Objective morality, Relative morality, or No morality...?

[Gottle_of_Geer]

Objective morality, Relative morality, or No morality…???

None of the foregoing - the first two are stated as absolutes, as though they necessarily excluded each the other; whereas these two absolutes are not the only possibilities. Insisting on one to the exclusion of the other is like insisting that because the skeleton has a place in the structure of the human body, muscles do not, and cannot.​

 

[masterjedi747]

Ham1:

Aside from that your contention that “The CHOICE, when made with full knowledge/consent, IS the intrinsically evil action” is simply not in keeping with Catholic moral theology. It seems you are equating “intrinsically evil” with sin or an act of the will. They are not the same. When the Church speaks of “intrinsically evil” it is referring only to the object of the act. Evil (malum) can occur even when not chosen by the will. Please read the link in my post above, it describes this quite well. A good example is abortion. Whether the woman consents or has knowledge of the act, the object of the act is in itself evil or intrinsically evil.

I read it, and downloaded it for future reference (it was quite good)…but I’m still not sure why you claim that my position “is not in keeping with Catholic moral theology”. And I realize how difficult this discussion can be, since the terminology itself tends to be quite confusing.

To quote from the article: “Although malum is generally translated “evil”, most English speakers think that references to evil are always to moral evil. For instance, although Aquinas would speak of a three-legged dog as an instance of evil (malum), few English speakers would speak thus. The modern age tends to use the word “evil” to refer only to egregiously bad moral action – such as Hitler’s pogrom against Jews. Aquinas clearly means to include in the category of objective evil (malum) all kinds of imperfections, large and small, both in the being and in the operation of things.”

I guess I would disagree with a small part of what Aquinas is saying. I would argue that “malum” is not truly evil…it may indeed bear similarities to true evil (and these similarities are good because they can help us understand true evil further)…but that “peccatum” (sin) is the only REAL evil, and that is all that we should truly be concerned about when it comes to discussing morality.

I’ll use the same example I did earlier…that of a hurricane/tornado. The destruction it causes would be considered by Aquinas to be evil (malum)…and I would agree to a certain extent. But when you seriously start looking “malum” as a real form of evil, it gets kind of ridiculous. The scratch on my desk is evil (malum), nearsighted eyesight is evil (malum), storms cause evil (malum)…and on and on the list goes. Looking at evil like this is OK, but it’s impractical and often not really significant at all.

True evil (peccatum) is the type that Lucifer and his fallen angels originally “created”…sin. And as I have been taught so many times in Religion class, sin occurs in the will. Using your free will to reject God is evil (peccatum). This is all we really need to be concerned with when it comes to morality. The physical action accompanying the action could be considered evil (malum), but the act of the will itself, that decision to reject God, is where true evil (peccatum) occurs.

I’m not sure how far this has gotten us…but I have one last thing to ask. You said that “when the Church speaks of “intrinsically evil” it is referring only to the object of the act.” Is this “intrinsically evil” as in “malum” or “peccatum”? It seems to me that they would mean “malum”…that the act (of abortion, for example) is intrinsically disordered in the natural sense, but not necessarily intrinsically sinful (because certain condiitons must be met in order for it to be a sin). Is this correct?

 

[masterjedi747]

mosher:

I think what the good Master Jedi might be refering to a not so simple notion concerning the evil that occures in the act of willing even before one actually physically does something. The example given in most ethics books is this:

A man wills to kill another but the other man dies in an accident before the first man has the opportunity to kill the second man. Is the first man guilty of murder? Yes, the act was willed and never revoced and thus the first man is morally culpable for the murder of the second man even though he was unable to consumate the act of murder.

Well, to be honest…no, not really. But maybe we could start this as a smaller side discussion.

I don’t think I would agree with that example entirely. The first man is indeed guilty of a sin…what it is specifically, I’m not entirely sure…but I don’t think it’s murder. Look at the requirements for a mortal sin: It must BE a serious matter, you must KNOW that it is wrong and desire to do it anyway, and then finally you must give your full consent of the will to DO the action. If you don’t DO it, how can you be guilty of it? I believe you would simply be guilty of a different type of sin altogether.

