On scientism

[Matthias123]

In this note I intend to outline the doctrines of scientism, and expose such opinions as erroneous. I must state at this early point that when I say scientism, I am not referring to the scientific method. Science per se works wonderfully, and is perhaps our crowning achievement in our quest to discover the specifics, peculiarities, and operation of the natural order. There is however, a tendency among scientists – especially certain “celebrity” scientists – that attempt to extend the authority of science beyond its competency. In this they have done a disservice to science itself, and human intellectual thought as a whole, by engaging in scientific discovery with false expectation, and committing errors due to the inadequacy of the scientific method, to investigate phenomenon is outside of its established scope.

The doctrine of scientism teaches that science has dominion over all other methods of human intellectual inquiry – whether they are the metaphysics, philosophy, or religion. In addition it requires everyone to be subject to its methodological restrictions.

We will first start off with the notion that science has dominion over the metaphysics. I am not a historian of course, but from what I understand this is the result of the positivism in the enlightenment. For those who are not familiar with positivism, you should know that this philosophical doctrine teaches there is to be no belief without empirical validation, that reason cannot transcend sense, and that metaphysical speculation should be avoided. I do think that positivism has started to fall through, as its inadequacy seems to be realised, as far as I can tell. I will however, offer my own small and amateur argument against such a doctrine:

The scientific method requires observation of a phenomenon, in order to validate a hypothesis by empirical means. Since metaphysics is the study and explanation of reality, it follows that the metaphysics are required for the proper interpretation of the observed phenomenon.

Suppose Charles Darwin is out on the HMS Beagle, categorizing different species of birds in for his upcoming work On the Origin of Species. Now the way he understands categorization, and interprets what he perceives through his senses, depends on Darwin’s metaphysical view. Do these species objectively exist, or do the categories only subjectively exist in his mind? Is there an objective difference between a pigeon and a seagull? Or is it just the mind making distinctions of what is distinctionless? Are species material? If they are, they why is it that we don’t categorize different sizes of seagulls as different species?

Secondly, there are metaphysical assumptions that the entire scientific method relies on. The uniformity in nature, the immutability of truth, and a certain degree of metaphysical realism, are all assumptions that scientists make when they endeavour in scientific pursuits. It is unfortunate that the modern person doesn’t realize that all of this at one time had to be investigated and developed.

Imagine you are one of the some of the first anatomically modern homosapiens existing I in Africa during 200,000 BC – some 100,000 years before the last ice age. You live in a wild and cruel world, without technology, without any knowledge of the natural world. How do you know that the objects you see actually exist? If I know something from the past, will it always be true, or will it change eventually? Human experience says seems to indicate the former, but how do they know?

In truth, the scientific method would not have been possible without the Greek, Muslim, and primarily the Christian metaphysicians.

Now we will proceed to the more general category of human intellectual thought, namely philosophy. I will touch on this briefly as I have already gone into some details with the metaphysics. Basically the notion that science has dominion over philosophy in general is in error for the same reasons that it doesn’t have dominion over the metaphysic – philosophy is the study of reality in general, while science is the study of the specifics. You cannot study the specifics without knowledge of the general.

The final point of discussion is the idea that science has dominion over religion. Now I obviously need to explain some things here, so the reader does not interpret what I am saying to mean something that it is not. Science does not have authority over religion in pursuits that are not within its scope. Obviously, any religious person who treks into the scientific domain, and attempts to argue that the earth was created in six days, or that humans have not biologically evolved by lesser primates, or that the universe is only six thousand years old, or that the earth was once effected by a global flood, is going to be thought of as absurd. I think it would be appropriate to quote Aristotle at this time:

“Let this, then, suffice to show (1) that the most indisputable of
all beliefs is that contradictory statements are not at the same time true” Metaphysics Book IV: Aristotle 350BC

Truth cannot contradict truth, and scientific truth will never contradict the truth of the Word through the Spirit. This would make God a trickster, which is a wicked thing to say of God, as Saint Thomas said in Summa Contra Gentiles. This is a notion that Thomas Aquinas so firmly held – as he is responsible for reconciling Aristotelian physics with Christian theology – as it was in danger of being banned due to some erroneous doctrines. Throughout the entire two thousand year teaching of the Church, nothing has come to challenge a de fide teaching. Even the Galileo affair was not a de fide teaching, and after a lesson in prudence, the Church is well prepared to accept any scientific truth that are certain.

Of course we mustn’t jump to even theory that comes our way, but the ones that are established with certainty will not be a problem. How could it be? We preach that Jesus Christ is the Truth!

