Of substance and accidents: when H20 isn't water

[Blue_Horizon]

I have been trying to nail down a short definition of Aristotelian “accidents”.
Unfortunately many of the definitions I come across are ambiguous or sometimes seem to slightly contradict one another.

Specifically I am looking for a good definition that a contributor can then meaningfully apply to a couple of real-world change scenarios.

Example One:
When what we call “water” changes to what we call “ice”.
Are most agreed that the accidents are modified but the substance remains the same?
If so the “thing” (water) is the same in both cases.

Example Two:
I have a bucket of powdered limestone and make a slurry with water and stick my arm in it.
It feels cool but nothing further happens.
I then take a second bucket, heat it for some time in a very hot oven and cool it down.
I make a slurry with water and stick my arm in it. My arm immediately gets burnt both chemically and heat-wise. If I leave my arm in it no doubt little would come out a few hours later. This powder was once used to bury corpses.
Is this white powder the same in both cases?

Example Three: We irradiate H20 (“water”) with neutrons. The hydrogen atoms each gain two neutrons (lets ignore the possibility that this might take a million years if at all possible). It is still chemically H20 (popularly called tritium oxide rather than hydrogen oxide). Yet this water is quite poisonous (apart being worth billions of dollars). Is this the same thing in both cases? Seems to be.

What is a consistent basis for explaining the changes (substantial or not substantial) in each case. It does not seem to be conservation of chemical identity.

 

[Gorgias]

Aristotle doesn’t speak of ‘accidents’ per se, as I recall; he does speak of subjects and things that are ‘in’ them and things that are ‘said of’ them.

Example One:
When what we call “water” changes to what we call “ice”.
Are most agreed that the accidents are modified but the substance remains the same?
If so the “thing” (water) is the same in both cases.

I believe that Aristotle would have said that water, as a substance, is capable of receiving contraries (i.e., ‘heat’ and ‘cold’). Water that is sufficiently cold (or, alternately, sufficiently free from having heat) is called ‘ice’.

Example Two:
I have a bucket of powdered limestone and make a slurry with water and stick my arm in it.
It feels cool but nothing further happens.
I then take a second bucket, heat it for some time in a very hot oven and cool it down.
I make a slurry with water and stick my arm in it. My arm immediately gets burnt both chemically and heat-wise. If I leave my arm in it no doubt little would come out a few hours later. This powder was once used to bury corpses.
Is this white powder the same in both cases?

I’m confused by this example: you’re talking about two chemically different substances, so no, they’re not the same. One is powdered limestone, and the other is quicklime (in which, through the application of heat, carbon dioxide is released from the limestone, thus creating the caustic chemical called ‘quicklime’.)

So no, they’re not the same thing, even if they share the same accidents of whiteness and powderyness. Powdered sugar also shares the same properties; you wouldn’t say that it is the same thing as powdered limestone, would you?

Example Three: We irradiate H20 (“water”) with neutrons. The hydrogen atoms each gain two neutrons (lets ignore the possibility that this might take a million years if at all possible). It is still chemically H20 (popularly called tritium oxide rather than hydrogen oxide). Yet this water is quite poisonous (apart being worth billions of dollars). Is this the same thing in both cases? Seems to be.

No, it’s not the same thing. Again, it might share some of the accidents of H[sub]2[/sub]O, but triated water is T[sub]2[/sub]O (or [sup]3[/sup]H[sub]2[/sub]O). They are, chemically speaking, different substances.

What is a consistent basis for explaining the changes (substantial or not substantial) in each case. It does not seem to be conservation of chemical identity.

I’m not sure what you’re asking – it seems that you’re saying “if it changes, but looks the same, isn’t it the same thing as it was originally?”. That doesn’t hold at all…

 

[Blue_Horizon]

First off an apology.
I said the white powder was lime-stone.
You are correct, this is colloquially what is normally considered Calcium Carbonate.
But by “lime” I really meant builder’s lime (ie hydrated lime).

Aristotle doesn’t speak of ‘accidents’ per se, as I recall; he does speak of subjects and things that are ‘in’ them and things that are ‘said of’ them.

Good point. Lets assume we are talking of Scholastic interpretation of Aristotle if you like (ie substance and accidents).

Using your terminology then, how does one in practice distinguish between a “subject” and these “things” said of them? That is, how do we define the point at which “the things said of the subject” have so changed that we are no longer talking about the original “subject” but a different subject completely?

I believe that Aristotle would have said that water, as a substance, is capable of receiving contraries (i.e., ‘heat’ and ‘cold’). Water that is sufficiently cold (or, alternately, sufficiently free from having heat) is called ‘ice’.

So Aristotle holds that cold and heat do not change the “subject” (water). Only the “accidents” are modified.
I wonder would he have held that the “subject” of the white powder below likewise does not change with hydration/dehydration?