I was referring more to the “when you DO it” stage. When you physically commit that evil (malum) action in the present, you are, by definition, using your free will to choose to do that action. And using your free will to knowingly reject God’s law IS the intrinsically evil (peccatum) action that is commited.

mosher:

Ham1:

That’s nice. It’s not at all relevant, but it’s nice.

If I had been drinking something it would have been all over my keyboard after I read this.

I was standing up, and leaning forward against a chair to see the screen…and I almost fell over laughing as I read both of your responses.

 

[mosher]

masterjedi747:

Well, to be honest…no, not really. But maybe we could start this as a smaller side discussion.

Well can’t argue with honesty.

masterjedi747:

I don’t think I would agree with that example entirely. The first man is indeed guilty of a sin…what it is specifically, I’m not entirely sure…but I don’t think it’s murder. Look at the requirements for a mortal sin: It must BE a serious matter, you must KNOW that it is wrong and desire to do it anyway, and then finally you must give your full consent of the will to DO the action. If you don’t DO it, how can you be guilty of it? I believe you would simply be guilty of a different type of sin altogether.

The guilt is in the willing. Once you resolve to do something then you have for all moral purposes done it unless you revoke the resolve.

masterjedi747:

I was referring more to the “when you DO it” stage. When you physically commit that evil (malum) action in the present, you are, by definition, using your free will to choose to do that action. And using your free will to knowingly reject God’s law IS the intrinsically evil (peccatum) action that is commited.

No, actually you are missing a minor but essential aspect. When you physically do something you have already used your freewill at a previous time. The willing and the doing are different stages of a single act.

masterjedi747:

using your free will to knowingly reject God’s law IS the intrinsically evil (peccatum) action that is commited

Not quite but close. Let’s start from the begining:

All actions have a moral quality either positive or negative. There is no such thing as an act that has an amoral or non-moral quality.

What defines an act as moral or immoral? The moral quality of an act is considered intrinsic to the act itself. This means that the act itself is either good or bad and no amount of circumstace or other qualifyer can change its quality. This has to be understood teleologically. A moral act is directed to the good or virtue and an immoral act is directed away from the good or is a vice (this is why we call evil acts disordered).

The distinction trying to be made by the use of evil by St. Thomas is not sufficient. In english, ethicists use the terms “moral evil” and “natural evil” to express the difference. For instance:

The fact that I have bad eye sight is a natural evil. Someone poking out my eyes would be a moral evil.

 

[Seamus_Sully]

Ham1:

That’s nice. It’s not at all relevant, but it’s nice.

I was addressing the topic and not the most recent answers.

Sorry about not being relatively relevant.

 

[john_doran]

Ham1:

It is impossible to “choose” to commit an intrinsically evil act in such a way as to be blameless.

no, it’s not. an act is defined as “intrinsically” evil apart from any actual intention of the agent committing the act. but intention is precisely the source of moral culpability. which means i can intend (intrinsically evil) actions in such a way as not to be blameless for them. take my masturbation example, above. in fact, any correctly applied example of the principle of double effect can involve the morally licit intending of otherwise intrinsically evil acts.

Ham1:

The only way to have no culpability is to not choose that object or to choose something else which has the side effect of causing the evil act to occur (principle of double effect applies). Intrinsically evil means exactly and object that when chosen is always evil.

but this is exactly the opposite of what was originally posited on this thread: namely that actions can be intrinsically evil apart from any consideration of the manner in which they were chosen (if they were even chosen at all). i was the one who had initially suggested that the only sense that could be made of (morally) intrinsic evils were actions that were intended in certain specified ways.

Ham1:

I think much of this would be clearer to you if you check out the link I posted above. It explains quite well the differences between malum and peccata. When you have a chance to read through it let me know your thoughts.

i did read it. i don’t think it says what you think it says.

and i have to say that i am the furthest thing from a proportionalist that you could possibly hope to find. in fact, the idea that there are moral goods that are independent of individual acts of will is itself the first step toward proportionalism (and consequentialism and utilitarianism)…

 

[Ham1]

Master Jedi,

OK that sounds weird…good name though.

I apologize if any of this is repetitive.

