Natural law morality vs. utilitarian ethics

[Rocinante]

It seems that you are begging the question as to what questions we need to answer in order to solve moral problems. Your alternative seems to be, treat the pig as a locus of conscious experience which is no different in kind from any other locus of conscious experience… meaning what?! …which implies what? Your suggestion really does seem to be nonsensical.

conscious experience is different for pigs and humans and completely lacking in rocks. these are different kinds but the difference in how they need to be dealt with as a matter of ethics is not seen as a matter of these kinds needing to conform to different essential natures. the difference is just that they are different and so experience differently, and such differences need to be taken into account in learning about how to promote well-being for all these sorts of beings. but all individuals are also different within a kind.

we non-natural law ethicists don’t have to figure out what differences in individuals are essential to the kind and which are merely accidental because we don’t care. morality for us isn’t a duty of conforming to such natures but a duty to promote well-being for all beings to the extent that they are each capable of experiencing well-being. learning what given kinds are typically like can help inform decisions, but such generalizations can only ever provide rules of thumb while the ultimate concern is well-being for all to the greatest extent possible, not conformity.

the difference is that though we can learn about morality by studying nature (how things are), how things are (what is natural) is not taken to be how things necessarily ought to be.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Anne

while the ultimate concern is well-being for all to the greatest extent possible

If that is your ethical creed, you might offer to explain how anal sex contributes to the “well-being for all to the greatest extent possible.”

You see, that really sounds a bit absurd, doesn’t it?

In the first place, is pleasure by itself a criterion for well-being? Obviously, pleasure is the end of anal sex (at least for the male organ, if not for the anus), but the ultimate consequence of anal sex is damage to the rectum and the very possible transference of STDs, including lethal ones. Moreover, these diseases can be transferred from person to person ad infinitum et ad nauseam. This is “well-being to the greatest extent possible”?

 

[awatkins69]

sure i see a difference in kind between rocks and trees and starfish and people. but how do you get from “this is an X” to “this has a moral obligation to be true to its X-ness?” (which can’t be distinguished from “this has a moral obligation to be true to my particular conception of how an X ought to be so as to be a true X.”)

Well, first of all, only things with free will have obligations. An “ought” implies a “can”. So that leaves obligations only to humans. However, the definition of “good” still largely applies to non-human things. When an animal eats and nourishes itself, that is good because it fulfills its nature by keeping it healthy. When a pen writes well it is good because it fulfills its nature of something which writes. When a plant does photosynthesis well it has good chloroplasts, since they are fulfilling their nature.

With all of that said, from reading your reply, you’ve largely ignored what I said about the hypothetical imperative, the definition of the good, and the universal object of the will being the good, and how I pull these together to get the imperative. However, we can ignore it all if you want (or, if not, I can go through it all again). I want to give you a thought experiment, which I find highly compelling, contra utilitarianism:

Suppose we have two guys, a boss and his employee. The boss is a utilitarian; he believes in the principle of the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of people. The employee is not a pure utilitarian; he’s a consequentialist, and for him the ends justify the means. Now, the co-worker, who wants to get his family a new go-kart, tells the boss “I am going to slowly, horrendously and continuously torture myself to death for the next month, unless you give me 500 dollars”. In order to not go back on it, the employee makes a machine which won’t stop torturing him until he’s dead. Under utilitarianism, the boss is **obligated **to give the employee 500 dollars, in order to prevent the horrendous pain which the co-worker will suffer, his death, his loss of an efficient employee, the pain it will cause the family, and the lack of happiness that would be derived from the family’s having a go-kart. The employee knows that the boss is a good utilitarian and is obligated to give him the money, and the ends justify the means (is there something wrong in the end of “getting the family the go-kart”? It would cause happiness, right? Ends are all that matter, remember?).

Moral paradoxes like these make utilitarianism and consequentialism highly implausible.

