Nothing to something

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Nothing, excluding God, is starting position.
I am trying to wrap my head around the phrase “Nothing, excluding God”… and I fail.

Do you mean that there IS God and then there IS “nothing”? This would be the discredited worldview of “absolute” space and “absolute” time “floating around” in a huge piece of “nothing”. This kind of Newtonian metaphysics is not taken seriously any more. (Let me clarify: “some nincompoops may take it seriously, but I am not interested in contemplating the opinion of such people.”)
You then have something if the process is possible.
In a fantasy world everything is imaginable. But that does not mean that everything is possible.
 
I am trying to wrap my head around the phrase “Nothing, excluding God”… and I fail.

Do you mean that there IS God and then there IS “nothing”? This would be the discredited worldview of “absolute” space and “absolute” time “floating around” in a huge piece of “nothing”. This kind of Newtonian metaphysics is not taken seriously any more. (Let me clarify: “some nincompoops may take it seriously, but I am not interested in contemplating the opinion of such people.”)
I mean there is only God at the beginning. You then have God and creation. Subtract God from the equation and you end up with nothing to something/creation. That is the very meaning of creation ex nihilo.
In a fantasy world everything is imaginable. But that does not mean that everything is possible.
Nothing to something. Possible or impossible?
 
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I mean there is only God at the beginning. You then have God and creation. Subtract God from the equation and you end up with nothing to something/creation. That is the very meaning of creation ex nihilo.
Sorry, I am talking about the real, secular, philosophical concept / principle of “nothing”. Not whatever “existed” next to God.
Nothing to something. Possible or impossible?
Since “nothing” is just a concept, and something would be an ontological entity, the answer is: “no it is not possible, either logically or physically.” A concept, which does not exist as an ontological entity cannot become an ontological entity.
 
So, you are still defending the cycle theory in which there is no previous cycle yet there is?
 
Do you mind to elaborate on the bold part? I agree that nothing has infinite potential. I have an idea about this. I was wondering whether you are having proof or following the same idea that I have. It would be nice of you if you could demonstrate that why if nothing has infinite potential then it follows that it could be the material cause of contingent being.
To the best of my ability, I will gladly do so. So we both agree that nonbeing is best categorized as pure potency, correct? Well, that be so, is it also safe to say that creation is the reduction of potency to act? That is to say, something wasn’t there (perhaps an attribute), yet it became there through the work of an efficient cause, yes? For if we were to say such then it seems to me that would be an admittance that nothing can become something (for if nothing is potency - due to their complete lack of existence in a given respect - and something is act - for they are both existent in some respect - , and change is predicated on the idea of potency coming to act, then it seems as if it is shown on the basis of definition that nothing comes to something).

The fair objection I see to this is that it doesn’t demonstrate that nothing can be the material cause, for the potency lies specifically in the material and is not the material itself. However, I think that may be missing the point, which is that something was not there (perhaps a table) and that something came about through the actualization of potency (even if the potency was present in something which already held some actuality).

Furthermore, since we both recognize that nonbeing is pure potency, than it necessarily follows, I believe, that it can therefore be actualized into something (for potentiality is the deprivation of a certain quality which could be held but isn’t held).
 
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So, you are still defending the cycle theory in which there is no previous cycle yet there is?
It was explained to you that the term ‘previous’ is not applicable. Time ceases to exist in the process so temporal terms simply don’t apply. If you insist on claiming that something came from nothing then you may as well ask what was ‘previous’ to there being nothing. The question makes no sense.
 
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To the best of my ability, I will gladly do so. So we both agree that nonbeing is best categorized as pure potency, correct? Well, that be so, is it also safe to say that creation is the reduction of potency to act? That is to say, something wasn’t there (perhaps an attribute), yet it became there through the work of an efficient cause, yes? For if we were to say such then it seems to me that would be an admittance that nothing can become something (for if nothing is potency - due to their complete lack of existence in a given respect - and something is act - for they are both existent in some respect - , and change is predicated on the idea of potency coming to act, then it seems as if it is shown on the basis of definition that nothing comes to something).

The fair objection I see to this is that it doesn’t demonstrate that nothing can be the material cause, for the potency lies specifically in the material and is not the material itself . However, I think that may be missing the point, which is that something was not there (perhaps a table) and that something came about through the actualization of potency (even if the potency was present in something which already held some actuality).

Furthermore, since we both recognize that nonbeing is pure potency, than it necessarily follows, I believe, that it can therefore be actualized into something (for potentiality is the deprivation of a certain quality which could be held but isn’t held).
My question is why do you need a mover if the process of nothing to something is possible. I mean there is no constrain to prohibit the process since it is possible so it is just happens .
 
