On the Immortality of the Soul

[Skeptic92]

Can it be demonstrated that the soul does indeed survive after death, and doesn’t cease to exist? Note: I am not interested in Theological Arguments, theologically the immortality of the Soul is a given via revelation- I am after a purely Philosophical argument. So if you need to quote scripture, and Church documents- you’re doing it wrong.

Also:

If the soul can be held to subsist after death, how is the soul individuated? For in the classical metaphysics it is matter which individuates the form/soul, how can the soul be individuated if it is not united to matter?

 

[AndrewW94]

For your first question, I’ll just provide a summary since Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s arguments are easy to find: (eg. here: edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/03/what-is-soul.html)

The soul has powers that are above matter. For example, you have the ability to understand what a triangle is. This demonstrates that the soul is rational, or spiritual. Since these powers of the soul are immaterial, they continue to exist after death, which is the separation of the soul from the body.

As regards your second question Aquinas writes in De Unitate Intellectus:

[102] Nor is it true to say that every number is caused by matter, for then Aristotle would have inquired in vain after the number of separated substances. For Aristotle says in Book Five of the Metaphysics that “many” is said not only numerically but specifically and generically. Nor is it true that separate substance is not singular and individuated, otherwise it would have no operation, since acts belong only to singulars, as the Philosopher says; hence he argues against Plato in Book Seven of the Metaphysics that if the Idea is separate, it will not be predicated of many, nor will it be definable any more than other individuals which are unique in their species, like the sun and moon. Matter is the principle of individuation in material things insofar as matter is not shareable by many, since it is the first subject not existing in another. Hence Aristotle says that if the Idea were separate “it would be something, that is, an individual, which it would be impossible to predicate of many.”

[103] Separate substances, therefore, are individual and singular, but they are individuated not by matter but by this that it is not their nature to exist in another and consequently to be participated in by many. From which it follows that if any form is of a nature to be participated in by something, such that it be the act of some matter, it can be individuated and multiplied by comparison with matter. It has already been shown above that the intellect is a power of the soul which is the act of the body. Therefore in many bodies there are many souls and in many souls there are many intellectual powers, that is, intellects. Nor does it follow from this that the intellect is a material power, as has been shown.

[104] Should anyone object that, if the many souls are multiplied according to bodies, it follows that they will not remain when the bodies have been destroyed, the response is obvious from what has already been said. A thing is one in the way it is a being, as is said in Book Four of the Metaphysics; therefore, for the soul to be is to be in the body as its form, nor is it prior to body, nonetheless it remains in existence after the body is destroyed: thus each soul remains in its unity and consequently many souls in their manyness.

 

[PietroPaolo]

Can it be demonstrated that the soul does indeed survive after death, and doesn’t cease to exist? Note: I am not interested in Theological Arguments, theologically the immortality of the Soul is a given via revelation- I am after a purely Philosophical argument. So if you need to quote scripture, and Church documents- you’re doing it wrong.

Also:

If the soul can be held to subsist after death, how is the soul individuated? For in the classical metaphysics it is matter which individuates the form/soul, how can the soul be individuated if it is not united to matter?

Interesting question. I cover a few basic arguments for the immortality of the soul HERE. You can read it if you are interested. I do start with some Biblical arguments, you can skip those for the purely philosophical ones toward the bottom of the post.

 

[oldcelt]

Can it be demonstrated that the soul does indeed survive after death, and doesn’t cease to exist? Note: I am not interested in Theological Arguments, theologically the immortality of the Soul is a given via revelation- I am after a purely Philosophical argument. So if you need to quote scripture, and Church documents- you’re doing it wrong.

Also:

If the soul can be held to subsist after death, how is the soul individuated? For in the classical metaphysics it is matter which individuates the form/soul, how can the soul be individuated if it is not united to matter?

