Obeying one's superior

[KEVIN_WILCOX]

Obedience to God is without limit, whereas obedience to human beings and institutions is limited by higher laws that must not be transgressed.

In the Bible obedience is related to hearing God.

 

[Areopagite]

Obedience to God is without limit, whereas obedience to human beings and institutions is limited by higher laws that must not be transgressed.

In the Bible obedience is related to hearing God.

Oh, I forgot to mention that. Good point.

But what I said still applies because God will never have an evil intent, and despite what circumstances look like, God has taken everything into account to design the best outcome in every circumstance, so … circumstances shouldn’t be an issue. Obey God.

 

[KEVIN_WILCOX]

Oh, I forgot to mention that. Good point.

But what I said still applies because God will never have an evil intent, and despite what circumstances look like, God has taken everything into account to design the best outcome in every circumstance, so … circumstances shouldn’t be an issue. Obey God.

Areopagite, not quite that easy, life never is. One’s conscience should be one’s guide - if you firmly believe God is asking you to swim upstream against the tide, that is what one should do; even if the whole world should condemn you.

 

[Ron_Conte]

So the verdict is: If your commander tells you do to something objectively good or neutral, but the commander has an evil intent, you are still obligated to do it (because YOU are the one carrying out the action and it is YOU who do not have the evil intent).

However, there is a common sense exception that I gleamed from Ron Conte’s post … if the circumstances are such that following the command will probably cause much more harm than good, then you should not obey. (This is because the Circumstance is one of the 3 fonts that can turn the whole action to something immoral)

Yes, that is correct.

But all knowingly chosen acts are either good (morally licit) or bad (morally illicit). There are no morally neutral acts. Concerning merit, some acts merit a reward, and some acts merit a punishment, and other acts are neutral.

 

[Alindawyl]

Because, the opposite argument looks almost just as reasonable. This is because, even though the commander has an evil intent, it is YOU who are the one who actually is doing the objectively good/neutral act, and thus it seems reasonable that the commander’s intent does not seem to make YOUR act immoral. Surely, the commander’s act of ordering you would be sinful (because of his evil intention), but the act that YOU perform would only be evil if YOUR intent was evil. Right?

You may lack evil intent, but your knowledge of the commander’s evil intent changes things. If you know that murder will be the result of a given order and choose to carry it out anyway, that makes you an accessory to murder.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice for the United States clearly states that a soldier must not obey an unlawful order. An order to commit murder, no matter how cleverly disguised, is still a order to commit murder and therefore unlawful since murder is illegal.

“I was just obeying orders” is not a legal defense in a military court when the order isn’t lawful.

 

[johankrava]

or even a wife to her husband, should the subordinate obey the superior

Hey, what do you mean with this?
husband superior?

You might have problems

 

[Alindawyl]

As an additional point, from the Catechism of the Catholic Church:

1868 Sin is a personal act. Moreover, we have a responsibility for the sins committed by others when we cooperate in them:

• by participating directly and voluntarily in them;
• by ordering, advising, praising, or approving them;
• by not disclosing or not hindering them when we have an obligation to do so;
• by protecting evil-doers.

 

[Areopagite]

Areopagite, not quite that easy, life never is. One’s conscience should be one’s guide - if you firmly believe God is asking you to swim upstream against the tide, that is what one should do; even if the whole world should condemn you.

Yeah, I’m on board with you. I may not have expressed myself clearly … but that’s part of what I meant.

But all knowingly chosen acts are either good (morally licit) or bad (morally illicit). There are no morally neutral acts. Concerning merit, some acts merit a reward, and some acts merit a punishment, and other acts are neutral.

Are there no morally neutral acts? I remember hearing differently from a moral theologian. But maybe I’m not recalling it correctly. Isn’t “walking” a neutral act, though?

You may lack evil intent,** but your knowledge of the commander’s evil intent changes things.** If you know that murder will be the result of a given order and choose to carry it out anyway, that makes you an accessory to murder.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice for the United States clearly states that a soldier must not obey an unlawful order. An order to commit murder, no matter how cleverly disguised, is still a order to commit murder and therefore unlawful since murder is illegal.

“I was just obeying orders” is not a legal defense in a military court when the order isn’t lawful.

I am now disagreeing with this. Your knowledge of the commander’s evil intent does not change things as long as as the action (that you are ordered to do) is objectively moral … and that the circumstances are such that more good will result than evil.

The commander might be committing murder in his heart, but you are not because you are (in the example) bombing an enemy military installation, and the death of the commander’s wife is justified by the principle of double effect.