Now there are notions that science is not able to investigate that are to be left to theological speculation. The question “why does the universe go to all the trouble of existing in the first place?” – Stephen Hawking.

 

[Matthias123]

I believe this is a religious question that cannot be answered by the natural sciences. Many people would disagree – even Hawking himself I am sure – but I personally think that theoretical physicists have become a little bit too prideful. Hence I am not very surprised when people like Atheist philosopher Quentin Smith claim that the universe has no purpose. My response is that the purpose of the universe is not identifiable under the natural sciences, and the notion that the natural sciences can demonstrate a purposeless universe is in error. As science and religion spawn from the same desire – a search for truth – and this truth can be sought and understood in different ways – to claim that one system of reasoning can give us all truth, seems like a kind of intellectual pride.

In conclusion, religion, philosophy and the natural sciences can co-exist peacefully as long as each one remains in its scope of competence. Unfortunately due to human pride I believe that this is an impossible harmony to maintain in perfection. Therefore the observer must be diligent in making sure his information is coming from sources that are competent to come to the conclusions they claim to arrive at.

Any thoughts?

 

[James_S_Saint]

Sounds like a good synopsis of the subject.

I would point out that there is a significant difference in “real scientists” and those you hear from through the media. The media is selective. Real scientists are those who merely attend to their business and don’t go around preaching the meaning of life. They are a very silent majority within Science.

Scientism has its preachers, pastors, prophets, scriptures, robes, emblems, holy rituals, the whole nine yards.

 

[tonyrey]

Scientism is the belief that science can in principle explain reality. Many advocates of scientism are physicalists, i.e. they believe everything is ultimately derived from physical events. Strictly speaking, physicalism is based on the belief that physics explains existence - as is illustrated by the search for a “theory of everything”. But “physical reality” is also used to include living organisms, even though they cannot be explained in terms of physics. The gulf between “organic” and inorganic" has not been bridged.

The basic flaw in scientism is that science can neither explain itself nor the scientists who have created and developed science. As Mathias has pointed out, science is based on ontological and epistemological assumptions - which are intangible and presuppose rational minds with insight and understanding. Not all atheists advocate scientism but they all transform that which is created into that which creates!

 

[warpspeedpetey]

scientism is a self defeating proposition, but in a country where Church and state separation means only science is taught, and philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular are ignored, no wonder it is such a common misconception.

people dont know any better because they are really only exposed to the idea that science can explain everything.

 

[KyivAndrew]

Well I was recently treated to one antitheist’s response to me on one thread that Metaphysics is “irrational pursuit” akin to the older pursuits of alchemy by bright minds? Atheists by and large are believers in materialism, scientism, so how can one even show them the importance of Metaphysics?

By the way, the most egregious example of logical postivisim to scientism in action occurred when people such as Marx believed “scientific socialism” and the study of history using dialectical materialism could create a Paradise on Earth. By grounding everything down in Humanity into Materialism and the “iron laws of the dialectic and scientific socialism”, one quickly comes across the limits applying economic determinism to humanity or morality for that matter. Karl Popper wrote of the Poverty of Historicism though I am less well familiar with his work on the philosophy of science. The point is even “social scientists” can make egregious error in attempting to “scientize” philosophy.

 

[James_S_Saint]

Scientists make really lousy thinkers and philosophers.

Their preachers are even worse.

 

[NowAgnostic]

The doctrine of scientism teaches that science has dominion over all other methods of human intellectual inquiry – whether they are the metaphysics, philosophy, or religion. In addition it requires everyone to be subject to its methodological restrictions.

I do not think you are distinguishing sufficiently between these methods of inquiry considered in themselves and how they are practiced in the real world, by fallible humans. If humans were perfect there would never be any question of “dominion” because there would be no conflict between the various methods. But in the real world metaphysicians, philosophers, and theologians can make mistakes. And then of course science has dominion insofar as these other methods of human intellectual inquiry make empirical predictions which can be supported and confirmed (to a certain degree) or else disproved via the scientific method. If these empirical predictions fail, then something went wrong in the practice of metaphysics, philosophy, or religion by fallible humans. Science can’t say exactly what went wrong, of course, but scientists cannot be expected to and will not “hide” findings unpleasant for philosophers or theologians.

We will first start off with the notion that science has dominion over the metaphysics. I am not a historian of course, but from what I understand this is the result of the positivism in the enlightenment…

Even if positivism is a failed philosophy it wouldn’t show anything about what should have dominion. But what really got this going as far as I can tell is the advent of quantum mechanics in physics, which is really challenging for a “standard” metaphysical understanding of things. You have virtual particles popping in and out of existence, and irreducibly random events (not explained by hidden variables). And yet, quantum electrodynamics is the most accurate theory in science there is.

