Nazi Germany vs. Soviet Union?

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**The First Guidebook to Prisons and Concentration Camps of the Soviet Union Paperback – **April, 1982
by Avraham Shifrin (Author)

This book, written by a former inmate, describes no fewer than 1,976 concentration camps in the Soviet Union, as of early 1980. Estimates of the population were in the millions. The author provides exact addresses as well as all the necessary instructions for reaching the camps, prisons and psychiatric prisons, inviting the reader to visit the inmates and their families; needless to say, few Western tourists accepted this challenge, amid their enthusiasm for détente and the Bolshoi Ballet.

The author describes a world of watchtowers manned by guards bearing machine guns, and electrically charged barbed-wire fences; he portrays prisoners in columns or transport vehicles, prisoners attacked by dogs, prisoners in camp uniforms with numbers across their chests, women prisoners, child and teenage prisoners (p. 3). These are people persecuted for thinking differently; reading “forbidden” philosophical, political or religious books; posting notices; raising a flag; demanding religious instruction for their children; or undertaking a private commercial initiative (pp. 3-4). Such were the “crimes” for which millions of Soviet citizens were savagely punished.

Perhaps the most distressing part of this work is the very first section, which lists 119 prisons and concentration camps built specifically for women and children (pp. 14-22): a picture of inmates at Orel, a camp with 3,000 children, contains a sign with the words “Honest work: the road home to the family,” an obvious parallel with the Nazi slogan “Work shall set you free” (“Arbeit macht frei”) (p. 16). As the author records, these camps were characterised by extreme violence and sadistic cruelty: thus in Novosibirsk, club-carrying guards “subject the young prisoners (aged 10 to 18) to merciless beatings” while children are sent to hard labour projects; in Gornyi, children endure backbreaking duties, despite the prevalence of hunger, while “[t]hose who fall ill and request transfer to a hospital are beaten;” and in Gor’kii, the victims were so brutalised that “[m]any of the children fell ill and died for lack of medical attention” (p. 18).

Then there is the short section entitled “Extermination Camps” (pp. 31-5), listing camps where prisoners, “forced to work under dangerously unhealthy conditions for the Soviet war machine, face a virtually certain death” (p. 31). The author identifies three categories: (1) camps where almost no-one ever comes out alive (the prisoners work in uranium mines and uranium enrichment plants); (2) camps where the prisoners are used for dangerous work in the arms industry (the prisoners perform high-risk duties in military nuclear plants); (3) camps where prisoners are used for dangerous work causing disability and fatal illness (the prisoners operate machines without ventilation). No fewer than 41 extermination camps are listed. By the second edition, the author had discovered another camp in Khaidarovka, where “prisoners die while mining uranium,” and “a death camp with uranium mines” in the desert at Kul-Kuduk (p. 366); that brought the total to 43.

Next the author documents the existence of 85 psychiatric prisons, where mentally healthy human beings were administered heavy doses of neuroleptic drugs; where inmates were bound so that the victim’s body becomes compressed as if in a vice; and where prisoners were beaten by criminals and subjected to electric shocks at the slightest provocation (p. 47). Former inmate Vladimir Bukovsky recalled the injections of sulfazine, which caused an abscess, high temperature and intense pain; torture with insulin shocks; and treatment with high doses of haloperidol to lower the dopamine level, inducing Parkinson’s disease (Index on Censorship, October 2001). As the author points out, these horrors were inflicted as punishment for political dissent, for seeking to emigrate, or merely for expressing a belief in God.

The author reports that some camp inmates were driven to the point where they branded anti-communist slogans on their foreheads. At first, these were cut out of their flesh. Subsequently, the offenders were “tried in secret and shot” (p. 370).

Some people think that Communism was a great idea until it went bad because of Stalin, and that the Gulag system was a product of Stalinism. Far from it. The Gulag system long preceded Stalin, and long survived him. The items date from the 1970’s Brezhnev era.

This comprehensive catalogue, based upon the author’s experiences as well as eyewitness accounts, lists thousands of detention facilities, according to city, town, and region, in the USSR. The facilities are located not only in remote areas of the Soviet Union, but also population centers, including the seized Polish city of Lvov (Lwow, Lviv). (p. 80).

Many of the conditions of incarceration in Soviet camps are no better than they were in the days of Stalin. For instance, in the notorious logging camps, prisoners toil long hours in 40 or 50 below Celsius weather. Owing to their meager and unbalanced diet, they experience scurvy (p. 167), if not avitaminosis.