 

[awatkins69]

Argh, I think I made that kind of confusing. Also, I see you don’t believe that utilitarianism=greatest pleasure for greatest number (although thought that is kind of outside of the classical exposition). Anyways, here it is again, to make it less confusing. Even if you [somehow] don’t find it compelling, many others will. That’s why I’m posting it, for the others:

Suppose we have two workers, a boss (B) and his employee (E). B is a strict utilitarian; he believes in the principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. E is not a pure utilitarian; he’s a consequentialist, and for him the ends justify the means. Now E, who wants to get his family a new go-kart, tells B, “I am going to slowly, horrendously and continuously torture myself to death for the next month, unless you give me 500 dollars”. In order to not go back on it, E makes a machine which won’t stop torturing him until he’s dead. The machine is perfect in that it can give the maximum amount of pain over a month’s duration without killing him until the end. Under utilitarianism, B is **obligated **to give E 500 dollars, in order to prevent: the horrendous pain which he will suffer, his death, the loss of an efficient employee, the pain it will cause the family, and the lack of happiness that would be derived from the family’s having a go-kart. E knows that B is a good utilitarian and is obligated to give him the money, and the ends justify the means (is there something wrong in the end of “getting the family the go-kart”? It would cause happiness, right? Ends are all that matter, remember?).

The question is not whether this scenario would actually happen (although it seems like it could). I’m not focused on the trivialities like “how could he make a machine like that?” or “nobody does that in real life.” The point of the thought experiment is to show the theoretical implausibility of utilitarianism.

 

[Rocinante]

Argh, I think I made that kind of confusing. Also, I see you don’t believe that utilitarianism=greatest pleasure for greatest number (although thought that is kind of outside of the classical exposition).

i see “the greatest happiness…” as a pithy little slogan that was probably never intended to be taken as a mathematical formula, but in asserting it, mill and benthem left them selves open to some obvious criticism.

Suppose we have two workers, a boss (B) and his employee (E). B is a strict utilitarian; he believes in the principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. E is not a pure utilitarian; he’s a consequentialist, and for him the ends justify the means. Now E, who wants to get his family a new go-kart, tells B, “I am going to slowly, horrendously and continuously torture myself to death for the next month, unless you give me 500 dollars”. In order to not go back on it, E makes a machine which won’t stop torturing him until he’s dead. The machine is perfect in that it can give the maximum amount of pain over a month’s duration without killing him until the end. Under utilitarianism, B is **obligated **to give E 500 dollars, in order to prevent: the horrendous pain which he will suffer, his death, the loss of an efficient employee, the pain it will cause the family, and the lack of happiness that would be derived from the family’s having a go-kart. E knows that B is a good utilitarian and is obligated to give him the money, and the ends justify the means (is there something wrong in the end of “getting the family the go-kart”? It would cause happiness, right? Ends are all that matter, remember?).

i could play dumb and say, yeah, so what is the problem? of course B should give E the money to reduce total suffering in the world.

if i said that, i suspect that you would point out the obvious negative consequences of universalizing a moral obligation that says that people ought to pay such people who try to extort money. isn’t that what you would do? but then that would be making a consequentialist moral argument. right?

is there something about this scenario other than that neither of us like the consequences that we ought to have a moral concern about? i really don’t see how there ever could be.

 

[awatkins69]

i could play dumb and say, yeah, so what is the problem? of course B should give E the money to reduce total suffering in the world.

if i said that, i suspect that you would point out the obvious negative consequences of universalizing a moral obligation that says that people ought to pay such people who try to extort money. isn’t that what you would do? but then that would be making a consequentialist moral argument. right?

is there something about this scenario other than that neither of us like the consequences that we ought to have a moral concern about? i really don’t see how there ever could be.

Hold on, so you admit that the consequences follow from the utilitarian and consequentialist principles? If so, that’s fine and you’re being logically consistent.

I use this example to illustrate for other people, and they can determine whether utilitarianism and consequentialism are plausible or not themselves. I find it highly implausible, and I think most people would; however, you’re not being inconsistent.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

awatkins

*The point of the thought experiment is to show the theoretical implausibility of utilitarianism. *

Not only is utilitarianism in this thought experiment implausible, but ironically it shows that the man who is willing to risk having himself tortured to death to achieve his end is violating natural law ethics. It serves no purpose to risk not only his own life, but also to deprive his family of their natural right to his financial and moral support should he die because he failed to realize that his employer might not be the utilitarian he thought him to be. Thus he acted not only stupidly, but against the natural law which tells us that we should act to ensure our own survival and the survival of those we love.