The scientific method requires observation of a phenomenon, in order to validate a hypothesis by empirical means. Since metaphysics is the study and explanation of reality, it follows that the metaphysics are required for the proper interpretation of the observed phenomenon.

But that’s just the problem - even something as prosaic as the double-slit experiment doesn’t fit nicely with standard metaphysics.

Do these species objectively exist, or do the categories only subjectively exist in his mind? Is there an objective difference between a pigeon and a seagull? Or is it just the mind making distinctions of what is distinctionless?

Interesting questions, but how precisely do the answers impact the science?

It turns out, the traditional view of species has been challenged by the existence of “ring species” - in other words, A can reproduce with B, B can reproduce with C, C can reproduce with D, etc., all the way around until Z can reproduce with A, but A can’t reproduce with M. So are they all the same species or are they not?

Secondly, there are metaphysical assumptions that the entire scientific method relies on.

There are. They are the same metaphysical assumptions that the other disciplines rely on as well. Law of non-contradiction, excluded middle, etc., and the existence of an external world and other minds, etc. These are necessary to have a rational discussion about anything - they have to be assumed.

The uniformity in nature,

Not so. At the quantum level things are random. “Uniformity in nature” occurs at the macro-level after averaging over a lot of quantum events.

the immutability of truth,

Not so. It is possible that scientific laws or constants can change over time. Science need not assume they are always the same, and in fact some have postulated the speed of light was different in the early universe.

and a certain degree of metaphysical realism,

Not so. Science need not assume the real existence of universals.

are all assumptions that scientists make when they endeavour in scientific pursuits.

Well they aren’t.

How do you know that the objects you see actually exist? If I know something from the past, will it always be true, or will it change eventually? Human experience says seems to indicate the former, but how do they know?

In truth, the scientific method would not have been possible without the Greek, Muslim, and primarily the Christian metaphysicians.

I think this a little bit of an exaggeration. It’s true that science makes the assumptions that those objects actually exist. It could have done so without Greek, Muslim, and Christian metaphysicians. These metaphysicians weren’t necessary to make that assumption. It is not a particularly insightful or brilliant one. Moreover, it is still a metaphysical assumption. These metaphysicians never actually succeeded in proving this.

Basically the notion that science has dominion over philosophy in general is in error for the same reasons that it doesn’t have dominion over the metaphysic – philosophy is the study of reality in general, while science is the study of the specifics. You cannot study the specifics without knowledge of the general.

Yes but if supposed “knowledge” of the general conflicts with empirical knowledge of the specifics, then something went wrong in how that “knowledge” was allegedly obtained.

The final point of discussion is the idea that science has dominion over religion… Throughout the entire two thousand year teaching of the Church, nothing has come to challenge a de fide teaching. Even the Galileo affair was not a de fide teaching, and after a lesson in prudence, the Church is well prepared to accept any scientific truth that are certain.

Yes but, what if, hypothetically speaking, something did come to challenge a de fide teaching. And what if the evidence was very strong. Saying “that wouldn’t or couldn’t happen” doesn’t establish what should have dominion in theory. In fact, maintaining that such a thing couldn’t happen because truth can’t contradict truth is tantamount to an admission on your part that in theory science actually should have dominion. You are not a Young Earth Creationist, obviously, but they maintain (some of them anyway) that it simply doesn’t matter what scientific evidence should be brought forth, no matter how strong, the Bible must trump it all.

Now there are notions that science is not able to investigate that are to be left to theological speculation. The question “why does the universe go to all the trouble of existing in the first place?” – Stephen Hawking.

There are certainly some questions science cannot investigate. Science can only investigate questions which make empirical predictions.

 

[Matthias123]

I do not think you are distinguishing sufficiently between these methods of inquiry considered in themselves and how they are practiced in the real world, by fallible humans. If humans were perfect there would never be any question of “dominion” because there would be no conflict between the various methods. But in the real world metaphysicians, philosophers, and theologians can make mistakes. And then of course science has dominion insofar as these other methods of human intellectual inquiry make empirical predictions which can be supported and confirmed (to a certain degree) or else disproved via the scientific method. If these empirical predictions fail, then something went wrong in the practice of metaphysics, philosophy, or religion by fallible humans. Science can’t say exactly what went wrong, of course, but scientists cannot be expected to and will not “hide” findings unpleasant for philosophers or theologians.