I think we are on the same page here basically. The sentence I quoted from you scared me a bit because it is sometimes used by those who wish to distort the truths of moral theology. By saying the evil is only in the choice of the action, others can make the case that if a choice is not made then no evil occurs and this as we know is not true.

It seems that the stumbling point for you is the definition of evil. When Aquinas uses evil (malum) he is speaking of a privation of good. Our world is filled with natural evils. Physical defects, tornados…all these are natural evils. It does seem that this is largely a language issue as “evil” in English nearly always refers to moral evil and carries a strong negative connotation. Certainly, many people would balk at describing a birth defect as “evil.” But according to Aquinas’ definition it is a privation of good and is fitting.

There are certain objects that are in and of themselves disordered, that is, can never be reconciled with Nature. Since these acts are disordered, they can never be morally chosen. They are basically “unchoosable.” But you are correct in noting that sin only occurs if one chooses one of these instrinsically evil acts.

 

[Ham1]

john doran:

no, it’s not. an act is defined as “intrinsically” evil apart from any actual intention of the agent committing the act. but intention is precisely the source of moral culpability. which means i can intend (intrinsically evil) actions in such a way as not to be blameless for them. take my masturbation example, above. in fact, any correctly applied example of the principle of double effect can involve the morally licit intending of otherwise intrinsically evil acts.

but this is exactly the opposite of what was originally posited on this thread: namely that actions can be intrinsically evil apart from any consideration of the manner in which they were chosen (if they were even chosen at all). i was the one who had initially suggested that the only sense that could be made of (morally) intrinsic evils were actions that were intended in certain specified ways.

i did read it. i don’t think it says what you think it says.

and i have to say that i am the furthest thing from a proportionalist that you could possibly hope to find. in fact, the idea that there are moral goods that are independent of individual acts of will is itself the first step toward proportionalism (and consequentialism and utilitarianism)…

Actually, your first point is answered by my quote immediately following it. Your example does not involve one choosing or intending an intrinsically evil act. Your example involves an intrinsically evil act occuring as a consequence of a morally neutral act and clearly fulfills the conditions for double effect. However, under double effect it is not correct to claim that the side effect is intended by the agent. The agent must make every effort to avoid the side effect.

Intrinsically evil means always disordered. It means always goes against right reason. It means an act that can never be morally chosen. It is essentially an act that is morally “unchoosable.”

I don’t think we’re that far apart here.

Not sure what your last sentence means though. I don’t believe that I said there are moral goods apart from choice.

 

[john_doran]

Ham1:

Intrinsically evil means always disordered. It means always goes against right reason. It means an act that can never be morally chosen. It is essentially an act that is morally “unchoosable.”

if that’s all you’re saying - that there are ways of intending that are inherently immoral - then we are saying exactly the same thing.

understand, though, that you are now saying something completely different (at least facially) from what you said in post 54, when you said this:

Ham1:

A moral evil object can occur in a moral act without the commission of a sin, mortal or otherwise. Some objects are evil in and of themselves and therefore render the entire act evil

 

[Ham1]

I should have said, “an evil object can occur…”

I do mean however that there are acts that are evil in and of themselves. If I unintentionally kill someone and evil act has occured even though I did not choose the act and in doing so commit moral evil. I suppose you might say that evil has occured but a moral evil has not.

 

[mosher]

Ham1:

I should have said, “an evil object can occur…”

I do mean however that there are acts that are evil in and of themselves. If I unintentionally kill someone and evil act has occured even though I did not choose the act and in doing so commit moral evil. I suppose you might say that evil has occured but a moral evil has not.

Yes and this is because there are two different types of acts that a human person can do. One is called a “human act” and the other is called an “act of man.” A human act is one that has moral consequence of culpability and an act of man while it man cause an evil it does not have the same moral quality.

 

[masterjedi747]

mosher:

The guilt is in the willing. Once you resolve to do something then you have for all moral purposes done it unless you revoke the resolve.

Yes…and no. Let’s work with an example.

