New proofs that God exists?

[latin_rite]

Logically sound? Sure. So is:

Everyone living in Italy is blind.
Fred lives in Italy.
Therefore, Fred is blind.

Something can be logically sound and still be wrong.

Well actually Fred is blind.

 

[ceefo]

If God actually exists, then why all the mental circumlocutions? I think all this shows is that the CONCEPT of God is a mental exercise. The legitimate question here is: Is there any way to show that God exists, or is it simply a mental construct? Showing such a thing can’t rely upon rhetorical arguments, which is all that the poster has been able to produce.

 

[Candide_West]

Are you sure the “universe” ‘existed’ before the emergence of the concept of ‘the universe’? Isn’t the universe simply a concept- There may be cultures which have no word for ‘universe’, have no conception of a unified totality, and (for them) the ‘universe’ simply wouldn’t exist- rather there would just be a bunch of separate ‘stuff’.*

Indeed, but that separate stuff still does actually exist. So whether you call them a single thing or refer to each part separately, “the universe” or “all the stuff that exists” does in fact exist outside of human minds to conceptualise.*

Moreover, isn’t the universe only ‘conceptually’ unified? Compare with the emerging idea of ‘dark matter’ or ‘multiverses’- until the concepts/language was formulated, to all intents and purposes, they simply did not ‘exist.’ And if the word “chair” did not exist, would it be true to say that “chairs still exist”? No, because the category/word would not be there even to make the statement.*

This seems to be rather like saying that Rhinos didn’t exist until they were discovered. The problem with that is that if they didn’t exist then they couldn’t have been discovered.

So existence is a function of language.

I think this is where our views diverge. To me a name is a label which we attach to a concept. Some of those concepts refer to things which have an identifiable physical nature (like “chair”) and some are their own referents - where the referent only exists as a concept (like “justice” or “seven”).*

I think your “proof” shows that the concept of God exists (in the same way that “seven” exists) but I don’t think anyone would argue that the concept exists. But it doesn’t prove that God has a nature beyond a concept in human heads.*

Otherwise we can argue that your proof also shows that the flying spaghetti monster exists.

And if I create a new word- say “antiverse”- refering to an alternate universe with precisely opposite conditions to this one (including being non-existent, in comparison to the existent nature of this universe), haven’t I just ‘made’ something new?*

Well, yes, you’ve made a new concept. Of course that doesn’t mean that such a place exists outside your (and now my) mind.

For the sake of discussion, maybe God could be ‘defined’ as:
the ideatum of the idea of the absolutely transcendent.
Or, more simply:
God is the referent of the word ‘God’.*

Yes, you can define God any way you like. The problem comes when people get mixed up with defining things into existence by assuming that when they redefine something it retains all it’s original properties. To demonstrate…

1. I define “God” as “the number seven”
2. “the number seven” exists.
3. Therefore “God” exists.
4. Therefore God (an omniscient, omnipotent, creative, sentient being) exists.

But 4. Doesn’t hold because in 1. God was redefined as*“the number seven” so the proof just makes God irrelevant.

We agree that the ‘idea of the absolutely transcendent’ exists. That idea must have a ideatum (a non-thing/thing to which the idea refers), which, is necessarily infinitely removed from the ‘idea’.That ideatum exists (ek-sistere- ‘stands out’ from other ‘things’)- otherwise the idea of it could not have been formed.

In other words, ‘God’ is what I am thinking of when I am thinking of ‘God’. And ‘God’ must ‘exist’- otherwise, what am I thinking of? Even if it is non-thing (no thing/nothing), it is still part of the verbal/conceptual structure which is -]re/-]ality.

This again seems to mean that goblins, fairies, the flying spaghetti monster and God all exist. But only if we accept that their existence is as concepts.

 

[Qoeleth]

I think this is where our views diverge. To me a name is a label which we attach to a concept. Some of those concepts refer to things which have an identifiable physical nature (like “chair”) and some are their own referents - where the referent only exists as a concept (like “justice” or “seven”).*

Yes, you can define God any way you like. The problem comes when people get mixed up with defining things into existence by assuming that when they redefine something it retains all it’s original properties. To demonstrate…

1. I define “God” as “the number seven”
2. “the number seven” exists.
3. Therefore “God” exists.
4. Therefore God (an omniscient, omnipotent, creative, sentient being) exists.