Yes I would grant that I have not distinguished between then as much as I should. The dominion over conflicting truths is not what I am really talking about. Obviously if science has established something for certain, then this is going to restrict the metaphysics. Although I would assert if something is metaphysically impossible, then the scientist does not have the right the claim the contrary, with authority. He could claim that his observation seems to suggest the contrary, but I do not believe he should come to the conclusion that the contrary is happening without the metaphysical problem being resolved.

This however is not what I am talking about. My main issue is scientists claiming to have “disproved” certain metaphysical positions that they could not have done. All I am saying is let each subject stay within it’s own scope. Also I have a problem with scientists pushing their method on us. I am not restricted by methodological naturalism, and so I am free to interpret their conclusions in light of this.

Even if positivism is a failed philosophy it wouldn’t show anything about what should have dominion. But what really got this going as far as I can tell is the advent of quantum mechanics in physics, which is really challenging for a “standard” metaphysical understanding of things. You have virtual particles popping in and out of existence, and irreducibly random events (not explained by hidden variables). And yet, quantum electrodynamics is the most accurate theory in science there is.

I would consider it an error for the physicist to claim that his observations suggest that something can come into being without an efficient cause. Fortunately this is not the case! You lack information in your analysis of QM – the particle is popping in and out of existence, but it is not coming out of metaphysical nothingness, it is tunnelling from quantum nothingness, which is actually something, but it is so void that we call it nothing. The Copenhagen interpretation of QM does cause some problems, but I do not believe that this is the best interpretation.

But that’s just the problem - even something as prosaic as the double-slit experiment doesn’t fit nicely with standard metaphysics.

I really don’t see how this has anything to do with science having dominion over the metaphysics. The natural sciences don’t understand this completely either.

Interesting questions, but how precisely do the answers impact the science?

It turns out, the traditional view of species has been challenged by the existence of “ring species” - in other words, A can reproduce with B, B can reproduce with C, C can reproduce with D, etc., all the way around until Z can reproduce with A, but A can’t reproduce with M. So are they all the same species or are they not?

It impacts the natural sciences because ones interpretation of observation is dependant on ones metaphysical view. This is most evident, as you demonstrated above, in QM.
I do not know enough metaphysics in this particular topic to give you an answer. I think you misunderstand though; there is nothing wrong with science restricting metaphysics, just as there is nothing wrong with the metaphysics restricting the natural sciences. As long as each means of reasoning are ruling in one’s area of competency we will have harmony.

Not so. At the quantum level things are random. “Uniformity in nature” occurs at the macro-level after averaging over a lot of quantum events.

I believe you are in error my friend. When I say uniformity in nature, I am saying that truth is immutable. We know they are random, but one cannot say that at the quantum level truth changes, likewise we cannot say at the quantum level that we cannot take what we learnt and apply them to the future.

Granted that due to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, we cannot predict where the particle will end up, due to the fact that as soon as we try to calculate the velocity of the particle, we loose track of the momentum, and vice versa. So yes, some things do break down, but truth does not. (Yes I know I was refering to the same thing twice – poor writing, shoot me )

Not so. It is possible that scientific laws or constants can change over time. Science need not assume they are always the same, and in fact some have postulated the speed of light was different in the early universe.

This is true, but this is not what I am referring to. I am saying that the knowledge of the early universe is not going to change because truth is the past changes on its own. For example, nobody is going to believe that at some point in time, the objective truth that dinosaurs existed might eventually change.

Not so. Science need not assume the real existence of universals.

I am not talking about universals. I am not an exaggerated realist either. I am talking about the objects that they see objectively existing, and not just in the mind.

 

[Matthias123]

Yes but, what if, hypothetically speaking, something did come to challenge a de fide teaching. And what if the evidence was very strong. Saying “that wouldn’t or couldn’t happen” doesn’t establish what should have dominion in theory. In fact, maintaining that such a thing couldn’t happen because truth can’t contradict truth is tantamount to an admission on your part that in theory science actually should have dominion. You are not a Young Earth Creationist, obviously, but they maintain (some of them anyway) that it simply doesn’t matter what scientific evidence should be brought forth, no matter how strong, the Bible must trump it all.

Because my metaphysical views, and theological convictions I do not believe this is possible. We will talk if this actually occurs one day, otherwise it really doesn’t matter.

To sum everything up, I really like your post, and I agree with most of it, but I think that we are talking about different things. I take the blame, as I could have been clearer when writing.

Pax et bonum

 

[Matthias123]

I said above you are in error in regards to uniformity in nature. You are not in error; I was in error because of poor writing. Please disregard that statement.

 

[MindOverMatter]

Not so. It is possible that scientific laws or constants can change over time. Science need not assume they are always the same, and in fact some have postulated the speed of light was different in the early universe.

