Object of an act

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From the department of Bioethics at the University of Navarre (which does the Navarre Bible)…

unav.es/cdb/dhbapmoralact2c4.html

I post it here not so much of its theological proposal…but rather for what it takes
for granted.

namely that “murder is an object”

i quote:

“Thus, killing a person voluntarily and unjustly is called murder. And “murder” is a moral object.”

Granted this is not a document from the Magisterium …but it is from a very well known and orthodox Catholic University…and it takes it for granted that murder is an object…in the same way that the CCC says prayer and fasting is an object.
 
From the department of Bioethics at the University of Navarre (which does the Navarre Bible)…

unav.es/cdb/dhbapmoralact2c4.html

I post it here not so much of its theological proposal…but rather for what it takes
for granted.

namely that “murder is an object”

i quote:

“Thus, killing a person voluntarily and unjustly is called murder. And “murder” is a moral object.”

Granted this is not a document from the Magisterium …but it is from a very well known and orthodox Catholic University…and it takes it for granted that murder is an object…in the same way that the CCC says prayer and fasting is an object.
my point here is that a moral object can be simply named by its name if it has one…such as murder, fornication, theft, prayer, fasting etc

though one needs to keep in mind this from Veritatis Splendor:

“In order to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally, it is therefore necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting person. The object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behavior. To the extent that it is in conformity with the order of reason, it is the cause of the goodness of the will; it perfects us morally… By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person” (n. 78)

many objects can be stated by a name like murder…(for murder is the freely chosen kind of behavior…etc) where as others do not have simple names…and can be rather more complex …

so murder can be an object as can other things that have no proper name to describe the freely chosen kind of behavior.

of course one can also describe the objects by parsing them …to give a fuller understanding of what is being choosen …namely Murder: “the unjust taking of a an innocent life”

it can get a bit messy in describing all of this…and the concept of the moral object can be a tricky thing to understand and describe…
 
Addendum:

In reading over these threads it seems to me that

part of the difficulty …is the use of different language…

for instance Ron uses older technical language …and the various uses of the word “end”. (i recall somewhat some of them now from my studies…though i can not evaluate at this time for my part all of his uses)

Where as I use the more recent things in this regard…particularly the Catechism (and moral elaborations after the CCC…for my formal studies were after its publication and after VS…and thus i was formed on this language) …which I find very clear and is very good to explain these things…but which can express things differently or more refined than in older manuals etc.

and so at times in these discussions…one speaks past the other…

similar terms take on different meanings…

so my apologies for any misunderstandings of use…and thus some errors in assessing some of Ron’s arguments…

though some disagreements remain. (ie. that murder can be called a moral object…and that certain things are different objects than others… etc)

It is i think very beneficial to use the language of the Catechism and other recent documents etc…
 
I can have:

Object: watching a movie
Intention: to relax…have entertainment
Circumstance: it is a reasonable movie, and it is a good day to watch it …or what have you

or I can have:

object: watching a pornographic movie

which would be an intrinsically evil object …and thus always evil.
PeteZaHut is going to OD on his own monicker if one continues to conflate "act’ and “object.” For instance, a jury ordered to watch a pornographic film in order to judge its redeeming value does no evil. The act is simply “watching a movie”; the object is to judge its content. No intrinsically evil object here.

Similarly, the act “pulling the trigger on a loaded/chambered gun” is morally neutral. The object – murder, self-defense, or target practice (morally evil, good, and neutral respectively) can only be determined by examination of intent.

Some words depict actions in which the definition includes the actor’s intent, i.e. murder, adultery, theft, etc. Because these special words by definition combine act with specific intent, they describe, if inclusive of an evil intent, intrinsically or objectively evil acts. Their object is always evil because the actor’s intent is always evil, i.e. a disordered will.
 
Some words depict actions in which the definition includes the actor’s intent, i.e. murder, adultery, theft, etc. Because these special words by definition combine act with specific intent, they describe, if inclusive of an evil intent, intrinsically or objectively evil acts. Their object is always evil because the actor’s intent is always evil, i.e. a disordered will.
Oh oh o mlly, now you’ve done it! I think now that you have mentioned intent antecedent to determining the moral object (i.e. you are describing the principal conditions that determine the moral object of an act) you might have inadvertently caused yourself some trouble.