It has been argued that there were no death camps under the Communist system comparable to the Nazi death camps–to which admission guaranteed death. There certainly were, even in the 1970’s. (e. g., p. 31-on, 73, 228, 266, 269, 285). These include the camps where poorly protected or unprotected workers dealt with uranium, facing very close to 100% mortality. Interestingly, one “ordinary” camp had a phrase praising work as a means of freedom–chillingly reminiscent of the ARBEIT MACHT FREI sign at Auschwitz. (p. 10).
 
The First Guidebook to Prisons and Concentration Camps of the Soviet Union Paperback – April, 1982
by Avraham Shifrin (Author)

[continued]

Non-criminal prisoners are housed with common criminals (p. 88). They often face abuse, some organized by the prison staff, from the latter. Those incarcerated include political dissidents, nationalists advocating their homeland’s freedom from the Soviet empire, and Jews (including the author) guilty of “Zionism” in wishing to emigrate from the USSR to Israel.

Anti-religion and especially anti-Christianity has always been a staple of the political left, and under Communism, it was honed to perfection. In psychiatric hospitals, those who believe in God were considered insane. The most commonly-mentioned offense for incarceration in the Soviet prisons and camps was professed belief in God and wanting to teach religion to one’s own children (p. 66, 155-156, 194, 200, and many more). One eyewitness described such a situation as follows, “An atmosphere of hopelessness and despair reigned in the camps. Only the religious prisoners were able to stand above the human degradation. They believed that they were being tested by God and that they had to endure their sufferings. The others, however, fought each other over food or reduced themselves to acts of homosexuality or even sodomy.” (p. 167).

There have been quite a few large revolts against the unjust incarcerations and living conditions in the prisons and camps. (150, 152, 240-241, 298). Some of them were successful for a few days before being drowned in blood by Soviet forces or the KGB, the successor to the NKVD.

Shifrin warns leftists in the West who yearn for or support Communism. He points out that the Communist secret police first killed the leftists. (p. 362).
 
Yes, right-wingers want to make the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany equivalent evils.

It isn’t fair because it is driven entirely by ideology and propaganda.
Isn’t it interesting that no claim that it isn’t true is made…? 🙂
I ask anyone: where is the evidence that Stalin killed more people than Hitler? Where is the evidence for the tens of millions of deaths? The answer is that there is no evidence.
If you are upset at the lower figure, then I ask for evidence for the higher figures. Evidence is the word.
Yes, that is correct, there is no evidence at all of an aggressive Soviet foreign policy. They were largely foreign policy realists.
Ah, the evidence. “Evidence! I need more evidence! I refuse to believe unless I get more evidence!”…

When do we hear those exclamations here?

Oh, right. When the atheists claim that they do not believe God exists because “there is no evidence”.

Of course, we see that this claim is usually false (although it might well be that they do believe it themselves). They have other reasons for disbelief - “No evidence!” is just a pretext, held by inflated requirements, never used for claims that one likes (for example, “Outside sources are necessary!”, “No hearsay evidence!”).

It sure looks like we have an instance of that here…
The Soviets wanted concessions from the Finland as a buffer for Leningrad. The Poles (along France and Great Britain) were obstinate about signing anti-German mutual defense pacts. The Poles were the cowards, since the entire leadership left the country, and they could not surrender to the Nazis, so a rump state could be negotiated between the Soviet Union and Germany-territory.
So, the Poles were cowards, because they didn’t surrender? Brilliant. Have you actually tried to read what you wrote? 🙂

Of course, this case conveniently forgets Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, ignores the possibility to, um, attack Nazis and not Poles (or to dig in and wait)…
 
Often I have noticed, in theology of evil discussion in Catholic circles the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany are presented as equal evils, and that one empire is as evil as the other.

Any thoughts?
One was as evil as the other.

Dictatorship is the most unjust form of government irrespective of their respective politics. Dictatorships in all their forms are equally evil because they are dictatorships. One is not better than the other.

One is not better than the other because one ticks more of our boxes than the other. The fact a dictatorship ticks more of our boxes does not mean it is less unjust or less evil. My personal politics lean left, but I do not think Nazi Germany was less evil than the Soviet Union as a result. I think both were equally evil.

The one thing I will say for Hitler is he had a degree of loyalty to the German people. Stalin had no loyalty to his people - that is what made him even more effective as a dictator than Hitler. No compliment intended.
 
Isn’t it interesting that no claim that it isn’t true is made…? 🙂

Ah, the evidence. “Evidence! I need more evidence! I refuse to believe unless I get more evidence!”…

When do we hear those exclamations here?

Oh, right. When the atheists claim that they do not believe God exists because “there is no evidence”.

