I can’t agree because you haven’t shown why it is more reasonable to abandon the traditional analysis which I outlined above (Nov 17, '14, 10:11 am) for your ambiguous statement “There is no such thing as a Mop Bucket objectively speaking.” The traditional analysis covers all the concerns you have without the ambiguity.There is no such thing as a Mop Bucket objectively speaking. The object that we use “as” a mop bucket does exist, but the purpose it is being used for (a mop bucket being the end goal for which it was formed) is purely a subjective teleological concept insofar as the object being used is not by its own objective nature a “mop bucket”; it is simply being used as one according to a concept in our minds. In other words we are giving a meaning to an object that does not exist in its nature objectively.
A true teleology requires the teleogical meaning to exist in the very nature of the object we percieve.
Mop buckets however do not have this quality becuase the teleological meaning does not exist in the object itself, but instead a subjective concept is imposed upon it. The same is true of hammers, socks, Christmas cards etc. The teleological meaning we give to these objects are purely subjective. what reason does one have to disagree?
Its been clearly explained why mop buckets don’t exist objectively. If you can formulate an objection to my argument that clearly reveals that you understand what I am saying then I am all ears. If you are simply going to assert that some traditional view refutes my view then we cannot really have much of a debate.I can’t agree because you haven’t shown why it is more reasonable to abandon the traditional analysis which I outlined above (Nov 17, '14, 10:11 am) for your ambiguous statement “There is no such thing as a Mop Bucket objectively speaking.” The traditional analysis covers all the concerns you have without the ambiguity.
If you mean what is asserted in the following quote, I agree. It’s completely unproblematic. It’s nothing new.Let me put this another way. Does the story of peter pan exist objectively in the symbols used to present the story on paper? The answers is no. The symbols represent particular meanings that don’t actually exist in the symbols we call words; there is merely a social agreement about what those symbols should represent in order to get our story across which is the end goal.
You are attempting to switch the burden of proof for the novel and ambiguous formulation that you are advancing here.Its been clearly explained why mop buckets don’t exist objectively. If you can formulate an objection to my argument that clearly reveals that you understand what I am saying then I am all ears. If you are simply going to assert that some traditional view refutes my view then we cannot really have much of a debate.
, 16a3-7]Handling things in a little different order. We probably agree more than you think; but IMO you are shirking a responsibility you have in this discussion.
If you mean what is asserted in the following quote, I agree. It’s completely unproblematic. It’s nothing new.
“Spoken words then are the symbols of mental experience psyche pathematon] and written words are the symbols of spoken words. And just as written letters are not the same for all men, neither are spoken words. But what these are primarily signs of, mental experience, are the same for all, as also are those things pragmata] of which our affections are likenesses.”
[Aristotle, *De Interpretatione
That doesn’t mean that mop buckets objectively exist.Things in the world have meaning.
No it is not and i have given you my reasons why.This is obvious as is the reality of a bucket as a bucket.
I don’t think you really understand what i am talking about.This is what science is all about, what philosophy is all about. This is what reality is all about.
Talk to somebody, if these words don’t convince you; the reality of their being hopefully will.
NP. I hear you about the limits of time. When you get the time you can pick up on those points which are still at the heart of your discussion below, we can continue.I do not have time at this moment to answer every point at this moment in time. But consider the following.
I quite agree with your concerns regarding Paley. But one avoids his errors and their unfortunate consequences precisely by virtue of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy, not by denying it.It is my position that most theists have a flawed watchmaker understanding of teleology and this thread was made to reveal that problem which has infected theistic arguments for God since William Paley and perhaps way before that to. It is responsible for creating a shift from belief in God to the idea that because natural evolution is true that therefore teleology is dead.
100% correct. If buckets do not exist how does DNA? Or clouds? Do away with buckets,you do away with most of science as it relates to dynamic and ecological systems. You can focus your attention on getting at the cause of something, but if you don’t know where it is going, what its purpose is within a whole, you know nothing. All medicine is based on what things do and how to promote certain ends.. . . I don’t think you really understand what i am talking about.
Sure.NP. I hear you about the limits of time. When you get the time you can pick up on those points which are still at the heart of your discussion below, we can continue.
Why do you think that i am denying it?But one avoids his errors and their unfortunate consequences precisely by virtue of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy, not by denying it.