 

[Rocinante]

Hold on, so you admit that the consequences follow from the utilitarian and consequentialist principles? If so, that’s fine and you’re being logically consistent.

I use this example to illustrate for other people, and they can determine whether utilitarianism and consequentialism are plausible or not themselves. I find it highly implausible, and I think most people would; however, you’re not being inconsistent.

i’m not sure you followed what i’m saying. i’m saying that B should not give E the money and the reasons that both you and i would both give as explanation would be consequentialist reasons. if B gives E the money, there are far more significant consequences than the reduction of E’s pain. in the long run, B giving E the money would decrease happiness in the world and that is why it would be wrong to give the money.

 

[awatkins69]

i’m not sure you followed what i’m saying. i’m saying that B should not give E the money and the reasons that both you and i would both give as explanation would be consequentialist reasons. if B gives E the money, there are far more significant consequences than the reduction of E’s pain. in the long run, B giving E the money would decrease happiness in the world and that is why it would be wrong to give the money.

Explain how there would be more happiness in E’s suffering horrendously for a month, dying, his family mourning, his family not having a bread-winner, his family not getting happiness from a go-kart, and B losing a valuable employee vs. B giving him the 500 dollars. To make the point even more, suppose that B is a millionaire so that this isn’t bad for him, and suppose that E will never do this again.

Note that E is completely morally justified in his extortion if he is a consequentialist. His ends are good, so there’s no problem with what he’s doing. B is a millionaire, so it’s not going to hurt him - not even close to the pain E will suffer. So B is morally obligated here. From the point of view of the utilitarian, if B doesn’t give him the money, B is being immoral. In fact, B would be a real jerk!

The funny thing about this is that this scenario isn’t all that theoretically impossible. If you were my boss, I could do this to you!

 

[Betterave]

conscious experience is different for pigs and humans and completely lacking in rocks.

Right. In other words, they each have a different nature.

these are different kinds but the difference in how they need to be dealt with as a matter of ethics is not seen as a matter of these kinds needing to conform to different essential natures.

Correct. That’s not how it’s seen. There is no posteriority of the notion of ‘nature’ to the notion of ‘kind of conscious experience.’ The different kinds of conscious experience are simply expressions of the different natures involved.

the difference is just that they are different and so experience differently, and such differences need to be taken into account in learning about how to promote well-being for all these sorts of beings.

No, that’s too simplistic. It’s not that they’re just different, it’s that they’re radically different in kind.

but all individuals are also different within a kind.

Yes. In other words, even individuals that share a common nature, and so are the same, are still individuals, and so are different.

we non-natural law ethicists don’t have to figure out what differences in individuals are essential to the kind and which are merely accidental because we don’t care.

Correction: You think you don’t care. Really you do.

morality for us isn’t a duty of conforming to such natures but a duty to promote well-being for all beings to the extent that they are each capable of experiencing well-being.

But you don’t approach each individual with a clean slate. That’s obvious (I hope!) and this implies that you do care about what is essential to a given kind. Think about it: do you really need to get to know each individual pig you meet before you can decide how to appropriately interact with it?

learning what given kinds are typically like can help inform decisions, but such generalizations can only ever provide rules of thumb while the ultimate concern is well-being for all to the greatest extent possible, not conformity.

Well that’s awfully vague. But it’s not clear: Are you attempting to criticize natural law theory still? If yes, how so? (This is looking suspiciously like another straw man.)

the difference is that though we can learn about morality by studying nature (how things are), how things are (what is natural) is not taken to be how things necessarily ought to be.

Sure. So what?

 

[Rocinante]

It serves no purpose to risk not only his own life, but also to deprive his family of their natural right to his financial and moral support should he die because he failed to realize that his employer might not be the utilitarian he thought him to be.

note that your critique above of what the supposed utilitarian tries to do in this hypothetical situation is a consequentialist critique. he shouldn’t do it because of the actual or potential consequences of doing it.