Have you seen Batman Begins? (If not, I’ll explain anyway…) Earlier in the film (before he becomes Batman) Bruce plans to shoot and kill the man who murdered his parents when he exits the courthouse. But before he can even get close, another woman disguised as a reporter walks up straight up to the guy and shoots him in the chest, killing him. Is that woman guilty of commiting murder? Yes, but we can’t know for sure whether or not she is also guilty of commiting a sin…although it seems highly likely that she was. We should all agree up to that point, correct? Now, is Bruce guilty of commiting murder? I don’t think so. But I DO agree that his intention to do so WAS mortally sinful, and that he must therefore repent of that action before he dies (which it appears that he does later in the film) if he ever wants to reach heaven.
But it’s still not murder (because he wasn’t actually involved in killing the guy), although it certainly might be just as serious a sin. I’m not really arguing the severity of the sin…just the specific name that we apply to it.

mosher:

No, actually you are missing a minor but essential aspect. When you physically do something you have already used your freewill at a previous time. The willing and the doing are different stages of a single act.

Again…yes and no. You just have to be careful how you say it.

You CAN will to do something before you do it…but that’s not the same as when you actually choose to do it in the present. Again, with the murder example. Even though you may have already made up your mind to kill the other person…which is in itself a serious sin…you could still change your mind at any given moment and choose not to go through with it. We’re not like the angels who are, by their very nature, intrinsically committed to doing something once we choose to do it…we have the ability to change our minds.

What I’m talking about is the choice you make to intentionally pass the “point of no return”…when, at the last moment when you could still change your mind, you decide to go through with it anyway and pull the trigger. That is an act of the will, in the present moment, that is (more likely than not) sinful. But it’s not the same as when you made up your mind in the past to do it in the future…that was a different (although likely just as serious) sin. But I believe there’s a real (albeit subtle) difference between the two.

mosher:

All actions have a moral quality either positive or negative. There is no such thing as an act that has an amoral or non-moral quality.

That is NOT what I remember leaning in morality class. http://forum.gateworld.net/images/gw_smilies/uncertain.gif

Thinking back solely to the principles of double effect, the first reqirement we learned was that the action itself must be morally good or morally neutral…because you cannot morally perform an evil action in order to achieve good. But besides that…I don’t think that premise makes sense anyway. What about actions such as walking, talking, breathing, blinking, swimming, running, and sitting? These are morally neutral actions…there is nothing inherently virtuous or sinful involved in any of them. Perhaps you could consider them as “natural goods”, since they seem to be nearly (if not) the opposite type of thing as “natural evils”…but MORALLY speaking, they are neutral in regards to the objective truth of right and wrong.

 

[masterjedi747]

Ham1:

I do mean however that there are acts that are evil in and of themselves. If I unintentionally kill someone and evil act has occured even though I did not choose the act and in doing so commit moral evil. I suppose you might say that evil has occured but a moral evil has not.

I’m going to edit your text slightly…tell me if you still agree with this:

“I do mean however that there are acts that are evil (malum) in and of themselves. If I unintentionally kill someone, an evil (malum) act has occured even though I did not choose the act and commit moral evil (peccatum). I suppose you might say that natural evil (malum) has occured but a moral evil (peccatum) has not.”

 

[Ham1]

masterjedi747:

I’m going to edit your text slightly…tell me if you still agree with this:

“I do mean however that there are acts that are evil (malum) in and of themselves. If I unintentionally kill someone, an evil (malum) act has occured even though I did not choose the act and commit moral evil (peccatum). I suppose you might say that natural evil (malum) has occured but a moral evil (peccatum) has not.”

Looks good to me, Master.

 

[mosher]

masterjedi747:

Now, is Bruce guilty of commiting murder? I don’t think so. But I DO agree that his intention to do so WAS mortally sinful, and that he must therefore repent of that action before he dies (which it appears that he does later in the film) if he ever wants to reach heaven.
But it’s still not murder (because he wasn’t actually involved in killing the guy), although it certainly might be just as serious a sin. I’m not really arguing the severity of the sin…just the specific name that we apply to it.

According to Thomas and Aristotle ethics only treats with the moral order and not the physical order and thus the name of the violation is given by the act of willing. This is why we say that slander is related to murder because it is murder of a persons character. If you like, in my example I could say that the person who habitually willed a persons death and never revoked that willed act is just as culpable for the persons death as the person who actually killed him.

masterjedi747:

You CAN will to do something before you do it…but that’s not the same as when you actually choose to do it in the present. Again, with the murder example. Even though you may have already made up your mind to kill the other person…which is in itself a serious sin…you could still change your mind at any given moment and choose not to go through with it. We’re not like the angels who are, by their very nature, intrinsically committed to doing something once we choose to do it…we have the ability to change our minds.