Einstein tells us: “Energy cannot be created or destroyed, it can only be changed from one form to another.”
Since our thought processes (Morals, beliefs, superstitions, etc.) are all ideas created within our brains and these thoughts are conducted through the interaction of energy in the brain’s various structures, and the energy of our thoughts cannot be destroyed, the energy of our thoughts will continue after our deaths.

That does not answer the question of how they retain a form that would continue some form of consciousness…I know. But I, and others, are working on that.

John

 

[tonyrey]

Einstein tells us: “Energy cannot be created or destroyed, it can only be changed from one form to another.”
Since our thought processes (Morals, beliefs, superstitions, etc.) are all ideas created within our brains and these thoughts are conducted through the interaction of energy in the brain’s various structures, and the energy of our thoughts cannot be destroyed, the energy of our thoughts will continue after our deaths.

That does not answer the question of how they retain a form that would continue some form of consciousness…I know. But I, and others, are working on that.

John

Where do “we” come in? Are “our” thoughts just floating in a void purposelessly?

 

[tonyrey]

If the soul can be held to subsist after death, how is the soul individuated? For in the classical metaphysics it is matter which individuates the form/soul, how can the soul be individuated if it is not united to matter?

Why assume that only material objects can be individuated?

 

[oldcelt]

Where do “we” come in? Are “our” thoughts just floating in a void purposelessly?

We would continue to exist in our preserved thoughts (soul?). I can not see how any body could be involved and I don’t know what, if any purpose we will have.

I’d like to think of the afterlife as a sort of permanent dream state…but that’s just me.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

As regards your second question Aquinas writes in De Unitate Intellectus:

[102] Nor is it true to say that every number is caused by matter, for then Aristotle would have inquired in vain after the number of separated substances. For Aristotle says in Book Five of the Metaphysics that “many” is said not only numerically but specifically and generically. Nor is it true that separate substance is not singular and individuated, otherwise it would have no operation, since acts belong only to singulars, as the Philosopher says; hence he argues against Plato in Book Seven of the Metaphysics that if the Idea is separate, it will not be predicated of many, nor will it be definable any more than other individuals which are unique in their species, like the sun and moon. Matter is the principle of individuation in material things insofar as matter is not shareable by many, since it is the first subject not existing in another. Hence Aristotle says that if the Idea were separate “it would be something, that is, an individual, which it would be impossible to predicate of many.”

I don’t think this really answer’s the OP’s question.
"… how is the (disembodied) soul individuated? …matter individuates the form/soul, how can the soul be individuated if it is not united to matter? "

Above Aquinas seems to only be saying that non-material substances by definition must be singular (eg Plato’s forms or Angels). Therefore non-material substances must be multiplied by differences in form. This is quite true, “angel” defines a group/genus not a single species common to many individuals. Each angel is its own uniques species (ie each a unique non-material form).

But this is not the poster’s question really. He is talking about “disembodied material substances” (DMS’s) which are not the same as “non-material substances”.

I think that we have to assert that DMSs must inherently retain some sort of unique potentiality wrt matter (matter is totally “generic”) which makes them different from other DMSs. This means DMSs must have some sort of “sub-species” differences.

Could my DMS come back as a female (I am a male) and still be me?
Yes I think so, the differences between DMSs is probably much deeper than a superficial potential towards a particular hair color or skin colour or sexual identity or even DNA code.

Or perhaps it is not really about “form” at all.
Maybe DSM’s are unique and individuated on the basis of non “ontological” causes - e.g. personal history. That is, my prev material life represents a particular causal thread running through the giant tapestry of the Cosmos/Time that is uniquely identified not only in itself but also by reason of the “gap” that would remain in the Universe’s fabric if this little thread were pulled out.

That little thread cannot be “pulled out” of existence because to do so would mean all the other “threads” I had a causal influence on could no longer be themselves either.
That means, like the Persons of the Trinity, we can only be uniquely identified by our unique causal relationship of origin to each other (ie to other DMSs).

