Object of an act

[Verbum_Caro]

I was saying it in the normal sense of the words.

of what “to watch pornographic movie” means ordinarily…

Got it. Thanks, Bookcat.

VC

 

[Ron_Conte]

Am I right in saying that the second set of conditions would be incorrect because the object is formed by what you are trying to accomplish? That is just confusing to me because it seems like to determine the object, you have incorporate intent, but then there is a whole different category of intent that cannot make an evil object good. Does that make sense?

There are three fonts of morality:

1. intention - the intended end or purpose for which the act was chosen
2. the chosen act with its inherent moral meaning, as determined by the end to which the act is inherently directed
3. the circumstances

Intent in the sense of purpose or intended end is in the first font.
The second font is based on the intentionally chosen act, but the end in this font is NOT the end that the person intends, but the end that the act ‘intends’. Moral and immoral acts each have an end toward which they are inherently directed. The act itself is intentionally chosen, but the end is inherent to the type of act.

 

[Ron_Conte]

See how you have to say “object can be: watching a movie for entertainment (a reasonable one).” It has to include “for entertainment” to make sense, which seems like it includes the intention.

If you watch a movie for entertainment, the ‘for entertainment’ is in the first font – it is the intended end or purpose. A good intended end does not justify an intrinsically evil act. So if you choose to do something intrinsically evil, but for a good purpose, it is still a sin.

 

[Ron_Conte]

1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting “in order to be seen by men”).

(Note…the ‘end’ is the intention)

In my opinion, Bookcat’s many posts above show a poor understanding of the fonts of morality, especially the moral object.

The three fonts of morality are actually each a type of end:

1. intended end, which is the end chosen by the subject
2. the moral object, which is the end toward which the act itself is inherently directed
3. the end results of the act, which is the consequences

The problem with Bookcat’s posts on this subject, in several different threads, is that they confuse intended end and moral object, thereby causing intrinsically evil acts to seem moral when chosen for a good intended end.

 

[Bookcat]

There are three fonts of morality:

1. intention - the intended end or purpose for which the act was chosen
2. the chosen act with its inherent moral meaning, as determined by the end to which the act is inherently directed
3. the circumstances

Intent in the sense of purpose or intended end is in the first font.
The second font is based on the intentionally chosen act, but the end in this font is NOT the end that the person intends, but the end that the act ‘intends’. Moral and immoral acts each have an end toward which they are inherently directed. The act itself is intentionally chosen, but the end is inherent to the type of act.

Lets use the language of the Catechism: it is very clear and is the language the Church is using. best for all.

The Catechism:

1750 The morality of human acts depends on:

• the object chosen;
• the end in view or the intention;
• the circumstances of the action.

The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the “sources,” or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.

 

[Bookcat]

If you watch a movie for entertainment, the ‘for entertainment’ is in the first font – it is the intended end or purpose. A good intended end does not justify an intrinsically evil act. So if you choose to do something intrinsically evil, but for a good purpose, it is still a sin.

the intention is the second source…lets stick with the language of the Catechism…otherwise confusion can set in.

1750 The morality of human acts depends on:

• the object chosen;
• the end in view or the intention;
• the circumstances of the action.

The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the “sources,” or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.

 

[o_mlly]

Someone please explain this:

1751
The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by conscience.

The human will always chooses the apparent or subjective “good” relative to the actor. However, the objective or true good – the morality-- of an act is dependent on its effects *upon the moral character of the actor *-- not others. If the act’s effects on others are always evil, then the act is always and everywhere evil to both the actor – the moral agent – and those effected.

Even if the act’s effects on others are good, the goodness of the act relative to the actor must still incorporate the intention of the actor. If the will of the actor is evil, e.g. vainglory in almsgiving, the effect on the moral character of the actor is evil while the effects on the poor may indeed be materially good.

 

[Bookcat]

In my opinion, Bookcat’s many posts above show a poor understanding of the fonts of morality, especially the moral object.