Rigth but the act of willing always proceedes the act of doing. You can will a particular end however you are always free to revoke that willed act which effects ones culpability.

masterjedi747:

That is NOT what I remember leaning in morality class. http://forum.gateworld.net/images/gw_smilies/uncertain.gif

Thinking back solely to the principles of double effect, the first reqirement we learned was that the action itself must be morally good or morally neutral…because you cannot morally perform an evil action in order to achieve good. But besides that…I don’t think that premise makes sense anyway. What about actions such as walking, talking, breathing, blinking, swimming, running, and sitting? These are morally neutral actions…there is nothing inherently virtuous or sinful involved in any of them. Perhaps you could consider them as “natural goods”, since they seem to be nearly (if not) the opposite type of thing as “natural evils”…but MORALLY speaking, they are neutral in regards to the objective truth of right and wrong.

All human acts as opposed to acts of man have a moral quality positive or negative. Ethicians say that in theory there are morally neutral acts but St Thomas says that when considered in the concrete has a moral quality. Such actions as you are describing gain their moral quality from the motive associated with the act. However I would say that some of the actions that you listed are human acts and some are acts of man. Only those that are human acts have a moral quality.

 

[john_doran]

Ham1:

I suppose you might say that evil has occured but a moral evil has not.

that’s exactly what i would say.

 

[masterjedi747]

mosher:

If you like, in my example I could say that the person who habitually willed a persons death and never revoked that willed act is just as culpable for the persons death as the person who actually killed him.

That makes much more sense to me, yes.
But I do understand what you’re saying…I just don’t like the terminology. And one minor question…did you really mean habitiually, or was it supposed to be intentionally?

mosher:

Right but the act of willing always proceedes the act of doing.

Always, or often? It still seems to me that you would also have to be willing (or choosing) to do it while you are doing it…since (in most cases) you could (theoretically) stop what you are doing at any given moment and walk away.

mosher:

Ethicians say that in theory there are morally neutral acts but St Thomas says that when considered in the concrete has a moral quality. Such actions as you are describing gain their moral quality from the motive associated with the act.

Alright. So, in a way, both statements are true. Thinking (for example) is a morally “neutral” action…this simply means that it’s morality depends upon how it is used. And strictly speaking, since it could be either moral or immoral, it fits under neither category properly, and is therefore considered “neutral”. But in reality, when you do the action, it must be either moral or immoral…only one or the other, and never both. Is this correct?

mosher:

However I would say that some of the actions that you listed are human acts and some are acts of man. Only those that are human acts have a moral quality.

That’s because acts of man are involuntary, whereas human acts are voluntary…correct?

 

[mosher]

masterjedi747:

That makes much more sense to me, yes.
But I do understand what you’re saying…I just don’t like the terminology. And one minor question…did you really mean habitiually, or was it supposed to be intentionally?

Yes, habitually. It is a specific type of voluntariness.

masterjedi747:

Always, or often? It still seems to me that you would also have to be willing (or choosing) to do it while you are doing it…since (in most cases) you could (theoretically) stop what you are doing at any given moment and walk away.

Always this is because intellect preceeds will and will preceeds action. However the willing itself is an act proper.

masterjedi747:

Alright. So, in a way, both statements are true. Thinking (for example) is a morally “neutral” action…this simply means that it’s morality depends upon how it is used. And strictly speaking, since it could be either moral or immoral, it fits under neither category properly, and is therefore considered “neutral”. But in reality, when you do the action, it must be either moral or immoral…only one or the other, and never both. Is this correct?

In a sense. Rather it is that in the abstract neutral acts exist but in reality they don’t because of motive will always modify the moral quality of the act.

masterjedi747:

That’s because acts of man are involuntary, whereas human acts are voluntary…correct?

Yes, but you have to be careful with that language because an act can have a moral quality and be involuntary such as when your will is being overpowered - your internal freedom is not intact. But I know what you are talking about … Young Padawan.