But how is the “causal complex” that each DMS uniquely represents imputed to us in ontological terms (which is what “disembodied soul” is surely meant to represent). How is it held together in a disembodied non-material “existence” as “me”. Somehow it is in God.
Perhaps “disembodied souls” are in fact “embodied” in another dimension of materiality we know nothing about.

OR, the soul retains an imprint, a sort of memory of our causal history. Like the soul’s of the baptised/confirmed/priests are said to bear a “character” other souls do not possess.

OR, each human soul, even though material, is its own species (like the angels).
“Species” is not the best word as “material species” are known to be different apparantly because they cannot breed together. Back to the each human form is a “sub-species” of “human” thesis above then.

Hmmmn, perhaps the Scholastics got that wrong. Two males cannot breed together, does that mean they are different species? Yet a male and a female (obviously from different planets) can breed togther! I am confused .

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Can it be demonstrated that the soul does indeed survive after death, and doesn’t cease to exist? Note: I am not interested in Theological Arguments, theologically the immortality of the Soul is a given via revelation

As to this your first question.
I think understanding of how the brain works at a biological level makes some of Aristotles “clearly self-evident” propositions no longer self-evident.

For example memory.
Now an Aristotelian may well correct me but I was under the understanding that the concept of “biological matter being able to store sensible experience” was not something the ancients would have considered possible in their wildest dreams.
Therefore a spiritual power of the 'soul" was posited to explain this material impossibility.
I believe Augustine for this reason not only considered intellect and will to be of the rational soul - but also memory (this is the Trinitarian likeness in the human soul).

Well, I don’t think modern moderate realists are very strong on memory being a power of the soul anymore are they? Even Aquinas seems to soft pedal that one.

This is something I have always wondered, but I am only a GP.
Perhaps a specialist here coould correct me if I am mistaken on this observation.

But the point I am making is that we easily throw in “soul” (or god for that matter) to fill the spaces that material nature seems unable to explain. Often enough at a later date we do get a perfectly acceptable natural explanation - and god disappears (eg lightning is no longer the bolt of Zeus hurled at sinners).

Maybe our definition of “rational soul” from Aristotle needs to be similarly peared back a little. Maybe its immortality is a conclusion of faith more than reason.

 

[oldcelt]

As to this your first question.
I think understanding of how the brain works at a biological level makes some of Aristotles “clearly self-evident” propositions no longer self-evident.

For example memory.
Now an Aristotelian may well correct me but I was under the understanding that the concept of “biological matter being able to store sensible experience” was not something the ancients would have considered possible in their wildest dreams.
Therefore a spiritual power of the 'soul" was posited to explain this material impossibility.
I believe Augustine for this reason not only considered intellect and will to be of the rational soul - but also memory (this is the Trinitarian likeness in the human soul).

Well, I don’t think modern moderate realists are very strong on memory being a power of the soul anymore are they? Even Aquinas seems to soft pedal that one.

This is something I have always wondered, but I am only a GP.
Perhaps a specialist here coould correct me if I am mistaken on this observation.

But the point I am making is that we easily throw in “soul” (or god for that matter) to fill the spaces that material nature seems unable to explain. Often enough at a later date we do get a perfectly acceptable natural explanation - and god disappears (eg lightning is no longer the bolt of Zeus hurled at sinners).

Maybe our definition of “rational soul” from Aristotle needs to be similarly peared back a little. Maybe its immortality is a conclusion of faith more than reason.

Very nice post. Thank you for your insights.

John

 

[Skeptic92]

Interesting question. I cover a few basic arguments for the immortality of the soul HERE. You can read it if you are interested. I do start with some Biblical arguments, you can skip those for the purely philosophical ones toward the bottom of the post.

The argument from simplicity is interesting, I will have to look into it further…I’m currently writing something on the Argument from Analogy (Philosophy of Mind) so I’ll have to look into it later.

As to this your first question.
I think understanding of how the brain works at a biological level makes some of Aristotles “clearly self-evident” propositions no longer self-evident.