Of course, we see that this claim is usually false (although it might well be that they do believe it themselves). They have other reasons for disbelief - “No evidence!” is just a pretext, held by inflated requirements, never used for claims that one likes (for example, “Outside sources are necessary!”, “No hearsay evidence!”).

It sure looks like we have an instance of that here…
The evidence in the Soviet archives suggest 2.5 million people died. If you want to blame it entirely on Stalin, I wouldn’t argue with that yet. There is simply no good evidence for the higher figures. There is no evidence of mens rea on the Soviet government’s part for the “Holodomor”; actually, no mens rea means no “Holodomor”, since the “Holodomor” was a deliberate famine.
So, the Poles were cowards, because they didn’t surrender? Brilliant. Have you actually tried to read what you wrote? 🙂
Of course, this case conveniently forgets Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, ignores the possibility to, um, attack Nazis and not Poles (or to dig in and wait)…
What is wrong the pact itself? You conveniently ignore the attempts by the Soviet government to form anti-Nazi pacts.

The Polish government ran away. They interned themselves in Romania. That can be seen as the equivalent of a surrender, but they forfeited an sovereign power by doing so.
Polish Government Uniquely Irresponsible
No other government during WW2 did anything remotely like what the Polish government did.
Many governments of countries conquered by the Axis formed “governments in exile” to continue the war. But only the Polish government interned itself in a neutral country, thereby stripping itself of the ability to function as a government and stripping their own people of their existence as a state.
What should the Polish government leader have done, once they realized they were completely beaten militarily?
Code:
The Polish government should have remained somewhere in Poland – if not in the capital, Warsaw, then in Eastern Poland. If they had set up an alternative capital in the East -- something the Soviets had prepared to do East of Moscow, in case the Nazis captured Moscow -- then they could have preserved a "rump" Poland.
There it should have capitulated – as, for example, the French Government did in July 1940. Or, it could have sued for peace, as the Finnish government did in March 1940.
Then Poland, like Finland, would have remained as a state, though it would certainly have lost territory.
Or, the Polish government could have fled to Great Britain or France, countries already at war with Germany.
Polish government leaders could have fled by air any time. Or they could have gotten to the Polish port of Gdynia, which held out until September 14, and fled by boat.
Why didn't they? Did Polish government leaders think they might be killed? Well, so what? Tens of thousands of their fellow citizens and soldiers were being killed!
    Maybe they really did believe Rumania would violate its neutrality with Germany and let them pass through to France? If they did believe this, they were remarkably stupid. There's never been any evidence that the Rumanian government gave them permission to do this.
    Did they believe Britain and France were going to "save" them? If so, that too was remarkably stupid. Even if the British and French really intended to field a large army to attack German forces in the West, the Polish army would have had to hold against the Wehrmacht for a month at least, perhaps more. But the Polish Army was in rapid retreat after the first day or two of the war.
    Or, maybe they fled simply out of sheer cowardice. That is what their flight out of Warsaw, the Polish capital, suggests.
Everything that happened afterwards was a result of the Polish government being interned in Rumania.
Here’s how the world might have been different if a “rump” Poland had remained after surrender to Hitler:
  • A “rump” Poland might finally have agreed to make a mutual defense pact that included the USSR. That would have restarted “collective security”, the anti-Nazi alliance between the Western Allies and the USSR that the Soviets sought but UK and French leaders rejected.
That would have
Code:
greatly weakened Hitler;
probably eliminating much of the Jewish Holocaust;
certainly preventing the conquest of France, Belgium, and the rest of Europe;
certainly prevented many millions of deaths of Soviet citizens.
  • Poland could have emerged from WW2 as an independent state, perhaps a neutral one, like Finland, Sweden, or Austria.
All this, and more – if only the Polish government had remained in their country at least long enough to surrender, as every other government did.
msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/research/mlg09/did_ussr_invade_poland.html
 
The evidence in the Soviet archives suggest 2.5 million people died. If you want to blame it entirely on Stalin, I wouldn’t argue with that yet. There is simply no good evidence for the higher figures. There is no evidence of mens rea on the Soviet government’s part for the “Holodomor”; actually, no mens rea means no “Holodomor”, since the “Holodomor” was a deliberate famine.

What is wrong the pact itself? You conveniently ignore the attempts by the Soviet government to form anti-Nazi pacts.

