On the Immortality of the Soul

[Portofino]

But falsifiability is an empty criterion for the truth or sense of a proposition. That non-falsifiable propositions are meaningless or false, for instance, is not itself falsifiable, so it is self-referentially inconsistent. (Not to suggest that you are advocating this sort of criterion for meaning.)

I don’t think Popper advocated this sort of criterion for truth, either. He respected the difference between analytical propositions – the negation of which would entail a logical absurdity – and synthetic propositions, the negation of which would not entail a logical absurdity. To say “A is not A” (in the same way and in the same respect) is a logical absurdity. To say, on the other hand, “the French Revolution never happened” is not, in and of itself, a logical absurdity. It would take recourse to empirical evidence to settle the issue.

Popper thus wasn’t proposing that “A is A” needs to be falsifiable, in order to be admitted as a true position. For theories involving synthetic propositions, however, he contended that non-falsifiability was a weakness in terms of being able to acquire certainty as to the truth of that proposition. A priori reasoning alone, while it could make a compelling case, could not settle the issue definitively. The same, obviously, would go for the statement “transubstantiation happens.” To say “transubstantiation does not happen” is not a self-refuting statement. Popper would have submitted that, insofar as there’s no way to falsify the “transubstantiation happens” – nothing could disprove transubstantiation, because it is posited to elude sense evidence, there would be no means of an objective verification of this statement, either. The exception would be arguments where it is claimed that a Eucharistic host or some Eucharistic hosts, as analyzed by a laboratory, contained cardiac tissue; the problem Popper would have found with this, I think, is that those Eucharistic hosts which, when analyzed by a laboratory, are not found to contain cardiac tissue, would be said by the proponents of transubstantiation to offer no counter-evidence; the proposition “transubstantiation occurs” is thus unfalsifiable, upon which basis Popper would have described it not as a strength, but a weakness, in terms of attaining to certainty of its truth. He would describe it, non-pejoratively, as an “unscientific proposition.” He had no problem in saying that “A = A” or “1+1=2” are unscientific, or non-scientific propositions, as well. The difference is that “transubstantiation occurs” is not an analytic proposition; it is a synthetic one, the negation of which is not self-refuting. Such a synthetic proposition, according to Popper, is non-verifiable, and parts of its weakness in being non-verifiable is that there are no conditions under which it could be shown to be false (if a theory makes predictions, those predictions are – by nature – falsifiable, and therefore verifiable as well; the theory is putting itself in the line of fire, so to speak). There being “no conditions under which it could be shown to be false” is inherent in the strength of an analytic proposition (A = A); for a synthetic proposition, however (per Popper), there being “no conditions under which it could be shown to be false” – coupled with the fact that positing “it is false” is not itself a self-refuting statement – is a weakness. Theories that stuck their necks out, in terms of making predictions whereby they could be proven wrong (as was the case with Einstein’s relativity theory, no matter how airtight the equations themselves appeared to be, on paper), were posited by Popper as theories which, ironically, were actually capable of verification (as was Einstein’s general relativity theory, through the solar eclipse of 1919 – the theory stuck its neck out, because the predictions it made could have turned out to be false).

The general consensus “out there” in the world seems to be that the proposition “the operations of the intellect are immaterial” is a synthetic proposition as opposed to an analytic one. I admittedly lack the background to make sense of the paragraph in which you demonstrate that intellectual operations must be immaterial in nature, as given the present understanding of what it means to be material. I’d be interested in seeing what those who feel competent to judge would think of this proof you’ve adduced, and whether it really settles the matter in air-tight fashion (if it did, it would no small accomplishment for the Rationalist approach). Other who view the proposition “operations of the intellect are immaterial in nature” to be a synthetic proposition – insofar as they would not posit “operations of the intellect are not immaterial in nature” to be self-refuting – would look to further findings in neuroscience, or would --at most–grant that there are still unsolved problems as regards the nature of thinking and intellection.