For example memory.
Now an Aristotelian may well correct me but I was under the understanding that the concept of “biological matter being able to store sensible experience” was not something the ancients would have considered possible in their wildest dreams.
Therefore a spiritual power of the 'soul" was posited to explain this material impossibility.
I believe Augustine for this reason not only considered intellect and will to be of the rational soul - but also memory (this is the Trinitarian likeness in the human soul).

Well, I don’t think modern moderate realists are very strong on memory being a power of the soul anymore are they? Even Aquinas seems to soft pedal that one.

This is something I have always wondered, but I am only a GP.
Perhaps a specialist here coould correct me if I am mistaken on this observation.

But the point I am making is that we easily throw in “soul” (or god for that matter) to fill the spaces that material nature seems unable to explain. Often enough at a later date we do get a perfectly acceptable natural explanation - and god disappears (eg lightning is no longer the bolt of Zeus hurled at sinners).

Maybe our definition of “rational soul” from Aristotle needs to be similarly peared back a little. Maybe its immortality is a conclusion of faith more than reason.

Your last sentence was the conclusion I was coming to, the books/papers I have read on the subject (Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Mind. Brian Leftow, Mind, Body, Soul. et al) seemed to have struggled to justify the individuation of the Soul/form after death (whilst not struggling to point to the metaphysical possibility of the soul subsisting, just not its necessity) which has led me to think it is a theological conclusion, rather than a philosophical one.

It doesn’t matter too much, as I do not mind thinking that the existence of the soul (and the possibility it will subsist after death) is when we reach the limit of the human reason. I was interested whether or not my musings were correct.

However on powers of the soul: most of the powers of the soul in Aristotelian-Thomistic Dualism are seen to be dependent on the body. For example if the brain suffered damage, it would follow that cognition would also be impaired, rather than the strict substance dualism of Descartes that could imply no link between the brain and mental phenomena. So that memory being ‘stored’ in the brain wouldn’t cause too much trouble for the Thomistic or Aristotelian Dualist, it would still find its ‘cause’ in the soul, and that which makes a living being this living being in particular.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

However on powers of the soul: most of the powers of the soul in Aristotelian-Thomistic Dualism are seen to be dependent on the body…

Yes, in the Aristotelian view the spiritual powers are mediated through bodily organisation and if the tissue (eg memory) is damaged then those powers still exists but cannot operate.

We might question what “operate” actually means in this context. Obviously memory cannot operate in what we call daily conscious life on earth if the tissue is damaged. But does memory still operate in some other “spiritual” realm of consciousness we are not conscious of . Obviously while we live embodied we are only “conscious” of sensible consciousness. But after we die does a disembodied soul get “forced” to be conscious in some other fashion?

And then there is the further problem of how do memories get transferred to the soul and remain there? Aquinas holds there is a “one way” relationship between body and soul. The soul changes the body, not the other way around. Obviously cognition seems to deny that principle in some way. (Unfortunately my Thomism is not adequate enough to explain that one ).

But really your valid point above about the body mediating use of the soul’s powers…is not what I was really commenting on.

Below I was applying Ocham’s razor to Aristotle’s positing a “soul” in the light of modern biology.
Namely, if we can now explain by material causality that which was hitherto inexplicable and hence inferred by spiritual causality THEN Ocham tells us it is more reasonable to go with the solution that is the least involved. Do not multiply unneeded causes.

So I do not say that the Aristotelian explanation is either wrong or impossible for it is very
very possible but it now seems over complicated and unnecessary as simpler explanations suffice. The same use of Reason that made Aristotle posit the existence of a spiritual soul with power of memory, nowadays in the light of modern biology, seems to force us to adopt a more simple model.
Memory is not a power of the soul but of the body itself (like locomotion).

So if disembodied souls are philosophically even possible then there seems no intrinsic reason why they would have a personal memory - and Buddhists would agree (and go further).