 

[masterjedi747]

mosher:

Yes, habitually. It is a specific type of voluntariness.

It still doesn’t make sense. HABIT is one of the factors that can LESSEN the individual’s guilt of the sin commited…so how do you figure that this should enter into the discussion here? If you INTENTIONALLY will the death of another, then that’s a very bad thing…but hopefully you shouldn’t be HABITUALLY willing the death of another person anyway.

mosher:

Always this is because intellect preceeds will and will preceeds action.

I understand that…but I don’t see how it is opposed in any way to what I am saying.

With the murder example again (just because it’s easy to use)…first you use your intellect to recognize the action, then you use your free will to choose it (this is where sin comes in), and then the action follows. But even AS you are doing it, you still KNOW what you are doing and can CHOOSE to stop at any moment. Your intellect can re-evaluate the situation, and you can choose to change your mind. I’m saying is that there is a distinction between wanting to kill someone (which is bad), planning to kill someone (which is worse), and then actually going ahead and doing it (which is VERY bad). Planning to kill someone, although it may be just as serious, is not the exact same type of sin as actually doing it…because up until that final moment when you really commit to doing it (the moment when you choose to pull the trigger), your will is still free to choose NOT to go through with it. That your initial choice to begin planning the event for the future is not the exact same as your final action (choice) to pass the “point of no return” in the present. It’s a different choice, and therefore a different sin…even though the two may indeed be equivalent as far as their objective morality goes.

mosher:

…an act can have a moral quality and be involuntary such as when your will is being overpowered - your internal freedom is not intact.

Could you perhaps provide an example…accompanied with an explanation?

You can be forced to do something AGAINST your will…but your will itself cannot be forced to choose something that it does not want to. Your will was created by God to be intrinsically free. Even if your body is physically forced to do an action, it does not (and cannot) affect your will. You can still NOT want to do something even as you are being physically forced to do it.

 

[mosher]

masterjedi747:

It still doesn’t make sense. HABIT is one of the factors that can LESSEN the individual’s guilt of the sin commited…so how do you figure that this should enter into the discussion here? If you INTENTIONALLY will the death of another, then that’s a very bad thing…but hopefully you shouldn’t be HABITUALLY willing the death of another person anyway.

In this aspect we are not speaking about habit such as habitual smoking etc. Rather, habitual voluntariness is the act of willing something at one time and not necessarily keeping it present in the mind but never revoking the willed act.

masterjedi747:

I understand that…but I don’t see how it is opposed in any way to what I am saying.

With the murder example again (just because it’s easy to use)…first you use your intellect to recognize the action, then you use your free will to choose it (this is where sin comes in), and then the action follows. But even AS you are doing it, you still KNOW what you are doing and can CHOOSE to stop at any moment. Your intellect can re-evaluate the situation, and you can choose to change your mind. I’m saying is that there is a distinction between wanting to kill someone (which is bad), planning to kill someone (which is worse), and then actually going ahead and doing it (which is VERY bad). Planning to kill someone, although it may be just as serious, is not the exact same type of sin as actually doing it…because up until that final moment when you really commit to doing it (the moment when you choose to pull the trigger), your will is still free to choose NOT to go through with it. That your initial choice to begin planning the event for the future is not the exact same as your final action (choice) to pass the “point of no return” in the present. It’s a different choice, and therefore a different sin…even though the two may indeed be equivalent as far as their objective morality goes.

I follow - and I agree with you and you are correct that in every stage the moral culpability is relatively the same. What I think we are seperated by is mere semantics. I think it is probably for ease of discussion that the sin of murder is attributed to both cases.

masterjedi747:

Could you perhaps provide an example…accompanied with an explanation?

You can be forced to do something AGAINST your will…but your will itself cannot be forced to choose something that it does not want to. Your will was created by God to be intrinsically free. Even if your body is physically forced to do an action, it does not (and cannot) affect your will. You can still NOT want to do something even as you are being physically forced to do it.

Internal freedom can only mitigated by an internal force and not by an external force. For instance a chronic habit will weeken the freedom of the will to choose the good. While the will is bound to choose the percieved good an internal modifier to the can cause a loss of some level of freedom.