I am really struggling to understand why you would express this particular response in regards to the question of immutable truth?

Not so. Science need not assume the real existence of universals.

Why?

Yes but if supposed “knowledge” of the general conflicts with empirical knowledge of the specifics, then something went wrong in how that “knowledge” was allegedly obtained.

Do you not agree that there is more to science then empirical observation, such as “interpretation”? For instance; when trying to find a valid method of interpreting empirical evidence, does one not require a “meta-science”, or rather, “metaphysics”?

In fact, maintaining that such a thing couldn’t happen because truth can’t contradict truth is tantamount to an admission on your part that in theory science actually should have dominion.

Why?

 

[Matthias123]

Yes but if supposed “knowledge” of the general conflicts with empirical knowledge of the specifics, then something went wrong in how that “knowledge” was allegedly obtained.

If there are philosophical problems concerning the activity of the whole, describing in details how the parts work, will not resolve these issues.

Consider the problem that humanity has with killing each other. This problem is not going to be resolved by looking at a part of humanity, says China, even if China is what is causing humanity to kill each other. This is because without looking at the whole, one cannot ascertain and isolate which particular part is causing the problem. Therefore one is either forced to look at the whole objectively, or forced to evaluate each individual part and come to a conclusion through the process of elimination, thus still observing the whole, just not at once. Even if you ascertain the problem in more specific detail, the problem still obviously exists on the lower levels. Now let’s make this relevant, and apply this to the philosophy of the mind. There is a metaphysical problem when it comes to the nature of the idea. If the idea is made out of matter, we wouldn’t be able to know matter because the idea would be made up of what we are trying to know. Therefore the idea in the mind must not be material, it must be immaterial. Then you get the problem of how the mind can know itself et cetera. This is not going to be resolved by looking at a particular part, as the problem that exists in the general is still going to exist at the lower levels. So unless the problem at the highest level can be resolved, there is going to be no resolution to the problem

This is why it is so critical to have a proper understanding of being, otherwise, as Aristotle warns; you are going to come to radically different conclusions.

In contrast, with bottom up explanatory models, the person is attempting to gain a picture of objective reality through his pursuits. The metaphysician starts with reality and moves downward.

So if a particle physicist’s science results in a really distorted picture of reality, I do not think it would be unreasonable to suggest he has failed, unless there is an overwhelming amount of evidence to suggest otherwise.

 

[Matthias123]

I am not sure if I made my self clear enough in my last post, so I would like to give another example:

Say I am a computer technician attempting to troubleshoot a computer system. When I try to start up the computer (whole) nothing happens.

Now let’s compare the top down methodology of metaphysics with the bottom up of the mechanistic natural sciences:

Now in order to troubleshoot the computer I need to deal with the whole. I need to consider all the parts in the computer and try to determine which part is the problem. I can, right away rule out some parts that would not cause this phenomenon. The floppy drive for instance is not going to normally cause this problem. Therefore I narrow it down to parts like the PSU, like the PSU and motherboard. After examining these parts I determine that the reason for the computer not booting is a faulting Power Supply Unit. Now even though I came to the conclusion evaluating parts, I still ultimately came to the conclusion from the whole. For without ruling out other parts I would not have been able to determine that the PSU was the sole cause of the problem. It is true that there are occasions when you wouldn’t check the other parts because you think it is unlikely that they would be causing the problem, but when you do this you cease to operate on pure reason.

Now a person using a bottom up explanatory method would first look at all the parts, and then determine that since the Power Supply is faulty, that if turned on the computer will not start up. Now let’s say for example that the person examining the parts says that because there is a problem with the RAM, the computer will not POST. However when the user turns on the computer it does POST, and there is no problem. Who are we to trust? The machine obviously POSTs fine on the upper level (user level) so we must conclude that the person who asserted that there was a problem with the memory and that it wouldn’t POST is in error.

 

[NowAgnostic]

I am really struggling to understand why you would express this particular response in regards to the question of immutable truth?

Because I didn’t understand exactly what was being referred to. Past truths can’t change, I’ll certainly agree with that insofar as they reference the past; however, physical laws and constants can theoretically change, true in the past, different today.

Why?

Because it doesn’t make a bit of difference to science whether classifications represent real essences which individual members instantiate or whether these classifications are present only in the mind, there being no such thing as universal essences instantiated by more than one object. We need not worry about whether the “seagull” is an essence (a universal), or merely a human classification, to do the science. As long as a “seagull” is well defined, we can verify or disprove predictions about them.