Disembodied souls are still a weak point in Scholastic philosophy.
On this particular topic even Aristotle has not been of much help to Christian Revelation.
Yes Aristotle helped us escape much of the excessive “angelising” of pre-medieval theology (ie use of Plato) but when it comes to disembodied souls even Aristotle skids in the mud and we revert to our ancient Platonist legacy - which doesn’t gel well with Revelation any better now than it did in the Early Church.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

I’m inclined to believe that a conclusive philosophical demonstration of the immortality of the soul is virtually impossible without dying and then coming back to life. And if you did that, someone would retort that you didn’t really die, and that in any case what happened to you, if it cannot be explained now, will surely be explained later by the genius of science.

The most powerful argument for the immortality of the soul is that it is not a material thing, and that therefore it needn’t perish as material things perish. At that point the argument is not whether the soul is immortal, but whether it is immaterial. In that case, we go by our common sense and our gut feeling, rather than by philosophical certititude. If the materialist believes the soul is material and dies with the body, he needs to be able to prove that. How can he do it? He can’t. The materialist, who demands proof for everything, cannot prove that God does not exist and cannot prove that the soul is made of matter and dies with the body. This lack of proof proves one thing most of all: that the materialist is as hamstrung as the spiritualist in proving his most cherished assumptions.

That is why everything in the end comes down to faith or lack of faith.

Everything comes down in the end to what you hope is true or what you hope is not true.

 

[polytropos]

I have not read every word in this thread, sorry if I am repeating anything. Just making a few comments.

Yes, in the Aristotelian view the spiritual powers are mediated through bodily organisation and if the tissue (eg memory) is damaged then those powers still exists but cannot operate.

This is correct. But in the Aristotelian view essential powers are intrinsic to whatever has a particular essence, whether it can exercise them or not. In the case of the mind, this isn’t an ad hoc principle being invoked. A fetus is essentially rational since it is essentially human. If you uprooted a tree, brushed all of the dirt from its roots, and hid it from sunlight, it would not be able to acquire any nutrients, but it would still retain the power of growth (until it died).

So I do not say that the Aristotelian explanation is either wrong or impossible for it is very
very possible but it now seems over complicated and unnecessary as simpler explanations suffice. The same use of Reason that made Aristotle posit the existence of a spiritual soul with power of memory, nowadays in the light of modern biology, seems to force us to adopt a more simple model.
Memory is not a power of the soul but of the body itself (like locomotion).

I don’t think an Aristotelian would accept such a bifurcation. An Aristotelian would hold that locomotion is a power of the soul as well. He’d hold that growth is a power of trees (which, according to Aristotle, have vegetative souls), even if he has a complete biological explanation of growth in trees. The soul and the body are not in the same category of being. The soul is the form of the body. A body without a soul is a dead body. But that is not to suggest that the soul is this Cartesian res cogitans hanging over the body and dictating its actions; that is not at all how forms are generally conceived in a hylemorphic ontology.

I think there is a slight distinction to be made between theorizing about humans having an Aristotelian soul and humans having an immaterial Aristotelian soul. In Aristotelianism, everything has a form. In the material world, forms are what account for the unity and essence of natural substances–and generally speaking, are fully material. A materialist considering a shift in philosophical views could conceivable become a hylemorphist without holding that the soul is immaterial. Additional arguments are required for that (based on, for instance, the universality of abstracted forms, or indeterminacy of the physical). The latter sort of argument is not directly tethered to hylemorphism. Hylemorphists tend to favor those types of argument because they are consonant with non-Cartesian, non-property dualism. But there does not obtain any mutual entailment between, for instance, hylemorphism and James Ross’s argument, even though they are compatible with each other.

So if disembodied souls are philosophically even possible then there seems no intrinsic reason why they would have a personal memory - and Buddhists would agree (and go further).