 

[Rocinante]

Explain how there would be more happiness in E’s suffering horrendously for a month, dying, his family mourning, his family not having a bread-winner, his family not getting happiness from a go-kart, and B losing a valuable employee vs. B giving him the 500 dollars. To make the point even more, suppose that B is a millionaire so that this isn’t bad for him, and suppose that E will never do this again.

Note that E is completely morally justified in his extortion if he is a consequentialist. His ends are good, so there’s no problem with what he’s doing. B is a millionaire, so it’s not going to hurt him - not even close to the pain E will suffer. So B is morally obligated here. From the point of view of the utilitarian, if B doesn’t give him the money, B is being immoral. In fact, B would be a real jerk!

when we do the kantian bit and ask what our mothers probably always asked us and say, what if everyone behaved this way?, we are asking about the potential consequences of doing this or that. the consequences of this situation shouldn’t be viewed in isolation as though “E will never do this again” (how would B know that?) or that no one else will ever find out and try to do what E did (how would B know that?). B should consider both long and short term consequences and the possibility for others emulating E.

by the way, you keep bringing up the terms “means” and “ends.” as dewey pointed out, means are always also ends. if giving money to an extortionist is bad, the fact that it can be viewed here as a means to some other end doesn’t mean that it isn’t also a consequence itself that ought to be considered along with all other actual and potential consequences.

 

[Rocinante]

Right. In other words, they each have a different nature.

you can say that, and i can say that, but we’d be meaning different things by the term “nature.”

all i’d mean is that they are different and we can learn about those differences by studying how things are now. when you talk about nature, you aren’t talking about how things are but rather how things ought to be.

for me the conclusion is a complete non sequitur to say this is what pigs or humans generally do or can do therefore this is what a pig or a human ought to do. natural law ethics seems to require such a logical leap. doesn’t it?

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Anne

*note that your critique above of what the supposed utilitarian tries to do in this hypothetical situation is a consequentialist critique. he shouldn’t do it because of the actual or potential consequences of doing it. *

There is a built in consequence to not following the natural law. If you try to fly from a tree top, you fall flat on your face. If you deny others the ownership of their property and steal from them, you go to jail. If you have indiscriminate sex with members of your own sex or the opposite sex, you get STDs. It’s not nice to try to fool Mother Nature.

In the case of this thought experiment, the natural law is that one should seek to live, and to protect one’s own family. That natural law is built into all species of life. When you flaunt that law by playing head games with your utilitarian boss (who may not be so utilitarian as you think he is) you stupidly put your own life and the welfare of all your family at risk. Yes, these are consequences of not following the natural law of protecting self and family, as there are always consequences of not following the natural law.

 

[Betterave]

you can say that, and i can say that, but we’d be meaning different things by the term “nature.”

all i’d mean is that they are different and we can learn about those differences by studying how things are now. when you talk about nature, you aren’t talking about how things are but rather how things ought to be.

for me the conclusion is a complete non sequitur to say this is what pigs or humans generally do or can do therefore this is what a pig or a human ought to do. natural law ethics seems to require such a logical leap. doesn’t it?

Your non sequitur may be a non sequitur, but as an attempt to characterize natural law theory it is simply a straw man. Do you really think that natural law theory claims that, e.g., if most people are lazy, then people ought to be lazy? Do you??

I’m curious: what is the source for your views on what natural law theory is/claims?

 

[awatkins69]

when we do the kantian bit and ask what our mothers probably always asked us and say, what if everyone behaved this way?, we are asking about the potential consequences of doing this or that. the consequences of this situation shouldn’t be viewed in isolation as though “E will never do this again” (how would B know that?) or that no one else will ever find out and try to do what E did (how would B know that?). B should consider both long and short term consequences and the possibility for others emulating E.

by the way, you keep bringing up the terms “means” and “ends.” as dewey pointed out, means are always also ends. if giving money to an extortionist is bad, the fact that it can be viewed here as a means to some other end doesn’t mean that it isn’t also a consequence itself that ought to be considered along with all other actual and potential consequences.

You’re missing the point. This is what I meant when I said originally that we shouldn’t get into the little unimportant details; it’s a thought experiment. I think pretty much everyone else gets the point. However, if you do want to do that, I can just polish up the thought experiment to make it more effective. So, we can just add two factors to get my point across.

