Nothing to something

[lelinator]

True, but it is necessary to explain why “ contingent beings ” exist rather than none at all.

Actually, the first thing that we need to do is to determine what we mean by “contingent beings”. You seem to have two ways of identifying something as a contingent being. First, if its dependent upon something else for its existence, then its a contingent being. Second, if it changes, then it’s also a contingent being. It’s the second one that I have a problem with.

Let me see if I can explain my hesitance in accepting this definition by means of an analogy. And to emphasize, this is only an analogy.

Science tells us that energy can never be created nor destroyed. Now if it can’t be created, then that must mean that it’s not contingent upon anything else for its existence. If it was, then it could be created, and it could be destroyed. So by the first definition, it’s not contingent. It’s not dependent upon anything else for its existence.

However, energy can change. It can take on an attribute that it didn’t have before. But that doesn’t mean that the energy has ceased to exist…it hasn’t. The attribute however, can cease to exist. Unlike the energy itself, existence isn’t an immutable part of the attribute’s being.

So I can ascribe to the idea that if something is dependent upon something else for its existence, then it’s contingent. But I can’t ascribe to the idea that if something changes, then that in itself means that it’s contingent. I don’t accept the argument that simply because something changes it’s contingent.

 

[STT]

Nothing to something is impossible in nature, unless you redefine nothing in some way so that it allows natural virtual creations.

I asked about the process whether God is involved or not.

But then it is nothing according to the physicists but not philosophical nothing.

By nothing, I mean absence of any thing.

With theism, God is the perfect Being so when He created the universe, it might have been out of nothing in the sense of no material existence before, but it was not exactly nothing to something since it was God to something. With theism, God always existed and in fact He is above time in some sense.

Introducing God does not resolve the issue if the process of nothing to something is impossible.

I still can’t figure out exactly what time is unless the passage of time is an increase in entropy.

The entropy increase because time passes.

 

[Gorgias]

Science tells us that energy can never be created nor destroyed. Now if it can’t be created, then that must mean that it’s not contingent upon anything else for its existence. If it was, then it could be created, and it could be destroyed.

Hang on a second, though. That doesn’t speak to how it came to be, within this ‘closed system’. Now that it’s here? Sure – the first law of thermodynamics takes over. But, the fact that it came into existence somehow can’t be discounted.

 

[lelinator]

lelinator:

That’s your description of the entire hierarchical causal series for a loaf of bread

In an abbreviated sense. Lots of steps in between, of course.

But ok, I get where you’re coming from, now. I had always been a bit uneasy with my response to you in that thread; it seemed, intuitively, that I might have been too casual with “per se” and “per accidens” series in that conversation, to the point of conflating the two.

Yes, I knew when I read your description that you were likely being a bit too succinct, but I didn’t see any reason to quibble about it. I knew what you meant. It’s like when I described the baker, the miller, and the farmer as a per accidens series, I knew when I was writing it that it wasn’t quite right, but for the sake of brevity I left it the way it was. I knew that you were smart enough to figure out what I meant.

mind of the baker → hand → bread materials → bread. Here, the causality rests in the mind of the baker.

I would question whether that’s actually a per se causal series. But again, I really don’t see the need to argue the point. We both know how easily these conversations can get sidetracked.

So, which do you want to talk about? The per se series, which terminates in God at the beginning, or any of the per accidens series, which could ‘potentially’ be infinite but which I think we’ll find are not, practically speaking.

Actually, I don’t want to talk about either one. What I really want to talk about, is why reality looks the way that it does. How did God get reality to turn out exactly the way it did without violating our free will? After all, it could’ve turned out very, very differently…couldn’t it? Up to this point I’ve been trying to establish how you viewed God’s creative process. Is God a “tinkerer” as you put it in your next post for example? Or is he a “fine tuner” who simply started reality in motion knowing exactly how it would turn out?

But I’ll have to expound upon this further in my response to your next post.

 

[lelinator]

I think you’re asking whether God is actively causing acts at each moment in time; that is, acts that would not happen without God’s active ‘tinkering’. I see it as being somewhat different: God set things in motion, knowing where they’d go. He continues to sustain his creation at every instant, but doesn’t have to continually ‘tinker’ and ‘nudge’ for His plan to go from ‘potential’ to ‘actuality’.

These would seem to be the two most reasonable explanations for how God got reality to turn out exactly the way it did.

1. God’s a tinkerer. He’s actively causing events to happen in a particular way.
2. God’s a fine tuner. He set the initial conditions so precisely that it guaranteed that events would turn out exactly the way He wanted them to.

The problem however, is that both of these methods would seem to interfere with our free will. The first one suggests that God imposes His will upon our actions. And the second one suggests that reality is deterministic, leaving no room for free will. So how are we to understand something that @Latin harps on all the time, that what we have is “Aided Free Will”.