It’s in the objective nature of dna to be dna. To be dna is the natural end to which it is in act. It is always being dna so long as it is dna, and thus there is a true teleology involved in its behavior. Dna exists objectively insofar as its nature has a true objective meaning. It’s not however in the nature of the object that we call a sock to be a sock. To be a sock is not the objective natural end or meaning to which the object is in act. We have simply imposed the idea of a sock, and the meaning involved, on that object and told people that a sock is the end to which it is in act. It is not the same thing. A sock is not a substance but instead it is more like an conceptual accident. The object involved does not have the teleology of a sock in its nature. A sock is a purely conceptual item.100% correct.
If buckets do not exist how does DNA?
Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas made the ambiguous statement that an artificial thing like a tool does not objectively exist. Yet they avoided the errors of Paley.Why do you think that i am denying it?
They didn’t argue that the object we use for the purpose of a hammer had the objective nature of a hammer either. And in any case why is that a requirement of my argument being either right or wrong or taken seriously? I’m confused.Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas made the ambiguous statement that an artificial thing like a tool does not objectively exist. Yet they avoided the errors of Paley.
It’s in the objective nature of dna to be dna. To be dna is the natural end to which it is in act. It is always being dna so long as it is dna, and thus there is a true teleology involved in its behavior. Dna exists objectively insofar as its nature has a true objective meaning. It’s not however in the nature of the object that we call a sock to be a sock. To be a sock is not the objective natural end or meaning to which the object is in act. We have simply imposed the idea of a sock, and the meaning involved, on that object and told people that a sock is the end to which it is in act. It is not the same thing. A sock is not a substance but instead it is more like an conceptual accident. The object involved does not have the teleology of a sock in its nature. A sock is a purely conceptual item.
The same is true for hammers, post cards, mop buckets and the list goes on.
We do not create true natures like God does.
(1) Well now, we’re back to this, but you said you didn’t have time to explore it. So which is it?They didn’t argue that the object we use for the purpose of a hammer had the objective nature of a hammer either. And in any case why is that a requirement of my argument being either right or wrong or taken seriously? I’m confused.
Again, I’m mainly questioning your formulation.You are attempting to switch the burden of proof for the novel and ambiguous formulation that you are advancing here.
It is not just a matter of clearly explaining your views on this topic as if you were the first person ever to discuss it. There is an existing discourse on these issues going back over 2,000 yrs. So it is also incumbent on you to show why your discourse and ambiguous formulation are superior to that which already exists and which we know. So far you have shirked this responsibility. We have no reason yet to adopt your discourse and assertion over and above the existing one.
Let me review.
What you explained applies to a stone used as a weapon or a porcupine quill used as a needle. If all human users disappeared the stone-weapon or quill-needle would no longer have objective existence, but the stone and quill would.
This is completely unproblematic.
Something artificial (man-made), however, is objectively artificial . . . even if all humans disappeared. Man-made objects like hammers or buckets, would retain their nature as man-made (artificial) objects and could still function in some cases even if all humans ceased to exist. What would cease to exist is the concept of hammer (in the mind of a human knower) and the knowledgeable user.
So why is your ambiguous formulation superior? especially since artificial objects are objectively artificial.
Should, in our human annihilation scenario, a distant alien arrive and find them, such objects as hammers would be recognized as objectively artificial, made for a purpose (discernible in principle), and a sign of intelligent life. We do this all the time with pre-historic cultures: we recognize tools (instrumental causes).
You need to account for this given that you seem to maintain tools have no objective existence as tools even though they can be recognized as such. You seem to suggest their nature is no different whatsoever than that of the stone or quill in the wild.
“Some things”, Not post-cards or socks. It would be misleading of you to say that we create the teleology intrinsic to a substance. That is not what Aquinas is saying.(2) Furthermore, Aquinas addresses the issues involved more than you think, and holds that some things created by art are substances. These, by definition, are true natures.
Its important to take notice of the part that i have put in bold in your quote because it makes an important distinction that you have clearly overlooked. Aquinas says clearly that there is nothing to prevent art from producing substantial forms. It does not follow from this that he is arguing that all art or even some art is the same thing as **manufacturing ** teleology as if to say that if we use a substance for an end that we conceptualized in our minds that therefore that conceptual end is necessarily identical with the natural end inherent in a true substance.“There is nothing to prevent art from making a thing whose form is not an accident, but a substantial form . . . **for art produces such forms not by its own power, but by the power of natural energies. ** And in this way it produces the substantial forms of bread, by the power of fire baking the matter made up of flour and water.” (ST, III,75,6 ad 1) also Commentary On The Sentences, 4.11.1.1 qc. 3 arg 3.TT
I am sure you would.I would include Styrofoam and weapons-grade Uranium.