Some may read this not as intent prior to the the fixing of (and indeed contributing to) the moral object but rather as that intent outside of the moral object that cannot reform an evil moral object. Be prepared, you may get some info about how intent can never make an evil act good (which is true of course.).

VC
 
PeteZaHut is going to OD on his own monicker if one continues to conflate "act’ and “object.” For instance, a jury ordered to watch a pornographic film in order to judge its redeeming value does no evil. The act is simply “watching a movie”; the object is to judge its content. No intrinsically evil object here.

Similarly, the act “pulling the trigger on a loaded/chambered gun” is morally neutral. The object – murder, self-defense, or target practice (morally evil, good, and neutral respectively) can only be determined by examination of intent.

Some words depict actions in which the definition includes the actor’s intent, i.e. murder, adultery, theft, etc. Because these special words by definition combine act with specific intent, they describe, if inclusive of an evil intent, intrinsically or objectively evil acts. Their object is always evil because the actor’s intent is always evil, i.e. a disordered will.
you are right in a sense…watching a movie may be a bad example…for it focuses perhaps on the physical action…

but it is a freely choosen behavior…as noted in vs…and thus could i think be said to be the object. but yes …usually one is going to have in ones will more than that…in the chosen behavior…

But one has to take care regarding putting too much on intention …

There is the object…and the intention …and the circumstance.

But having said this I think one can say as you have said…that there is a sense where some objects are the very objects they are because they have “embedded” within them what can be said to be an intention or circumstance…but they are still objects.

For instance: 2482 “A lie consists in speaking a falsehood with the intention of deceiving.” so without that intention to deceive it is not a lie.

or Calumny: According to CCC 2477, one “becomes guilty . . . of calumny who, by remarks contrary to the truth, harms the reputation of others and gives occasion for false judgments concerning them.” so there is a circumstance embedded here.

(I borrowed…or was it stole…i will have to examine the object and intention here…the above idea in essence from Jimmy Akin’s blog)

but the object still remains the object.

Murder for instance is an object.
One can have the intention …of murder in order to get money for the murder…

that would be the intention.

the whole concept of the moral object is a bit difficult …at least in some senses.

BUT the intention is not the main source…it is the object that is most important.

Fornication
Calumny
Condemning an innocent person
Idolatry
Adultery
Theft
Drunkenness
Blasphemy
Murder
etc

these objects and other like them …one can say are intrinsically evil…and no intention or circumstance can make them good. (not that you were saying any such thing)

when you say “The object – murder, self-defense, or target practice (morally evil, good, and neutral respectively) can only be determined by examination of intent.”

this is incorrect. For one must look at the object primarily. Murder remains murder even with the best intent. As does adultery…or theft…

(of course as note above there can be a sort of intent that is part of the very definition …and that intent would need to be there…but this is not the case with all)

it not the intent that is key…it is the object …murder is murder…no matter what the intention. it remains a evil object even if the person who does it thinks it is good and “intends” good personally.

But yes…I agree that one can not say simply that a ‘physical act’ is the object…for it involves more than that …as one can read above in Veritatis Spendor…

I imagine we would agree more than disagree…

it is difficult to get all ones i’s dotted and t’s crossed in looking at this in the more complicated details…
 
[1 Timothy]
{1:5} Now the goal of instruction is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith.
{1:6} Certain persons, wandering away from these things, have been turned aside to empty babbling,
{1:7} desiring to be teachers of the law, but understanding neither the things that they themselves are saying, nor what they are affirming about these things.

[Galatians]
{1:6} I wonder that you have been so quickly transferred, from him who called you into the grace of Christ, over to another gospel.

[James]
{3:1} My brothers, not many of you should choose to become teachers, knowing that you shall receive a stricter judgment.
 
Oh oh o mlly, now you’ve done it! I think now that you have mentioned intent antecedent to determining the moral object (i.e. you are describing the principal conditions that determine the moral object of an act) you might have inadvertently caused yourself some trouble.

Some may read this not as intent prior to the the fixing of (and indeed contributing to) the moral object but rather as that intent outside of the moral object that cannot reform an evil moral object. Be prepared, you may get some info about how intent can never make an evil act good (which is true of course.).

