so far.

 

[hecd2]

Okay then. I need no warnings from you about your views. I’ve been around the block. And Plantinga does not represent the last word on the subject.

We can agree, it seems, that the mind can attain truth about the external world. It is foolish to deny that the human mind can know external reality existing independently of the mind.

Yes, we can agree that, with the provisos from my side that this knowledge cannot achieve the certainty attendant on mathematical proofs, and that our confidence in its truth depends on the degree to which it is testable, and confirmed by others in passing those tests (to avoid, as far as possible, the human failing of believing false propositions).

The crux of the matter is whether your explanation of the fact the mind attains truth has any real merit. Descartes, and most modern philosophers utterly failed. It would have been much easier for subsequent philosophers to have corrected the Cartesian error than to spin off a multitude of elaborate responses one way or another.

Historically, it is just a textbook example of Aristotle’s dictum that a little error in the beginning amounts to a colossal one in the end. As important as they are, adding brain studies to the mix does not alter the fundamental philosophical problems, nor does it resolve them in the least.

I am just putting your view in its proper historical context. But then again, I look greatly look forward to arguing my seemingly arrogant position in another thread.

I understand that you are merely setting out here what you regard to be the historical context, since, otherwise, you have merely repeated your opinion about the existence of these errors without describing what the errors are or the reasons you hold them to be erroneous.

I look forward to the thread.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

Nothing at all here that is a priori. Your statement reveals a total lack of knowledge of literally centuries of reflection and debates by countless thinkers addressing these matters…Try *a posteriori * and you will approach closer to the truth of the matter.

Let’s make a deal that neither of us accuse the other of “total lack of knowledge” of any area of thinking as a substitute for making an actual argument. Your post addressed to Fran, as it was written, was replete with petitio pricipii. Let’s look at the arguments in a little more detail, because I think that post can stand as a model for your basic position.

To re-assert “Quiroga” is to refuse to address or respond to anything contrary to your own position.

I can understand why you wish Quiroga would go away, but nevertheless the Quiroga work is a direct contradiction of your statement “There is no evidence to show that a single concept is embodied in one or any number of neurons.”.

You need to explain how particular and limited matter and energy can account for what is not particular but universal in intention or meaning. That brain states are involved in mental states is a given. Now let’s move beyond the basics. The medievals realized that even without sophisticated brain studies. It seems you have not gotten off of first base.

Well, of course, what they are showing here is not only that brain states are involved in mental states, but that particular brain states are involved in specific mental states including conceptual as well as perceptual tasks. It doesn’t help your case to imply that no progress at all has been in understanding brain processes and how they embody mental processes in the healthy and the damaged brain.

The intellect uses the phantasms and percepts of the brain. Hence, we have an intimate interaction. What is valid in Quiroga’s research proves nothing more. Interpretations of the significance of data is an entirely different matter. I do not see that you are progressing one iota in proving your position.

If you are expecting me to *prove *that the brain and mind are different aspects of the same phenomenon, you will be disappointed. I have been very careful from the outset to point out that my conclusion is a parsimonious one based on the necessity of brain processes for mind processes (including acts of intellect, by the way), the indivisibility of mind from brain and the absence of evidence that brain is insufficient to account for mind.

Again, human perception is enlightened by universal concepts. Perception of an individual person or the written name of a person involves both percepts and concepts. Of course, there will be corresponding changes in brain states. I know that without brain studies. It seems you are arguing in a circle without addressing the issues I have discussed.

You appear entirely to have missed the point that this particular brain state is correlated not with a percept or a phantasm but with the abstraction of the concept regardless of the perceptual clue. If you don’t see that as an argument against the insufficiency of brain states to represent concepts then I don’t know what could possibly carry weight with you.

Now Iet’s look at the post that initiated this particular exchange. I detect in it several flaws. First of all, you are dogmatic about what you see as the lack of prospects for natural science to investigate the processes by which the brain encodes mind phenomena - in other words to explain the mind with material causes. Your dogma arises from what you consider to be an irrefutable argument from philosophy that the mind is a non-material phenomenon and therefore lies outside of the proper study of natural science. I merely point out that philosophical arguments raised against various fields of scientific investigation (and various specific scientific conclusions) have a very poor track record.

