On the Immortality of the Soul

[Blue_Horizon]

From a blog analysis titled “Reading the Summa” (readingthesumma.blogspot.com/2014/01/question-89-separated-souls-cognition.html). I’ve not found the relevant passage in the Summa itself, but this squares with my memory of what Aquinas wrote about it.

"Once the soul is separated from the body, the soul no longer has available to it any of the bodily organs associated with cognition; all that is left is the immaterial intellect. Can such a separated soul continue to have intellectual cognition? Certainly nothing new is coming in via sense organs, as they are bodily and no longer available to the separated soul. Even worse, there is no longer the power of the imagination available to the intellect, so the agent intellect can no longer shine a light on any phantasms in order to abstract quiddity. There may, of course, be the possibility of a supernatural form of cognition granted by a gift of grace; but if we are simply thinking in terms of the possible natural cognition available to the separated soul, then it is hard to see how this can function after death. The sed contra presents a perplexing counter-argument: one of the distinguishing aspects of the human soul is that it can exist separated from the body; it is a subsistent form. As a subsistent form it must have its own proper operations that do not depend on the separated body; surely therefore, the intellect must be able to operate once the body is gone because intellectual cognition is proper to the soul.

Aquinas agrees that this is perplexing but goes on to argue that the soul has two modes of understanding. The first mode of understanding occurs when the soul is united with the body and consists in the abstraction of form from material objects via the illumination of phantasms by the agent intellect. This first mode of understanding should be considered as the natural mode of understanding for a soul because it is natural for a soul to be united with a body. But still, a soul can subsist independent of a body; corresponding to this second state of being, there is a second operation of the intellect, a different mode of understanding. The first mode of understanding corresponds to the cognition of intelligible species after they are abstracted from their material being; the second mode of understanding is ordered to the cognition of those things that are intelligible absolutely speaking. That is, of those forms that do not have to be abstracted from a material mode of being."

This doesn’t get you “more perfect knowledge,” nor does it get you to memories of your particular experiences on earth (your second birthday party; Aunt Polly’s lemonade; the dog you had in the 5th grade). Aquinas would acknowledge that it takes divine grace to get you those things, sans body.

Nonetheless, I agree with you wholeheartedly that to say that Aquinas suspends judgment as to whether there could be any activity of the intellect, whatsoever, without the body and without special divine aid, is not quite correct. He posits a continued operation of the intellect, even without the role of special divine aid, as pertains to this “second mode of the operation of the intellect”, which – he posits – is purely abstract in nature.

Yes, you seem to have well understood the problematic I am raising wrt Aquinas - as does the blog you quoted.

Unless I am mistaken then the three of us are agreed that:
"Aquinas posits a continued operation of the intellect…as pertains to this “second mode of the operation of the intellect” as pertains to this “second mode of the operation of the intellect”
cannot be proven to follow philosophically from any of his preceeding philosophic affirmations. (I think Aquinas know this already himself. That is why he posits the need for angels or a special grace from God).

Given this state of affairs, and use of Occham’s razor, I would go further and say that if Aquinas himself cannot demonstrate that the unassisted disembodied soul actually engages in rational activity of any sort then … his (and Aristotle’s) premise that human rationality requires an immaterial soul also becomes suspect.

That is, the phantasm is much more deeply bound up with all human intellection than either Aristotle and Aquinas were at the time capable of emprically understanding.
(Just as they could not empirically understand how a heavenly body could continually move without an external mover - and therefore, by principle, had to posit the existence of a soul (ie life).)

The above problematics suggest that the stronger argument philosophically re the state of the disembodied soul (if indeed even posited) is that it is not “conscious”, of any objects and in fact exists more in a basic “semen”-al, sleepy, hibernated mode (perhaps merely looking for matter to “recreate” itself in) just as ancient Greek (and Hindu) myth and poetry (and yourself) suggest.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I have found the passage where Aquinas clarifies his thoughts on what the operations of the intellect would be, after death, even with no additional divine assistance and simply in conformance with its given nature.

Question 89

"Whether the separated soul can understand anything?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul separated from the body can understand nothing at all. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4) that “the understanding is corrupted together with its interior principle.” But by death all human interior principles are corrupted. Therefore also the intellect itself is corrupted.
…
…
To solve this difficulty we must consider that as nothing acts except so far as it is actual, the mode of action in every agent follows from its mode of existence. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the body, and another when apart from it, its nature remaining always the same; but this does not mean that its union with the body is an accidental thing, for, on the contrary, such union belongs to its very nature, just as the nature of a light object is not changed, when it is in its proper place, which is natural to it, and outside its proper place, which is beside its nature. The soul, therefore, when united to the body, consistently with that mode of existence, has a mode of understanding, by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a mode of understanding, by turning to simply intelligible objects, as is proper to other separate substances.

…

It is clear then that it was for the soul’s good that it was united to a body, and that it understands by turning to the phantasms. Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart from the body, and also to understand in another way.

Whether the separated soul understands separate substances?

Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not understand separate substances…

** I answer that, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), “our mind acquires the knowledge of incorporeal things by itself”—i.e. by knowing itself (Question [88], Article [1], ad 1). Therefore from the knowledge which the separated soul has of itself, we can judge how it knows other separate things.** Now it was said above (Article [1]), that as long as it is united to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, and therefore it does not understand itself save through becoming actually intelligent by means of ideas abstracted from phantasms; for thus it understands itself through its own act, as shown above (Question [87], Article [1]). **When, however, it is separated from the body, it understands no longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to simply intelligible objects; hence in that state it understands itself through itself. **Now, every separate substance “understands what is above itself and what is below itself, according to the mode of its substance” (De Causis viii): for a thing is understood according as it is in the one who understands; while one thing is in another according to the nature of that in which it is. And the mode of existence of a separated soul is inferior to that of an angel, but is the same as that of other separated souls. Therefore the soul apart from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls, but it has an imperfect and defective knowledge of the angels so far as its natural knowledge is concerned. But the knowledge of glory is otherwise.

Reply to Objection 1: The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect considering its nature in which it communicates with the nature of the body: but it has a greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care of the body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence in the present life.