VC
🙂
 
Some words depict actions in which the definition includes the actor’s intent, i.e. murder, adultery, theft, etc. Because these special words by definition combine act with specific intent, they describe, if inclusive of an evil intent, intrinsically or objectively evil acts. Their object is always evil because the actor’s intent is always evil, i.e. a disordered will.
You are on to something here.

EWTN has this piece from a loyal moral theologian:
In short, the “object” specifying the act is precisely , and, in doing so, ratifies in his heart and endorses—e.g., the “object” of an act of adultery is the free choice to have intercourse with someone who is not one’s spouse. With this understanding of the “object” of the human act, it is easy to grasp John Paul II’s argument, which he summarizes by saying: “Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature ‘incapable of being ordered’ to God because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image” (n. 80; emphasis added)…
…John Paul II, however, undoubtedly agrees with Pope Paul VI in describing the object of the act of contraception and of contraceptive sterilization differently. The object of contraception, according to the Popes, is precisely (cf. , n. 14: “Equally to be rejected is every act which, either in anticipation of the conjugal act, or in its accomplishment, or in the development of its natural consequences, <proposes, either as end or as means, to impede procreation>”; here the Latin text reads: “id tamquam finem obtinendum aut viam adhibendam <intendat ut procreatio impediatur”>).[25] John Paul II and Paul VI are, of course, absolutely correct in so identifying the object chosen by persons who contracept. They choose to impede procreation…
 
keeping in mind that the object is key is important.

the intrinsically evil object is already evil due to its object.

this does not do away though with a kind of embedded intent in some objects.

here is an interesting post from Jimmy Akin on this latter part.

jimmyakin.typepad.com/defensor_fidei/2006/11/intrinsic_evil.html
Yes, from what I undrstanding I think we agree. What sparked my interest here is that in some other threads Ron, and some others, hold that certain forms of medical treatment are in fact the sin of contraception.

After reading this thread here it has reinforced my undertsanding that holding such a view is incorrect.

Using the example of adultery it seems apparent that the action of choosing to have sex with some person not your spouse is always wrong, even with some good intent like saving a life. That does presuppose that the object involves the intent to have sex with someone not your spouse.

And, the intrinsic evil of contraception has the object of suppressing fertility to limit children, no matter the intention. The object of treating a medical condition that may use medication that has an unintended side effect is not contraception.

What do you think?
 
Yes, from what I undrstanding I think we agree. What sparked my interest here is that in some other threads Ron, and some others, hold that certain forms of medical treatment are in fact the sin of contraception.

After reading this thread here it has reinforced my undertsanding that holding such a view is incorrect.

Using the example of adultery it seems apparent that the action of choosing to have sex with some person not your spouse is always wrong, even with some good intent like saving a life. That does presuppose that the object involves the intent to have sex with someone not your spouse.

And, the intrinsic evil of contraception has the object of suppressing fertility to limit children, no matter the intention. The object of treating a medical condition that may use medication that has an unintended side effect is not contraception.

What do you think?
of course …to do any real action…one has to have some sort of intent…

and with the action of adultery (the action…as opposed to the 'adultery of the heart the Jesus pointed out to us–which is of course also intrinsically evil etc)–yes the object itself is intrinsically evil and never justifiable as a knowingly choosen object (there would be not guilt of adultery if my wife had a twin who tricked me…but the reality is still evil)

what you bring up is actually the principle of doubt effect.
and there are particulars to that …especially that he object chosen is not itself evil…

but in the example you gave…one must be careful too…for some treatments can be abortive…

one good source for these kinds of questions is

ncbcenter.org/NetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=183

here is an example that goes into the double effect principle

ncbcenter.org/NetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=581

catholic.com/thisrock/2006/0609uan.asp
 
Oh oh o mlly, now you’ve done it! I think now that you have mentioned intent antecedent to determining the moral object (i.e. you are describing the principal conditions that determine the moral object of an act) you might have inadvertently caused yourself some trouble.

Some may read this not as intent prior to the the fixing of (and indeed contributing to) the moral object but rather as that intent outside of the moral object that cannot reform an evil moral object. Be prepared, you may get some info about how intent can never make an evil act good (which is true of course.).

VC
How do you read it, VC? If you read my post as you suggest other may, then ask yourself: Why does the Church not teach that there are any intrinsically good acts?
 