The Polish government ran away. They interned themselves in Romania. That can be seen as the equivalent of a surrender, but they forfeited an sovereign power by doing so.

msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/research/mlg09/did_ussr_invade_poland.html
Oh, I see. If only Poland had signed a piece of paper, Soviets would have went into Polish territory to fight Nazis. But Poland did not sign a piece of paper, and Soviets went into Polish territory as Nazi allies, to fight Poles. Because USSR was such great enemy of Nazis, of course. And so-o-o peace-loving. 🙂

And they would certainly have thrown into garbage the Pact with Hitler then… Oops… Wasn’t USSR supposed to be a great believer in signed pieces of paper in this fairy tale…? 🙂

I guess that explains why Soviets lost battles in June of 1941 - there was no piece of paper signed, right? Why, oh why didn’t Pavlov offer this excuse before he was executed… 🙂

Now, that was kinda fun, but there are two more interesting questions: 1) what is the real reason for liking USSR? 2) how is liking USSR supposed to fit with being a Catholic?
 
Oh, I see. If only Poland had signed a piece of paper, Soviets would have went into Polish territory to fight Nazis. But Poland did not sign a piece of paper, and Soviets went into Polish territory as Nazi allies, to fight Poles. Because USSR was such great enemy of Nazis, of course. And so-o-o peace-loving. 🙂

And they would certainly have thrown into garbage the Pact with Hitler then… Oops… Wasn’t USSR supposed to be a great believer in signed pieces of paper in this fairy tale…? 🙂

I guess that explains why Soviets lost battles in June of 1941 - there was no piece of paper signed, right? Why, oh why didn’t Pavlov offer this excuse before he was executed… 🙂

Now, that was kinda fun, but there are two more interesting questions: 1) what is the real reason for liking USSR? 2) how is liking USSR supposed to fit with being a Catholic?
This is rather puerile. Of course, Stalin didn’t trust Hitler. I asked why the pact itself is really that bad. My main point was that the Soviets made many good faith efforts to oppose Nazi Germany, but Western diplomacy rebuffed them. Also note that a larger Kriegsmarine through the Anglo-Naval Pact and re-militarization of the Rhineland was tolerated by the West.

If the attack happened in 1942, Soviet losses would not have been as catastrophic. My point is that the Red Army had not finished modernizing and reorganizing its armed forces; it had nothing to do with a naive faith in treaties.
Which in turn raises another question: what if Hitler didn’t cancel Operation Barbarossa, but rather postponed it until the summer of 1942? Assuming the Axis were successful in the Middle East, the Soviets would have faced a German–Italian expeditionary force advancing north through the Caucasus (perhaps Turkey would have joined the rising Axis tide.) Another year would also have given Germany more time to loot and exploit the resources of conquered Western Europe.
On the other hand, the Red Army in June of 1941 was caught terribly off-balance, still reeling and reorganizing from Stalin’s purges. The extra year would have given the Soviets time to finish regrouping the Red Army as well as absorbing formidable new equipment such as the T-34 tank and Katyusha rocket launcher. Delaying Barbarossa until 1942, assuming Britain hadn’t surrendered, would have meant that Germany would begin its attack on Russia while still needing to bolster its western defenses against the inevitable Anglo-American counterattack.
Superior German tactical and operational skills, as well as greater combat experience, would have given the Wehrmacht the edge in the opening days of Barbarossa 1942. Yet the catastrophic losses the Red Army suffered in 1941 would probably have been lower, leading to the possibility that Barbarossa delayed would have been a gift to the Soviets.
nationalinterest.org/feature/what-if-hitler-never-invaded-russia-during-world-war-ii-17492

On the other hand, one should acknowledge the strategic implications of the Soviet defeats in 1941. An encirclement and capture of 600,000 troops in Kiev is a strategic victory for the Wehrmacht, but many anti-communists actually downplay this. Some Germany generals thought the drive to Moscow should have been initiated earlier, but that would have Red Army soldiers available to attack the Southern flank from the assault. My point here is that Hitler did not make an error in capturing Kiev and the industrial and agricultural assets of Ukraine as opposed to taking Moscow, as many German general allege in their memoirs. Hitler’s military incompetence has been exaggerated.



As for my affinity with the Soviet Union:
But in any case, none of this explains why anyone might be nostalgic in former communist states, now enjoying the delights of capitalist restoration. The dominant account gives no sense of how communist regimes renewed themselves after 1956 or why western leaders feared they might overtake the capitalist world well into the 1960s. For all its brutalities and failures, communism in the Soviet Union, eastern Europe and elsewhere delivered rapid industrialisation, mass education, job security and huge advances in social and gender equality. It encompassed genuine idealism and commitment, captured even by critical films and books of the post-Stalin era such as Wajda’s Man of Marble and Rybakov’s Children of the Arbat. Its existence helped to drive up welfare standards in the west, boosted the anticolonial movement and provided a powerful counterweight to western global domination.
Seamus Milne.
 