Reply to Objection 2: The separated soul understands the angels by means of divinely impressed ideas; which, however, fail to give perfect knowledge of them, forasmuch as the nature of the soul is inferior to that of an angel.

Reply to Objection 3: Man’s ultimate happiness consists not in the knowledge of any separate substances; but in the knowledge of God, Who is seen only by grace. The knowledge of other separate substances if perfectly understood gives great happiness—not final and ultimate happiness. But the separated soul does not understand them perfectly, as was shown above in this article.​

The separated soul … has a greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care of the body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence in the present life.

The problem is that this is merely a required consistant assertion that must follow if we accept the prior unproven premises that:

• a disembodied soul does survive death
• and that it does have a power of intellection that will work without the use of phantasms.

It also rests on the premise that a disembodied form is essentially operative in the same was as a pure form.

So nothing about the truth of these assumptions is underwritten by such a “reason” it seems .

The “clog” upon human intelligence in this life may well be due to the Fall and the loss of praeternatural gifts. There is no guarantee that complete removal of phantasms (ie the body) will make anything better or more perfect in this regard).
It may well be that human nature (including the soul), if left merely to itself, will never fare much better than what we have now (and the disembodied soul even worse).

But we can be sure a ressurected body will “unclog” the intellect.

 

[polytropos]

Unless I am mistaken then the three of us are agreed that:
"Aquinas posits a continued operation of the intellect…as pertains to this “second mode of the operation of the intellect” as pertains to this “second mode of the operation of the intellect”
cannot be proven to follow philosophically from any of his preceeding philosophic affirmations. (I think Aquinas know this already himself. That is why he posits the need for angels or a special grace from God).

Given this state of affairs, and use of Occham’s razor, I would go further and say that if Aquinas himself cannot demonstrate that the unassisted disembodied soul actually engages in rational activity of any sort then … his (and Aristotle’s) premise that human rationality requires an immaterial soul also becomes suspect.

I agree with the top paragraph.

What I do not understand is what you mean by “Aquinas himself cannot demonstrate that the unassisted disembodied soul actually engages in rational activity of any sort.” As every quote of Aquinas in this thread testifies, Aquinas does not even try to demonstrate that. Whenever he talks about activity after death, he speaks of angels. Consider the quote in Portofino’s 99th post: “And from those substances [ie. angels], as from things above it, the separated soul will be able to receive a more abundant influx, productive of a more perfect understanding on its own part.” I see nothing to suggest that Aquinas thought that it could be demonstrated philosophically that the soul not just subsists but is active. In what way, then, does it impugn him not to have succeeded at what he did not try and probably did not believe?

He believed the soul was active after death on the basis of faith. Applying Occam’s razor to that belief is like applying it to the belief that the Unmoved Mover is the Christian God. Proponents of Aquinas’s First Way do not purport to have demonstratively prove that. They acknowledge that it is on the basis of faith that they make the association. They are interested in demonstrating the consistency of the identity claim, not its philosophically demonstrable necessity. Aquinas is likewise claiming that his account of a subsistent soul is consistent with the activity of the disembodied soul after death, if one appeals to the external theological principle that angels exist. It obvious does not follow demonstratively. But it’s a theological point; it is not claimed to. (On the contrary, the subsistence of the soul is claimed to follow demonstratively.)

With respect to your underlined claim, it does not follow.

Aquinas did not claim that the disembodied soul can act unaided, so let us suppose that after death, it does not get aid from higher intelligences and so cannot act, since it has not access to the phantasm, its proper object. So what? You say that then the requirement of an immaterial soul for rationality is “suspect.” Why?

To be a bit more specific, we are admitting (on the basis of philosophy, without recourse to theological premises) that phantasms (a “material” component) are a necessary component of the activity of the intellect. Rather plainly, it does not follow that phantasms are a sufficient component, and so it does not follow on that basis (the inactivity of the soul without phantasms) that only a material principle, rather than an immaterial principle, would be sufficient for intellection. To suppose that it would imply that would be fallacious, a confusion of a necessary condition with a sufficient condition.

That is, the phantasm is much more deeply bound up with all human intellection than either Aristotle and Aquinas were at the time capable of emprically understanding.

This seems to me to be false. Aquinas: “It follows that, so long as the soul is in the body, it cannot perform that act without a phantasm; neither can it remember except through the powers of cogitation and memory, by which the phantasms are prepared, as stated above.” Both of them thought that intellective acts (for an embodied soul) required a phantasm. (And in a disembodied soul, as you are at pains to point out, Aquinas appeals to theological principles to argue that it can perform intellective acts; so he seemed to believe that even after death, though it was consistent to suppose that the soul could act with recourse to some external principle, it could not act without the phantasm.) How is the phantasm bound up “more deeply” with human intellection than to be necessarily bound up with human intellection, as Aquinas and Aristotle believed it was?

 

[Portofino]

You guys are getting me to read more Aquinas – and to feel excited about doing so

Unless I am mistaken then the three of us are agreed that:
"Aquinas posits a continued operation of the intellect…as pertains to this “second mode of the operation of the intellect” as pertains to this “second mode of the operation of the intellect”
cannot be proven to follow philosophically from any of his preceeding philosophic affirmations. (I think Aquinas know this already himself. That is why he posits the need for angels or a special grace from God).

My understanding is that one could really debate Aquinas on this point of a “second mode of understanding” that the intellective soul is said to possess and which is said not to rely on phantasms (it becomes “self-generating”, as it were, no longer relying on the senses in order to function). He seems to be saying that this, at least, is an operation of the disembodied intellect that exists not only through special divine grace – and thus outside the realm of philosophical argument – but by nature, in the nature of the intellect itself.

From my reading of the limited passages involved, it appears he takes this to be axiomatic; at least, I don’t see a formal proof of this second operation of the intellect, which does indeed come across as more “ethereal” in terms of the impression it makes. It does indeed come across as somewhat mysterious.