Secondly your argument is circular - it goes like this: the mind is not an aspect of material reality so the scientific method is unable to explore it; the scientific method has (so far) failed to fully explain the mind so the mind must be a non-material entity.

Thirdly, the second stage of the circular argument is itself a non-sequitur. Our putative inability to explain the mind as a phenomenon of the material world does not in itself entail the conclusion that the mind is a non-material phenomenon.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[Fran65]

If you don’t see that as an argument against the insufficiency of brain states to represent concepts then I don’t know what could possibly carry weight with you.

I know that this is addressed to itinerant, but I would like to interject here that whilst it may (if true) demonstrate the involvement of the brain in conceptual thinking it still does not demonstrate sufficiency.

On another thread I used the example of my laptop and software. If my laptop hardware breaks down, the software does not function. This shows that there is an interaction between the software and hardware, but does not show that the software is the hardware. I am not suggesting dualism in my use of this example, but am seeking to demonstrate the error in the conclusion that you seem to be making based on work such as Quiroga’s.

 

[hecd2]

I know that this is addressed to itinerant, but I would like to interject here that whilst it may (if true) demonstrate the involvement of the brain in conceptual thinking it still does not demonstrate sufficiency.

I agree - it does not demonstrate or prove sufficiency. But it is a piece of evidence to add to the inductive arguments against the claim of insufficiency. All those who hold that mind is an immaterial entity seem to think that I claim to prove or demonstrate that material causes are sufficient. I can’t prove or demonstrate that as things stand which is point that I acknowledged from the outset.

What Quiroga et all show is that the argument that abstractions cannot be encoded neurologically is invalid.

On another thread I used the example of my laptop and software. If my laptop hardware breaks down, the software does not function. This shows that there is an interaction between the software and hardware, but does not show that the software is the hardware. I am not suggesting dualism in my use of this example, but am seeking to demonstrate the error in the conclusion that you seem to be making based on work such as Quiroga’s.

You have misunderstood my argument and my position.

(By the way, not wishing to go down that rabbit hole, but as a matter of clarification, computer software is always encoded materially and to the extent that an algorithm is running the hardware/software complex is a material one)

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[Fran65]

If you don’t hold that the mind is immaterial, then this implies that you hold that mind is material. If you hold that mind interacts with the brain, but it is not produced by the brain then we agree.

I would like to know which part of your argument I have misunderstood - without going off topic - if possible.

I did know that software is encoded, I was trying to get at the difference between the object and what the object ‘appears’ to do, and how these two things can differ. It’s a little like explaining a cooker and then saying…and that’s how carrot cake is produced…there’s more to it than assumed.

 

[grannymh]

Quiroga’s more recent follow up [1] to the 2005 study adds spoken words and names to the modes, and finds that, for example, a neuron located in the left anterior hippocampus reacts selectively for “Oprah Winfrey”, where “Oprah Winfrey” is represented to the test subject by various pictures of her, a textual representation of her name (“Oprah Winfrey”), as well as spoken audio (a recording of someone saying “Oprah Winfrey” is played for the subject).

[1] Quian Quiroga R, Kraskov A, Koch C, Fried I., Explicit Encoding of Multimodal Percepts by Single Neurons in the Human Brain,* Current Biology*, Volume 19, Issue 15, 1308-1313, 23 July 2009 (doi:10.1016/j.cub.2009.06.060)

My apology in advance for my left brain being cranky.

My question is:

How does this particular paper reflect the normal condition of the human species?

I have scanned the posts from here to post 701 looking for precise references to the research paper “Explicit Encoding of Multimodal Percepts by Single Neurons in the Human Brain” by Rodrigo Quian Quiroga, Alexander Kraskov, Christof Koch, and Itzhak Fried. The paper’s Summary and Results are mentioned in the midst of lots of very interesting discussions.

Apparently, I either did not see or I entirely missed the key discussion regarding the paper’s section “Experimental Procedures, Subjects and Recordings.” In either case, because this is the section which directly influences evaluations of validity, it will not hurt to return to this topic via my personal question.

The first paragraph under “Subjects and Recordings” plainly states: “The data come from 16 sessions in 7 patients with pharmacologically intractable epilepsy, implanted with intracranial electrodes for clinical reasons.” Actually, the authors are very upfront because in the text under “Results” readers are directed to see “Experimental Procedures.”