Murder, may I remind you, does not really have to do, actually, with intent even. Murder is the direct killing of an innocent person. You may have a good intent or a bad intent, but as long as you directly kill an innocent person … it’s murder. In the example, carrying out the order (which had an evil intent) is not murder because you are not directly killing the wife but rather, her death is a secondary result of the object (that is, to blow up the installation).

Nonetheless, you could say that the officer has committed murder in his heart by having an evil intent, but the one carrying out the order did not … thus, it is perfectly moral to follow the order.

Hey, what do you mean with this?
husband superior?

You might have problems

You know what I mean.

I don’t mean that the husband is better than wife. I do mean, however, (contrary to popular opinion, obviously) that he has authority over her.

Please don’t kill me.

 

[KEVIN_WILCOX]

There are different types of morality - benevolent; pragmatic; utilitarian; for the greater good and morality in accord with the rights of the individual. Morality is a BROAD concept. When a person refers to morality what is theirdefinition, how are they using the term, what is their meaning?

 

[Alindawyl]

I am now disagreeing with this. Your knowledge of the commander’s evil intent does not change things as long as as the action (that you are ordered to do) is objectively moral … and that the circumstances are such that more good will result than evil.

The commander might be committing murder in his heart, but you are not because you are (in the example) bombing an enemy military installation, and the death of the commander’s wife is justified by the principle of double effect.

Murder, may I remind you, does not really have to do, actually, with intent even. Murder is the direct killing of an innocent person. You may have a good intent or a bad intent, but as long as you directly kill an innocent person … it’s murder. In the example, carrying out the order (which had an evil intent) is not murder because you are not directly killing the wife but rather, her death is a secondary result of the object (that is, to blow up the installation).

Nonetheless, you could say that the officer has committed murder in his heart by having an evil intent, but the one carrying out the order did not … thus, it is perfectly moral to follow the order.

Her death is a secondary result to you, but her death is the primary result intended by the one who ordered the attack. The commander has intent to commit murder using you and the rest of the soldiers under his command as the murder weapon. You are aware of the commander’s intent, as previously stated in the scenario. Carrying out the attack makes you complicit in his sin because of that knowledge. You have agreed to be used as a murder weapon, meaning you condone the murder.

The fact that the gun sights are also set on any number of enemy soldiers is nothing more than a distraction. The directly intended death of an innocent on the part of the one giving the orders means no amount of good can be justified. You can’t claim that her death is not a directly intended end of the action being taken.

 

[KEVIN_WILCOX]

Life’s decisions are not easy. When I was a child the next door neighbour told me of his childhood. In Germany Nazi soldiers broke into his house and told him unless he joined the Nazi youth both he and his family would be shot. He reluctantly joined. He knew it was wrong and he did not want to see his family killed.

 

[Areopagite]

Her death is a secondary result to you, but her death is the primary result intended by the one who ordered the attack. The commander has intent to commit murder using you and the rest of the soldiers under his command as the murder weapon. You are aware of the commander’s intent, as previously stated in the scenario. Carrying out the attack makes you complicit in his sin because of that knowledge. You have agreed to be used as a murder weapon, meaning you condone the murder.

The fact that the gun sights are also set on any number of enemy soldiers is nothing more than a distraction. The directly intended death of an innocent on the part of the one giving the orders means no amount of good can be justified. You can’t claim that her death is not a directly intended end of the action being taken.

It seems reasonable though that the only way to be complicit in someone’s else’s sin is to participate in the sin’s objective nature. But in this case, the objective nature (i.e. not including the intent and circumstance) is not evil. Thus you are not complicit in the sin. I may be wrong. But I think this is highly reasonable.

You say that “You can’t claim that her death is not a directly intended end of the action being taken” but I do claim that. This is because the action being taken is technically YOUR action … and thus YOUR intent is what matters. The commander’s action of ordering the action was evil because of his evil intent, but the action that you are carrying out based on that order is a different action, with a different intent (namely, your intent, not his).

 

[Alindawyl]

It seems reasonable though that the only way to be complicit in someone’s else’s sin is to participate in the sin’s objective nature. But in this case, the objective nature (i.e. not including the intent and circumstance) is not evil. Thus you are not complicit in the sin. I may be wrong. But I think this is highly reasonable.

You say that “You can’t claim that her death is not a directly intended end of the action being taken” but I do claim that. This is because the action being taken is technically YOUR action … and thus YOUR intent is what matters. The commander’s action of ordering the action was evil because of his evil intent, but the action that you are carrying out based on that order is a different action, with a different intent (namely, your intent, not his).

You are effectively arguing the following.

I am a guard at a concentration camp in WWII Germany. I don’t have any personal animosity toward the prisoners. I don’t beat them or call them names or mistreat them in any way. I just do my job as a guard by patrolling and looking out for escapees.