The three fonts of morality are actually each a type of end:

1. intended end, which is the end chosen by the subject
2. the moral object, which is the end toward which the act itself is inherently directed
3. the end results of the act, which is the consequences

The problem with Bookcat’s posts on this subject, in several different threads, is that they confuse intended end and moral object, thereby causing intrinsically evil acts to seem moral when chosen for a good intended end.

Ron I am afraid is confusing things. Lets stick with the language of the Catechism here…

And I should add for the sake of readers that his accusation is unfounded. Nowhere do I do this…unless perhaps sometimes including an intention in the object…like watching a movie for entertainment…which i then clarified…

and i have certainly NOT done this…“confuse intended end and moral object thereby causing intrinsically evil acts to seem moral when chosen for a good intended end.”

by no means!

(in fact i have repeatedly said that intrinsically evil acts could never be justified…)

and others here will attest that Ron is off base here. As is at least part of his understanding of this area.

I use the language and the understanding that is found in the Catechism of the Catholic Church…etc

My background is not only my own long studies…but also a degree in Theology from Franciscan University of Steubenville with honors …which I add so that others who read these posts may know where I am coming from.

 

[Bookcat]

From the Catechism of the Catholic Church:

I. THE SOURCES OF MORALITY

1750 The morality of human acts depends on:

• the object chosen;
• the end in view or the intention;
• the circumstances of the action.

The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the “sources,” or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.

1751 The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by conscience.

1752 In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject. Because it lies at the voluntary source of an action and determines it by its end, intention is an element essential to the moral evaluation of an action. The end is the first goal of the intention and indicates the purpose pursued in the action. The intention is a movement of the will toward the end: it is concerned with the goal of the activity. It aims at the good anticipated from the action undertaken. Intention is not limited to directing individual actions, but can guide several actions toward one and the same purpose; it can orient one’s whole life toward its ultimate end. For example, a service done with the end of helping one’s neighbor can at the same time be inspired by the love of God as the ultimate end of all our actions. One and the same action can also be inspired by several intentions, such as performing a service in order to obtain a favor or to boast about it.

1753 A good intention (for example, that of helping one’s neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. The end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation. On the other hand, an added bad intention (such as vainglory) makes an act evil that, in and of itself, can be good (such as almsgiving).39

1754 The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent’s responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death). Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil.

II. GOOD ACTS AND EVIL ACTS

1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting “in order to be seen by men”).

The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are some concrete acts - such as fornication - that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil.

1756 It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.

IN BRIEF

1757 The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the three “sources” of the morality of human acts.

1758 The object chosen morally specifies the act of willing accordingly as reason recognizes and judges it good or evil.

1759 “An evil action cannot be justified by reference to a good intention” (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Dec. praec. 6). The end does not justify the means.

1760 A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together.

1761 There are concrete acts that it is always wrong to choose, because their choice entails a disorder of the will, i.e., a moral evil. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.

 

[o_mlly]

The human will always chooses the apparent or subjective “good” relative to the actor. However, the objective or true good – the morality-- of an act is dependent on its effects *upon the moral character of the actor *-- not others. If the act’s effects on others are always evil, then the act is always and everywhere evil to both the actor – the moral agent – and those effected.

Even if the act’s effects on others are good, the goodness of the act relative to the actor must still incorporate the intention of the actor. If the will of the actor is evil, e.g. vainglory in almsgiving, the effect on the moral character of the actor is evil while the effects on the poor may indeed be materially good.

Slight correction: “If the act’s effects on all others are always and only evil …”

 

[Ron_Conte]

The human will always chooses the apparent or subjective “good” relative to the actor. However, the objective or true good – the morality-- of an act is dependent on its effects *upon the moral character of the actor *-- not others. If the act’s effects on others are always evil, then the act is always and everywhere evil to both the actor – the moral agent – and those effected.

Even if the act’s effects on others are good, the goodness of the act relative to the actor must still incorporate the intention of the actor. If the will of the actor is evil, e.g. vainglory in almsgiving, the effect on the moral character of the actor is evil while the effects on the poor may indeed be materially good.

