On the Goodness of God

[Charlemagne_II]

Does the existence of human and animal suffering prove that either there is no God, or that if there is a God, God is malevolent rather than benevolent?

 

[Pieman333272]

No, all it proves is that this is not the best of all possible worlds.

 

[Spock]

Does the existence of human and animal suffering prove that either there is no God, or that if there is a God, God is malevolent rather than benevolent?

Let’s concentrate on the animal suffering due to natural causes. It does not “prove” that God does not exist. It does not “prove” that God is malevolent. It only proves that we have no reason to assume that God is benevolent. It “proves” that God is either indifferent or malevolent.

Reasons:

1. God is supposed to be benevolent and loving his creation (not just humans, but animals, too).
2. Benevolent means to act in someone else’s best interest.
3. To be burned in a wildfire or be drowned in a tsunami cannot be in the animals’ best interest - since they cannot be rewarded for this suffering either in this life or in a hypothesized afterlife. Their suffering does not add one iota to our “free will” (if that is stipulated to be some “greater good”).
4. Therefore God is not benevolent.

This syllogism is valid. Is it also “sound”? It is, unless you can deny any of its prermises. If you can show that one of the three premises is invalid, the syllogism will be logically valid, but unsound. Go for it.

 

[GreggAlvarez]

Reasons:

1. God is supposed to be benevolent and loving his creation (not just humans, but animals, too).
2. Benevolent means to act in someone else’s best interest.
3. To be burned in a wildfire or be drowned in a tsunami cannot be in the animals’ best interest - since they cannot be rewarded for this suffering either in this life or in a hypothesized afterlife. Their suffering does not add one iota to our “free will” (if that is stipulated to be some “greater good”).
4. Therefore God is not benevolent.

This syllogism is valid. Is it also “sound”? It is, unless you can deny any of its prermises. If you can show that one of the three premises is invalid, the syllogism will be logically valid, but unsound. Go for it.

The syllogism is valid, but not sound.

Premise 3 is unwarranted: It assumes that God did those things. If you take into the Christian view of God, WE (Adam and Eve) caused the distortion of nature. I would also assume that most wildfires are caused by idiots. Only humans are capable of that. Of course, we cannot discuss that with you because you already disagree with even the idea that God does not exist.

Premise 4 is therefore unwarranted

 

[GreggAlvarez]

Let’s concentrate on the animal suffering due to natural causes. It does not “prove” that God does not exist. It does not “prove” that God is malevolent. It only proves that we have no reason to assume that God is benevolent. It “proves” that God is either indifferent or malevolent.

Last two sentences are not proven.

 

[danserr]

Let’s concentrate on the animal suffering due to natural causes. It does not “prove” that God does not exist. It does not “prove” that God is malevolent. It only proves that we have no reason to assume that God is benevolent. It “proves” that God is either indifferent or malevolent.

Reasons:

1. God is supposed to be benevolent and loving his creation (not just humans, but animals, too).
2. Benevolent means to act in someone else’s best interest.
3. To be burned in a wildfire or be drowned in a tsunami cannot be in the animals’ best interest - since they cannot be rewarded for this suffering either in this life or in a hypothesized afterlife. Their suffering does not add one iota to our “free will” (if that is stipulated to be some “greater good”).
4. Therefore God is not benevolent.

This syllogism is valid. Is it also “sound”? It is, unless you can deny any of its prermises. If you can show that one of the three premises is invalid, the syllogism will be logically valid, but unsound. Go for it.

Logical versions of the problem of evil and not typically regarded as very compelling today, even by most atheist philosophers. Premise three is flawed because it is possible that “God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing the existence of suffering.” As long as this is even possibly true the argument is invalid.

 

[PAboy57]

As far as the animal world I’ll go out on a limb and say survival of the fittest is the general rule of thumb. If man in involved in unneccesary suffering that is a different story. Also tsunamies don’t happen all that often. Survival of the fittest ensures good healthy species in which man has domain.