So far as the senses go both materials display remarkably different properties in their changed states. And they both revert to their original states when the change is reversed (unlike sugar).

It seems to me that perhaps Aristotle (and perhaps the Scholastics?) regarded the “irreversibility” of the change as a more solid indicator of a “subject” change (rather than merely accidental change which is reversible).

I’m confused by this example: you’re talking about two chemically different substances, so no, they’re not the same.

We moderns think we know better because of chemistry. Yet is there actually anything logically necessary in the view that all chemical change must be a “subject change” and vice-versa?
If a change is easily reversible (whether ice to water or builders lime to quicklime) then for all intents and purposes is there a “subject change” philosophically?

And also, if there is a sub-atomic change (which is not a chemical change) then the situation seem to become more ambiguous still.

Identity may be about more than the blinkered and perhaps arbitrary view that it is “chemical” or “atomic” identity.

Powdered sugar also shares the same properties; you wouldn’t say that it is the same thing as powdered limestone , would you?
The difficulty I see is a little more subtle than this. The issue isn’t whiteness and powderiness of two unrelated materials - as if a subject is identified purely by its more external and static sensible properties.
The issue is one of change and reversibility.The dehydration of sugar (or its heating) cannot be reversed. The hydration of “quicklime” will turn it back into lime (ie builder’s lime) as the very name suggests. And builder’s mix can be turned back into quicklime by heating it.

No, it’s not the same thing. Again, it might share some of the accidents of H[sub]2[/sub]O, but triated water is T[sub]2[/sub]O (or [sup]3[/sup]H[sub]2[/sub]O). They are, chemically speaking, different substances.

To the best of my knowledge the Scientific Community does not regard isotopes as different chemical elements. Indeed, chemical compounds made from isotopic variations in one of the elements, predictably have the same chemical/sensible properties. Yet in a few rare cases not quite perfectly so. Therefore there is no chemical change between water made from “tritium” and water made from “hydrogen”. Yet the latter is apparently poisonous to humans (nothing to do with radioactivity though).

Obviously there is a sub-atomic difference but how would one argue whether that difference is a “subject change” or a "“the things said of the subject” change? Two extra neutrons could be argued to be a merely accidental change (not unlike a “mixture” or an “aggregation” or even a “solution” with something else. Water is still water if salt is mixed with it isn’t it?)

Here there are some related issues:
What about O2 molecules as opposed to O (ozone) atoms. Is this a chemical change? Is it a “subject change?”

Or electrolyte solutions. Are elements with one or two electrons missing/added the same as their nascent elements with a perfect compliment of electrons? Their properties are very different. I am not sure if these are chemical changes. Are they “subject changes”?

This is why I am thinking “reversibility” of the change is a better indicator of “subject change” than **chemical identity **- whatever that might mean.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I have been trying to nail down a short definition of Aristotelian “accidents”.
Unfortunately many of the definitions I come across are ambiguous or sometimes seem to slightly contradict one another.

Specifically I am looking for a good definition that a contributor can then meaningfully apply to a couple of real-world change scenarios.

Example One:
When what we call “water” changes to what we call “ice”.
Are most agreed that the accidents are modified but the substance remains the same?
If so the “thing” (water) is the same in both cases.

Example Two:
I have a bucket of powdered limestone and make a slurry with water and stick my arm in it.
It feels cool but nothing further happens.
I then take a second bucket, heat it for some time in a very hot oven and cool it down.
I make a slurry with water and stick my arm in it. My arm immediately gets burnt both chemically and heat-wise. If I leave my arm in it no doubt little would come out a few hours later. This powder was once used to bury corpses.
Is this white powder the same in both cases?

Example Three: We irradiate H20 (“water”) with neutrons. The hydrogen atoms each gain two neutrons (lets ignore the possibility that this might take a million years if at all possible). It is still chemically H20 (popularly called tritium oxide rather than hydrogen oxide). Yet this water is quite poisonous (apart being worth billions of dollars). Is this the same thing in both cases? Seems to be.

What is a consistent basis for explaining the changes (substantial or not substantial) in each case. It does not seem to be conservation of chemical identity.

Aristotle identifies three types of accidents - quantity, quality, and place. According to him everything else would be a substance. It would be very difficult to correctly identify each one correctly, as Aristotle points out. Clearly, when we use electrolysis to make hydrogen and oxygen we have caused a substantial change. I think that water freezing would be a change in quality and evaporation would be a change in both quality and place ( though Aristotle would say otherwise). The point is to recognize what the predicaments imply. And, as I said before, Thomas does not follow Aristotle strictly.