Thus, I feel confident in asking posters to seriously consider the subjects in this research. Then, do please explain how the actions of these particular, individual seven subjects reflect the normal operation of one’s brain. Thank you.

 

[hecd2]

My apology in advance for my left brain being cranky.

My question is:

How does this particular paper reflect the normal condition of the human species?

I have scanned the posts from here to post 701 looking for precise references to the research paper “Explicit Encoding of Multimodal Percepts by Single Neurons in the Human Brain” by Quian Quiroga R, Kraskov A, Koch C, Fried I. The paper’s Summary and Results are mentioned in the midst of lots of very interesting discussions.

Apparently, I either did not see or I entirely missed the key discussion regarding the paper’s section “Experimental Procedures, Subjects and Recordings.” In either case, because this is the section which directly influences evaluations of validity, it will not hurt to return to this topic via my personal question.

The first paragraph under “Subjects and Recordings” plainly states: “The data come from 16 sessions in 7 patients with pharmacologically intractable epilepsy, implanted with intracranial electrodes for clinical reasons.” Actually, the authors are very upfront because in the text under “Results” readers are directed to see “Experimental Procedures.”

Thus, I feel confident in asking posters to seriously consider the subjects in this research. Then, do please explain how the actions of these particular, individual seven subjects reflect the normal operation of one’s brain. Thank you.

I don’t think that there is any suggestion by anyone that epileptics, even with implanted electrodes, have different brain states in conceptual tasks from non-epileptics or that they are unable to conceptualise individual people except when they are fitting.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

If you don’t hold that the mind is immaterial, then this implies that you hold that mind is material. If you hold that mind interacts with the brain, but it is not produced by the brain then we agree.

I would like to know which part of your argument I have misunderstood - without going off topic - if possible.

It’s very simple and I have stated it quite a few times already, but here goes again. The brain is not just necessary for all tasks that we ascribe to mind, but everything that we ascribe to mind can be radically affected by material effects targeted on the brain. A working brain can be shown to be necessary for a functioning mind, and particular brain states and neural circuits are necessary for particular mental tasks. In the absence of evidence that brain processes are insufficient (you see I do not state that I can show that they are sufficient, but nor can anyone else show that they are insufficient) the parsimonious conclusion, which is also consistent with what evidence we do have, is that mental states and brain states are different aspects of the same material phenomenon (or I could say that mind is an epiphenomenon of brain) - my conclusion is not a proof, it is not deductive, but it is inductive and it is parsimonious in the excellent tradition of natural science.

I did know that software is encoded, I was trying to get at the difference between the object and what the object ‘appears’ to do, and how these two things can differ. It’s a little like explaining a cooker and then saying…and that’s how carrot cake is produced…there’s more to it than assumed.

But in your analogy the thing that is missing from the cooker explanation is an agent. You are not suggesting that the phenomenon of mind is produced by an unknown immaterial agent, are you, because that is the homuncular fallacy. In treating physiological processes, it’s as well to identify what the thing appears to do with what the thing does.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[grannymh]

I don’t think that there is any suggestion by anyone that epileptics, even with implanted electrodes, have different brain states in conceptual tasks from non-epileptics or that they are unable to conceptualise individual people except when they are fitting.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

So far the only discussion I have seen about different brain states referred to blindness. Which brings me back to my original question which needs to be answered – How does this particular paper reflect the normal condition of the human species?

I did come across a comment --taken out of context-- that some insights can be gained by comparing findings to those described with single-cell recordings in monkeys. However, I limit my question to human beings.

In other words, I would like an explanation of how this research on seven specific individuals represents the findings one would expect in the human population. Thank you.

Blessings,
granny

The quest for knowledge is worthy of the adventures of the journey.

 

[hecd2]

I will attempt to define a critical problem and lay some ground for further discussion. It’s a challenge for me to present my ideas withouth using all of the technical terms I am used to working with. Simply put there is the modern *sensist *or radical empericist challenge to the traditional understanding of concepts. This is one of the areas where ancient and medieval psychology exhibit more perceptive and accurate insights than does modern psychology, each school basically influenced by a particular school of philosophy.