The camp commander has ordered some of the prisoners to be herded into a gas chamber. I am not one of those guards. The commander has, however, ordered me to activate the gas chamber. Now, I do not want to see these people murdered. I did not put them in the gas chamber myself and have no intent to kill them. I’ve been ordered to turn it on empty several times to test the equipment, so I know what it does and what will happen if there are people in it.

I think about it and decide that turning on a gas chamber is not itself an evil act. I mean, I’ve turned it on before without anyone dying. Just turning it on doesn’t objectively have an evil end. I didn’t put the people in the gas chamber. The intent to kill them is that of my commander, not me. All I personally intend to do, after all, is turn on a mechanical device. The fact that dozens of innocents will die is not my fault but the fault of another. I didn’t put them in harm’s way.

This rationalization of murder was the defense given by many of the men on trial in Nuremberg after WWII. They were just following orders. They didn’t intend to kill anyone. It was all their commander’s fault. Only he had the evil intent, not them. Suspecting this defense would be employed is why the London Charter was issued at the end of WWII. Obedience to orders could not be taken into consideration when it came to determining guilt, only when it came to possibly mitigating the punishment of those who were convicted.

A soldier is not responsible for setting policy. Just being a guard at a concentration camp is no crime. Just being in the Hitler Youth is no crime. If the civil government legally requires you to serve in a specific capacity, then so be it. But if given an order you know is unlawful, you must not obey it even if it means personal suffering for disobedience. Better to let evil be done to you than knowingly allow yourself to be used as the instrument of doing evil to another.

 

[Areopagite]

You are effectively arguing the following.

I am a guard at a concentration camp in WWII Germany. I don’t have any personal animosity toward the prisoners. I don’t beat them or call them names or mistreat them in any way. I just do my job as a guard by patrolling and looking out for escapees.

The camp commander has ordered some of the prisoners to be herded into a gas chamber. I am not one of those guards. The commander has, however, ordered me to activate the gas chamber. Now, I do not want to see these people murdered. I did not put them in the gas chamber myself and have no intent to kill them. I’ve been ordered to turn it on empty several times to test the equipment, so I know what it does and what will happen if there are people in it.

I think about it and decide that turning on a gas chamber is not itself an evil act. I mean, I’ve turned it on before without anyone dying. Just turning it on doesn’t objectively have an evil end. I didn’t put the people in the gas chamber. The intent to kill them is that of my commander, not me. All I personally intend to do, after all, is turn on a mechanical device. The fact that dozens of innocents will die is not my fault but the fault of another. I didn’t put them in harm’s way.

This rationalization of murder was the defense given by many of the men on trial in Nuremberg after WWII. They were just following orders. They didn’t intend to kill anyone. It was all their commander’s fault. Only he had the evil intent, not them. Suspecting this defense would be employed is why the London Charter was issued at the end of WWII. Obedience to orders could not be taken into consideration when it came to determining guilt, only when it came to possibly mitigating the punishment of those who were convicted.

A soldier is not responsible for setting policy. Just being a guard at a concentration camp is no crime. Just being in the Hitler Youth is no crime. If the civil government legally requires you to serve in a specific capacity, then so be it. But if given an order you know is unlawful, you must not obey it even if it means personal suffering for disobedience. Better to let evil be done to you than knowingly allow yourself to be used as the instrument of doing evil to another.

In my example though, your order was “to blow up the enemy installation” (which posed a legitimate threat to your side). This order is perfectly fine. Even if the circumstances was that one innocent person was going to die (the wife of the commander), I would say it’s still justified. The commander, of course, issued the order with the intent of getting rid of his wife, but as the order is considered objectively, it is fine. The circumstances still permit it too, because only one innocent will die (and it is an indirect death … because your target is the installation) , while a major enemy threat is eliminated.

In your example of “turning on the gas chamber,” the circumstances are such that obeying the order would be evil. It would directly cause the death of innocent people without any good being achieved. Also, this would be evil no matter what the intent of the commander is. Conceivably, the Nazi commander might have a good intent thinking he’s ending the prisoner’s suffering in the concentration camp. It’s a very different kind of situation than from what I’m talking about.

 

[KEVIN_WILCOX]

In my example though, your order was “to blow up the enemy installation” (which posed a legitimate threat to your side). This order is perfectly fine. Even if the circumstances was that one innocent person was going to die (the wife of the commander), I would say it’s still justified. The commander, of course, issued the order with the intent of getting rid of his wife, but as the order is considered objectively, it is fine. The circumstances still permit it too, because only one innocent will die (and it is an indirect death … because your target is the installation) , while a major enemy threat is eliminated.

