Hey, Dan. Thank you for chiming in. I don’t know why, but for some reason I can’t find or use the quote button, so I’ll have to quote manually:
Anyway, in a marriage, it’s not that the other Party “is allowed the right to withdraw.” When a person (validly) marries, he/she automatically and necessarily has the right to withdraw from any such agreement regarding the postponement of children, even an indefinite postponement undertaken for weighty reasons. That’s what exchanging this right means.
Yes, that’s my point. The right is exchanged automatically as part of accepting the whole package. But here’s the trick: if you exclude the right with a positive act of you will, you are necessarily refusing to accept the whole package, and the law makes it impossible to accept just part of it. Hence I was analysing the couple’s frame of mind at the point. If they are dead on barring the right to withdraw, which in real-life terms means they’re entering into a rigid arrangement that is not subject to change, then it looks to me like they’re withholding the
ius itself, not just the
usus of it.
If the other Party responds with “no, you can’t go back on our plan–we had an agreement”, the withdrawing Party could say “actually, our agreement was to marry.” If the response comes back “No, I’m not changing my mind”, then we’ve got simulation.
Also the way I see it, yes.
What is difficult in this case is that:
‘No I’m not changing my mind, because it could kill me.’
‘I don’t care. We’re married, and I’ve got a right to this, you have to comply.’
Then strictly speaking the asker is not in a position to claim the ‘debt’, the ‘askee’ has a moral right to refuse, and so on. So we would basically be asking ourselves whether the ‘askee’ theoretically recognizes the existence of the asker’s right. Which is not the sort of distinction non-lawyers ever ponder. Maybe philosophers, but they get lost in it. And obviously they’d say ‘yeah, I recognize it, I just can’t comply with it,’ and we’d be down to psychological divinations.