Man’s misuse of his free will is a significant cause for the unneccesary suffering of others. People that suffer from disease, not brought about by their own behavior, has nothing to do with the kindness of God. Maybe their parents contributed in one form or another. Maybe they are to use their suffering to help others. Regardless, their suffering will be used in some way for eventual good.

God is not mean but will punish his beloved children sometimes to make a point and change behavior to the better. Similar to the parent and child relationship.

I agree with Pieman and added a couple of thoughts. We should instead find ways to thank God for everything he has given us while on earth. Offering prayer is a start.

God Bless.

 

[Spock]

The syllogism is not valid.

Premise 3 is unwarranted: It assumes that God did those things. If you take into the Christian view of God, WE (Adam and Eve) caused the distortion of nature. I would also assume that most wildfires are caused by idiots. Only humans are capable of that. Of course, we cannot discuss that with you because you already disagree with even the idea that God does not exist.

Premise 4 is therefore unwarranted

I see your objection. No, I do not assume that God created the wildfires and the tsunamis, they are caused by poor “Mizz Mother Nature”. He merely allowed them. In other words he failed to act to prevent them. Some wildfires are indeed caused by idiots, but some are caused by lightnings. Tsunamis are definitely not caused by humans, diseases are not caused by humans. And the so-called "original sin had only one effect: It made God angry and God cursed his creation. To say that the disobedience of Adam and Eve caused the distortion of nature is a distortion of what happened (allegedly!). I don’t know if Genesis is supposed to be taken literally or allegorically (I have no information of a church dogma on the subject), but one thing is certain: a disobedience to a command does not carry an effect of “distortion” of natural laws.

So my syllogism still stands.

 

[Spock]

Premise three is flawed because it is possible that “God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing the existence of suffering.” As long as this is even possibly true the argument is invalid.

To say that from “it is possible that ‘A’ is true” it follows that “therefore ‘A’ is true” is not even logically valid.

 

[danserr]

To say that from “it is possible that ‘A’ is true” it follows that “therefore ‘A’ is true” is not even logically valid.

I’m afraid you misunderstand my point badly. I did not say “it is possible that God has moral reasons to allow suffering therefore he does.” You misunderstand me badly here. I am simply showing why the vast majority of philosophers regard deductive arguments from evil such as you have made, as invalid.

You essentially tried to argue that the existence of a good God and the existence of suffering are a logical contradiction. “1. If God were good, he would not allow suffering.” 2. Suffering exists, 3. so a good God does not."
I reply that “God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing the existence of evil.” As long as this is even possibly true, then your argument is invalid. This shows that the existence of God and suffering are not openly contradictory as your argument claims.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

If God exists and is said to be malevolent because of human and animal suffering, why does God also produce animal and human pleasures … sometimes even ecstacies? Wouldn’t a malevolent god produce only pain and no pleasure. Wouldn’t a malevolent God see to it that pain, not pleasure, was the predominant experience of life. And perhaps even the only experience of life? Whereas it appears in fact that at least for most people there is considerably more pleasure to be found in life than pain.

Spock’s remarks from the William Lane Craig thread:

I have a great peace of mind. I have a lot of joy. I am happy as I can be. I overflow with love for my wife and family. There is almost nothing that I would “wish” to have that I do not have. (Well, I would love to live as long as I get tired of living, but that is not possible, so it does not bother me.)

If there is a God, would you still say He is malevolent?

 

[Spock]

You essentially tried to argue that the existence of a good God and the existence of suffering are a logical contradiction. “1. If God were good, he would not allow suffering.” 2. Suffering exists, 3. so a good God does not."