Linus2nd

 

[JimG]

My knowledge of Aristotle and Thomistic philosophy is rusty, but my understanding of the meaning of ‘accidents’ is this:

Accidents are what is perceptible to the senses. When we perceive the physical world, we do not perceive it directly. Nothing of the ‘substance’ of anything touches us. We only know what’s out there by the accidents that are perceptible to our senses. What impinges on our senses, and by extension what we perceive by extending our senses with scientific instruments, those are the accidents by which we know the world. Those are what can enter our senses and be integrated into our brain and abstracted by our mind.

When I perceive something, I know it by it’s qualities—touch, sight, smell, sound, etc. If I see a cat, I don’t get the actual cat in my brain in order to identify it, I identify it by those qualities which I can perceive, which are not the thing itself.

We know reality through accidents. Fortunately, accidents—sense perceptions—are consistent, so that reality is knowable.

If I could change the sense perceptions—the accidents—that are received from an object, then I perceive the object differently. We don’t pay good money to go into a move theater and just look at a movie screen, and yet that’s what we are doing. The projectionist changes the accidents that we see, making the experience worth paying for. (Of course, even when we are staring at a blank screen, we are still perceiving it’s accidents, not it’s substance.)

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Aristotle identifies three types of accidents - quantity, quality, and place. According to him everything else would be a substance. It would be very difficult to correctly identify each one correctly, as Aristotle points out. Clearly, when we use electrolysis to make hydrogen and oxygen we have caused a substantial change. I think that water freezing would be a change in quality and evaporation would be a change in both quality and place ( though Aristotle would say otherwise). The point is to recognize what the predicaments imply. And, as I said before, Thomas does not follow Aristotle strictly.

Linus2nd

Linus please apply your insights to the three examples given otherwise coherence of discussion will be lost and no one will learn anything.
This discussion can easily go off on disconnected tangents and lose “containment” methinks :thumbsup.

Anyhows, you mention three types of “things” that reside in a subject (commonly called accidents." I thought there were seven or eight but I suppose these are the most important.

Re water/ice:
Well I am not exactly sure what “quality” means but quite a few differences obtain between ice and water. I suppose going from liquid to solid is a change in quality.
But going from small volume to larger volume is a difference in quantity. I suppose that depends on how one defines “quantity” (ie mass or volume). But a change in volume is quantity so far as I am concerned. So I think at least “2 accident types” have changed here. BTW where does “temperature” rate? Surely it is an “accident”. Is it a quality? yet it seems more than a quality for it brings about changes in other accidents as well (eg quantity).

But the deeper problem I see with this approach is that the senses can be fooled. Often a change in accidents also signals a change in substance. When powdered cement attracts water from the air and becomes hard it isn’t simply a change of “state” (from powder to solid). In fact the powdered aggregate has bonded into a new substance (concrete). If we powder it up again it still isn’t cement. So this change is a substantial one - yet water to ice is an accidental one. So on what basis do we say that ice is still really water while powdered concrete is no longer cement?

So merely defining the different sorts of “things in a subject” (ie categories of accident) doesn’t help in actually “finding” different subject/accidents in the real world. And if Aristotle admits himself that its hard to apply to the real world…of what value is the distinction in the first place?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Continued from above…

Tritium Oxide and Hydrogen Oxide:
L2 how would you apply your observations above to a hydrogen atom gaining two neutrons?
Is this merely an accidental change? How does “aggregation” fit into Aristotle’s theory? If I mix dry quicklime with dry sand is the quicklime still quicklime? If it is do we call this accidental change a change in quality of quantity or just a change in place (ie diluted by interposing foreign substances) or what? If so it would seem the gaining of two neutrons is just an accidental change (which the Chemists seem to hold as isotopes of an element are still considered the same element). All chemistry students know that it is a change in the number of protons that turns one element into another element - it is this causes the most vivid change in the “subject’s” accidents. Neutron change usually causes no change in properties whatsoever (apart from atomic weight which is but a change in mass quantity).

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Accidents are what is perceptible to the senses. When we perceive the physical world, we do not perceive it directly. Nothing of the ‘substance’ of anything touches us. We only know what’s out there by the accidents that are perceptible to our senses. What impinges on our senses, and by extension what we perceive by extending our senses with scientific instruments, those are the accidents by which we know the world. Those are what can enter our senses and be integrated into our brain and abstracted by our mind.

Agree totally. Accidents are known by the senses (I like the “extended by scientific instruments bit”) while substance is inferred.

What is problematic is getting beyond this point and understanding how the distinction is useful in “understanding” change. If we only sense the “window dressing” then it seems impossible to empirically distinguish substantial change from accidental change with any objective certainty.

In fact the distinction appears arbitrary in many cases and depends totally on our personally chosen criterion of “identity” (i.e. nuclear change, atomic change, molecular change, crystalline change, cellular change, aggregate/solution change, state-change).

In fact each of these changes, depending on actual substances involved, may or may not result in changes in properties at the macro-sensible level. The real world seems too varied for us to use any single one of the above identity criterion for consistently distinguishing mere accidental change from substance change.