But even if we were to affirm “thinking is immaterial in nature,” would there be any of further investigating what that immateriality even means? “Immateriality” is a conceptual category, designating anything that is not material in nature (just as non-French would designate anything other than French – e.g., Irish, English, African, Indian, Chinese, etc.). It’s a negative definition, ironically, as opposed to a positive definition – thus, it is much broader, much more open-ended. Likewise, if I were to make a distinction between “me” (as an individual) and “not me” (countless individuals), the latter category is obviously a much broader category. It tells me what others are not but doesn’t tell me what others, in and of themselves, actually are.

 

[polytropos]

I don’t think Popper advocated this sort of criterion for truth, either. He respected the difference between analytical propositions – the negation of which would entail a logical absurdity – and synthetic propositions, the negation of which would not entail a logical absurdity.

Of course, I don’t think anyone has ever advocated a falsification principle for analytic propositions. Not even the logical positivists.

That does not change the fact that such falsifiability criteria are self-referentially inconsistent, for they are neither analytic nor falsifiable. The statement implies its own, as you say, “weakness in terms of being able to acquire certainty as to the truth of that proposition.”

The general consensus “out there” in the world seems to be that the proposition “the operations of the intellect are immaterial” is a synthetic proposition as opposed to an analytic one.

It is synthetic. (Kind of. I am generally sympathetic with those philosophers who have argued against the meaningfulness of the analytic/synthetic distinction.) I would suggest that it is like the proposition “Water is H2O” (the difference being that the proposition about intellective acts is predicative, the proposition about water is an identity claim.) Immateriality is contained in the essence of the the intellect, but it is certainly something that we learn on the basis of our interactions with the world and ourselves. It is necessarily the case, but not a priori.

We reason in order to recognize the fact. But it is ultimately on the basis of observation that we learn, say, that the physical is by nature underdetermined, and what our minds are capable of. If, say, physical systems were shown to be capable of generating semantic content and of realizing universal functions, then I would say my argument would be falsified. I have no idea what such a system would be like, but that would be an empirical fact that would falsify it. I think one could argue that such a physical system is inconceivable, but that is still on the basis of our interactions with physical systems.

I’d be interested in seeing what those who feel competent to judge would think of this proof you’ve adduced, and whether it really settles the matter in air-tight fashion (if it did, it would no small accomplishment for the Rationalist approach).

Like all arguments in philosophy of mind (or philosophy in general), it is controversial.

But even if we were to affirm “thinking is immaterial in nature,” would there be any of further investigating what that immateriality even means? “Immateriality” is a conceptual category, designating anything that is not material in nature (just as non-French would designate anything other than French – e.g., Irish, English, African, Indian, Chinese, etc.). It’s a negative definition, ironically, as opposed to a positive definition – thus, it is much broader, much more open-ended. Likewise, if I were to make a distinction between “me” (as an individual) and “not me” (countless individuals), the latter category is obviously a much broader category. It tells me what others are not but doesn’t tell me what others, in and of themselves, actually are.

Yes, “immaterial” is a negative definition. The upshot is that, whatever acts of intellection are, they cannot be fully realized by a physical system.

I am certainly interested in a further investigation of what immateriality means. I don’t think that is particularly easy to do, but it is an interesting subject.

 

[vindicated]

I would like to share an experience that I had about thirty years ago. I dream a lot, and usually have excellent recall. They are all normally in color, and include normal earthly people and places. In this instance though, I perceived myself to be in a vast space of light, like the dome of a cathedral. There was a stained glass window to my left. Suddenly, there was a presence there with me. It was my former piano teacher, Sr. Regina. I heard nothing audible, but I felt a sense of love coming from her, and it made me happy. Then all of a sudden, a white dove flew off through the stained glass window. The next day, I was sitting at my mom’s kitchen table, and remarked to her that I had really been neglecting to write to Sr. Regina, and wondered how she was doing. My mother said, " oh my, didn’t you hear? Sr. Regina died last night."
Whoa! Talk about goosebumps. As long as I live, I will forever be convinced that she came to me that night to say goodbye. It was unlike any dream I’d ever had. That personal experience is enough to convince me of our immortality.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

… it doesn’t counter my argument to gesture that some scientific model may contradict my argument. …and my argument is to the effect that there could not be one.