Nonetheless, I’m sensing that Aquinas is maintaining that this second mode of understanding of the intellect–continued operation of the intellect, post-disembodiment–is something that can be posited even without appeal to revelation. I’m construing a distinction between his claim that the disembodied intellect can continue to operate without phantasms – albeit with a circumscribed range of activity-- and the existence of a more fully “fleshed out” soul in the afterlife – with, for example, memories of those creatures on earth and of acts committed whilst on earth-- which, in this more fleshed out version, cannot be drawn as an inference from the hylemorphic theory of mind alone.

But you seem to be saying that Aquinas already goes too far, in positing this “second mode of operation” of the intellect, already transgressing the boundaries of strict philosophic proof and entering the realm of faith. I’m inclined to fully understand an objection of this kind, but I don’t think Aquinas would have conceded this. When he wrote of the second mode in which the intellect operates, independently of phantasms, I think he considered himself to still be within the realm of strict philosophical demonstration. Perhaps he felt that, once intellect was separated from body through death, this second mode would “kick in”, as it were, like a reserve gas tank of sorts. Intellect would “fall back” on a way of understanding which admittedly is not natural to it – nor “ideal” for it - but which nevertheless is possible to it, something of which it is capable (just like humans can live for a sometimes extended period of time with an insufficient amount of food or no food at all; “running on empty”). Thus the intellect, like the body would do in other contexts, “switches gears,” in this case from the first mode of intellection (which relies on phantasms) to the second.

this state of affairs, and use of Occham’s razor, I would go further and say that if Aquinas himself cannot demonstrate that the unassisted disembodied soul actually engages in rational activity of any sort then … his (and Aristotle’s) premise that human rationality requires an immaterial soul also becomes suspect.

I think that’s the point you’re debating; it seems “forced” to you, or to be a non sequitur. But it seems Aquinas himself did believe he had demonstrated that intellect can continue to operate without the body, and also that it can continue to exist and remain “intact.” That’s my understanding, anyway, independently of the fact that I feel where you’re coming from Who knows, Thomists themselves might concede that this second mode of intellection has benefitted from a “weaker” demonstration than the first mode – a comparative weak spot, as it were, more vulnerable to attack or to further debate. One can always attempt to debate the premises, even if the conclusions drawn from those premises are logically valid.

above problematics suggest that the stronger argument philosophically re the state of the disembodied soul (if indeed even posited) is that it is not “conscious”, of any objects and in fact exists more in a basic “semen”-al, sleepy, hibernated mode (perhaps merely looking for matter to “recreate” itself in) just as ancient Greek (and Hindu) myth and poetry (and yourself) suggest.

Having read the passages I had found and quoted above, I now feel certain that Aquinas believed the intellect can continue to “function” and to operate according to this “second mode of intellection”, without the body. He doesn’t some to be saying that it is an open question whether a disembodied intellect can still engage in the activity of thought (he believes that it can, even without the invocation of divine aid). What he doesn’t believe can be invoked without divine aid is the survival of the human personality — which, again, would have memory of sins committed on earth; or memories of loved ones; or perhaps feelings of joy or despair, or remorse; or perhaps imaginings of heaven (as might be experienced by someone in purgatory, presumably), and all of the things we consider to be integral to the “human personality” and to a rich inner life, all of which are not a matter of indifference.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I’m not sure where exactly you are referring to.

This is the inherent and relentless argument rolled out in the whole structure of the SCG.
It is not by accident that Aquinas first proves the existence of an uncreated rational nature whose essence is to exist, then the existence of pure forms, then man as if he is a pure form embodied.

It is only recently I realised this is in fact a Platonic top-down “participation” approach to Aristotelian hylomorphism in understanding human nature from a Christian approach. Not quite pure philosophy though this was Aquinas’s announced intent.
Aristotle’s philosophy was more a “bottom up” approach.

In this sense Aquinas on the understanding of human intellect (and the place of phantasms) is more rational than empirical - and Aristotle the reverse.

As a philosopher I feel more comfortable with Aristotle’s approach - and had he lived now I am pretty sure his empricism would have made him redefine the human soul as more likely material.

But it seems like you are interpreting (4) more strongly than is necessary. Rational forms self-subsist and actively understand. OK. What does actively understand mean here? Does it mean that at all times they must be in a process of understanding?

Of course I accept the embodied soul logically must have powers that do not need to be in act all the time. Yet even Aquinas states that powers are posited on the basis of their known acts/operations. If no separated soul can be actually shown to ever act in this way then Occham’s razor demands that we should not posit the existence of the power itself in the separated soul. In any case, separated from the body why would such a power one time be in act another time not? If it existed it would surely be contemplating and acting all the time as rest would have no meaning without body or phantasms to tire an absent associated organ.

Well, whether the mind can be shown to be immaterial has always been the biggest debate in philosophy of mind… In any case, gesturing toward the field does not of itself vindicate materialism.

And this is what the OPs question all boils down to.
Neither side has a cast iron defence.
However since the time of Aristotle, and more rapidly since the time of Aquinas, the “material soul” explanation is now becoming more plausible while the stubble of the former is coming closer to Occham’s razor.

But that is not what the theories are claiming. To say that we intellect forms does not mean that I instantly obtain a complete understanding of every natural substance I see.

Thanks for that, I am not well aquainted with the (neo) hylomorphic defence.
But it is interesting that even the ancients noted that repeated experience/phantasms were required to aquire knowledge of allegedly immaterial universals. That is how Hume and others (I am more familar with De Bono’s material account of abstraction which may be a hack) also see their material abstraction process working in this regard.

It’s also worth noting that hylemorphism does not posit complete immateriality of our mental faculties. Hylemorphists don’t, for instance, spurn all neurobiology. They rather make specific arguments why specific phenomena are necessarily immaterial.

Understood. But I think it is now hard to defend the necessarily immaterial nature of knowledge of universals. I am not familiar with other intellective acts you may be speaking of?

 

[polytropos]

Of course I accept the embodied soul logically must have powers that do not need to be in act all the time. Yet even Aquinas states that powers are posited on the basis of their known acts/operations. If no separated soul can be actually shown to ever act in this way then Occham’s razor demands that we should not posit the existence of the power itself in the separated soul.

For the same reason we would still posit the power of growth in a tree with no leaves. Powers are posited on the basis of their known acts/operations. But powers are common to form and, basically by definition, do not have to be exercised to exist.

