T
Touchstone
Guest
Right. I don’t see any basis for such an ontological necessity either. But it’s enough to point out that this is how the argument must justify itself – not on historical-evidential terms, but as the preferred choice in an “anything goes” universe, “anything goes” because it is controlled and instantiated by the impassible will of deity.we cannot explain the plain fact of existence of the universe apart from G-d. it is a necessary part of any explanatory chain. i dont think that occam, a Catholic himself, would find the parsimony of ontological beings to exclude G-d. when russel did it, he simply ignored the ontological necessity of a Creator.
Which is to say, parsimony goes out the window. If Gd, then anything, and there’s no basis for prefering economy in explanations when we don’t feel like it, especially when we find “God did it” appealing.
That’s a non-sequitur on multiple levels. Even if an ontological argument of some kind obtains (which is quite a concession from me, there), it does not follow that YHWH is real, or in anyway connected with that necessary being. It certainly does not follow that YHWH is that because of prophecies, which, as I said, are much more efficiently explained by mundane, natural causes.so when we posit G-d as a cause of the Messianic Prophecies, we posit a necessary being.
What you have, as I understand it is something like this:
- Something exists, therefore Necessary Being. (insert ontological argument details here)
- Necessary Being, therefore Yahweh.
- Yahweh, therefore prophecy is fulfilled as an explanation of claims.
-TS