But 4. Doesn’t hold because in 1. God was redefined as*“the number seven” so the proof just makes God irrelevant.

Do ‘chairs’ actually exist as a physical class? The objects called ‘chairs’ are made of different materials, designs, sizes. Someone might see a tree trunk as a ‘chair’, some one might see a beanbag as a ‘chair’. Someone might see what you or I would conventionally call a ‘chair’, and call it simply ‘firewood’. I suggest that there are no concepts outside of the subjective act of conceptualising and naming them. Someone thought up the concept of ‘chair’ to describe things which formed the functioning of ‘sitting equipment’. Similarly the concept of ‘God’ refers to the unknown ‘object’ of the sense of the transcendent.

The language of ‘God’ as a omnipotent, omniscient being is always metaphoric- since the primary attribute of God as the ideatum of the idea of the absolutely transcendent is that no predicates may be attached to Him. But this is itself a predicate, and therefore de-constructs.

I think the a-theist Derrida put it best “‘God’ ‘is’ the bottomless collapse of meaning.” And Eckhart said that anything we say about God is always more untrue than it is true (and I suppose that includes even this statement).

Indeed, we have been having a conversation about the ontological status of ‘God’. So, ‘God’ (defined as the -]being/-] the ontological status of whom we have been discussing) must ‘exist’ (in the sense of being distinguishable from [ex-sistere] from things ‘other than God’- and this ‘being distingushable from other -]things/-]’ is necessarily subject [it depends upon the subject who does the distinguishing].)

 

[Candide_West]

Do ‘chairs’ actually exist as a physical class? The objects called ‘chairs’ are made of different materials, designs, sizes. Someone might see a tree trunk as a ‘chair’, some one might see a beanbag as a ‘chair’. Someone might see what you or I would conventionally call a ‘chair’, and call it simply ‘firewood’. I suggest that there are no concepts outside of the subjective act of conceptualising and naming them. Someone thought up the concept of ‘chair’ to describe things which formed the functioning of ‘sitting equipment’. Similarly the concept of ‘God’ refers to the unknown ‘object’ of the sense of the transcendent.

Yes, indeed “chair” is just a label which we conceptually attach to objects which have certain properties. What you actually call it is largely immaterial. Just as a “chair” wouldn’t become a “bag” just because you attach a label saying “bag” to it because it’s just a shorthand way of referring to a set of characteristics.*

The problem is that if you get caught up in thinking that the label is really the concept then the concept must be a real thing.*

The language of ‘God’ as a omnipotent, omniscient being is always metaphoric- since the primary attribute of God as the ideatum of the idea of the absolutely transcendent is that no predicates may be attached to Him. But this is itself a predicate, and therefore de-constructs.

Well quite.*

I think the a-theist Derrida put it best “‘God’ ‘is’ the bottomless collapse of meaning.” And Eckhart said that anything we say about God is always more untrue than it is true (and I suppose that includes even this statement).

Interesting, but I don’t think this helps your case.

Indeed, we have been having a conversation about the ontological status of ‘God’. So, ‘God’ (defined as the -]being/-] the ontological status of whom we have been discussing) must ‘exist’ (in the sense of being distinguishable from [ex-sistere] from things ‘other than God’- and this ‘being distingushable from other -]things/-]’ is necessarily subject [it depends upon the subject who does the distinguishing].)

But if we’re talking about concepts then it just means that the God concept is distinguishable from other concepts.*

In other words I can distinguish the difference between a squuikle and a ggrrrmpyt in my head. But neither of these concepts can do anything outside my head because they are self referential (squuikle refers to the conceptsquuikle (exclusively) ). Does that prove that they exist? Well yes, but only that they exist as concepts. If I wanted to use this to show thatsquuikles exist outside my head is have to start again.