No, most emphatically no! I did not say that God’s supposed benevolence contradicts any and all sufferings. It is possible that some sufferings are morally justifyable. I said that the suffering of the animals due to natural causes cannot be justified. And that is because there is no possible “greater good” which can emerge from these sufferings. The animals themselves cannot benefit - which is obvious. If you wish to argue that there is some auxiliary benefit which would “justify” that suffering, which cannot be achieved without that suffering, and which more than compensates for the suffering, and which suffering cannot be lessened without losing that benefit → I am all ears (as Ross Perot used to say ). Go and spell it out for me. But to say that “there might be such a benefit, which we don’t know about” simply does not cut it. It would be an argument from ignorance, which is a boring fallacy.

I reply that “God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing the existence of evil.” As long as this is even possibly true, then your argument is invalid.

First, it is just a bare assertion. Second you commit the same logical error saying “if it is possible, then it is valid” - which is still a fallacy.

 

[danserr]

First, it is just a bare assertion. Second you commit the same logical error saying “if it is possible, then it is valid” - which is still a fallacy.

You insist on misunderstanding me. I did not say that “if possible, therefore true.” My point is not to “prove” a separate argument as you seem to think, I am only pointing why your argument is invalid. I am not saying “if possible, then valid,” I am saying “if possible, yours in invalid.”

I will give a comparable example.

1. Jesus is liar, lunatic, or God.
2. He is not a liar or lunatic
3. he is God.

This argument fails because there is another possibility, namely that Jesus is legend. As long as this is even possibly true, then the argument is invalid. The burden is not on the skeptic to prove that Jesus is legend, as long as that is even possibly true, then the argument is invalid. That is the situation with your argument. As long as it is even possible true that “God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing suffering” then a logical version of the problem of evil fails

 

[Spock]

If there is a God, would you still say He is malevolent?

I did not say this. I said that God is either indifferent or malevolent. I do agree that there is a lot of pleasure in our life, which would indicate that God is NOT malevolent. Though it is possible that a really malevolent being would allow some temporary joy, in order to make the following “bad stuff” even more devastating. There is nothing as cruel as giving false hope. So the conclusion is that God is probably indifferent and possibly malevolent. I would bet on indifferent.

 

[Spock]

You insist on misunderstanding me. I did not say that “if possible, therefore true.” My point is not to “prove” a separate argument as you seem to think, I am only pointing why your argument is invalid. I am not saying “if possible, then valid,” I am saying “if possible, yours in invalid.”

I will give a comparable example.

1. Jesus is liar, lunatic, or God.
2. He is not a liar or lunatic
3. he is God.

This argument fails because there is another possibility, namely that Jesus is legend. As long as this is even possibly true, then the argument is invalid. The burden is not on the skeptic to prove that Jesus is legend, as long as that is even possibly true, then the argument is invalid. That is the situation with your argument. As long as it is even possible true that “God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing suffering” then a logical version of the problem of evil fails

Thanks for the clarification. I apologize for not understanding you before. If I understand you correctly now, you say that my #3 point is deficient, since I did not allow for the possibility that there is a “morally justifyable” reason for God to allow the animal suffering - just like the skeptic who points out that “legend” is another possibility next to the others.

I see what you meant (if I correctly understand you now). The trouble is that I agree that the “legend” is a viable option, but I see no argument that the animal suffering is “morally justifyable”. Would you give me some arguments for this? I accept that a suffering is morally justifyable under some very specific circumstances: to wit,

1. if the suffering leads to some “greater good”, which cannot be achieved without the suffering, and
2. if the suffering is logically necessary to this greater good, and
3. the suffering cannot be lessened, because lessening it would lose the geater good, and
4. the sufferer must be the recipient of this greater good.

I wonder if you might disagree with #4 here. My position is that to cause suffering to entity “A” so that entity “B” will reap some benefits cannot be justified - as a generic principle. (If that would be case then you could justify to forcefully extact a kidney for form unwilling person to transplant it into someone else to save his life.) I don’t think that causing suffering to an animal can be justified if a human would gain some greater good - as a generic principle. If that would be true, then causing suffering to some laboratory animals to get a better cosmetic material could be justified. Maybe you think so, I don’t know. If you do not agree with this generic principle, but you say that in the specific example of burning in a wildfire (or drowning in a tsunami) the suffering of the animals is morally justifyable, then you must give a specific reason why it is morally justifyable, not just say that it “may be” morally justifyable.