AIDED FREE WILL
The Catholic Church dogmatically teaches AIDED (CAUSED/ COERCED/ BROUGHT ABOUT) FREE WILL as follows:

Aided free will means, without even knowing, God himself operates in our wills and He CAUSES our acts. – CCC 307, CCC 308, etc.

If God isn’t a tinkerer, nor a fine tuner, then what is He, and how is Aided Free Will actually free will at all? How does God get reality to turn out precisely the way it did without violating our free will?

 

[lelinator]

Hang on a second, though. That doesn’t speak to how it came to be, within this ‘closed system’.

Remember, it’s an analogy. The point of it being that the fact that something changes doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s contingent. The energy’s existence isn’t altered by the fact that its attributes change. The attributes are contingent, the existence isn’t.

At the moment we have no explanation as to how energy came to exist…it just does. Just as theists have no explanation as to how God came to exist…He just does.

The point that I was trying to make is that change alone isn’t a determinant of contingency.

 

[Gorgias]

The problem however, is that both of these methods would seem to interfere with our free will. The first one suggests that God imposes His will upon our actions.

Well, then, maybe we have to talk about what “free will” actually means. (There are varying answers, and folks have divergent opinions.)

Does “free will” mean “free action”? As in, “if I can’t actualize something I will to do, then I don’t have free will”? If so, that’s a tough position to hold. Or, at least, as you do a Wily E. Coyote fall from a cliff, because you “willed” to fly but found out you couldn’t actualize that will… well, perhaps we’ll hear a faint “I… think… I… was… mistaken…” as you plummet!

On the other hand, does will merely mean that I have the facility to make a choice (regardless how that choice turns out)? I think that’s a more reasonable definition of ‘free will.’

With that in mind, even if God is a ‘tinkerer’ or a ‘fine tuner’, He doesn’t thwart my free will. I continue to have the capacity to will things (even if there are things I cannot actualize).

How does God get reality to turn out precisely the way it did without violating our free will?

Since I see ‘free will’ as being free will and not unlimited free act, this question seems immaterial to me. It simply isn’t a question of “violation of free will”!

At the moment we have no explanation as to how energy came to exist…it just does. Just as theists have no explanation as to how God came to exist…He just does.

Theists would assert that energy is part of creation, and God created all of the universe (including the energy). So, it’s not that “we have no explanation” – you might not, but we sure do!

(p.s., I’m surprised – no response to the per se and per accidens causal series discussion?)

 

[lelinator]

(p.s., I’m surprised – no response to the per se and per accidens causal series discussion?)

I’m imposing my will on the course of this conversation.

 

[Gorgias]

Gorgias:

(p.s., I’m surprised – no response to the per se and per accidens causal series discussion?)

I’m imposing my will on the course of this conversation.

 

[quaestio45]

At the moment we have no explanation as to how energy came to exist…it just does. Just as theists have no explanation as to how God came to exist…He just does.

Im quite late into the conversation, so I don’t know if you already responded to this, but theists have an explanation for why God exists. Its because God is existence itself through and through (both essence and existence), and as such, he must exist, because otherwise he would not be pure existence.

Energy, on the other hand, needs explanation for its existence and is not itself eternal because it does not possess a completion of being (which we know because its state of existence is contingent on its environment). As such, we must say that it needs an explanation for its existence on something ontologically prior to it.

 

[lelinator]

Well, then, maybe we have to talk about what “free will” actually means. (There are varying answers, and folks have divergent opinions.)

Does “free will” mean “free action”? As in, “if I can’t actualize something I will to do, then I don’t have free will”? If so, that’s a tough position to hold. Or, at least, as you do a Wily E. Coyote fall from a cliff, because you “willed” to fly but found out you couldn’t actualize that will… well, perhaps we’ll hear a faint “I… think… I… was… mistaken…” as you plummet!

On the other hand, does will merely mean that I have the facility to make a choice (regardless how that choice turns out)? I think that’s a more reasonable definition of ‘free will.’

With that in mind, even if God is a ‘tinkerer’ or a ‘fine tuner’, He doesn’t thwart my free will. I continue to have the capacity to will things (even if there are things I cannot actualize).

Before I leave this thread entirely, I’m wondering if you can clarify one thing for me…what’s the difference between your concept of man’s free will and @Latin’s concept of man’s free will? Because frankly, I can’t see any difference other than semantics.

If I understand both of your positions correctly they both lead to the same conclusion…man doesn’t have anything more than the illusion of free will.

 

[Gorgias]

what’s the difference between your concept of man’s free will and @Latin’s concept of man’s free will?

To my mind, Latin’s idea of an “aided free will” says that we don’t have free will, but only God does.