What I believe thinkers of the past have in fact been subconsciously doing is applying “easy reversibility” as the practical criterion of accidental change. If you cannot reverse a change easily…then its a substantial change.

L2 mentioned “electrolysis of water” (which isn’t really that different from hydration/dehydration of quicklime except the change is more obvious to the senses and it is a change unknown to the ancients).

Is water and a mixture of two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen really all that different?
All it takes is electricity to separate and electricity (a spark) to reconvert.
Why do we make so much of an ionic bond to say they are completely different substances? Isn’t it just because at the macro-level they have such different properties…
Yet ice and steam have very different properties too…

Obviously H20 ionic bonds are harder to break and rejoin than merely heating/cooling ice (“stretching” molecular bonds).

But really, what is essentially different these two sets of allegedly different “substances” other than the fact the changes are at different levels of material bonding (ionic versus molecular).

If I could change the sense perceptions—the accidents—that are received from an object, then I perceive the object differently.

We may be going off on a tangent here but I accept the basic point.
I suppose what is at issue is what is the objective material basis behind this change in accidents. You have taken it the other direction when talking about a projector screen which is really more about manipulating symbols (via light and sound which are the “mediums” of some sense perceptions) of past perceptions that we have memorised.

 

[JimG]

It seems to me that nearly any change in the accidents can indicate a change in the underlying reality, which is the substance. We can never experience the underlying substance directly. We always experience it through accidents. Because of that, there’s not much point in trying to overthink the matter when applying it to individual cases. All of ordinary life, all our experience, all our science, all our measurements, all of physics, involves observing and measuring and categorizing accidents, never substance.

The good thing is that accidents are consistent. If we observe a molecule of water, we infer that the underlying substance is water, and it is. Nature does not lie to us by arbitrarily changing accidents.

If we had different sense organs sensitive to different wavelengths, we would perceive nature differently, so the accidents and our perceptions would be different, though consistent with our sensory perception. But the substance would remain the same. An apple is still an apple, though a housefly and a human perceive it quite differently because of their different sense organs. Neither housefly nor human can directly perceive substance, only accidents.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Agree totally. Accidents are known by the senses (I like the “extended by scientific instruments bit”) while substance is inferred.

What is problematic is getting beyond this point and understanding how the distinction is useful in “understanding” change. If we only sense the “window dressing” then it seems impossible to empirically distinguish substantial change from accidental change with any objective certainty.

In fact the distinction appears arbitrary in many cases and depends totally on our personally chosen criterion of “identity” (i.e. nuclear change, atomic change, molecular change, crystalline change, cellular change, aggregate/solution change, state-change).

In fact each of these changes, depending on actual substances involved, may or may not result in changes in properties at the macro-sensible level. The real world seems too varied for us to use any single one of the above identity criterion for consistently distinguishing mere accidental change from substance change.

What I believe thinkers of the past have in fact been subconsciously doing is applying “easy reversibility” as the practical criterion of accidental change. If you cannot reverse a change easily…then its a substantial change.

L2 mentioned “electrolysis of water” (which isn’t really that different from hydration/dehydration of quicklime except the change is more obvious to the senses and it is a change unknown to the ancients).

Is water and a mixture of two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen really all that different?
All it takes is electricity to separate and electricity (a spark) to reconvert.
Why do we make so much of an ionic bond to say they are completely different substances? Isn’t it just because at the macro-level they have such different properties…
Yet ice and steam have very different properties too…

Obviously H20 ionic bonds are harder to break and rejoin than merely heating/cooling ice (“stretching” molecular bonds).

But really, what is essentially different these two sets of allegedly different “substances” other than the fact the changes are at different levels of material bonding (ionic versus molecular).

We may be going off on a tangent here but I accept the basic point.
I suppose what is at issue is what is the objective material basis behind this change in accidents. You have taken it the other direction when talking about a projector screen which is really more about manipulating symbols (via light and sound which are the “mediums” of some sense perceptions) of past perceptions that we have memorised.

In response to your two posts, you would have to read both Aristotle and Thomas to see what I mean and to see the differences between the two. Unfortunately there is no Index to either one, so it is very difficult to go to a few quotes of either to get to a complete understanding of " quality " and " substance. " I would point generally to Thomas’ comments on the Physics and Metaphysics for a start or to Thomas’ Principles of Nature ( which is general and gives no specific examples) : dhspriory.org/thomas/english/DePrincNaturae.htm

Aristotle would give the example of growth in living things as an example of " quantity " and color as an example of " quality " and the change from life to death as an example of a change of "substance. "

In chemistry one would have to distinguish between the physical constituents and the typical or customary behavior of an element to identify the substance. For it is clear that the typical behavior of an atom of gold is different from the behavior of an atom of sodium.
Gold and sodium are obviously different substances. Taken in larger amounts of the atoms of each would be examples of quantity of the substance of each, while the color and reactive qualities of each with other elements under the same or different conditions, would be examples of their substantial natures and even the various qualities - color, etc.
So it is a general understanding of the principles involved rather than a complete description of their possible accidents that we are after.