1. Suppose that E, to prove that he will never do this again, implants a device in his brain that will paralyze him if he ever tries to do it again, and that it will only paralyze him when he tries to do this. B can be assured it will never happen again.
2. Also, suppose this is all done behind closed doors, and E also implants a device in his brain that prevents him from telling anyone about this. So much for the “everyone else will start doing this.”

In short, I’m asking you to consider if the situation only yielded these consequences. Would it be better for set A to obtain, or set B to obtain?:

Set A:
-the man to be horrendously unhappy and in pain for the next month
-for him to die
-for his family to have no father
-for his family to have no bread-winner
-for his family to descend into poverty
-for his family to not have a go-kart
-for B to lose a valuable employee

vs

Set B:
-the rich B gives the extortion money

Again, this will happen only once. Explain.

 

[John21652]

You can claim that natural law advocates equivocate on the use of natural if you want (I think you’re probably either just not understanding what they’re saying, or you are talking to incompetent expositors of natural law theory), but that doesn’t at all imply your strong claim here: that the notion of “what fulfills our nature” is a nonsensical one. If you really believe that, then you clearly simply don’t understand what the phrase means.

Read Bentham. Pleasure is the goal of hedonism, sure, but utilitarianism was originally a hedonistic moral theory

It still is!

I have been reading through this thread and finding that not only is the debate convoluted, but the mistake common to those who attempt at contrasting and comparing ethical theories is fast entrenching itself here. That is, people compare apples to oranges to bananas. An unripe Orange might have a lot of green on it, but it is still a long way from being an apple. Similarly, an over ripe apple might have some yellow on it, but it will never be a banana. Terms are being discussed without those term’s meaning being agreed on. I note that Rocinate at one point writes that human nature is a construct that can change according to environmental variables. That view does not take into account that human nature might have unchanging, rationally discernable aspects which hold true across time, space and environment. After all, the term “human nature” is used to excuse all sorts of things. One aspect of human nature that comes to mind is sociability. So far, throughout the development of human history, man as a social being has always held true. There are certain obvious traits that go to make up this socialability of mankind and therefore these behaviours are what directs mankind’s rational endeavours to know these traits, to discern them as observable and universal behaviours and so label them as normative. Hence your natural Law based morality. **awatkins69 **wrote that “ought” suggests “can”. It does indeed. However it also implies “should” without necessarily making it an imperative. The “ought” and by definition the “should” are derived from those norms which can be identified as being necessary to the proper functioning of a man as a moral agent in association with other humans. That is how the Natural Law morality is arrived at. The proper ends of mankind are those which are discernable as being true to his natural inclinations, such as sociability, the need to mate and procreate, the need to survive and prosper, the need to be safe and secure, the need to be fed and clothed, etc, etc. etc. Those behaviours which fulfill the basic requirments of human nature are those that are discerned to be normative. They are normative because they are universally applicable and objectively discernable across space and time and common to humankind. They are normative because they are universal and predictable, or ordered, behaviours. Thus Murder is not a universal and predictable behaviour and is deemed to be disordered and immoral. After all, morals are simply rules that govern human behaviour. Disordered behaviour that frustrates the proper and basic requirements of human nature are anathema to the achievement of those ends deemed to be 'good" for the proper functioning of mankind. Someone mentioned rape. Rape is not just an action that hurts an individual. It is an action, a behaviour, that hurts the social bonds between people. It destroys certainty in human relations and is therefore a morally reprehensable act on many levels. It is disordered behaviour, and universally condemned. Natural Law, then, takes into account the relationships between mankind, those he strives for and has always striven for and it takes into account mankinds place in the natural world. Natural Law consists of both Physically discernable laws and Ethically discernable moral norms, all of them objectively discoverable. It is this objectivity, through the use of reason, that sets Natual Law above the consequentialist theories of morality, which have subjective wants and desires as their foundation.