The above quote is not a correct explanation of morality.
The act’s effects on others is the third font of morality, called consequences (or circumstances).
The moral character of the person who acts does not determine the morality of the act.

The intended end, the moral object, and the consequences are the sole determinants of the morality of any knowingly chosen act.

 

[Ron_Conte]

My background is not only my own long studies…but also a degree in Theology from Franciscan University of Steubenville with honors …which I add so that others who read these posts may know where I am coming from.

When did you study at Steubenville and what was your major and your degree, if you don’t mind saying?

 

[o_mlly]

The above quote is not a correct explanation of morality.
The act’s effects on others is the third font of morality, called consequences (or circumstances).
The moral character of the person who acts does not determine the morality of the act.

The intended end, the moral object, and the consequences are the sole determinants of the morality of any knowingly chosen act.

You refute what I did not post: You think you read: “The moral character of the person who acts does determine the morality of the act.”

Rather, I posted, the morality of the act determines the moral character of the actor. If you refute, cite an authority.

 

[Bookcat]

When did you study at Steubenville and what was your major and your degree, if you don’t mind saying?

In the late nineties

Theology

Including moral theology…as well as sexual and medical ethics…

 

[Ron_Conte]

You refute what I did not post: You think you read: “The moral character of the person who acts does determine the morality of the act.”

Rather, I posted, the morality of the act determines the moral character of the actor. If you refute, cite an authority.

Oh, you’re right, I misread that.

Certainly, when we choose moral evil, it corrupts the will. And certain kinds of acts are incompatible with a good will:

“It is a matter of prohibitions which forbid a given action semper et pro semper, without exception, because the choice of this kind of behaviour is in no case compatible with the goodness of the will of the acting person, with his vocation to life with God and to communion with his neighbour.” – Veritatis Splendor, n. 52.

However, I think you post above errs by presenting the consequences of an act, its effects, as the sole source of morality.

 

[Ron_Conte]

To return to the original subject of this thread, let’s use an example.

Murder is always immoral because it has an evil moral object. But if we say that the moral object is murder, then it is as if we are saying that murder is immoral because it is murder. This approach does not help one determine which acts are murder and which are not.

The moral object of murder is not murder. Murder is the act, not the object. The intentionally chosen act is distinct from the object that the act inherently seeks.

The moral object of murder is the deprivation of life from an innocent human person. This object is evil because it is a deprivation of a good required by the moral law, by the love of God and neighbor.

The act of murder is any of innumerable deliberate acts that are inherently directed at that end (i.e. at that moral object) of depriving an innocent of life.

The CCC is very terse on the subject of the basic principles of ethics. Veritatis Splendor is a much more complete source on this topic. Catholics should not rely solely on the Catechism for their understanding of the Faith. They should rely on Tradition and Scripture, and all the documents of the Magisterium (including but not limited to the Catechism). I don’t think that it is helpful to this discussion, Bookcat, for you to keep cutting and pasting the same few paragaphs from the CCC over and over again. The Catechism requires interpretation in the light of Tradition, Scripture, Magisterium. When it is used as the sole source of doctrine, misinterpretation is likely.

 

[o_mlly]

Oh, you’re right, I misread that.
…

However, I think you post above errs by presenting the consequences of an act, its effects, as the sole source of morality.

I didn’t read that in my post either. In responding to the OP’s request, I am presenting a differentiation of the effects, interior to the moral agent and exterior to others, for consideration in explaining the Catechsim’s citation.

 

[Bookcat]

To return to the original subject of this thread, let’s use an example.

Murder is always immoral because it has an evil moral object. But if we say that the moral object is murder, then it is as if we are saying that murder is immoral because it is murder. This approach does not help one determine which acts are murder and which are not.

The moral object of murder is not murder. Murder is the act, not the object. The intentionally chosen act is distinct from the object that the act inherently seeks.

The moral object of murder is the deprivation of life from an innocent human person. This object is evil because it is a deprivation of a good required by the moral law, by the love of God and neighbor.