It was explained to you that the term ‘previous’ is not applicable. Time ceases to exist in the process so temporal terms simply don’t apply. If you insist on claiming that something came from nothing then you may as well ask what was ‘previous’ to there being nothing. The question makes no sense.
The point is that there was a moment before time ceases.
 
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Freddy:
It was explained to you that the term ‘previous’ is not applicable. Time ceases to exist in the process so temporal terms simply don’t apply. If you insist on claiming that something came from nothing then you may as well ask what was ‘previous’ to there being nothing. The question makes no sense.
The point is that there was a moment before time ceases.
But not after. So if you have a new iteration of the universe there is no ‘before’.
 
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Freddy:
But not after. So if you have a new iteration of the universe there is no ‘before’.
It is just not iteration of the same time. It is iteration of different times.
Yes. So there is no before and after. They are different. Separate. Not connected.

Does it make sense to ask what was before the big bang? Google it and see what the answer is. You will be told that it’s a nonsensical question because time started at the big bang.
 
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Freddy:
Whoops. Used ‘before’ again!

Tell me what happened ‘before’ the big bang and I’ll let you off.
The current cycle is the first cycle if there is no before cycle.
‘First’ requires a ‘second’ to make sense. Second means it comes ‘after’ the first. Which means the first was ‘before’ the second. Invalid terms again I’m afraid.
 
My question is why do you need a mover if the process of nothing to something is possible. I mean there is no constrain to prohibit the process since it is possible so it is just happens .
Well @STT, it seem that if you accept the distinction between nonbeing as a material cause and an efficient cause, and that you also accept that nonbeing may be the material cause by which being may come up (due to it being mere potentiality and therefore actualizable), yes? If that be, the question you seem to be asking (correct me if I’m wrong) is why can’t nonbeing as material cause simply, without need of an efficient cause, actualize into the formal cause of being, yes? Were I to rephrase it of course.

Well, lets explore this a little, if we may. If I were to ask the question “can nothing (as a material cause) be actualized into something (as a formal cause) without need of an efficient cause?”, would it be reasonable and valid for me to rephrase it into, say “can nothing be actualized into something with the efficient cause being nothing”? For, if I am not wrong, it seems to me the same phrase, ultimately (the same way that if I were to say “there is no cat in the hat” and “the cat in the hat is nothing [or not really existent]” and “there are zero cat in the hat’s”, I’d be essentially saying the same thing).

That be so, the question seems to shift into “can nonbeing be an efficient cause of the actualization of nonbeing to being being?”
Once it is put that way, however, we seem be in territory which most people would find self evident in conclusion, which is, that nonbeing cannot be the efficient cause.
 
‘First’ requires a ‘second’ to make sense. Second means it comes ‘after’ the first. Which means the first was ‘before’ the second. Invalid terms again I’m afraid.
It is valid. You need to contemplate about what I am talking about.
 
Well @STT, it seem that if you accept the distinction between nonbeing as a material cause and an efficient cause, and that you also accept that nonbeing may be the material cause by which being may come up (due to it being mere potentiality and therefore actualizable), yes? If that be, the question you seem to be asking (correct me if I’m wrong) is why can’t nonbeing as material cause simply, without need of an efficient cause, actualize into the formal cause of being, yes? Were I to rephrase it of course.
There are two points in here: 1) Nothing is neither material cause (in the sense that wood is material cause of a chair) nor efficient cause and 2) The idea that in material world things move from potentiality to actuality due to a mover is purely classical and does not necessary apply to nothing unless a separate proof is given since as I mentioned before material world/something and nothing are different categories so the idea that a mover always needed in material world to move something does not necessary applies to nothing.
Well, lets explore this a little, if we may. If I were to ask the question “can nothing (as a material cause) be actualized into something (as a formal cause) without need of an efficient cause?”,
Yes, that is what I am trying to say.
would it be reasonable and valid for me to rephrase it into, say “can nothing be actualized into something with the efficient cause being nothing”?
No, that is not what I am trying to say. Nothing is not a thing therefore it cannot be efficient cause.
That be so, the question seems to shift into “can nonbeing be an efficient cause of the actualization of nonbeing to being being?”
That is not what I am trying to say.
Once it is put that way, however, we seem be in territory which most people would find self evident in conclusion, which is, that nonbeing cannot be the efficient cause.
Of course nothing cannot be an efficient cause since it is not a thing.
 
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Freddy:
‘First’ requires a ‘second’ to make sense. Second means it comes ‘after’ the first. Which means the first was ‘before’ the second. Invalid terms again I’m afraid.
It is valid. You need to contemplate about what I am talking about.
I’m not discussing what you are talking about. I’m discussing a separate proposal entirely. In which terms like before and after are not valid.
 
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