In any case, separated from the body why would such a power one time be in act another time not? If it existed it would surely be contemplating and acting all the time as rest would have no meaning without body or phantasms to tire an absent associated organ.

… so you are giving an argument for the continued operation of the intellect?

But I refer again to the leafless tree. Why would such a power of photosynthesis be active at one time and not another? Because a necessary principle (leaves) is missing, even though it still has its necessary identity conditions.

But it is interesting that even the ancients noted that repeated experience/phantasms were required to aquire knowledge of allegedly immaterial universals. That is how Hume and others (I am more familar with De Bono’s material account of abstraction which may be a hack) also see their material abstraction process working in this regard.

They need to rely on phantasms precisely because universals do not exist mind-independently. Your humanity is a form, but it is a concrete, particular form. Humanity as such is a universal form. To say it has instances is to say that there are things with concrete human forms. But none of those concrete human forms are humanity in the abstract.

This is not exactly like Hume and the empiricists. (“Abstraction” has decisively different meanings in the different traditions.) Hume believed that from “phantasms” (he did not call them that) we could only draw generalizations, and that we did not actually intellect the forms of things. His is an event ontology in which you do not know things themselves, but generalize cases when you see things. (You have never seen a cat. You have a generalization of the properties of a cat because in your sensory experience there was once a series of experiences with cats in them, and you create an idea of cat out of the commonalities between those experiences.) This account faces the issue that no one can figure out a logic of induction, and that we seem to achieve greater certainty in our dealings with the world than it would credit. (In his book Mental Acts, Peter Geach points out a number of other concepts for which abstractionism of the Humean/Lockean variety does not work–numbers, colors, logical operators, etc.)

 

[polytropos]

Understood. But I think it is now hard to defend the necessarily immaterial nature of knowledge of universals. I am not familiar with other intellective acts you may be speaking of?

Well, there is knowledge of universals; I would regard that as the broadest category.

One could also argue from the nature of formal thinking. For instance: Consider the fact that any set of physical data is necessarily underdetermined. By this I mean that from a set of physical data, one cannot conclude that it realizes one function to the exclusion to the other. Saul Kripke, for instance, defined “quus” by x (quus) y = x + y if x + y < 57, = 5 otherwise. Quus behaves like plus while its sums are up to 56. For sums larger than 56, though, quus returns 5.

Now consider any physical system that we would ordinarily say “realizes” the addition function. No matter how many (name removed by moderator)uts you test, you will never resolve that the function is not “quus-like.” It is always the case that for some sufficiently large (name removed by moderator)uts, it will not return the sum, but some other (name removed by moderator)ut. This is actually the case of every physical system. (A calculator will, rather than return a sum, return an error message eventually. Even if the power of the were sufficiently strong, which it of course cannot be, the (name removed by moderator)uts it could test would be bounded by the length of the universe.)

The upshot of this is that physical systems cannot realize determinate functions to the exclusions of others.

However, our thinking can exclude determinate functions to the exclusion of others. When we add, we are performing addition, a function defined abstractly for all conceivable (name removed by moderator)uts. We are not performing an operation that for some (name removed by moderator)uts will return a non-sum. So: All physical systems are indeterminate with respect to the realization of abstract functions. Formal thinking can be determinate with respect to the realization of abstract functions. Therefore, formal thinking is not fully realized by a physical system.

This analysis can be extended to various other sorts of functions. For instance, modus ponens is a formal function which takes (name removed by moderator)uts of the form “if p, then q” and “p” and returns “q”. When we do modus ponens, we are undertaking a determinate process that works for any instances of “p” and “q”. But any implementation on a physical system will be indeterminate and, indeed, will not work for all conceivable (name removed by moderator)uts.

Other operations would be included as well. For instance, definition: I define “soul” as “the form of a living body.” When I do so, I am not allowing any exceptions to my definition. But any physical system which does so will inevitably allow exceptions. (One sees that this sort of determinacy is present in all of our rational thinking.)

One can broaden the scope of the argument somewhat. It probably concedes too much to allow that when a calculator “does addition” it is adding two numbers, and will eventually “break down.” The question becomes: what makes what a calculator does addition other than my desire to use the calculator to aid my own addition? I punch buttons which have symbols on them (though the calculator doesn’t “know” what the symbols are or what they represent) and the calculator displays an arabic numeral. But then: what makes it an arabic numeral? There is nothing intrinsic to the display that makes it so; it is my intentions that do so. Further, consider the calculator’s internal operations. When we model computation, we let the presence of voltage at a given logic gate represent “1” and the absence “0”. But this is of course extrinsic to what the calculator is doing.

The same issues crop up at any level. (This is owed to the abstract, general nature of computation.) Syntax is not intrinsic to physics; there is nothing which suggests that syntax emerges from physics as it seems to be a function of our intentions. But our formal mental operations are syntactical and determinate.

 

[Portofino]

If no separated soul can be actually shown to ever act in this way then Occham’s razor demands that we should not posit the existence of the power itself in the separated soul.

Here’s a good article on the subject, which introduces rather fine shades of gray in terms of what Aquinas claimed the disembodied soul is capable of understanding naturalistically versus what the disembodied intellect is capable of understanding only with divine aid, as it were.

jp2forum.org/mlib/document/040811wippel-separatedsoul.pdf

To my knowledge, at no time does Aquinas explicitly state, “we cannot know whether the disembodied intellect engages in the operation of understanding or not; all we can know is that, at a minimum, the intellectual soul subsists.” That may be a more modern formulation of the question, since we’ve more scrupulously separated theological evidence from philosophical evidence in a way that Thomas did not. Aquinas doesn’t say we don’t know, or cannot know, whether understanding does or doesn’t occur in a disembodied intellect; he says we do know that intellective soul does subsist and that intellective soul does continue to engage in operations of intellect, albeit differently (which is not necessarily to say “wholly supernaturally”, either). According to some accounts (per the attached article) those operations of understanding are posited to have both a (comparatively more anemic) natural source – making at least a modicum of intellectual understanding still possible, a kind of “intellectual memory” – and a more luxurious supernatural source, also depending also on which writings of Aquinas are being treated (plus, by some accounts, as stated in the article, Aquinas’ own treatment is not always entirely consistent and may have evolved throughout his life).