The point is that there are numerous substances susceptible of having various accidents.
A pound of the substance of silver has the quantity of mass as well as various qualities, rust or gray or shiny, etc. Aristotle and Thomas would each cite these as examples of the principles. Every substance would have both the qualities of mass and color of some amount or degree. " Amount " and " degree " would correspond to quantity and quality respectively ( my interpretation ). And each would also be in a certain and a different " place. " Each would be either " here " or " there. "

So it happens then that the various physical configurations of each element would correspend to or determine or typify various substances and certain of their qualities. So we see how each quality exists in a subject that we call a substance.

One should also realize that these concepts are always discussed in the context of the principles of act and potency which are at the heart of the metaphysics of both Aristotle and Thomas and must be understood in that context. One should also keep in mind that both recognize that there are first substance and second substance. I always get the two confused, but one relates to the physically identifiable " thing," while the other deals with the underlying " reality " composed of the principles of potency and act or matter and form.
In the latter context, the principles would not be regarded as accidents. Rather, they are the " causes " of the existence or the being of a particular substance.

However, the above deals only with physical substances. Spiritual substances would be a category that Aristotle didn’t recognize or deal with. That is one place Thomas differs.

Linus2nd .

.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

In response to your two posts, you would have to read both Aristotle and Thomas to see what I mean and to see the differences between the two. Unfortunately there is no Index to either one, so it is very difficult to go to a few quotes of either to get to a complete understanding of " quality " and " substance. " I would point generally to Thomas’ comments on the Physics and Metaphysics for a start or to Thomas’ Principles of Nature ( which is general and gives no specific examples) : dhspriory.org/thomas/english/DePrincNaturae.htm

Aristotle would give the example of growth in living things as an example of " quantity " and color as an example of " quality " and the change from life to death as an example of a change of "substance. "

In chemistry one would have to distinguish between the physical constituents and the typical or customary behavior of an element to identify the substance. For it is clear that the typical behavior of an atom of gold is different from the behavior of an atom of sodium.
Gold and sodium are obviously different substances. Taken in larger amounts of the atoms of each would be examples of quantity of the substance of each, while the color and reactive qualities of each with other elements under the same or different conditions, would be examples of their substantial natures and even the various qualities - color, etc.
So it is a general understanding of the principles involved rather than a complete description of their possible accidents that we are after.

The point is that there are numerous substances susceptible of having various accidents.
A pound of the substance of silver has the quantity of mass as well as various qualities, rust or gray or shiny, etc. Aristotle and Thomas would each cite these as examples of the principles. Every substance would have both the qualities of mass and color of some amount or degree. " Amount " and " degree " would correspond to quantity and quality respectively ( my interpretation ). And each would also be in a certain and a different " place. " Each would be either " here " or " there. "

So it happens then that the various physical configurations of each element would correspend to or determine or typify various substances and certain of their qualities. So we see how each quality exists in a subject that we call a substance.

One should also realize that these concepts are always discussed in the context of the principles of act and potency which are at the heart of the metaphysics of both Aristotle and Thomas and must be understood in that context. One should also keep in mind that both recognize that there are first substance and second substance. I always get the two confused, but one relates to the physically identifiable " thing," while the other deals with the underlying " reality " composed of the principles of potency and act or matter and form.
In the latter context, the principles would not be regarded as accidents. Rather, they are the " causes " of the existence or the being of a particular substance.

However, the above deals only with physical substances. Spiritual substances would be a category that Aristotle didn’t recognize or deal with. That is one place Thomas differs.

Linus2nd .

.

I should have added that H20 may indeed be a different substance from water as we understand it. I will leave it to you chemists to figure that one out. Substance, quantity, and quality are tied in with the theory of hylomorphism and the type of change or motion Aristotle and Thomas deal with.

Linus2nd

 

[Richca]

I have been trying to nail down a short definition of Aristotelian “accidents”.
Unfortunately many of the definitions I come across are ambiguous or sometimes seem to slightly contradict one another.

Specifically I am looking for a good definition that a contributor can then meaningfully apply to a couple of real-world change scenarios.

Example One:
When what we call “water” changes to what we call “ice”.
Are most agreed that the accidents are modified but the substance remains the same?
If so the “thing” (water) is the same in both cases.

Example Two:
I have a bucket of powdered limestone and make a slurry with water and stick my arm in it.
It feels cool but nothing further happens.
I then take a second bucket, heat it for some time in a very hot oven and cool it down.
I make a slurry with water and stick my arm in it. My arm immediately gets burnt both chemically and heat-wise. If I leave my arm in it no doubt little would come out a few hours later. This powder was once used to bury corpses.
Is this white powder the same in both cases?