Any substantial form according to Aquinas, by definition, has an intrinsic teleology. If and when art has produced a substance, it has an intrinsic finality. That’s all I affirmed.“Some things”, Not post-cards or socks. It would be misleading of you to say that we create the teleology intrinsic to a substance. That is not what Aquinas is saying.
Its important to take notice of the part that i have put in bold in your quote because it makes an important distinction that you have clearly overlooked. Aquinas says clearly that there is nothing to prevent art from producing substantial forms. It does not follow from this that he is arguing that all art or even some art is the same thing as **manufacturing ** teleology as if to say that if we use a substance for an end that we conceptualized in our minds that therefore that conceptual end is necessarily identical with the natural end inherent in a true substance.
When we make bread, we are not creating the teleology of food, but rather the teleology already exists in the nature or “natural energies” as Aquinas clearly stated. Its objective. The conceptual teleology of a post-card on the other-hand does not exist objectively in the object that we use for a post card. A Post-card is not a true object, but the substance we use for a post card is. There is clearly a valid distinction that you either don’t care to see or fail to understand.
Oh, please. The teleology already present in wheat grains is the function of reproducing, not eating. Leaves are edible. That doesn’t thereby mean their teleology is for food: it is for photosynthesis.The substantial form of bread has an intrinsic teleology. Bread, while we have had a hand in bringing its potency to act, is not an artifact like symbols written on a wall. It can be used for food because it really is food. It is not an accident. Its nature is objective. We haven’t artificially given it the meaning or teleology of food. If you decide to use that bread to plug your ears, it does not mean that the purpose of bread is to plug your ears. It is not objectively true that the nature of bread is to plug your ears with. Artificial teleology and objective teleology is not the same thing. One is real, the other is conceptual.
And how does that in anyway contradict my argument as stated in the OP?Any substantial form according to Aquinas, by definition, has an intrinsic teleology. If and when art has produced a substance, it has an intrinsic finality. That’s all I affirmed.
Then there is no reason to disagree with what i am saying in the first place. Needles and stone-axes do not have objective teleologies.I have already stated that re-purposing a stone for a weapon or a porcupine quill for a needle does not mean that they have been given an intrinsic teleology as such.
Making bread and creating a sock is not the same thing. The fact that bread can be consumed as food is intrinsic to its nature; its teleology has not been “created” despite the fact that it has been “made”. A sock on the other hand is just a concept for which we have found a suitable object.When made into bread a new substantial form has been made, with its own teleology: for food. Bread really is food because it has been made to be such.
I brought up Aquinas to show that there is an existing discourse on the subject at hand; that he affirms that some man-made objects are substances; and that he suggests why. You need to address the existing discourse to show why your novel and ambiguous formulation is superior. Besides Aquinas never said that artificial objects “have never existed objectively.”And how does that in anyway contradict my argument as stated in the OP?
A careful reading of the concerns I voiced in order to reach some understanding with you would show that I was speaking about the case where one picks up a stone and uses it as a weapon of finds a porcupine quill and uses it to make holes in things. This is clear from the fact that the next category is things that are fashoned by man, like a stone-axe, stone-knife, or stone arrowhead.Then there is no reason to disagree with what i am saying in the first place. Needles and stone-axes do not have objective teleologies.
Agreed, bread is a substance: a sock is not–and neither is DNA.Making bread and creating a sock is not the same thing. The fact that bread can be consumed as food is intrinsic to its nature; its teleology has not been “created” despite the fact that it has been “made”. A sock on the other hand is just a concept for which we have found a suitable object.
The bottom line is, so far all you have done is elaborate your idea. You have neither met objections from existing thought nor shown your formulation to be more reasonable. If you don’t intend to engage existing philosophical discourse at a philosophical discussion forum in the effort to test and justify your philosophical thinking–and it appears you don’t–just say so.Thats the bottom line.
Objects or natures that have been “shaped” by an artificail inteligence for some particular end exist. Socks, on the other hand, do not exist.I brought up Aquinas to show that there is an existing discourse on the subject at hand; that he affirms that some man-made objects are substances; and that he suggests why. You need to address the existing discourse to show why your novel and ambiguous formulation is superior. Besides Aquinas never said that artificial objects “have never existed objectively.”