Do you not agree that there is more to science then empirical observation, such as “interpretation”? For instance; when trying to find a valid method of interpreting empirical evidence, does one not require a “meta-science”, or rather, “metaphysics”?

I do not agree. Science is only concerned with whether data supports a given hypothesis. Thus, science deals with likelihoods. The tools of inductive reasoning come into play here, which are strictly mathematical. Metaphysics may indeed play a role in our deciding which hypotheses we are going to test. However, this comes prior to observation, not after it. Metaphysics has no role in interpretation of the evidence as to whether the hypothesis is supported or not.

Yet, there is a paradox in the scientific method (induction). Bayes’ theorem shows that no matter how skeptical one is of a given truth initially, there can be enough evidence to convince him; nevertheless, no matter how much evidence there is, there may still be a very hardened skeptic not convinced.

Why?

Because otherwise, such a thing could happen, if religion and theology are supposed to be completely impervious to any and all empirical evidence. Now some Protestant groups say this, because they believe there can be a divide between faith and reason, but in Catholicism it has to be admitted that in theory (hypothetically speaking) there could be enough empirical evidence against it to make faith unreasonable. Let’s say a long-lost writing of St. Paul turned up, of which the authenticity be hardly be doubted, let’s say there was as much evidence to substantiate its authenticity as his Epistles or more, and in it he says he made up the whole story of his conversion on the road to Damascus and subsequent events. Or, let’s say that very, very strong scientific evidence turned up that the universe was in fact eternal. Or, I can think of many other things. The point is that if you admit that in the presence of such evidence one should abandon Catholicism, then science should have “dominion”; if not, faith can be unreasonable, also contrary to Catholicism and so one would be believing a contradiction. The claim that such evidence will never be observed because truth can’t contradict truth is an agreement to the previous sentence; otherwise, why shouldn’t such evidence be found?

 

[NowAgnostic]

Yes I would grant that I have not distinguished between then as much as I should. The dominion over conflicting truths is not what I am really talking about. Obviously if science has established something for certain, then this is going to restrict the metaphysics. Although I would assert if something is metaphysically impossible, then the scientist does not have the right the claim the contrary, with authority. He could claim that his observation seems to suggest the contrary, but I do not believe he should come to the conclusion that the contrary is happening without the metaphysical problem being resolved.

If the scientist has directly observed the contrary happening then he can flatly say the metaphysician who said such a thing was “impossible” is wrong. Even if the contrary is not directly observed, but only inductively inferred, he can still take the metaphysician’s view as a hypothesis which can be tested, insofar as it makes a prediction, and evaluate it on that basis, and find it highly unlikely, which is what “disproved” means in science most often.

This however is not what I am talking about. My main issue is scientists claiming to have “disproved” certain metaphysical positions that they could not have done. All I am saying is let each subject stay within it’s own scope.

And I am saying that when metaphysics makes empirical predictions it moves over into the domain of empirical science, and cannot expect to insulate itself from the scientific method and verification or disproof.

Also I have a problem with scientists pushing their method on us. I am not restricted by methodological naturalism, and so I am free to interpret their conclusions in light of this.

Science isn’t restricted by methodological “naturalism” either, although the definition of “naturalism” is somewhat hazy. Science can entertain as a hypothesis, for instance, that angels are pushing the planets and stars around.

I would consider it an error for the physicist to claim that his observations suggest that something can come into being without an efficient cause. Fortunately this is not the case!

Yes, it is the case.

You lack information in your analysis of QM – the particle is popping in and out of existence, but it is not coming out of metaphysical nothingness, it is tunnelling from quantum nothingness, which is actually something, but it is so void that we call it nothing.

The “quantum nothingness” makes the event possible, yes. That doesn’t mean that “quantum nothingness” can be in any sense held to be an efficient cause without changing the meaning of the term as metaphysicians understand it. It is an irreducibly random event, as best as we can tell. Local hidden variable theories have been disproven. An irreducibly random event can have no “cause”. Or, to use more metaphysical language, yes, the quantum vacuum provides the potency for a virtual particle to arise, but it does not provide the act, the potency’s reduction to act appears out of nowhere, unexplained and uncaused.

The Copenhagen interpretation of QM does cause some problems, but I do not believe that this is the best interpretation.

Yeah, but come on, all interpretations of QM cause some problems.

I really don’t see how this has anything to do with science having dominion over the metaphysics. The natural sciences don’t understand this completely either.

Well the natural sciences can just say, we don’t know, but shut up and calculate. But the metaphysics will say a particle is supposed to have a definite place and a definite velocity, and it should not matter whether we bother to measure it or not.