Example Three: We irradiate H20 (“water”) with neutrons. The hydrogen atoms each gain two neutrons (lets ignore the possibility that this might take a million years if at all possible). It is still chemically H20 (popularly called tritium oxide rather than hydrogen oxide). Yet this water is quite poisonous (apart being worth billions of dollars). Is this the same thing in both cases? Seems to be.

What is a consistent basis for explaining the changes (substantial or not substantial) in each case. It does not seem to be conservation of chemical identity.

Substances exist by themselves. Accidents inhere in a substance, they do not exist by themselves.

 

[KyrieEleison17]

Aristotle’s idea of substance would have corresponded more closely to our notion of a specific nature, especially as exemplified in individuals, near as I can tell.

Different substances will have different essences and definitions. It’s obvious that water, snow and ice are similar materially but could they really be reduced to a single essence? Do they really have the same nature? I don’t think we could say so without impoverishing reality. When I am asking for a glass of water I am not asking for a glass filled with snow or ice. Water and ice are very different from each other regardless of their obvious common underlying matter.

There are no shortage of problems that the periodic table of elements entails. The atom in its modern reincarnation is constantly becoming more sophisticated and complex as it has to answer and increasingly explain the whole wealth of reality. We added the nucleus (protons and neutrons) and we added electrons and we we’ve had to increase the complexity (and reduce the intelligibility) of electrons to make them work (particle-wave(s) - from modern literature on the subject I think the notion of a “flux” best describes, though I wont be surprised if ultimately something new is added to the atom - we’ve done it before when it became necessary). And now we’ve added even more elementary parts to the nucleus (quarks and the like) - something my high school teachers failed to inform me about.

Certainly the impression of modern atomic theory I was presented with in high school was a highly watered down presentation of atomic theory. Basic questions like how the various elements or natural inanimate substances can be so extraordinarily similar whilst demonstrating such great diversity of properties and attributes was never explained to me. Why are some atoms apparently so much lighter than others, for example? Is it because the atoms or molecules are more spread out? How can water and gold have such radically different properties when they are supposed to be so similar? How can the atoms be alive as they would seem to have to be in a living organism since they just are supposed to be the physical subject that is said to be alive? How could atoms ever think or be conscious or produce a state of thinking or consciousness? What relationship do the atoms - the apparent underlying subject - have to things like consciousness or thinking?

These and many other questions arise.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Substances exist by themselves. Accidents inhere in a substance, they do not exist by themselves.

I suppose th e difficulty with these seemingly no-nonsense staements is that it is not clear whether the truth contained refers only to the words/symbols only or whether it actually extends to the sensible reality that language/concepts refer to and which seek to understand.

The problematic concept/phrase is “exist by themselves”.
What does that actually mean in terms of the “real world”.

The obvious observation is that “substance” (conceived as different from its accidents) doesn’t actually “exist” without its accidents either does it? So it doesn’t really exist “in itself”. In fact it only exists through its accidents.

If a table has no colour or extension or smell or mass it cannot be perceived by human beings. It is a ghost. Scholastics would no doubt say it may still exist even if it cannot be perceived.

I would prefer to call in Ochkam’s razor and say if it cannot ever be perceived by anyone (nor by scientific instruments which are extensions of human sensibility) then why posit its existence?

So what does the word “exist” mean in the definition you use above. Really I believe it “smuggles” in an ontological framework for the discussion (ie an objective God’s eye point of view) when only a **perceptual one **(from limited human point of view) can really be justified by what we actually experience in the world.

I suppose this is the gulf between Science (existence is only perceived existence) and the Church (existence is somehow affirmed apart from mere perception) that still divides the two today.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Aristotle’s idea of substance would have corresponded more closely to our notion of a specific nature, especially as exemplified in individuals, near as I can tell.

Different substances will have different essences and definitions. It’s obvious that water, snow and ice are similar materially but could they really be reduced to a single essence? Do they really have the same nature? I don’t think we could say so without impoverishing reality. When I am asking for a glass of water I am not asking for a glass filled with snow or ice. Water and ice are very different from each other regardless of their obvious common underlying matter.

There are no shortage of problems that the periodic table of elements entails. The atom in its modern reincarnation is constantly becoming more sophisticated and complex as it has to answer and increasingly explain the whole wealth of reality. We added the nucleus (protons and neutrons) and we added electrons and we we’ve had to increase the complexity (and reduce the intelligibility) of electrons to make them work (particle-wave(s) - from modern literature on the subject I think the notion of a “flux” best describes, though I wont be surprised if ultimately something new is added to the atom - we’ve done it before when it became necessary). And now we’ve added even more elementary parts to the nucleus (quarks and the like) - something my high school teachers failed to inform me about.