If I understand both of your positions correctly they both lead to the same conclusion…man doesn’t have anything more than the illusion of free will.

That’s not my position at all. I believe that we do have a free will! (However, that doesn’t mean that we have freedom of any-and-all actions.) How does “humans have free will” translate for you into “humans have the illusion of free will”? Just curious…

 

[lelinator]

To my mind, Latin’s idea of an “aided free will” says that we don’t have free will, but only God does.

This is why I asked you to clarify your position, because your two positions are almost identical, but there is a subtle difference.

Think of it this way. Theists and atheists argue about the source of morality. The theist says that there’s an objective source of morality which men refer to as God. The atheist on the other hand says that morality is simply the result of man’s evolution into a social animal with all the accompany moral codes and laws that make such a social structure possible.

They have two distinct explanations, a natural one, and a supernatural one, which each lead to the exact same result…morality. Different explanations …same result.

In Latin’s case it’s “God’s will” that ultimately restricts what men can do. In Wile E. Coyote’s case it’s the laws of physics…or more specifically the laws of aerodynamics that restricts what Wile E. can do.

The subtle difference is, that in Wile E.'s case, Wile E. can still will to fly, he just can’t do it. But in Latin’s version Wile E. can’t even will to fly, because in Latin’s version it’s not just the outcome that’s being restricted, but it’s Wile E.'s will itself that’s being restricted.

The outcome is the same, but the process is different.

How does “humans have free will” translate for you into “humans have the illusion of free will”? Just curious…

In Latin’s version it seems rather apparent that man lacks free will. Because man’s very will is being superseded by God’s will. But the same may be true for Wile E. Coyote if the laws of physics are restrictive enough. If they are, then Wile E. too has lost free will, because he can only ever do exactly what the laws of physics say he can do.

So if the laws of physics are restrictive enough, then the free will that Wile E. thinks that he has, is only an illusion.

On the other hand, the illusion itself may be very, very important. It’s one thing to not have free will, it’s another thing entirely to know that you don’t have free will. In fact, just as it may ultimately be impossible to know why there’s something rather than nothing, it may ultimately be impossible to know whether you actually have free will, or only the illusion of free will.

Free will, even if it’s only an illusion, is still a very, very precious thing.

I was a bit rushed writing this, so I may have made some logical errors. Please feel free to point them out.

Edit: In case you missed the implication, you can equate God’s will to the laws of physics, and everything comes out the same…maybe.

 

[Latin]

In Latin’s version it seems rather apparent that man lacks free will. Because man’s very will is being superseded by God’s will.

CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA Divine Providence explains;

Life everlasting promised to us, (Romans 5:21); but unaided we can do nothing to gain it (Rom.7:18-24).

Again, from the fact that God has created the universe, it shows that He must also govern it; for just as the contrivances of man demand attention and guidance, so God, as a good workman, must care for His work.

http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12510a.htm

.
WITHOUT GOD AIDING AND GOVERNING OUR WILL WE CAN DO NO GOOD

The Council of Sens (1140) condemned the idea that free will is sufficient in itself for any good. Donez., 373.

Council of Orange (529)
In canon 20, entitled that Without God Man Can Do No Good. . . Denz., 193; quoting St. Prosper.
.
CCC 308 For God is at work in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure.
Far from diminishing the creature’s dignity, this truth enhances it.
.
CCC 307 God thus enables men to be intelligent and free, causes in order to complete the work of creation, … Though often unconscious collaborators with God’s will.
.
CCCS 1996-1998; Justification comes from grace (God’s free and undeserved help) and is given to us to respond to his call.
This call to eternal life is supernatural, coming TOTALLY from God’s decision and surpassing ALL power of human intellect and will.
.
CCC 1998 This vocation to eternal life is supernatural. It depends entirely on God’s gratuitous initiative, for he alone can reveal and give himself. It surpasses the power of human intellect and will, as that of every other creature.
.
Aquinas said, “God changes the will without forcing it. But he can change the will from the fact that he himself operates in the will as he does in nature,” De Veritatis 22:9. 31. ST I-II:112:3. 32. Gaudium et Spes 22; "being … – Because we don’t feel that God himself operates in our will we have the illusion we have libertarian free will.
.
CCC 2022 The divine initiative (supernatural intervention of God in the faculties of the soul) in the work of grace precedes, prepares, and elicits the free response of man.
.
St. Thomas teaches that all movements of will and choice must be traced to the divine will: and not to any other cause, because Gad alone is the cause of our willing and choosing. CG, 3.91.
.
For every salutary act internal supernatural grace of God (gratia elevans) is absolutely necessary, (De fide dogma).
.
De gratia et libero arbitrio 16, 32: “It is certain that we will when we will; but He brings it about that we will good … . It is certain that we act when we act, but He brings it about that we act, providing most effective powers to the will.”
.
There is a supernatural intervention of God in the faculties of the soul, which precedes the free act of the will, (De fide dogma).
.
God created us includes our will, by virtue of God governing our will, governing our actions.
.
God bless

 

[Gorgias]

They have two distinct explanations, a natural one, and a supernatural one, which each lead to the exact same result…morality.