This is rather puerile.
If you are going to offer fairy tales that are ridiculous, I do intend to ridicule them. Also please note that in doing so I did point out self-contradictions in them. Not to mention that you have tried to drop them silently (with distractions) - that seems to indicate that, whatever you say, you do understand that they are ridiculous. Just observe:
Of course, Stalin didn’t trust Hitler. I asked why the pact itself is really that bad. My main point was that the Soviets made many good faith efforts to oppose Nazi Germany, but Western diplomacy rebuffed them. Also note that a larger Kriegsmarine through the Anglo-Naval Pact and re-militarization of the Rhineland was tolerated by the West.

If the attack happened in 1942, Soviet losses would not have been as catastrophic. My point is that the Red Army had not finished modernizing and reorganizing its armed forces; it had nothing to do with a naive faith in treaties.

nationalinterest.org/feature/what-if-hitler-never-invaded-russia-during-world-war-ii-17492

On the other hand, one should acknowledge the strategic implications of the Soviet defeats in 1941. An encirclement and capture of 600,000 troops in Kiev is a strategic victory for the Wehrmacht, but many anti-communists actually downplay this. Some Germany generals thought the drive to Moscow should have been initiated earlier, but that would have Red Army soldiers available to attack the Southern flank from the assault. My point here is that Hitler did not make an error in capturing Kiev and the industrial and agricultural assets of Ukraine as opposed to taking Moscow, as many German general allege in their memoirs. Hitler’s military incompetence has been exaggerated.

In this whole text Poland hasn’t been mentioned even once. You supposedly answer the ridicule directed to your statement that Stalin would have fought Hitler if only - if only! - he had a treaty with Poland… And instead you manage to - who would have guessed! - find the place to praise Hitler’s military leadership!

Oh, and, of course, it is silly to claim “good faith” for any Stalin’s foreign policy initiatives right after praising him for “realist” (obvious euphemism for “Machiavellian”) foreign policy.
As for my affinity with the Soviet Union:
But in any case, none of this explains why anyone might be nostalgic in former communist states, now enjoying the delights of capitalist restoration. The dominant account gives no sense of how communist regimes renewed themselves after 1956 or why western leaders feared they might overtake the capitalist world well into the 1960s. For all its brutalities and failures, communism in the Soviet Union, eastern Europe and elsewhere delivered rapid industrialisation, mass education, job security and huge advances in social and gender equality. It encompassed genuine idealism and commitment, captured even by critical films and books of the post-Stalin era such as Wajda’s Man of Marble and Rybakov’s Children of the Arbat. Its existence helped to drive up welfare standards in the west, boosted the anticolonial movement and provided a powerful counterweight to western global domination.
OK, presumably, you take his words as your own?

First of all, let’s point out that this case is morally disgusting - how can one excuse murders of millions, persecution of Church (a member of which you claim to be) and the like by mere worldly benefits (even if they were real)? A Marxist can be expected to reject “bourgeois” morality, but a Catholic has no such option.

Yet let’s see how others fare in comparison with Stalin by those criteria… For example, Hitler, since the thread is about their comparison.

“rapid industrialisation” - check for Hitler (let’s mention just Volkswagen), check for all Western capitalists (that’s what they do, after all).

“mass education” - check for Hitler (compulsory education), check for the West in general.

“job security” - check for Hitler (under him, rather famously, unemployment was all but eradicated).

“huge advances in social and gender equality” - not check for Stalin - it’s not like under him “zeks” were equal to members of Nomenklatura, nor was there a single female member of Politburo under him (throughout the history, there were just 4 women in Politburo - see en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Politburo_of_the_Communist_Party_of_the_Soviet_Union&oldid=779954175#Ethnicity.2C_age_and_sex).

“genuine idealism and commitment” - check for Hitler (let’s just mention Hitlerjugend).

“Its existence helped to drive up welfare standards in the west” - not sure about that…

“boosted the anticolonial movement” - check for Hitler (let’s say, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Legion, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relations_between_Nazi_Germany_and_the_Arab_world).

“provided a powerful counterweight to western global domination” - it is hard to see what is supposed to be good about that, but check for Hitler.

It looks like, if you sincerely think those reasons are good (and good enough to outweigh mass killings, persecution of Church etc.), you should be a fan of Hitler too. So, can you explain why you are not a fan of him?

For that matter, maybe you also would like to explain how did you become a fan of Stalin?
 
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