On Jesus' Resurrection

[danserr]

The Argument from Silence

• (from Licona p.334). Allison actually points out that we can turn the argument from silence around. Since the pagan Paul was writing to were skeptical of the Resurrection, had these pagans thought Jesus corpse to be in the grave… they would have brought this forward as a point in their favor and Paul would have had to answer them. This he did not do.

Objection: First, neither Paul nor his audience was pagan. Second, his audience would have known that talking about a corpse in a grave was futile. Paul would simply have told them of course there is a body in the grave, he rose to life in a different body.

1. Do you really think Allison made a slip that obvious? By pagan, obviously he means they were pagans converting to Christianity and that their background was pagan as opposed to Jewish. Hence this does not challenge the point.
2. But some Corinthians were obviously objecting to Resurrection, it seems like one good objection from their viewpoint would have been an empty tomb. Which they never brought up and Paul never had to answer. That Paul would have told them it didn’t matter (which I deny for obvious reasons), is less interesting than that he never did, which suggests they never questioned it. Your claim requires several unclear assumptions including that previous to this letter the Corinthians were clear that Paul was teaching 2BT. Second, it requires that they would not have made any objections based on what would probably have been their previous belief in 1BT (by which I mean the concept of it, not that they would actually have believed it.

As to Wright, the claim that he thinks the text could support 2BT seems to contradict his own claim to which he is obviously more committed that Resurrection implied empty tomb.

Anyway, on the whole, my main response to your argument from silence is simply that the empty tomb was so clearly implied in the burial then resurrection that it was unnecessary to mention explicitly. I’ve quoted Wright, now Craig:

And really, even today were we to be told that a man who died and was buried rose from the dead and appeared to his friends, only a theologian would think to ask, ‘But was his body still in the grave?’ How much more is this true of first century Jews, who shared a much more physical conception of resurrection than we do! 17

Read more: reasonablefaith.org/the-historicity-of-the-empty-tomb-of-jesus#ixzz1ux0LLjrB

In short, we are back to the same position we were in before. There is strong positive evidence for the empty tomb, while it is also most plausible that Paul himself believed in it. Denying the empty tomb would commit us to certain improbable positions contradicted by the current data (like that the pre-Markan passion narrative on which Mark relied did not include the empty tomb story). On the contrary the only support for the tomb not being empty is a certain controversial reading of Corinthians, which even is granted, may not even imply 2BT. Yet, this reading and translation of Corinthians is rejected by most, and has several severe drawbacks on its own terms, including that the seed analogy clearly seems to teach numerical identity of the risen body with the deceased one, Paul’s failure to use “allos” which he would likely have were he referring to two distinct bodies, that even granting Carrier’s translation it does not necessarily teach 2BT.

You want to claim that no matter how good the evidence for the empty tomb, you are so warranted in your belief that Paul did not believe in the empty tomb, that you can dismiss any evidence and commit yourself to any improbable conclusion in order to deny the empty tomb.

But, I think when weighing the evidence, given the strong positive evidence for the empty tomb, the implausibilities that result from denying it (including your professed inability to explain the disciples belief that Jesus rose), and reasons for doubting that Paul taught 2BT in Corinthians, the weight of the evidence clearly falls on the side of the empty tomb.

 

[Perplexity]

danserr: While I feel that most of your objections do not succeed, prior to this exchange, I hadn’t foreseen that the Spirit-Body hypothesis would only change when the tomb was alleged to have been empty, not that it was. Here, I’m confronted with the same calculations as before.

While an event’s being multiply and independently attested to by early sources who would’ve been embarrassed to so attest normally renders that event historically probable, I must say the empty tomb is unique in that it entails hypotheses whose improbability overwhelms the evidential support bestowed upon it by the criteria of authenticity.

Obviously, you’ll disagree because of your priors.

So, I guess, if I’ve provided others with reason to reject the resurrection it’d be by way of illuminating probabilistic relations they were previously unaware of, unless they came to agree with my claims about the priors of those positions entailed by the empty tomb on other grounds. That leads to my last point. I feel like the only way I could advance this position is to continue arguing that the resurrection’s prior is comparable to, say, Swoon or Hallucination’s.

In any case, thanks for the extended dialogue, I appreciate the amount of time and effort you’ve put into this. I’ve learned a lot.