Certainly the impression of modern atomic theory I was presented with in high school was a highly watered down presentation of atomic theory. Basic questions like how the various elements or natural inanimate substances can be so extraordinarily similar whilst demonstrating such great diversity of properties and attributes was never explained to me. Why are some atoms apparently so much lighter than others, for example? Is it because the atoms or molecules are more spread out? How can water and gold have such radically different properties when they are supposed to be so similar? How can the atoms be alive as they would seem to have to be in a living organism since they just are supposed to be the physical subject that is said to be alive? How could atoms ever think or be conscious or produce a state of thinking or consciousness? What relationship do the atoms - the apparent underlying subject - have to things like consciousness or thinking?

These and many other questions arise.

Yes I tend to agree with you re asking for a glass of water and the substance implications thereof.

The discovery of the atom has indeed proven very problematic for Aristotle’s framework of substance/accident because his framework is solidly based on the fact (for Aristotle) that Democritus was wrong. That is, Aristotle didn’t believe in atoms, he held that substances were infinitely divisible.

(Wrt to compounds/elements being heavier (ie different densitys) than others I believe it is consistently related to the number of total protons/neutrons involved as Avogado’s principles suggest)

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Gold and sodium are obviously different substances.
Linus2nd .
.

Probably the whole difficulty with this approach rests on this statement L2.
Why are they obviously different substances?
Just because gold is inert and sodium the opposite and reacts spectacularly with water.

But surely you are making this judgement based on other unspoken assumptions.
Graphite and diamond are also very different too are they not?
Would you regard these as different substances?

And what about builders lime and quicklime?
They seem very much the same yet they are in fact more different (chemically) than graphite and diamond.

What about oxygen and ozone?

Whence the consistency of approach wrt judging different things as different substances?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Probably the whole difficulty with this approach rests on this statement L2.
Why are they obviously different substances?
Just because gold is inert and sodium the opposite and reacts spectacularly with water.

But surely you are making this judgement based on other unspoken assumptions.
Graphite and diamond are also very different too are they not?
Would you regard these as different substances?

And what about builders lime and quicklime?
They seem very much the same yet they are in fact more different (chemically) than graphite and diamond.

What about oxygen and ozone?

Whence the consistency of approach wrt judging different things as different substances?

Does one have absolute certainty about anything? Even if I offered an opinion you would worry it to death until you could claim it doesn’t hold water. You want the certainty of a mathematical equation. Unfortunately nothing in life is that certain. The physical constitution of the material universe is a different thing from the undelying metaphysical realities. That’s about all I can say.

Linus2nd

 

[balto]

Probably the whole difficulty with this approach rests on this statement L2.
Why are they obviously different substances?
Just because gold is inert and sodium the opposite and reacts spectacularly with water.

But surely you are making this judgement based on other unspoken assumptions.
Graphite and diamond are also very different too are they not?
Would you regard these as different substances?

And what about builders lime and quicklime?
They seem very much the same yet they are in fact more different (chemically) than graphite and diamond.

What about oxygen and ozone?

Whence the consistency of approach wrt judging different things as different substances?

I was hoping that this thread would keep going a little longer because I am also having difficulty making sense of substantial forms. Maybe whether or not there is a difference in substantial form depends on what level of abstraction you are considering? To use your examples, if you are considering water as a chemical, then yes, there is a substantial form difference between water and gold but not between liquid water and ice. But if you are considering the physical state, then there is a substantial form difference between liquid water and ice.

It doesn’t seem to be any good to consider physical state alone and then conclude that ice and gold are not substantially different because they are both solids, but I think the reason is that the physical state of a chemical flows from the form of the chemical. It’s like an inheritance tree in object oriented programming I think. Physical state is lower on the inheritance tree than chemical state so if the two objects are not of the same chemical type then you are making an apples to oranges comparison by comparing a state underneath this super-type alone. All of the higher levels of abstraction exist virtually in the actual substance. I’m not sure how correct any of this is though, because the logical conclusion seems to be that the ultimate substantial form is the instantaneous form exhibited by the substance at this particular time point, which seems extreme to me.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I was hoping that this thread would keep going a little longer because I am also having difficulty making sense of substantial forms. Maybe whether or not there is a difference in substantial form depends on what level of abstraction you are considering? To use your examples, if you are considering water as a chemical, then yes, there is a substantial form difference between water and gold but not between liquid water and ice. But if you are considering the physical state, then there is a substantial form difference between liquid water and ice…

It doesn’t seem to be any good to consider physical state alone and then conclude that ice and gold are not substantially different because they are both solids, but I think the reason is that the physical state of a chemical flows from the form of the chemical. It’s like an inheritance tree in object oriented programming I think. Physical state is lower on the inheritance tree than chemical state so if the two objects are not of the same chemical type then you are making an apples to oranges comparison by comparing a state underneath this super-type alone. All of the higher levels of abstraction exist virtually in the actual substance. …QUOTE]

I see nothing illogical in your observations, and it is generally where I am at.
The unfortunate conclusion then is that “substance” (actually the real topic is probably a definition of “substantial change”) is really more a subjective and convenient “make believe” based on “common sense” notions of macro levels of change that don’t really have any consistently “objective” or unified criteria operating behind those judgements when applied to the real world.
It all depends on what level or depth of enquiry one is prepared to drill down to (ie state, crystal structure, molecular composition, atomic composition, sub-atomic composition etc).
Hence the substance/accident distinction looks to be relative (like genus/species) rather than absolute when speaking of minerals.