I agree with this, but I think most Thomists would too. Human forms are subsistent. That, Thomists argue, can be known through natural reason. But human forms depend on bodily instantiation for action. After death, there seems no natural reason to suppose that one should have access to memories. Thomists only (I think) would hold that insofar as they have faith in revelation about some sort of supernatural access to memories, ie. a bodily resurrection or the beatific vision. It is akin to belief in the trinity. One might hold that some traditional argument for God’s existence is sound, but hold that one could only identify that being with the Christian God through faith.

 

[oldcelt]

I was just wandering around the net looking for some papers om the subject of immortality. Found one that was non-religious and out of the clear blue the writer used the term 'Papist."

Well, that was then end of that. I wonder how many other people he lost for exposing his bigotry…but I’m glad he did.

 

[Portofino]

Can it be demonstrated that the soul does indeed survive after death, and doesn’t cease to exist? Note: I am not interested in Theological Arguments, theologically the immortality of the Soul is a given via revelation- I am after a purely Philosophical argument. So if you need to quote scripture, and Church documents- you’re doing it wrong.

Also:

If the soul can be held to subsist after death, how is the soul individuated? For in the classical metaphysics it is matter which individuates the form/soul, how can the soul be individuated if it is not united to matter?

This is a fascinating topic; thank you for starting this thread.

I’ve been thinking lately of how immortality of the soul is quite a separate a issue from the existence of God, at least from a philosophical standpoint (to say that a good God would not permit our souls to die with our bodies would be one more complaint to file in the “problem of evil” box which, as many of the Catholic posters have pointed out–on other threads–is neither here nor there within the context of disproving the existence of God, nor even a God who is good).

What fascinates me is that any philosophical arguments for the immortality of the soul could only point to the immortality of, indeed, the immaterial soul (in a Platonic sense). Nothing, to my knowledge, could go about proving – through *a priori *logic alone – something like the resurrection of the body.

Aristotle believed body and soul were inseparable – but, then again, he did not believe in an immortal soul and presumably held that the soul dies with the body.

Thomists believe that body and soul are inseparable, which goes against the grain because it would seem to subvert the notion that the soul survives death (because the body does die, is perishable). Only divine revelation, it seems to me, can posit that *A. the soul can survive death, and is “temporarily” separated from the body (matter and form are separable, Aristotle to the contrary), and B. the body, though mortal and subject to death, will return to life. *

 

[Aloysium]

Can it be demonstrated that the soul does indeed survive after death, and doesn’t cease to exist? Note: I am not interested in Theological Arguments, theologically the immortality of the Soul is a given via revelation- I am after a purely Philosophical argument. So if you need to quote scripture, and Church documents- you’re doing it wrong.

Also:

If the soul can be held to subsist after death, how is the soul individuated? For in the classical metaphysics it is matter which individuates the form/soul, how can the soul be individuated if it is not united to matter?

I would say that our very existence is that of a soul whose home is in eternity. These very words and ideas evaporate in the light of that reality.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I have not read every word in this thread, sorry if I am repeating anything. Just making a few comments.

This is correct. But in the Aristotelian view essential powers are intrinsic to whatever has a particular essence, whether it can exercise them or not. In the case of the mind, this isn’t an ad hoc principle being invoked. A fetus is essentially rational since it is essentially human. If you uprooted a tree, brushed all of the dirt from its roots, and hid it from sunlight, it would not be able to acquire any nutrients, but it would still retain the power of growth (until it died).

I don’t think an Aristotelian would accept such a bifurcation. An Aristotelian would hold that locomotion is a power of the soul as well. He’d hold that growth is a power of trees (which, according to Aristotle, have vegetative souls), even if he has a complete biological explanation of growth in trees. The soul and the body are not in the same category of being. The soul is the form of the body. A body without a soul is a dead body. But that is not to suggest that the soul is this Cartesian res cogitans hanging over the body and dictating its actions; that is not at all how forms are generally conceived in a hylemorphic ontology.