The lowest common denominator of consensus here seems to be: A. either Thomas never believed and never claimed there was any provable naturalistic basis to continued intellectual operations, independently of the body; or B. if he did claim it, it is not necessarily his strongest argument and remains paradoxical from a purely philosophical perspective, and we must conclude that, though, he did sufficiently demonstrate the intellectual soul’s subsistence, we must suspend judgment on the intellectual soul’s continuing capability of engaging in the activity of understanding.

I have doubts – as you seem to – over whether the “subsisting, even if not active” part of the equation has been demonstrated satisfactorily, but, (as I lack a scientific background) could not cogently dismantle the argument for the immateriality of intellectual operations from a neuroscientific or “other-scientific” perspective. I too would have a problem accepting that an intellective soul continues to exist but may – for all we know – be rendered non-functional (yet with its integrity intact, “undamaged” and ready to be “re-activated” at any time, if ever it were once more given access to its body and to phantasms). I also would be puzzled as to where in the world (quite literally ) the intellective soul would be localized, without a physical body (currently, even if “intellect” is posited to be immaterial and to occupy no space, the seat of its operations are at least diffusely “localized” in the human body and specifically in the top of the head, above the level of the eyes or thereabouts ). If it’s naturalistic, earthly explanations were talking about then heaven, hell, and purgatory are – by definition – supernatural realms and cannot be assumed. But if I couldn’t even make sense of where disembodied intellect would go, (heaven, hell, and purgatory or a Platonic world of Forms being excluded) then I would indeed doubt whether it is “alive and well” somewhere, its integrity unimpaired, even if no longer active or lying dormant.

 

[polytropos]

To my knowledge, at no time does Aquinas explicitly state, “we cannot know whether the disembodied intellect engages in the operation of understanding or not; all we can know is that, at a minimum, the intellectual soul subsists.” That may be a more modern formulation of the question, since we’ve more scrupulously separated theological evidence from philosophical evidence in a way that Thomas did not.

I think this is the case with any Aquinas exegesis. His philosophical and theological arguments are intermixed, although it is generally not too difficult to disentangle which propositions require recourse to revelation, and which do not.

(And I think that his many of his commentators have specified wherever there was ambiguity.)

 

[Blue_Horizon]

For the same reason we would still posit the power of growth in a tree with no leaves. Powers are posited on the basis of their known acts/operations. But powers are common to form and, basically by definition, do not have to be exercised to exist.

Nevermind PT, it seems you may not have twigged to my point.
The difficulty I am pointing to is that the acts of a form united with matter cannot be presumed possible of that same form without matter.

… so you are giving an argument for the continued operation of the intellect?

There are different levels of potentiality. I am suggesting a minimum consistant and plausible hypothesis (which minimalism Ockham prefers) is that the separated soul is better philosophically assumed to have no intellectual acts (or memory). And this because it actually has no active power to do so when separated from matter (you were suggesting it has a power which is never in act). I posit one step further, the intellective power/faculty not only does not engage in any acts…it itself is not around - it is but a dormant and unsubstantiated potentiality of the separated soul. However this does not mean that this faculty cannot be “reconstituted” should the separated form revitalise matter at a later time.

Hence the separated form, I suggest, is little more than a dormant seed carrying personal identity across the abyss of immateriality. I believe this view is closer to Aristotle - though of course he would never countenance the Resurrection or even the subsistance of pure forms let alone separated souls.

Perhaps this is what you are attempting to say with the tree example. I am not sure.
Regardless, Revelation appears to hold that separated souls are in fact pretty active intellectually. I suggest Aristotelian hylomorphism does not well support such a truth.

They need to rely on phantasms precisely because universals do not exist mind-independently. Your humanity is a form, but it is a concrete, particular form. Humanity as such is a universal form. To say it has instances is to say that there are things with concrete human forms. But none of those concrete human forms are humanity in the abstract.

Of course. But I find the Scholastic insistance that once we somehow come to some direct intuition of essence problematic. Understanding universals, esp essences, is always a work-in-progress. A generalisation may be a good word.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Well, there is knowledge of universals; I would regard that as the broadest category.

One could also argue from the nature of formal thinking. For instance: Consider the fact that any set of physical data is necessarily underdetermined. By this I mean that from a set of physical data, one cannot conclude that it realizes one function to the exclusion to the other. Saul Kripke, for instance, defined “quus” by x (quus) y = x + y if x + y < 57, = 5 otherwise. Quus behaves like plus while its sums are up to 56. For sums larger than 56, though, quus returns 5.

Now consider any physical system that we would ordinarily say “realizes” the addition function. No matter how many (name removed by moderator)uts you test, you will never resolve that the function is not “quus-like.” It is always the case that for some sufficiently large (name removed by moderator)uts, it will not return the sum, but some other (name removed by moderator)ut. This is actually the case of every physical system. (A calculator will, rather than return a sum, return an error message eventually. Even if the power of the were sufficiently strong, which it of course cannot be, the (name removed by moderator)uts it could test would be bounded by the length of the universe.)

The upshot of this is that physical systems cannot realize determinate functions to the exclusions of others.

However, our thinking can exclude determinate functions to the exclusion of others. When we add, we are performing addition, a function defined abstractly for all conceivable (name removed by moderator)uts. We are not performing an operation that for some (name removed by moderator)uts will return a non-sum. So: All physical systems are indeterminate with respect to the realization of abstract functions. Formal thinking can be determinate with respect to the realization of abstract functions. Therefore, formal thinking is not fully realized by a physical system.

This analysis can be extended to various other sorts of functions. For instance, modus ponens is a formal function which takes (name removed by moderator)uts of the form “if p, then q” and “p” and returns “q”. When we do modus ponens, we are undertaking a determinate process that works for any instances of “p” and “q”. But any implementation on a physical system will be indeterminate and, indeed, will not work for all conceivable (name removed by moderator)uts.