 

[ConstantineTG]

Does the existence of human and animal suffering prove that either there is no God, or that if there is a God, God is malevolent rather than benevolent?

Suffering is a product of our own sin, of our own doing by separating ourselves from God through sin. It is a product of our free will, we chose to be away from God and thus we suffer.

 

[GreggAlvarez]

I see your objection. No, I do not assume that God created the wildfires and the tsunamis, they are caused by poor “Mizz Mother Nature”. He merely allowed them. In other words he failed to act to prevent them. Some wildfires are indeed caused by idiots, but some are caused by lightnings. Tsunamis are definitely not caused by humans, diseases are not caused by humans. And the so-called "original sin had only one effect: It made God angry and God cursed his creation. To say that the disobedience of Adam and Eve caused the distortion of nature is a distortion of what happened (allegedly!). I don’t know if Genesis is supposed to be taken literally or allegorically (I have no information of a church dogma on the subject), but one thing is certain: a disobedience to a command does not carry an effect of “distortion” of natural laws.

To allow does not equal failure to prevent. That is a very negative definition of a positive word. I would have been fine with Him just “allowing” it. That is perfectly acceptable (for me). And whether or not Genesis is to be taken literally or allegorically, the lesson is still an explanation which (I believe, obviously) that Adam, as having dominion over Creation, has cursed it himself by being disobedient to his Creator. A ruler over something is the one who calls the shots for his land. But, I digress. This is obviously a moot point considering the stuff that is needless to say.

And I disagree with that last part. I obviously believe it does, especially when it comes to a king (Adam) have authority over his kingdom (Creation). For me, I have to consider this when talking about the problem of evil.

In any case, my main objection that we can both consider without any prior assumptions is the word “allow”. I disagree that it can be put in such words as these: “he failed to act to prevent them.” I prefer “to let happen” for simplicity, instead of “failure to act upon”. Now, of course, we have to agree on a definition. We have had problems with that before. Any ideas?

So my syllogism still stands.

Not anymore.

 

[GreggAlvarez]

I did not say this. I said that God is either indifferent or malevolent. I do agree that there is a lot of pleasure in our life, which would indicate that God is NOT malevolent. Though it is possible that a really malevolent being would allow some temporary joy, in order to make the following “bad stuff” even more devastating. There is nothing as cruel as giving false hope. So the conclusion is that God is probably indifferent and possibly malevolent. I would bet on indifferent.

Or being benevolent. This is my conclusion

 

[GreggAlvarez]

I wonder if you might disagree with #4 here. My position is that to cause suffering to entity “A” so that entity “B” will reap some benefits cannot be justified - as a generic principle. (If that would be case then you could justify to forcefully extact a kidney for form unwilling person to transplant it into someone else to save his life.) I don’t think that causing suffering to an animal can be justified if a human would gain some greater good - as a generic principle. If that would be true, then causing suffering to some laboratory animals to get a better cosmetic material could be justified. Maybe you think so, I don’t know. If you do not agree with this generic principle, but you say that in the specific example of burning in a wildfire (or drowning in a tsunami) the suffering of the animals is morally justifyable, then you must give a specific reason why it is morally justifyable, not just say that it “may be” morally justifyable.

Do you really consider “a better cosmetic material” a greater good? I hope not… For your sake…

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Spock

*I would bet on indifferent. *

The vast majority of mankind want to live and look forward to the fulfillment of their desires. This is your own experience of life, isn’t it? If God was indifferent to the welfare of mankind, why would He create them with a lust for life? Why wouldn’t they be just as indifferent to living as He is to creating?