You say that mediaeval and ancient psychology (based presumably on Platonic philosophy), exhibits more perceptive and accurate insights than modern psychology (based presumably on philosophical naturalism). Is this another one of those cases where you are merely setting out the historical context for a full supporting argument that you’re going to spin up in a separate thread, because you don’t show here why you assert that, or even what criteria you use to judge the accuracy and perception of the insights?

Sensists categorically deny the immateriality of the intellect by denying the evidence. They maintain that there is no intellect distinct from sensation and imagination, and that all acts of the mind are sensory in nature. Ideas are asserted to be sensory signs of the objects intended or meant. There are different lines of argument with various contemporary philosophical naturalists, but the fundamental distinctions made below between images, percepts and ideas or concepts is likewise denied.

Well, I, for one, do not deny the distinction between percepts and concepts, which, to me, are clearly different classes of cognition. Your entire broadside against sensists is wasted because I am not a sensist. When it comes to universals, I maintain a nominalist stance as laid out in a previous post.

[Several paragraphs previously answered snipped for brevity]
Every physical thing in nature is and must be a particular thing. One will never encounter a universal thing in nature. Existing universals are radically beyond the nature of physical matter and energy. Hence, we must posit their mode of being as extra-natural or non-physical. The physical brain, constituted as it is of matter and energy, has not the ability as matter and energy to produce what is not matter and energy, i.e. the universal concept.

Existing universals are, as I previously pointed out, categories of particular things or their properties - our understanding of universals depends on convention, language, culture, education and rule, and are not immutable. Give me any universal, and I can almost guarantee that I will be able to give you several interpretations of it. (the whole realist concept of universals can be undermined by a brief analysis of colour - shall we go there?)

But even if we grant the existence of universals in the realist sense, as existing in a supernatural domain, rabbitness engaged in hoppingness and nibblingness the greenness under the shadowness of buildingness , how on earth does your conclusion that the physical brain cannot produce them follow? You’ll have to do more than assert that it is impossible by showing us why this limitation exists, because there is no reason in principle why a particular neural network should not be recruited by the developing brain to encode the concept of say green-ness - to fire up when a green object is presented to the sight and consciously noticed, when the word green is heard or uttered or typed or thought about - the firing of that network being the mind’s representation of the universal; or, for another network to fire up when the concept of building is presented to the consciousness, by sight, word, sound, memory or reflection, the firing of that network being the mind’s representation of that universal. Just as different networks would represent particular things or particular aspects of particular things.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

Oh no! Me making an ID argument. I’d should be flogged without mercy if that were true. I have no sympathy with ID’s science killer ideology. My position differs from ID in that I recognize the proper limits of the particular sciences. Being a philosophical materialist you will not agree with my view of the legitimacy of philosophical psychology, only scientific psychology.

Well, I’m sorry, but your position here is exactly analogous to he ID argument. Some phenomenon (the emergence of life and the evolution of complex life in one case, the phenomenon of mind in another) is inexplicable by the methods of natural science because the phenomenon in question transcends the natural order - the only difference is that the ID guys are wrong, clumsy and ignorant and you are right because - well because you know what phenomena are amenable to the methods of natural science and they don’t. As I said, you should be careful with this argument, as looking from outside, you’re flirting with an argument you despise, and one could regard some points you make below as powerful science killers.

Not sure how all the stuff about Freud is relevant…

But where does the materialist go on this matter who realizes the inadequacy of his position. Certainly many brain researchers in the 20th century who were materialists realized late in their career the futility of the endeavor and moved on to other scientific pursuits.

I’d be very interested to know who they are.

I have some choice quotes from top names if you want them. On the fundamental issues, current researchers are no closer to an answer along materialist lines than were early and mid 20th century researchers.

Well, while acknowledging that there is a very long road to travel, I also think that you are mischaracterising the successes of neuroscience and brain research of the last couple of decades. Not only would you deny to future brain researchers any hope of success, but you also deny any past success. Well, natural scientists have proven the baleful predictions of philosophers, theologians and politicians wrong enough times in the past not to give up a project because some non-scientists think that it is hopeless.

And you did recognise the fallacy of using our putative inability to explain mind processes as proof that they have an immaterial foundation?