Other operations would be included as well. For instance, definition: I define “soul” as “the form of a living body.” When I do so, I am not allowing any exceptions to my definition. But any physical system which does so will inevitably allow exceptions. (One sees that this sort of determinacy is present in all of our rational thinking.)

One can broaden the scope of the argument somewhat. It probably concedes too much to allow that when a calculator “does addition” it is adding two numbers, and will eventually “break down.” The question becomes: what makes what a calculator does addition other than my desire to use the calculator to aid my own addition? I punch buttons which have symbols on them (though the calculator doesn’t “know” what the symbols are or what they represent) and the calculator displays an arabic numeral. But then: what makes it an arabic numeral? There is nothing intrinsic to the display that makes it so; it is my intentions that do so. Further, consider the calculator’s internal operations. When we model computation, we let the presence of voltage at a given logic gate represent “1” and the absence “0”. But this is of course extrinsic to what the calculator is doing.

The same issues crop up at any level. (This is owed to the abstract, general nature of computation.) Syntax is not intrinsic to physics; there is nothing which suggests that syntax emerges from physics as it seems to be a function of our intentions. But our formal mental operations are syntactical and determinate.

PT I appreciate the effort to educate me.
I am unable to comment much on this one because I am too dumb mathematically to even grasp the examples you provide let alone the commentary .

 

[Blue_Horizon]

…How is the phantasm bound up “more deeply” with human intellection than to be necessarily bound up with human intellection, as Aquinas and Aristotle believed it was?

Sorry, I thought it was clear. I believe that modern science now provides us models that may explain human intellective acts on the basis of what you have previously defined as a “material soul” rather than multiplying explanations with an additional “immaterial soul.”

Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas had any comprehension of how matter might provide a knowledge of universals for example. Just as they had no idea of how a heavenly body can move of itself and posited an unnecessary “soul”.

BTW do you believe that the immaterial soul (required to explain the highest rational acts) is empirically falsifiable a la Popper?

Personally I believe the logic that forces us to accept that an uncaused cause must exist behind material change … is far stronger than that which forces us to accept that human intellection must require an immaterial soul. It is interesting that the former is prob not empirically falsifiable.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Here’s a good article on the subject, which introduces rather fine shades of gray in terms of what Aquinas claimed the disembodied soul is capable of understanding naturalistically versus what the disembodied intellect is capable of understanding only with divine aid, as it were.

jp2forum.org/mlib/document/040811wippel-separatedsoul.pdf

To my knowledge, at no time does Aquinas explicitly state, “we cannot know whether the disembodied intellect engages in the operation of understanding or not; all we can know is that, at a minimum, the intellectual soul subsists.” That may be a more modern formulation of the question, since we’ve more scrupulously separated theological evidence from philosophical evidence in a way that Thomas did not. Aquinas doesn’t say we don’t know, or cannot know, whether understanding does or doesn’t occur in a disembodied intellect; he says we do know that intellective soul does subsist and that intellective soul does continue to engage in operations of intellect, albeit differently (which is not necessarily to say “wholly supernaturally”, either). According to some accounts (per the attached article) those operations of understanding are posited to have both a (comparatively more anemic) natural source – making at least a modicum of intellectual understanding still possible, a kind of “intellectual memory” – and a more luxurious supernatural source, also depending also on which writings of Aquinas are being treated (plus, by some accounts, as stated in the article, Aquinas’ own treatment is not always entirely consistent and may have evolved throughout his life).

The lowest common denominator of consensus here seems to be: A. either Thomas never believed and never claimed there was any provable naturalistic basis to continued intellectual operations, independently of the body; or B. if he did claim it, it is not necessarily his strongest argument and remains paradoxical from a purely philosophical perspective, and we must conclude that, though, he did sufficiently demonstrate the intellectual soul’s subsistence, we must suspend judgment on the intellectual soul’s continuing capability of engaging in the activity of understanding.

I have doubts – as you seem to – over whether the “subsisting, even if not active” part of the equation has been demonstrated satisfactorily, but, (as I lack a scientific background) could not cogently dismantle the argument for the immateriality of intellectual operations from a neuroscientific or “other-scientific” perspective. I too would have a problem accepting that an intellective soul continues to exist but may – for all we know – be rendered non-functional (yet with its integrity intact, “undamaged” and ready to be “re-activated” at any time, if ever it were once more given access to its body and to phantasms). I also would be puzzled as to where in the world (quite literally ) the intellective soul would be localized, without a physical body (currently, even if “intellect” is posited to be immaterial and to occupy no space, the seat of its operations are at least diffusely “localized” in the human body and specifically in the top of the head, above the level of the eyes or thereabouts ). If it’s naturalistic, earthly explanations were talking about then heaven, hell, and purgatory are – by definition – supernatural realms and cannot be assumed. But if I couldn’t even make sense of where disembodied intellect would go, (heaven, hell, and purgatory or a Platonic world of Forms being excluded) then I would indeed doubt whether it is “alive and well” somewhere, its integrity unimpaired, even if no longer active or lying dormant.

Thanks very much for this. It is the position I have personally arrived at - but I thought I was going against Aquinas in doing so. Perhaps Aquinas himself is not as adamant on this point as I have understood him to date.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Portofino you may like this commentary by Rickaby SJ on his translation of Aquinas in SCG 3:79 on the Resurrection

*Many of us remain quite unconvinced by these a priori reasons. We believe in the resurrection of the body as a revealed doctrine. … The body will rise again, because God has been pleased to place man in a supernatural state, and in Christ to renew the privileges of that state, one of those privileges being, as St Thomas points out, the final deliverance of the body from death.

Of the three arguments last given in the text, the first two rest upon the assumption that the soul, which is the ‘form’ of the body in man’s mortal life, becomes after death a nude ‘form’ crying for its ‘matter.’