I am not trying to counter your argument or prove you wrong (re immaterial soul).
I am merely saying that the question can reasonably be judged as still open, more so nowadays than Aristotles as the “material soul” option has sophisticated models of understanding not even imagined in those times.

However I do find the view that a “material soul” explanation could never be proven (whether empirically or otherwise) something of a stretch…

I suspect that you may be of this latter opinion because of a certain understanding of what a “material human soul” may actually mean. I suspect different people mean different things by this phrase. Which is how our discussion started (though we never went into detail on this point) .

Material Human Soul
It seems to me that all souls, by definition, are actually immaterial. All forms are immaterial, even a dogs. So it seems what people really mean by “material soul” these days is simply a principle of bodily organisation that does not survive death.

I have no idea if this is what Aristotle meant by the phrase. In fact I do not even know what Greek words are translated by this phrase or how deeply Aristotle was committed to such a concept (afterall even his “immaterial soul” does not survive death either). I cannot easily find any Aristotelian Commentary on this matter.
Are you able to source something?

My argument is based on principles of the indeterminacy of the physical, which we have (I think) good reason to believe is completely general. It is also the end of one of the best-reputed naturalistic developments of the 20th century (following similar arguments by Wittgenstein, Quine, and Kripke, though they did not apply the argument to the contents of our thoughts).

OK. I am really just critiquing Aristotle/Aquinas at this stage.
I don’t find recognition of “universals” via material processes so mysterious as to be impossible.

But falsifiability is an empty criterion for the truth or sense of a proposition. That non-falsifiable propositions are meaningless or false, for instance, is not itself falsifiable, so it is self-referentially inconsistent.

All I would say is that it is a good definition of “scientific truth.”
That is not to say there cannot be other types of truth.
Different types of truth have different levels of applicability and usefulness in day to day living.

I actually find the reasoning behind the Thomistic account of the soul (at least as it has been interpreted by many in the recent Thomist tradition) to be rather strong. I think it avoids many of the problems that beset substance/property dualism and materialism. And I think that philosophy of mind today is a very interesting area, and there are a number of people who doubt the materialistic consensus (not limited to those with theistic commitments).

OK. This assumes that a point of view “that there are no intellective acts in this life essentially independent of body” is intrinsically indicative of persons who hold all the other materialistic positions.
Aquinas’s account of the soul is manifestly problematic when it comes to the separated soul - esp wrt: (a) how it can, unaided, have any intellective acts at all; (b) how to explain multiplicity of disembodied souls without also positing they must differ in essential form.

 

[polytropos]

Material Human Soul
It seems to me that all souls, by definition, are actually immaterial. All forms are immaterial, even a dogs. So it seems what people really mean by “material soul” these days is simply a principle of bodily organisation that does not survive death.

I have no idea if this is what Aristotle meant by the phrase. In fact I do not even know what Greek words are translated by this phrase or how deeply Aristotle was committed to such a concept (afterall even his “immaterial soul” does not survive death either). I cannot easily find any Aristotelian Commentary on this matter.
Are you able to source something?

I think I have touched upon this issue somewhere in this thread. Abstracted forms are immaterial. Particular forms are not necessarily immaterial. As I have defined earlier, a soul is said to be immaterial just in case its highest power is essentially immaterial. (Power just being a disposition to act in a particular way, highest just being that power which entails other “lower” powers.) Here are some comments by David Oderberg, who has probably articulated the most complete Aristotelian-Thomistic hylemorphism in contemporary metaphysics:

Lest it be thought that hylemorphic dualism commits itself to a self-contradictory position concerning the immateriality of what are purely material objects such as tables and chairs, or dogs and cats, it must be emphasized that the theory is not one only about universals but about particulars as well. As abstract objects, universals such as chairness and felinity, and even humanity, are immaterial; they are essences construed metaphysically. If it is correct to say that universals are wholly present wherever and whenever they are instantiated, we are compelled to assign to universals a kind of spatio-temporal location that must still be compatible with their essential immateriality.