Free will. That has to be discussed soon. Matter and energy exhibiting free will. The return of Nietzsche, all matter exhibits the will to power. What are the laws of physics? Do they even apply to the physical brain in the materialist viewpoint? Apparently not.

I guess this is a promise for yet another thread, so I’ll leave it till then.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[Fran65]

It’s very simple and I have stated it quite a few times already, but here goes again. The brain is not just necessary for all tasks that we ascribe to mind, but everything that we ascribe to mind can be radically affected by material effects targeted on the brain. A working brain can be shown to be necessary for a functioning mind, and particular brain states and neural circuits are necessary for particular mental tasks. In the absence of evidence that brain processes are insufficient (you see I do not state that I can show that they are sufficient, but nor can anyone else show that they are insufficient) the parsimonious conclusion, which is also consistent with what evidence we do have, is that mental states and brain states are different aspects of the same material phenomenon (or I could say that mind is an epiphenomenon of brain) - my conclusion is not a proof, it is not deductive, but it is inductive and it is parsimonious in the excellent tradition of natural science.

I understood this argument the first time that you made it. My apologies if I didn’t make this clear in my subsequent posts. I do hope that you are not making the suggestion that because we disagree I don’t understand. I do understand, but I disagree.

But in your analogy the thing that is missing from the cooker explanation is an agent. You are not suggesting that the phenomenon of mind is produced by an unknown immaterial agent, are you, because that is the homuncular fallacy. In treating physiological processes, it’s as well to identify what the thing appears to do with what the thing does.

Of course I’m not! I’m trying to get at the limits of natural science when attempting to explain the brain and the inadequacy of materialism to deal with consciousness. All that is being studied in neuroscience is what the brain does. It ignores the phenomenology of human consciousness and then people are told “This is how it is” on the basis of mechanisms and processes. This ignores the richness, complexity, variety and compelling nature of consciousness.

The research that you describe is a plank in an argument that is going nowhere because the conclusion cannot be demonstrated beyond doubt.

 

[itinerant1]

Well, while acknowledging that there is a very long road to travel, I also think that you are mischaracterising the successes of neuroscience and brain research of the last couple of decades. Not only would you deny to future brain researchers any hope of success, but you also deny any past success. Well, natural scientists have proven the baleful predictions of philosophers, theologians and politicians wrong enough times in the past not to give up a project because some non-scientists think that it is hopeless.

When has a politician ever been right about anything? Don’t get me started on politicians.

Proving philosophers wrong is easy when modern philosophy is so dis-ordered. Relativity theory and non-Euclidean geometries have put Kant’s ridiculous epistemology in a bind.

Scientists often prove other scientists dead wrong.

Theologian can be wrong, too. They disagree about many things. But when there is a conflict between theologians, philosophers, and scientists (in any combination), then it needs to be determined whether the conflict is real or apparent. If the conflict is real, then it needs to be determined which one is wrong. Simple as that, though determining who is wrong can be exceedingly difficult in some matters.

Because a view is predominant among scientists is no proof that the view in question is true and correct. To assume otherwise, is to lack something of the scientific spirit. You do understand the logic here, I’m sure. If you agree, then your point is moot.

It is clear that scientists make, and must make, certain assumptions, pre-investigatively. It determines to a certain degree the kinds of questions they ask. Post-investigatively, the data is interpreted along specific lines, which can often reveal something of the researchers assumptions or beliefs. Science as a purely objective, value free pursuit is a modern myth.

Of course, it would be a gross misinterpretation of what I have been saying to think I am implying that certain lines of brain research are waste of time. Not that I don’t take that position on other matters. For example, as a computer specialist myself, I will state that AI is a pseudo-science.

I am only commenting on specific interpretations of brain research, interpretations sometimes made by the researchers themselves, or others. Interpretations I have come across at times are ones the researchers themselves, in the particular cases, would not assert. Researchers can be more cautious about stating the possible implications of their own research than are others who were not involved in the research. Sometimes others are more competent at interpreting and drawing conclusions from the research conducted by others. Things just aren’t as simple, which includes my views, as you seem to have portrayed them. And the saga continues…

And you did recognise the fallacy of using our putative inability to explain mind processes as proof that they have an immaterial foundation?