It impacts the natural sciences because ones interpretation of observation is dependant on ones metaphysical view. This is most evident, as you demonstrated above, in QM. I do not know enough metaphysics in this particular topic to give you an answer. I think you misunderstand though; there is nothing wrong with science restricting metaphysics, just as there is nothing wrong with the metaphysics restricting the natural sciences. As long as each means of reasoning are ruling in one’s area of competency we will have harmony.

I disagree, and let’s not equivocate on “interpretation”. The “interpretation” of observation in the natural sciences is analysis of whether a given hypothesis is supported or disproven. This is done via mathematics, not dependent on one’s metaphysical view. Now of course we have the Copenhagen “interpretation” of QM, the many-worlds “interpretation” of QM, etc., this is not what I mean by “interpretation”; these are not scientific interpretations.

Now I would ask do you agree that a metaphysical prediction can be falsified using the scientific method?

This is true, but this is not what I am referring to. I am saying that the knowledge of the early universe is not going to change because truth is the past changes on its own. For example, nobody is going to believe that at some point in time, the objective truth that dinosaurs existed might eventually change.

I agree with this.

I am not talking about universals. I am not an exaggerated realist either. I am talking about the objects that they see objectively existing, and not just in the mind.

This is a metaphysical assumption science must make, along with the other disciplines, yes.

 

[Matthias123]

If the scientist has directly observed the contrary happening then he can flatly say the metaphysician who said such a thing was “impossible” is wrong. Even if the contrary is not directly observed, but only inductively inferred, he can still take the metaphysician’s view as a hypothesis which can be tested, insofar as it makes a prediction, and evaluate it on that basis, and find it highly unlikely, which is what “disproved” means in science most often.

Well it looks like this is where we part ways because I disagree. One’s metaphysical view is directly relevant to the observation phase of the scientific method. I would even be so bold to assert that the observation is interpreted through metaphysics. This is what John Polkinghorne has been saying for a while now. I would assert that since the observation phase of the scientific method is restricted by metaphysics, I would claim that the scientist is not interpreting his observation correctly. I am really disappointed that you do not see this distinction.

And I am saying that when metaphysics makes empirical predictions it moves over into the domain of empirical science, and cannot expect to insulate itself from the scientific method and verification or disproof.

Super duper, I agree. I am referring to claims such as “science has disproved the soul through the Law of Conservation of Energy!” Which is completely absurd, because the Law of Conservation of Energy is a physical law, and has no implication to the immaterial. I am talking about scientists ruling oustide of their competancy. As soon as science starts to try to push its way into the spiritual domain, we have scientism.

Again, if metaphysics can ascertain something for certain, then I assert that the scientist does not have the right to claim otherwise, but rather conclude that he has not interpreted his observations correctly. If science can ascertain something for certain, the metaphysician is restricted by it.

Science isn’t restricted by methodological “naturalism” either, although the definition of “naturalism” is somewhat hazy. Science can entertain as a hypothesis, for instance, that angels are pushing the planets and stars around.

It is usually part the method. The only exception I can think of is sciences relating to the mind.

Yes, it is the case.

The “quantum nothingness” makes the event possible, yes. That doesn’t mean that “quantum nothingness” can be in any sense held to be an efficient cause without changing the meaning of the term as metaphysicians understand it. It is an irreducibly random event, as best as we can tell. Local hidden variable theories have been disproven. An irreducibly random event can have no “cause”. Or, to use more metaphysical language, yes, the quantum vacuum provides the potency for a virtual particle to arise, but it does not provide the act, the potency’s reduction to act appears out of nowhere, unexplained and uncaused.

You are in error; the virtual particles appearing in a perfect vacuum are caused by vacuum fluctuation.

To borrow an illustration from Quentin Smith:

                   -5     -4     -3     -2     -1     |     1     2     3     4     5

Here is your causality.

In this spontaneous emergence of particles, three particles appear and they destroy each other simultaneously.

Yeah, but come on, all interpretations of QM cause some problems.

Which is why the motto for the alternative theories are “Shut up and calculate!”

Well the natural sciences can just say, we don’t know, but shut up and calculate. But the metaphysics will say a particle is supposed to have a definite place and a definite velocity, and it should not matter whether we bother to measure it or not.

There is a difference between not being able to observe it and predict it, and not having it.

I disagree, and let’s not equivocate on “interpretation”. The “interpretation” of observation in the natural sciences is analysis of whether a given hypothesis is supported or disproven. This is done via mathematics, not dependent on one’s metaphysical view…

So we study dolphins with numbers now? Do we observe chemical reactions with calculators? Even in physics you don’t completely use mathematics. I must disagree with you,

Now I would ask do you agree that a metaphysical prediction can be falsified using the scientific method?