Their immateriality, however, does not entail that they can exist without their instances…

Even more important for present purposes, however, is the point that every particular instance of a universal is distinct from the universal itself: the hunger of Felix is a mode (trope) of hunger. Property instances are concrete entities, not abstract ones, and as such are not essentially immaterial, even construed metaphysically. (To call tropes ‘abstract particulars’, as trope theorists do (e.g. Campbell 1990), should be taken to reflect not their immateriality but their being abstractions from the substances in which they inhere.)

… As possessed by a substance, the substantial form is particular, not universal, and concrete, not abstract. If it is immaterial, it will not be because it instantiates an immaterial universal, e.g. human nature or felinity, but rather because there is something about the instances of the relevant universal such that they themselves are properly to be regarded as immaterial. In the human case, this is the idea that the human intellect is immaterial in its essential operations, hence that the physical essence of the human being is immaterial. (emphases Oderberg’s)

In short, to say that the form of a dog is immaterial in the same way human intellective acts are immaterial is an equivocation. All forms qua intellected universal are immaterial, but that is not the relevant sense of form in this discussion. We are concerned with concrete forms.

All I would say is that it is a good definition of “scientific truth.”
That is not to say there cannot be other types of truth.
Different types of truth have different levels of applicability and usefulness in day to day living.

OK.

OK. This assumes that a point of view “that there are no intellective acts in this life essentially independent of body” is intrinsically indicative of persons who hold all the other materialistic positions.

Uhh, I don’t think it does. (I did not intend it to.) There are a lot of positions in contemporary philosophy of mind. I am just saying that my view is the hylemorphism has a pretty good standing. I can’t generalize about the other views. There are too many.

Aquinas’s account of the soul is manifestly problematic when it comes to the separated soul - esp wrt: (a) how it can, unaided, have any intellective acts at all; (b) how to explain multiplicity of disembodied souls without also positing they must differ in essential form.

We have discussed (a) at paralyzing length. Aquinas says different things at different times, apparently. But in several places, we have seen, he cites the need for angels or God for the separated soul to perform intellective acts. I don’t think the other passages rule that out, even if they do not mention it. So I don’t see how (a) is problematic for him; it does not seem like it is an issue he intended to surmount without recourse to revelation.

I don’t see (b) as a prima facie difficulty. It seems only to have force if one is proceeding with the wrong view of forms. We are speaking of forms as particulars. We are not speaking of abstracted intellected forms, nor are we speaking of the Forms of Plato. Human bodies don’t “borrow” from intellectuality in the abstract, so there is no reason to suppose that their intellects, without a principle of matter, collapse into some common, universal intellect.

 

[tonyrey]

I would like to share an experience that I had about thirty years ago. I dream a lot, and usually have excellent recall. They are all normally in color, and include normal earthly people and places. In this instance though, I perceived myself to be in a vast space of light, like the dome of a cathedral. There was a stained glass window to my left. Suddenly, there was a presence there with me. It was my former piano teacher, Sr. Regina. I heard nothing audible, but I felt a sense of love coming from her, and it made me happy. Then all of a sudden, a white dove flew off through the stained glass window. The next day, I was sitting at my mom’s kitchen table, and remarked to her that I had really been neglecting to write to Sr. Regina, and wondered how she was doing. My mother said, " oh my, didn’t you hear? Sr. Regina died last night."
Whoa! Talk about goosebumps. As long as I live, I will forever be convinced that she came to me that night to say goodbye. It was unlike any dream I’d ever had. That personal experience is enough to convince me of our immortality.

Fascinating and far from farfetched!

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Fascinating and far from farfetched!

Yes, and it’s too bad these don’t count as evidence for immortality with many people. They want philosophical certainty rather than experiential certainty. The latter is in my opinion a good deal more convincing than the former for those blessed to have such experiences.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Yes, and it’s too bad these don’t count as evidence for immortality with many people. They want philosophical certainty rather than experiential certainty. The latter is in my opinion a good deal more convincing than the former for those blessed to have such experiences.