I think there is a slight distinction to be made between theorizing about humans having an Aristotelian soul and humans having an immaterial Aristotelian soul. In Aristotelianism, everything has a form. In the material world, forms are what account for the unity and essence of natural substances–and generally speaking, are fully material. A materialist considering a shift in philosophical views could conceivable become a hylemorphist without holding that the soul is immaterial. Additional arguments are required for that (based on, for instance, the universality of abstracted forms, or indeterminacy of the physical). The latter sort of argument is not directly tethered to hylemorphism. Hylemorphists tend to favor those types of argument because they are consonant with non-Cartesian, non-property dualism. But there does not obtain any mutual entailment between, for instance, hylemorphism and James Ross’s argument, even though they are compatible with each other.

I agree with this, but I think most Thomists would too. Human forms are subsistent. That, Thomists argue, can be known through natural reason. But human forms depend on bodily instantiation for action. After death, there seems no natural reason to suppose that one should have access to memories. Thomists only (I think) would hold that insofar as they have faith in revelation about some sort of supernatural access to memories, ie. a bodily resurrection or the beatific vision. It is akin to belief in the trinity. One might hold that some traditional argument for God’s existence is sound, but hold that one could only identify that being with the Christian God through faith.

Good stuff but you completely lost me in a few places…

An Aristotelian would hold that locomotion is a power of the soul as well.

Hmmmn. Where is the soul these days in the allegedly circular motion of the super lunar bodies that both Aristotle (and even Aquinas) posited had to exist? We can explain that mechanisticly so “poof” their souls no longer are credible to us . I don’t think any modern Aristotelian or Thomist would still be pushing that these days would they?

Once the false philosophic assumptions they were working from have been exposed it isn’t too hard to extrapolate to vegetation or even animals and suggest that locomotion is purely mechanical in explanation. Of course a spiritual principle (or a separate final cause) may be needed to explain the chain of causality that started the locomotion. But efficient and material and formal causes of locomotion seem adequately explained at the sensible level without recourse to an inferred spiritual substance?

humans having an immaterial Aristotelian soul.

I am not at all sure what the word “immaterial” means here. Or rather, what do you mean by a “material soul” - a soul by definition stands in opposition to “matter” as a co-principle of existant material substances Therefore a “material soul” is a contradiction in terms. .

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Thomists believe that body and soul are inseparable, which goes against the grain because it would seem to subvert the notion that the soul survives death (because the body does die, is perishable).

I think I know what you mean but I heard what you said .

I believe Thomists do hold that body and soul are separable - for that separation is the very definition of death.

I think what you mean is that matter and form are co-principles of material substances. In Aristotle’s Hylomorphic theory neither of these components have existance of themselves alone. Only when form actuates matter does a material substance exist.

Now Aquinas applied this principle to human nature and stated the soul is the form of the body. Therefore if soul is separated from body then the human individual no longer exists.
Of course Christians believe there is a personal subject here who is somehow immortal. Aquinas had no problem with that as he stated the disembodied soul somehow still exists.
Here he seems more Platonic (only forms exist) than Aristotle because, from what I have learnt, Aristotle would see this as impossible or at least an unjustified extrapolation from sensible experience.

Of course Aquinas does not dare call the disembodied soul “a human being”.
It cannot be a human being because human beings are material substances composed of both body and soul.

 

[Portofino]

Here he seems more Platonic (only forms exist) than Aristotle because, from what I have learnt, Aristotle would see this as impossible or at least an unjustified extrapolation from sensible experience.

Yes, thank you : ) As I understand it, Aristotle actually sits quite well again with Christian theology, post-resurrection – without body and soul, you are not a complete human person. The trick is getting from death – separation of body and soul – to the resurrection, and explaining the properties of the soul in between (e.g., does the soul survive its separation from the body? Is it conscious and does it have memories? And if it would reunite its the body at some later point, how would it “find” its body again, the right one to inhabit?)

There, it seems to me – the separation of body and soul through death and the quality of the continued existence of the human personality – one has lost not only Aristotle but the means of purely philosophical proof, notwithstanding the immense importance of the question.