If someone has a metaphysical prediction that is in the realm of science then there is a problem. Hence the term meta (beyond) physics.

 

[Matthias123]

Catholicism it has to be admitted that in theory (hypothetically speaking) there could be enough empirical evidence against it to make faith unreasonable. Let’s say a long-lost writing of St. Paul turned up, of which the authenticity be hardly be doubted, let’s say there was as much evidence to substantiate its authenticity as his Epistles or more, and in it he says he made up the whole story of his conversion on the road to Damascus and subsequent events. Or, let’s say that very, very strong scientific evidence turned up that the universe was in fact eternal. Or, I can think of many other things. The point is that if you admit that in the presence of such evidence one should abandon Catholicism, then science should have “dominion”; if not, faith can be unreasonable, also contrary to Catholicism and so one would be believing a contradiction. The claim that such evidence will never be observed because truth can’t contradict truth is an agreement to the previous sentence; otherwise, why shouldn’t such evidence be found?

It is more likely that the Church would admit she overstepped her authority when she decreed Papal Infallibility.

 

[Matthias123]

I erred above, that is the wrong illustration.

 

[JDaniel]

If the scientist has directly observed the contrary happening then he can flatly say the metaphysician who said such a thing was “impossible” is wrong. Even if the contrary is not directly observed, but only inductively inferred, he can still take the metaphysician’s view as a hypothesis which can be tested, insofar as it makes a prediction, and evaluate it on that basis, and find it highly unlikely, which is what “disproved” means in science most often.

In other words, you’re saying that the scientists hold all of the cards even though they cannot prove conclusively that the metaphysician is wrong? Simply by making a “postulation?” This cannot be so. If it is so, then ANYTHING can be postulated by anyone who calls himself a scientist. Does that make any sense?

And I am saying that when metaphysics makes empirical predictions it moves over into the domain of empirical science, and cannot expect to insulate itself from the scientific method and verification or disproof.

Can you provide an example?

Science isn’t restricted by methodological “naturalism” either, although the definition of “naturalism” is somewhat hazy. Science can entertain as a hypothesis, for instance, that angels are pushing the planets and stars around.

Again, it would appear that you are saying that the scientist is somehow judge and jury. He can do whatever he wants, right or wrong. Does that seem OK with you?

The “quantum nothingness” makes the event possible, yes. That doesn’t mean that “quantum nothingness” can be in any sense held to be an efficient cause without changing the meaning of the term as metaphysicians understand it.

Metaphysicians actually don’t deal with the subject you mention in the way you think. That subject is dealt with by those who study science down to and at its most general level. This more general science of nature studies mobile being, which is different than the study of immobile being. Metaphysics relinquishes from its considerations any reference to matter whatsoever. The metaphysician’s typical questions are, “what is being, or substance, or cause, or act, or relation.” Such questions apply to all being. They need not exist in matter. In fact, they could exist if there were no matter at all. Metaphysics is the science of being as being period. Now, as a science it studies the cause of its subject, which is being.

So, how can “quantum nothingness” not be considered to be an efficient cause? - not that I am agreeing that it is. Just for my erudition.

It is an irreducibly random event, as best as we can tell. Local hidden variable theories have been disproven. An irreducibly random event can have no “cause”.

Why?

Or, to use more metaphysical [natural philosophy] language, yes, the quantum vacuum provides the potencyfor a virtual particle to arise,

How?

but it does not provide the act, the potency’s reduction to act appears out of nowhere, unexplained and uncaused.

I don’t believe that is possible.

Well the natural sciences can just say, we don’t know, but shut up and calculate. But the metaphysics will say a particle is supposed to have a definite place and a definite velocity, and it should not matter whether we bother to measure it or not.

Once again, it is not the metaphysician you are talking about, so, why would a metaphysician speak to that? Unless, he is more than a “metaphysican”.

I disagree, and let’s not equivocate on “interpretation”. The “interpretation” of observation in the natural sciences is analysis of whether a given hypothesis is supported or disproven.

I agree.

This is done via mathematics, not dependent on one’s metaphysical view.

True, mathematics, induction, deduction, and empirical experimentation. The only problem with mathematics is that it is conceptual rather than empirical. The only problem with induction is that it must rely of other grounding, it is not something self-evident from the hypothesis. Deduction is hard to achieve for most science, and experimentation has is potential host of problems.

Now I would ask do you agree that a metaphysical prediction can be falsified using the scientific method?

How? They deal with different subjects. since when does science deal with immobile being as being?

jd