The act of murder is any of innumerable deliberate acts that are inherently directed at that end (i.e. at that moral object) of depriving an innocent of life.

it is actually the case that murder is the object. for it is the “freely chosen kind of behaviour.”

of course one can use the definitions of murder instead of the word …murder. but it remains the object. for these words signify particular kinds of behavior.

Veritatis Spendor:

“In order to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally, it is therefore necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting person. The object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behaviour.” (Veritatis Spendor 78)

Lets see how the Catechism gives an example of an object.

1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and** fasting **“in order to be seen by men”).

Here it calls “praying and fasting” the good object. It does not parse it and say …“turning your voice or heart to God…and going without food…” it just says ‘praying and fasting’

Likewise …Murder can be said to be the object. Evil object to be sure but object non the less.

to say: “The moral object is the killing of an innocent human person, i.e. deprivation of life from an innocent human person.” is the the same thing as to say “the moral object is murder”.

 

[Bookcat]

The CCC is very terse on the subject of the basic principles of ethics. Veritatis Splendor is a much more complete source on this topic. Catholics should not rely solely on the Catechism for their understanding of the Faith. They should rely on Tradition and Scripture, and all the documents of the Magisterium (including but not limited to the Catechism). I don’t think that it is helpful to this discussion, Bookcat, for you to keep cutting and pasting the same few paragaphs from the CCC over and over again. The Catechism requires interpretation in the light of Tradition, Scripture, Magisterium. When it is used as the sole source of doctrine, misinterpretation is likely.

The Catechism is a very sure norm…as the Apostolic Constitution of Pope John Paul II put it …and it is VERY clear.

so i keep posting it…for it needs to be front and center.

lets use the terms and very clear description one finds in the CCC

 

[Bookcat]

Veritatis Splendor: Pope John Paul II (which interestingly enough while being a very heavy and theological document of moral theology…quotes the Catechism …)

1. The morality of the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the “object” rationally chosen by the deliberate will, as is borne out by the insightful analysis, still valid today, made by Saint Thomas.126 In order to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally, it is therefore necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting person.** The object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behaviour**. To the extent that it is in conformity with the order of reason, it is the cause of the goodness of the will; it perfects us morally, and disposes us to recognize our ultimate end in the perfect good, primordial love. By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person. Consequently, as the Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches, “there are certain specific kinds of behaviour that are always wrong to choose, because choosing them involves a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil”.127 And Saint Thomas observes that “it often happens that man acts with a good intention, but without spiritual gain, because he lacks a good will. Let us say that someone robs in order to feed the poor: in this case, even though the intention is good, the uprightness of the will is lacking. Consequently, no evil done with a good intention can be excused. ‘There are those who say: And why not do evil that good may come? Their condemnation is just’ (Rom 3:8)”.128

The reason why a good intention is not itself sufficient, but a correct choice of actions is also needed, is that the human act depends on its object, whether that object is capable or not of being ordered to God, to the One who “alone is good”, and thus brings about the perfection of the person. An act is therefore good if its object is in conformity with the good of the person with respect for the goods morally relevant for him. Christian ethics, which pays particular attention to the moral object, does not refuse to consider the inner “teleology” of acting, inasmuch as it is directed to promoting the true good of the person; but it recognizes that it is really pursued only when the essential elements of human nature are respected. The human act, good according to its object, is also capable of being ordered to its ultimate end. That same act then attains its ultimate and decisive perfection when the will actually does order it to God through charity. As the Patron of moral theologians and confessors teaches: “It is not enough to do good works; they need to be done well. For our works to be good and perfect, they must be done for the sole purpose of pleasing God”.129

vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor_en.html

later on in the document…it mentions as a kind of behavior (intrinsically evil objects) that one can not do ever…

The Church has always taught that **one may never choose kinds of behaviour **prohibited by the moral commandments expressed in negative form in the Old and New Testaments. As we have seen, Jesus himself reaffirms that these prohibitions allow no exceptions: “If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments… You shall not murder, You shall not commit adultery, You shall not steal, You shall not bear false witness” (Mt 19:17-18). (VS 52)