In your example of “turning on the gas chamber,” the circumstances are such that obeying the order would be evil. It would directly cause the death of innocent people without any good being achieved. Also, this would be evil no matter what the intent of the commander is. Conceivably, the Nazi commander might have a good intent thinking he’s ending the prisoner’s suffering in the concentration camp. It’s a very different kind of situation than from what I’m talking about.

In Tibet Buddhists get Muslims to kill the livestock because it is against Buddhist belief to cause death. Other Buddhists pack the nose and throat of animals, returning later to find the animal dead, claiming it was not their intention to cause death.

 

[Areopagite]

In Tibet Buddhists get Muslims to kill the livestock because it is against Buddhist belief to cause death. Other Buddhists pack the nose and throat of animals, returning later to find the animal dead, claiming it was not their intention to cause death.

Are you implying that this disproves my argument? If yes, how so?

 

[KEVIN_WILCOX]

Are you implying that this disproves my argument? If yes, how so?

I feel what is taking place in your post is ‘political correctness’ - choosing words to make an action seem acceptable.
For example not biting someone’s finger but getting a finger caught on someone’s teeth.
Diplomacy and ‘legalese’.

 

[Areopagite]

I feel what is taking place in your post is ‘political correctness’ - choosing words to make an action seem acceptable.
For example not biting someone’s finger but getting a finger caught on someone’s teeth.
Diplomacy and ‘legalese’.

Well, for what it’s worth, I try being as politically incorrect as possible.

Now, I’m still open to correction on this issue, but from what moral theology says, I don’t see how my conclusion (and Ron Conte’s conclusion) is unreasonable.

I may be choosing words to make an action seem acceptable … but if in fact it is not acceptable … where in my words to do err?

In Tibet Buddhists get Muslims to kill the livestock because it is against Buddhist belief to cause death. Other Buddhists pack the nose and throat of animals, returning later to find the animal dead, claiming it was not their intention to cause death.

I think it is quite obvious that the Buddhist does intend to kill the animal. Killing the animal is, of course, morally permissible, but he sins by lying to others and himself that he never intended to kill it.

 

[Alindawyl]

I may be choosing words to make an action seem acceptable … but if in fact it is not acceptable … where in my words to do err?

You err in claiming that if you choose to cooperate in someone’s evil act, knowledge of their evil intent doesn’t attach any responsibility to you if you don’t share that evil intent. Basically that your intent not being evil absolves you of sin and means you are not actually cooperating in evil.

The Catechism of the Catholic Church clearly states that we assume responsibility for the sin of another when we cooperate in that sin. While it’s true that a lack of intent to do evil on your part does mean you are not DIRECTLY cooperating in evil, the Catechism doesn’t list that as the only means of cooperation. Among other things, it states that not hindering an evil act when we have an obligation to do so means we are cooperating in evil.

Military law in the United States from the beginning of our country tells us that soldiers have a duty to disobey unlawful orders. Little v. Barreme, a Supreme Court case decided in 1804, set the precedent that even a military order from the commander-in-chief must be disobeyed if it’s unlawful. It also set the precedent that a soldier carrying out an unlawful order could be held personally responsible for his action, and could not pass on that responsibility with the defense that he was only following orders.

 

[Areopagite]

You err in claiming that if you choose to cooperate in someone’s evil act, knowledge of their evil intent doesn’t attach any responsibility to you if you don’t share that evil intent. Basically that your intent not being evil absolves you of sin and means you are not actually cooperating in evil.

I agree that you should try and get him to get rid of his evil intent. But even if he persists with it, I don’t see how it would be wrong to obey the command if the object and circumstances are in order.

The Catechism of the Catholic Church clearly states that we assume responsibility for the sin of another when we cooperate in that sin. While it’s true that a lack of intent to do evil on your part does mean you are not DIRECTLY cooperating in evil, the Catechism doesn’t list that as the only means of cooperation. Among other things, it states that not hindering an evil act when we have an obligation to do so means we are cooperating in evil.

Of course, what do you mean by “cooperating in sin.” There is a whole big part of moral theology that deals with this (“Material cooperation in sin”). And it’s a bit complicated (and I can’t remember any of it), but it seems that we must have recourse to it in order to resolve this. Does anyone know what I’m talking about?

Military law in the United States from the beginning of our country tells us that soldiers have a duty to disobey unlawful orders. Little v. Barreme, a Supreme Court case decided in 1804, set the precedent that even a military order from the commander-in-chief must be disobeyed if it’s unlawful. It also set the precedent that a soldier carrying out an unlawful order could be held personally responsible for his action, and could not pass on that responsibility with the defense that he was only following orders.

But what did they mean be “unlawful” … does this refer to the object of the action … and also the intent? To my knowledge (and I could be very wrong about this), human court systems do not care about intent as long as the objective part of an action is lawful.