On the other hand, no one has ever shown that the mind is anything but neuronal activity. And plenty of psychological phenomena have been attributed directly to neurological activity. Is it so strange that, given the absence of any evidence of a ghost in the machine, one might conclude that there isn’t one, even if the machine is not well understood?
Nice try switching the burden of proof. Neurobiologists making reductive claims are the newcomers on this subject. As I said the conviction that there is an immaterial component to the composite human being goes back to the origins of our civilization and thrives as the majority conviction today. It does not necessitate Cartesian dualism (ghost in the machine) which I and the CC utterly reject.
The neurological researchers know, if you read their writings, that they have to prove their reductive claims regarding the brain and the mind; and they admit they have not yet done so. Some, as I showed, are satisfied with correlations. And I have no problem with that.
On the other hand, if you want to argue
philosophically that it is more reasonable to abandon the traditional claim regarding the immateriality of the soul for a reductive physicalist account (also the newcomer), by all means do so. I would be glad to discuss it.
But think.
• The DATUM to be explained is the mind defined as the complex of cognitional, volitional, perceptual, emotional processes, and qualia in the conscious life of an individual person usually emphasizing rationality. This is inner, first person, observer-dependent.
• The PROCESS involved. The scientific method investigates extra-mental physical objects that are third person and observer-independent and does so mechanistically in terms of structure and function.
• PROBLEM: How does one get from these thing-objects that work mechanistically and atomistically to the mind, my mind, as known in life? Once one tells the story of the physical and physiological processes in all possible depth there is still the further fact of inner conscious first-person mental activity in me. How does structure and function get one to consciousness?
Leibniz noted this:
“Moreover, it must be confessed that perception and that which depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions. And supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in a simple substance, and not in a compound or in a machine, that perception must be sought for.”
Monadology, 17]
How do you get from structure and function of third-person physical objects to inner first-person experience?