Which brings me to Utilitarianism. There is no more discredited theory of human value than Utilitarianism. It continues to collapse in on itself and hence it has shifted from what we call Classical Utilitarianism to Rule Utilitarianism and to Preference Utilitarianism. why, there is even negative Utilitarianism, which seeks nothing more than to minimise unhappiness. It even argues that if the entire universe could be instantly and painlessly rid of all life, unhappiness would cease to exist and it would be ethically correct to carry this out!! And still Utilitarianism collapses further into the rediculous and in the process it has to deny religion and mankinds discernably essential nature. It collapses into positivism and relativism and makes hedonistic self interest the sole driving force of human endeavours.Where and how low has Utilitarianism now sunk? Why, as defined by the latest and most famous proponent of this rediculous morality, Professor of Ethics at Princeton University, Peter Singer, who pronounced that the Bible was myth, and it is now OK for humans to have sex with animals. Provided the animals aren’t harmed, of course!! He did, after all, elevate animals to the same status as humans and state that abortion, euthanasia, homosexuality and infanticide were all OK. Vegetarianism is ethically correct, according to Singer, because animal suffering results from our dimination over the animals. He is yet to convince the Lions and Tigers who operate according to natural laws.

 

[Rocinante]

You’re missing the point. This is what I meant when I said originally that we shouldn’t get into the little unimportant details; it’s a thought experiment. I think pretty much everyone else gets the point. However, if you do want to do that, I can just polish up the thought experiment to make it more effective. So, we can just add two factors to get my point across.

1. Suppose that E, to prove that he will never do this again, implants a device in his brain that will paralyze him if he ever tries to do it again, and that it will only paralyze him when he tries to do this. B can be assured it will never happen again.
2. Also, suppose this is all done behind closed doors, and E also implants a device in his brain that prevents him from telling anyone about this. So much for the “everyone else will start doing this.”

In short, I’m asking you to consider if the situation only yielded these consequences. Would it be better for set A to obtain, or set B to obtain?:

Set A:
-the man to be horrendously unhappy and in pain for the next month
-for him to die
-for his family to have no father
-for his family to have no bread-winner
-for his family to descend into poverty
-for his family to not have a go-kart
-for B to lose a valuable employee

vs

Set B:
-the rich B gives the extortion money

Again, this will happen only once. Explain.

you can polish it up all you want to try to adjust to any objections i raise, but the bottom line is that what you and i both don’t want in this scenario is the consequence, “person pays extortionist.” that is not a consequence that we are very willing to accept easily. we have to make the alternative consequences extremely bad before we would accept “person pays extortionist” as the best option. i accept that it is possible to polish up a thought experiment like this to the point where the consequences of not paying the extortionist are bad enough that it would be best to do that.

note that real people actually make these sorts of decisions fairly often in case of kidnapping. what does natural law ethics say such people should do when colombian drug lords demand $10,000 for the life of your daughter?

consider also the ticking time bomb torture scenario. even though we find torture reprehensible, if the danger of the bomb was extreme enough and the chances of getting information that would enable us to prevent the explosion were thought to be good enough, we would have to do the torture. wouldn’t we?

how about the question of abortion to save the life of the mother?

the point is that it is always a weighing of consequences. how else could we make such decisions between two competing evils? how would an understanding of the so-called “essential nature of humanity” help at all in any of these scenarios?

rocinante

 

[Black_Rose]

Now do you reconcile these facts with Catholic “natural law”:

Infanticide was quite common in human history. About 20% of infants were killed in the paleolithic era.

The Spanish justified the poor treatment of the Native Americans with natural law philosophy.

Utilitarianism and “natural law” have a different epistemology: utilitarians are nominalists while “natural law” proponents are essentialists. In the nominalist sense, there is no essential natures, only propensities.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Now do you reconcile these facts with Catholic “natural law”:

I don’t. Natural law has been abused by those who would use it to justify certain kinds of abusive behavior. Slaves were regarded as less than human, more like animals, which justified slavery. That is an abuse of natural law by those who intend to profit from the abuse. Just as abortion physicians also justify killing the unborn for profit because they are not yet born, and therefore supposedly not yet human. Abuse of the natural law principle is no argument against it. There is no natural law that says it is right to kill our own children, born or unborn.

Common sense.