This assumption is not incontrovertible. After death, the change of the soul lifewards can scarcely be less than the change of the body deathwards. The disembodied spirit must be mightily translated to higher existence, if, bereft of its senses, it still lives and energises and understands, and does not lie stunned and dormant, as in a trance, a supposition which no Catholic theologian will allow (see Chap. XCI). Who shall define this higher existence? Who knows and can tell us that such elevation does not mean a fulness of spiritual nature, independent henceforth of matter and organs of sense? But if so
independent, how shall the soul ever return to be the form of a body? It shall not return to be the form of an animal body, but of a spiritual body (1 Cor. xv, 44), that is, of a body entirely subservient to the soul, and no hindrance to its spiritual functions, as St Thomas presently explains (Chap. LXXXVI).

Of the two philosophies that have most affected Christian thought, Platonism makes for the immortality of the soul, but against the resurrection of the body. Aristotelianism raises a difficulty against the immortality of the soul: how shall the ‘form’ continue when the ‘matter’ is gone? ? But that obstacle surmounted, Aristotelianism favours the resurrection, as St Thomas’s arguments show."*

WRT “the disembodied spirit must be mightily translated to higher existence, if, bereft of its senses, it still lives and energises and understands, and does not lie stunned and dormant, as in a trance, a supposition which no Catholic theologian will allow”
I wonder if, as Catholics, we may hold that the soul is in fact dormant?
To me it is more consistant with Aristotle’s concretised hylomorphism.
As Rickaby states, it is only by means of a Platonic take on hylomorphism that we easily grant intellectual acts to disembodied souls.

 

[Portofino]

Portofino you may like this commentary by Rickaby SJ on his translation of Aquinas in SCG 3:79 on the Resurrection

*Many of us remain quite unconvinced by these a priori reasons. We believe in the resurrection of the body as a revealed doctrine. … The body will rise again, because God has been pleased to place man in a supernatural state, and in Christ to renew the privileges of that state, one of those privileges being, as St Thomas points out, the final deliverance of the body from death.

Of the three arguments last given in the text, the first two rest upon the assumption that the soul, which is the ‘form’ of the body in man’s mortal life, becomes after death a nude ‘form’ crying for its ‘matter.’

This assumption is not incontrovertible. After death, the change of the soul lifewards can scarcely be less than the change of the body deathwards. The disembodied spirit must be mightily translated to higher existence, if, bereft of its senses, it still lives and energises and understands, and does not lie stunned and dormant, as in a trance, a supposition which no Catholic theologian will allow (see Chap. XCI). Who shall define this higher existence? Who knows and can tell us that such elevation does not mean a fulness of spiritual nature, independent henceforth of matter and organs of sense? But if so
independent, how shall the soul ever return to be the form of a body? It shall not return to be the form of an animal body, but of a spiritual body (1 Cor. xv, 44), that is, of a body entirely subservient to the soul, and no hindrance to its spiritual functions, as St Thomas presently explains (Chap. LXXXVI).

Of the two philosophies that have most affected Christian thought, Platonism makes for the immortality of the soul, but against the resurrection of the body. Aristotelianism raises a difficulty against the immortality of the soul: how shall the ‘form’ continue when the ‘matter’ is gone? ? But that obstacle surmounted, Aristotelianism favours the resurrection, as St Thomas’s arguments show."*

WRT “the disembodied spirit must be mightily translated to higher existence, if, bereft of its senses, it still lives and energises and understands, and does not lie stunned and dormant, as in a trance, a supposition which no Catholic theologian will allow”
I wonder if, as Catholics, we may hold that the soul is in fact dormant?
To me it is more consistant with Aristotle’s concretised hylomorphism.
As Rickaby states, it is only by means of a Platonic take on hylomorphism that we easily grant intellectual acts to disembodied souls.

Thanks – I really appreciate it I particularly liked the highlighted portion, as it fits with my own intuitive sense of it in terms of a “Aristotelian versus Platonic” orientation. Resurrection of the body is ideally compatible with an Aristotelian orientation, in terms of positing “what a body’s good for” and why it would make sense for a “body and soul reunion” But when we’re talking of a disembodied soul – and especially when we speak of cognition and experiences of a disembodied soul, as per Catholic doctrine, since soul sleep or even holding it out as a possibility is not acceptable in the light of revealed truth-- we are talking of something that Plato would have particularly relished but which might have given the historical Aristotle pause. In fact, he may have suspected it of smacking too much of Platonism

This whole conversation has gotten me to dip into Etienne Gilson’s “Introduction to Thomism” (and I’m proficient enough in French to enjoy it in the original; I find his style to be rather surprisingly unassuming and simple, given the subject matter). I’ve also enjoyed Frederick Copleston’s books, so would be inclined to want to read him on Aquinas, as well.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

This whole conversation has gotten me to dip into Etienne Gilson’s “Introduction to Thomism” (and I’m proficient enough in French to enjoy it in the original; I find his style to be rather surprisingly unassuming and simple, given the subject matter). I’ve also enjoyed Frederick Copleston’s books, so would be inclined to want to read him on Aquinas, as well.

Blast from the past!
You have made me remember I used to spend hrs on the carpeted floor in a remote shelving section of my old Alma Mater in Melbourne reading both these authors! I could never get far with Gilson - prob because something got lost in the English translation which is very bland. Copleston I found very solid but probably more thematic and historical rather than a specialist Scholastic theologian. Just what I needed at the time.

Guys can either of you advise sources of formal Church Teaching which would support Rickaby’s opinion that “…and does not lie stunned and dormant, as in a trance, a supposition which no Catholic theologian will allow …”?

I have always considered Psalm 6:5 fairly clear on the matter, “For in death there is no remembrance of you; in Sheol who can give you praise?” though no doubt other Biblical texts probably contradict this.

 

[polytropos]

I am unable to comment much on this one because I am too dumb mathematically to even grasp the examples you provide let alone the commentary .

I don’t mean to be an obscurantist. Take a piecewise-defined function like absolute value: |x|. It is “piecewise-defined” because how it alters the (name removed by moderator)ut value depends on whether the (name removed by moderator)ut value is positive or negative. (It returns x if x >= 0, -x if x < 0.)