Why does the Church not teach that there are any intrinsically good acts?
Intrinsically evil acts are intrinsically evil due to their very objects.
and thus can never be made ‘good’ by any intention or circumstance no matter how ‘good’.

Good objects…can be made evil …by evil intention or evil circumstance.
 
How do you read it, VC? If you read my post as you suggest other may, then ask yourself: Why does the Church not teach that there are any intrinsically good acts?
I think it safe to say that I read it in another light (i.e. principal conditions). So, your question regarding “intrinsically good acts” wouldn’t be directed at me. (Although I have a notion of an answer).

VC
 
Re-phrase:

Intrinsically evil acts are intrinsically evil due to their very objects.
and thus can never be made ‘good’ by any intention or circumstance no matter how ‘good’.

Acts with good objects…can be made evil …by evil intention or evil circumstance.

1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting “in order to be seen by men”).

thus one can not make an intrinsic evil into a good.

but one can corrupt what otherwise would have been good…(at least for the person doing that acting…for if one gives an alms to poor person in order to try to hide a crime…the alms is still a ‘good’ for the poor person…but this is getting more out to sea).
 
of course …to do any real action…one has to have some sort of intent…

and with the action of adultery (the action…as opposed to the 'adultery of the heart the Jesus pointed out to us–which is of course also intrinsically evil etc)–yes the object itself is intrinsically evil and never justifiable as a knowingly choosen object (there would be not guilt of adultery if my wife had a twin who tricked me…but the reality is still evil)

what you bring up is actually the principle of doubt effect.
and there are particulars to that …especially that he object chosen is not itself evil…

but in the example you gave…one must be careful too…for some treatments can be abortive…

one good source for these kinds of questions is

ncbcenter.org/NetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=183

here is an example that goes into the double effect principle

ncbcenter.org/NetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=581

catholic.com/thisrock/2006/0609uan.asp
Yes, I understand double effect plays a role, but what was brought up before was that because “contraception” is an intrinsically evil act, regardless of intention, one who uses medication that renders one sterile is using an evil means.

I contend that is not so because the object chosen is medical therapy, not contraception.

The abortifacient nature of some drugs really should not change the object of the moral act. If direct abortion is intrinsically evil and contraception is intrinsically evil both may never be done. So, if medical therapy is licit that does not mean one gets a pass to contracept but not a pass to directly abort. By that I mean neither action is the object or willed.
 
Intrinsically evil acts are intrinsically evil due to their very objects.
and thus can never be made ‘good’ by any intention or circumstance no matter how ‘good’.

Good objects…can be made evil …by evil intention or evil circumstance.
You’re almost there. The question was: Why does the Church not teach the existence of intrinsically good acts?

From the above you claim an action with a good object can be negated by either evil intention or evil circumstance.

Now give me an example of an evil act that consists of a good object, with good intention and evil circumstance. Bet you can’t.

Hint: CCC #1754 “Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves…”

That, as I posted, leaves only evil intentions capable of rendering morally neutral or morally good acts with good effects into evil outcomes for the actor whose will is disordered. I think that is how VC would have responded. Right, VC?
 
Yes, I understand double effect plays a role, but what was brought up before was that because “contraception” is an intrinsically evil act, regardless of intention, one who uses medication that renders one sterile is using an evil means.

I contend that is not so because the object chosen is medical therapy, not contraception.

The abortifacient nature of some drugs really should not change the object of the moral act. If direct abortion is intrinsically evil and contraception is intrinsically evil both may never be done. So, if medical therapy is licit that does not mean one gets a pass to contracept but not a pass to directly abort. By that I mean neither action is the object or willed.
if the way the medication works is via abortion…then it would not be something one could do…for then it would be an evil means to a good end (you say it is the nature of a drug…) But i imagine you are not saying that it does…

a medication that renders one “sterile” that is unable to conceive… as a an unintended side effect of a treatment though…can be a very different object …which would need to be evaluated.

(but again there is more to this question when it can work as abortifacent)

it can be a bit complicated in working out a particular issue like this…

two places to work out this very real issue:

One is: ncbcenter.org/NetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=183

where you can call and talk about all the particulars …

and the other is: popepaulvi.com/

for even if the use of whatever particular medication is licit…it may not be the best or only option…

they are both faithful to the Church and very good.
 
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