I would disagree that they’re “the same result,” however. They can be abstracted out, further and further, until you’re looking at them from such a distance that you say “meh… essentially the same”, but I wouldn’t say that that holds. Nevertheless, I get what you’re saying.

The subtle difference is, that in Wile E.'s case, Wile E. can still will to fly, he just can’t do it. But in Latin’s version Wile E. can’t even will to fly, because in Latin’s version it’s not just the outcome that’s being restricted, but it’s Wile E.'s will itself that’s being restricted.

The outcome is the same, but the process is different.

So, if you want to say that “free will” is in the outcome, you can certainly make that claim. I think that this is an inaccurate definition of “free will.”

But the same may be true for Wile E. Coyote if the laws of physics are restrictive enough. If they are, then Wile E. too has lost free will, because he can only ever do exactly what the laws of physics say he can do.

Again: “free act” and “free will” are distinct concepts.

So if the laws of physics are restrictive enough, then the free will that Wile E. thinks that he has, is only an illusion.

Either that, or he’s mistaken about the definition of free will…

Edit: In case you missed the implication, you can equate God’s will to the laws of physics, and everything comes out the same…maybe.

Except that… none of that speaks to human free will. It speaks to actions only. And, it doesn’t touch the ability to will something (just the ability to carry it out).

At the heart of it is a question that’s often asked: does a prisoner have free will? If not, then it’s something that can be physically thwarted; otherwise, it would seem like something that’s more intrinsic to a human person.

 

[lelinator]

Again: “free act” and “free will” are distinct concepts.

lelinator:

So if the laws of physics are restrictive enough, then the free will that Wile E. thinks that he has, is only an illusion.

Either that, or he’s mistaken about the definition of free will…

I would agree that “free act” and “free will” are two distinct concepts, but that doesn’t negate the possibility that it’s the laws of physics that determines both of them. In which case it doesn’t matter how you define it, the free will that Wile E. Coyote thinks he has, is only an illusion.

@Latin may actually be right, we freely will, what God wills us to will. And it doesn’t matter whether you’re a theist ascribing the cause of our will to God, or an atheist ascribing the cause of our will to the laws of physics, because the outcome is the same…we lack free will.

But let’s assume that you’re right, and neither God nor the laws of physics determines our free will. All that you’ve done is bring us right back to the original problem. Given that God has no control over our free will choices, how did God the fine tuner, God the tinkerer, cause reality to turn out precisely the way it did?

 

[Gorgias]

In which case it doesn’t matter how you define it, the free will that Wile E. Coyote thinks he has, is only an illusion.

No – only if he thinks that “free will” implies “free action”. I’m under no illusions that I’m able to fly like a bird. So, it would strike me as facetious to suggest that, since it’s not in my nature to fly, therefore I have no free will.

So, it’s not the “free will” that’s the illusion – it’s the idea that “free act” exists!

@Latin may actually be right, we freely will, what God wills us to will.

That really doesn’t hold up, unless you make it trivial: God wills that we might will whatever we wish. So… it’s true, but only trivially so.

Given that God has no control over our free will choices, how did God the fine tuner, God the tinkerer, cause reality to turn out precisely the way it did?

Still not seeing the problem.

If I can will as I wish, then I’m free to choose. If God ‘tinkers’ or ‘fine tunes’, He’s not doing it to me or to my will, so there’s no problem there!

 

[LeonardoArruda]

the process of nothing to something is possible

No its not, “nothing” is the absence of something, it does not have substance:

look at Trent’s opening statement, he will explain it better than me.

 

[STT]

No its not, “nothing” is the absence of something, it does not have substance:

look at Trent’s opening statement, he will explain it better than me.

Yes, nothing is absence of any thing. I don’t have time to go through all video now. I don’t even agree with the first audition statement about the contingent being.

 

[Gorgias]

I don’t even agree with the first audition statement about the contingent being.

Now you see our problem with your assertions, no? You’re using non-standard definitions of generally agreed-upon concepts, and therefore, your arguments tend to fall flat before they’re ever off the ground. It’s almost like you’re arguing “the moon is made of green cheese”, but you define ‘moon’, ‘green’, and ‘cheese’ differently than anyone else.

The definition Trent offers for ‘contingent’ – that is, a being whose existence depends on another being – is the normative definition in philosophy.

To be fair, @LeonardoArruda’s assertion that Trent lays out the argument well is a pretty solid one. You might want to give it another try, @STT.