The thrust of the argument is that any function realized in the physical world is indeterminate because on the basis of physical data, it satisfies the conditions of infinitely many piecewise-defined functions. (This is not an issue of knowing which a set of data satisfies, but the fact that it does not satisfy any of them, since its being physical entails that it cannot be differentiated even in principle.) This is not the case, however, with our thinking, which is determinate in that when we perform formal intellective operations, they have determinate semantic content (it is not possible that there is vagueness about which formal intellective operation we are performing, or, at least: it is the case that for some human intellective acts, the nature of the formal thought is not vague). Since no physical system can produce determinate semantic content, our pattern of thinking is not fully physical.

 

[Portofino]

Blast from the past!
You have made me remember I used to spend hrs on the carpeted floor in a remote shelving section of my old Alma Mater in Melbourne reading both these authors! I could never get far with Gilson - prob because something got lost in the English translation which is very bland. Copleston I found very solid but probably more thematic and historical rather than a specialist Scholastic theologian. Just what I needed at the time…

Heh, sounds fun!

Guys can either of you advise sources of formal Church Teaching which would support Rickaby’s opinion that “…and does not lie stunned and dormant, as in a trance, a supposition which no Catholic theologian will allow …”?.

My understanding is the notion of a dormant soul or a soul that has ceased all activity is contradicted by the doctrine of the particular judgment and also of an afterlife experienced in heaven, purgatory, or hell (for example, some of the Protestant Reformers argued for soul sleep precisely as a way of eliminating purgatory from the equation). A beatific vision also would necessitate that the soul possesses awareness and understanding. As we know, Aquinas also speaks of the qualities of the soul’s known existence after death, from a theological standpoint (e.g., a disembodied soul has “more perfect knowledge”).

If the soul were dormant, even praying to a saint would make no sense, unless you were to say, “they are an exception to the rule.” But that would be like adding “Ptolemaic epicycles” to the discussion, in an attempt to reconcile soul sleep with the intercession of the saints. And you would still have the problem of accounting for purgatory and hell – to put it bluntly, how can you suffer in purgatory or hell without knowing that you suffer, or without knowing anything at all?

I don’t there’s philosophic proof adduced to it, though.I think it’s a matter of what would be necessary, given core doctrine. Revelation would thus be compatible neither with the death of the soul – the soul ceasing to exist – nor a soul that continues to exist but lies dormant or has ceased all activities. If one were debating with a secular non-believer, where revelation is not admitted, it would leave one with a double-edged sword of a victory – to get him to admit that the soul survives the death of the body would be a victory; to further grant that there is no reason to believe that, without a body, the soul is capable of thought, feeling, understanding, or perception, would leave one unable to articulate the pragmatic difference between, say, such an afterdeath existence and no existence at all.

I have always considered Psalm 6:5 fairly clear on the matter, “For in death there is no remembrance of you; in Sheol who can give you praise?” though no doubt other Biblical texts probably contradict this.

Yeah, proof-texting can bring some compelling evidence that the notion of soul sleep has a more Hebrew feel to it. You can always argue that the language is metaphorical, of course, as when Jesus says, “I tell you Lazarus is not dead; Lazarus is merely sleeping”. But then one can proof text passages in support of the contrary, like, “I tell you, this day you will be with me in paradise” or when Paul writes, “now I see through a glass, darkly; then, I will see face to face.” In the Scripture and Tradition equation, Tradition would be the final arbiter in this case…

 

[polytropos]

Sorry, I thought it was clear. I believe that modern science now provides us models that may explain human intellective acts on the basis of what you have previously defined as a “material soul” rather than multiplying explanations with an additional “immaterial soul.”

Perhaps someone could adduce an argument to this effect. But I have given an argument to the contrary, and it doesn’t counter my argument to gesture that some scientific model may contradict my argument. There is no such scientific model now, and my argument is to the effect that there could not be one.

My argument is based on principles of the indeterminacy of the physical, which we have (I think) good reason to believe is completely general. It is also the end of one of the best-reputed naturalistic developments of the 20th century (following similar arguments by Wittgenstein, Quine, and Kripke, though they did not apply the argument to the contents of our thoughts).

BTW do you believe that the immaterial soul (required to explain the highest rational acts) is empirically falsifiable a la Popper?

I don’t think so. I have given an argument with either true or false premises. If someone could provide a physical system that can generate determinate semantic content as our minds can, then I would regard it as falsified. But I don’t see how that would be possible, given the nature of the physical. It is essentially a category mistake; the physical world is marked by indeterminacy, and our formal thoughts are not.

But falsifiability is an empty criterion for the truth or sense of a proposition. That non-falsifiable propositions are meaningless or false, for instance, is not itself falsifiable, so it is self-referentially inconsistent. (Not to suggest that you are advocating this sort of criterion for meaning.)

Personally I believe the logic that forces us to accept that an uncaused cause must exist behind material change … is far stronger than that which forces us to accept that human intellection must require an immaterial soul. It is interesting that the former is prob not empirically falsifiable.

Interesting. I actually find the reasoning behind the Thomistic account of the soul (at least as it has been interpreted by many in the recent Thomist tradition) to be rather strong. I think it avoids many of the problems that beset substance/property dualism and materialism. And I think that philosophy of mind today is a very interesting area, and there are a number of people who doubt the materialistic consensus (not limited to those with theistic commitments).

While I do think arguments for an uncaused cause are strong as well, I do have to admit that theists find little sympathy from without.

 

[polytropos]

This whole conversation has gotten me to dip into Etienne Gilson’s “Introduction to Thomism” (and I’m proficient enough in French to enjoy it in the original; I find his style to be rather surprisingly unassuming and simple, given the subject matter). I’ve also enjoyed Frederick Copleston’s books, so would be inclined to want to read him on Aquinas, as well.

Gilson is known for highlighting continuities and discontinuities between Aristotle and Aquinas, as well as between Aquinas and his commentators such as Cajetan. I recall that in his Elements of Christian Philosophy he discusses how Aquinas’s position on subsistent forms was a “departure” from Aristotle. (I say “departure” because it is not a point developed by Aristotle and does not appear to be anything he considered.) Gilson also had a tendency to accentuate the essence-existence/being-esse distinction, which is as well as greater generalization of Aristotle’s teaching, and bears significantly on Aquinas’s views about the possibility of subsistent forms.

Unfortunately I don’t have Gilson’s book on hand at the moment.