However when we speak of living things (which was Aristotle’s primary target when speaking of these things) the landscape is different.

With a gold statue we know the form is really just an accidental modification of the gold “matter”. A change of statue shape is not a change of the underlying “matter.” Of course we can keep dividing the gold statue into smaller bits until we finally come down to a bit (a single gold atom) that can no longer be divided and still entitle us to call the substance gold (most would agree that dividing the gold atom would be a substantial change).

But with living beings (in most cases - though fungal colonies may be different) you are already at the point of where you would be with a gold atom. To further divide is to lose the form (soul) implying death (a substantial change).

For this reason Aristotle would say, I believe, that matter/form in a live creature is not a relative distinction but an absolute one. That is, a creaturely substantial form is putting irreducible “prime matter” into act.

Yet even this assertion by Aristotle is challenged by modern science. The other day I heard a professor saying that a significant proportion of human weight belongs to organic entities that are in fact parasitic (or at least symbiotic) with the human organism.

That does not sound like “prime matter” to me. While we can still accept that the “organic community” that goes into the make-up of a living human body only has its single teleology/unity and self maintenance because of the over-riding human form (soul) which coordinates all…I think it is foolish to keep pretending that relatively self-subsisting, intermediary sub-organising units do not go into our human make-up. Even at the purely inorganic level our bones still seem to exhibit all the usual properties of the minerals of which they are made and which they allegedly “turn back into” when we die. Obviously minerals and chemicals and inorganic molecules are transformed into complex organic chemicals and organs and different types of cells are taken up into an overall purpose and function they would never “activate” if left on the beach. But that is not the point. The point is that the body cannot really be said to be a direct activation of prime matter as if intermediary forms and levels of material organisation
no longer exists or play a subservient part.

If that is the case can a living substance really be said to be but a single substance (integrated by only the single top level form (the soul)) which utterly transforms all mineral and inorganic/organic chemicals it subsumes?

Well, one may certainly arbitrarily force that on people as a “definition” of substance (which my priest biology teacher in secondary school asserted to the incredulity of us 15 yr olds) but whether that concept in consistant with the real-world examples thereof is a completely different question.

I didn’t really accept his metaphysical assertions back then, and to be honest, nothing I have experienced since leads me to believe I was mistaken.

Perhaps this pure assertion that living bones are not the the minerals we know they will return to was never meant to be understood in a “physical sense”. Maybe its just a shorthand to say they serve a higher purpose than their own limited inorganic nature would ever allow. No probs with that. But we no longer live in a pneumatic world where every grove has its protecting spirit, every river its taniwha (Maori) and every nation its guardian angel that we need to be consciously wary of lest we go astray somehow.

The Aristotelian “soul” certainly has much going for it still, but some of the attendant substance/accidents concepts attending with it need to be better updated as Scotus attempted (perhaps unsuccessfully) when he opined that Man is composed of a hierarchy of forms not just a single one (Aquinas’s position).

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Does one have absolute certainty about anything? Even if I offered an opinion you would worry it to death until you could claim it doesn’t hold water. You want the certainty of a mathematical equation. Unfortunately nothing in life is that certain. The physical constitution of the material universe is a different thing from the undelying metaphysical realities. That’s about all I can say.

Linus2nd

The simple point is this L2. If an allegedly “unifying theory” (eg of substantial change versus accidental change) abstracted from sensible experience no longer seems to be unified due to better science (with its extra sensible experience derived from tools that “extend the senses”) then it needs to be improved or discarded.

You are still working within the “Venn Diagram” of the ancients as if its business as usual and there is nothing new under the sun. There are times when the “Venn Diagram” box is itself too small or is proven inadequate as a frame of reference.

Now that would be acceptable if the philosophy of the ancients was a pure non-falsifiable metaphysic that doesn’t need to answer to empirical reality at all.
If that is your basic philosophic assumption here then I believe it is mistaken.

There seems every reason to believe that Aristotle himself would have radically upgraded much of his philosophy were he alive today. Principles that are derived from sensible experience, on principle, potentially can be overthrown by better understanding of sensible experience. It is impossible to hold that principles inducted empirically can always and everywhere be non-falsifiable at the same time.

And all this is quite apart from the obvious fact you have pointed out above.