 

[danserr]

While an event’s being multiply and independently attested to by early sources who would’ve been embarrassed to so attest normally renders that event historically probable, I must say the empty tomb is unique in that it entails hypotheses whose improbability overwhelms the evidential support bestowed upon it by the criteria of authenticity.
I’ve learned a lot.

Not sure I entirely follow, it seems that you are back to your position in your OP about since the empty tomb entails the very improbable Resurrection hypothesis (though by itself it does not), then you have to reject the empty tomb. I though we agreed (post 71) that we could not make an a priori judgment about the evidence based on the supposedly low Pr(R on B)? (or is that not what you meant by priors?) Though maybe we don’t want to open that can of worms again.

I feel like the only way I could advance this position is to continue arguing that the resurrection’s prior is comparable to, say, Swoon or Hallucination’s.

If you mean argue that you could launch a good argument against the Ressurrection by arguing that the evidence is explained just as well or better by Swoon or Hallucination theory, (according to criteria for best explanation,), then I agree with you. (though of course I don’t think this possible).

In any case, thanks for the extended dialogue, I appreciate the amount of time and effort you’ve put into this. I’ve learned a lot.

No problem. Your immortal soul is worth it.

 

[Perplexity]

Not sure I entirely follow, it seems that you are back to your position in your OP about since the empty tomb entails the very improbable Resurrection hypothesis (though by itself it does not), then you have to reject the empty tomb. I though we agreed (post 71) that we could not make an a priori judgment about the evidence based on the supposedly low Pr(R on B)? (or is that not what you meant by priors?) Though maybe we don’t want to open that can of worms again.

It’s an a posteriori judgment: the evidence we have, even at its finest, just doesn’t overcome the empty tomb’s low prior. My prior for the empty tomb is extraordinarily low, and I don’t think the evidence for the empty tomb is anything extraordinary. But, I’ve calculated what would happen if the evidence was extraordinary, and it’s not enough to overcome the empty tomb’s prior.

If you mean argue that you could launch a good argument against the Ressurrection by arguing that the evidence is explained just as well or better by Swoon or Hallucination theory, (according to criteria for best explanation,), then I agree with you. (though of course I don’t think this possible).

Sorry, I mean that our priors for things like Swoon or Theft (plus all the other non-resurrection hypotheses that’d be made candidates if the empty tomb was true) are probably comparable: completely negligible. So, what I would want to do is argue that your prior for the resurrection (even as a theist) should be uber low as well. This in turn would give you an uber low prior for the empty tomb, which in turn would probably mean that your proposed evidence for the empty tomb would be overwhelmed by your low prior.

This isn’t an a priori judgment to the effect that no evidence could over turn this low prior. Rather, it’s a judgment about the evidence we do have: even at its finest, it’s not enough. For the sake of debate, I’d be willing to grant whatever calculations you felt appropriate for the evidence. But, I think establishing the empty tomb’s prior through the resurrection’s prior would be my first move.

 

[davidv]

It’s an a posteriori judgment: the evidence we have, even at its finest, just doesn’t overcome the empty tomb’s low prior. My prior for the empty tomb is extraordinarily low, and I don’t think the evidence for the empty tomb is anything extraordinary. But, I’ve calculated what would happen if the evidence was extraordinary, and it’s not enough to overcome the empty tomb’s prior.

Sorry, I mean that our priors for things like Swoon or Theft (plus all the other non-resurrection hypotheses that’d be made candidates if the empty tomb was true) are probably comparable: completely negligible. So, what I would want to do is argue that your prior for the resurrection (even as a theist) should be uber low as well. This in turn would give you an uber low prior for the empty tomb, which in turn would probably mean that your proposed evidence for the empty tomb would be overwhelmed by your low prior.

This isn’t an a priori judgment to the effect that no evidence could over turn this low prior. Rather, it’s a judgment about the evidence we do have: even at its finest, it’s not enough. For the sake of debate, I’d be willing to grant whatever calculations you felt appropriate for the evidence. But, I think establishing the empty tomb’s prior through the resurrection’s prior would be my first move.

It seems to me that it is a category error to bring probability into play relative to a historical event. It either happened or it didn’t. In the case of the Resurction, if there is no supernatural, prior to the Resurrection, the probabilty of its occurance was zero. Any evidence of its occurance invalidates one or more of the assumptions that led to the initial zero probability estimate.

A statement about history is either true or not, and probability is not a factor. Evidence for or against exists and are either conclusive or not.