Certainly I realize that, which is why I have not made that argument. Proof of the immateriality of the intellect and its concepts stands on its own philosophical base. I know, as well, the philosophical arguments to the contrary. I have no doubt, though, that there are many things science is incapable of proving or disproving or even explaining.

If brain studies have anything to contribute to the mind-body problem, then well and good. I am all for it. I see, though as well, how scientific data is capable of diverse interpretations. This observation is clearly exemplified in chimp language studies, which by the way, can exhibit less than rigorous scientific investigative procedures and post-investigative conclusions.

 

[itinerant1]

But in your analogy the thing that is missing from the cooker explanation is an agent. You are not suggesting that the phenomenon of mind is produced by an unknown immaterial agent, are you, because that is the homuncular fallacy. In treating physiological processes, it’s as well to identify what the thing appears to do with what the thing does.

I think the majority of fallacies lie in your own argument, which is circular at best, and a petitio principii. You are working with a definition of mind as a phenomenon. This is to assume as true from the outset what you think you are trying to prove or that can be proven.

The human “mind” can include memory, percepts imagination, phantasms, intellect, and will. You treat all of these, presumptively and most arbitrarily as being in the same ontological category and hence we have a fallacy of composition…

To assume that everything about the mind is physiological such as thought (Darwin’s “secretion of brain”) and assert a “homuncular fallacy” by one who sees no evidence whatsoever that everything about mind is material is to lack scientific objectivity on your part, and it reveals a lack of in-depth understanding of mind-body problem.

 

[itinerant1]

You say that mediaeval and ancient psychology (based presumably on Platonic philosophy), exhibits more perceptive and accurate insights than modern psychology (based presumably on philosophical naturalism). Is this another one of those cases where you are merely setting out the historical context for a full supporting argument that you’re going to spin up in a separate thread, because you don’t show here why you assert that, or even what criteria you use to judge the accuracy and perception of the insights?

False presumption. I’m not sure how you came up with “Platonic philosophy”. You will see why I assert what I did in my responses to your inadequate arguments.

Well, I, for one, do not deny the distinction between percepts and concepts, which, to me, are clearly different classes of cognition. Your entire broadside against sensists is wasted because I am not a sensist. When it comes to universals, I maintain a nominalist stance as laid out in a previous post.

Nominalism is a denial of universals, which is characteristic of sensists. In fact, you might want to explain how your brand of nominalism is not sensist.

Existing universals are, as I previously pointed out, categories of particular things or their properties - our understanding of universals depends on convention, language, culture, education and rule, and are not immutable. Give me any universal, and I can almost guarantee that I will be able to give you several interpretations of it. (the whole realist concept of universals can be undermined by a brief analysis of colour - shall we go there?)

Let us go there. I would be interested in your argument against universals.

But even if we grant the existence of universals in the realist sense, as existing in a supernatural domain, rabbitness engaged in hoppingness and nibblingness the greenness under the shadowness of buildingness , how on earth does your conclusion that the physical brain cannot produce them follow? You’ll have to do more than assert that it is impossible by showing us why this limitation exists, because there is no reason in principle why a particular neural network should not be recruited by the developing brain to encode the concept of say green-ness - to fire up when a green object is presented to the sight and consciously noticed, when the word green is heard or uttered or typed or thought about - the firing of that network being the mind’s representation of the universal; or, for another network to fire up when the concept of building is presented to the consciousness, by sight, word, sound, memory or reflection, the firing of that network being the mind’s representation of that universal. Just as different networks would represent particular things or particular aspects of particular things.

All of this this just begs the question. You need to explain hypothetically or theoretically how what is particular and limited, i.e.matter and energy, can have universal designation. Your side-stepping of the issue is achieved by proffering what appears to me as a totally inadequate definition of universal. And a vague reference to what neural networks might be capable of, which is pure speculation, does not constitute much of an argument, if any at all. The most that should be argued from is what is currently known, and that includes but is not limited to the properties of matter and energy, which consideration I have previously presented but I did not see where you attempted to address it. Perhaps I missed your argument.

So, you will have to disprove the moderate realist notion of universal before you can get off of first base. I am only taking you up on your offer. After that, we should move on to other experiences of human consciousness that are not consistent with what science knows about matter and energy. So, in case you were worried, we will not run out of things to debate about the human mind. I am looking forward to getting a physicist’s take on these issues.