I suppose the reticence of many to trust subjective experience is because:
(i) reason tells us, in many cases, that our experience/senses in fact “lie” to us and reality can sometimes be reasonably shown to be non-intuitive.
(ii) Ockam’s razor suggests that if something inexplicable can be explained by a valid material hypothesis (which is in theory falsifiable) rather than a spiritual one (usually not falsifiable) … then chances are that the former is the more reasonable way to go 99% of the time. The Church’s “mystical investigation division” appears to use these principles.

I think it would be fair to say that, all things being equal, this epistemic/analytic framework is biased towards a material explanation of the as-yet-inexplicable. Yet history does suggest there is practical wisdom in this approach.

This may explain why both secular and religious scientific thinkers find it a useful starting point. At least a falsifiable hypothesis (“material” explanation if you will) allows for more constructive dialogue between opposing parties while a non-falsifiable hypothesis (being essentially rationalist in nature) seems unable to do so.

Perhaps at the end of the day a society where opponents have the possibility of proving each other wrong is more “harmonious” and likely to advance than a society where discussion can only end in stalemated and authoritarian hypotheses of “I say” " you say" log jams where nobody can ever be proven wrong.

 

[tonyrey]

I suppose the reticence of many to trust subjective experience is because:
(i) reason tells us, in many cases, that our experience/senses in fact “lie” to us and reality can sometimes be reasonably shown to be non-intuitive.
(ii) Ockam’s razor suggests that if something inexplicable can be explained by a valid material hypothesis (which is in theory falsifiable) rather than a spiritual one (usually not falsifiable) … then chances are that the former is the more reasonable way to go 99% of the time. The Church’s “mystical investigation division” appears to use these principles.

I think it would be fair to say that, all things being equal, this epistemic/analytic framework is biased towards a material explanation of the as-yet-inexplicable. Yet history does suggest there is practical wisdom in this approach.

This may explain why both secular and religious scientific thinkers find it a useful starting point. At least a falsifiable hypothesis (“material” explanation if you will) allows for more constructive dialogue between opposing parties while a non-falsifiable hypothesis (being essentially rationalist in nature) seems unable to do so.

Perhaps at the end of the day a society where opponents have the possibility of proving each other wrong is more “harmonious” and likely to advance than a society where discussion can only end in stalemated and authoritarian hypotheses of “I say” " you say" log jams where nobody can ever be proven wrong.

The most logical starting point for everyone is the reality of our interior life. There is more practical wisdom in that than all the material explanations in the world.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

The most logical starting point for everyone is the reality of our interior life. There is more practical wisdom in that than all the material explanations in the world.

Your contribution reminded me of Aquinas’s introduction to his Summa Contra Gentiles (aimed at assisting Christians in non Christian apologetics) where he takes up your very
concern.

You may find his own words interesting:
*
SCG 1:3 two Modes of Truth
The truths that we confess concerning God fall under two modes. Some things true of God are beyond all the competence of human reason, as that God is Three and One. Other things there are to which even human reason can attain, as the existence and unity of God, which philosophers have proved to a demonstration under the guidance of the light of natural reason. That there are points of absolute intelligibility in God altogether beyond the compass of human reason,
most manifestly appears… The human understanding cannot go so far of its natural power as to grasp His substance, since under the conditions of the present life the knowledge of our understanding commences with sense; and therefore objects beyond sense cannot be grasped by human understanding except so far as knowledge is gathered of them through the senses. …
Nevertheless our understanding is thereby led to some knowledge of God, namely, of His existence and of other attributes that must necessarily be attributed to the First Cause. There are, therefore, some points of intelligibility in God, accessible to human reason…"

** SCG 1:9 The Order and Mode of Procedure in this Work**
THERE is then a twofold sort of truth in things divine for the wise man to study: one
that can be attained by rational enquiry, another that transcends all the industry of reason.
…To the declaration therefore of the first sort of truth we must proceed by demonstrative reasons that may serve to convince the adversary. But because such reasons are not forthcoming for truth of the second sort, our aim ought not to be to convince the adversary by reasons, but to refute his reasonings against the truth …"*

I suppose the whole point of the SCG is to use reason so that we may start dialogue with those who do not accept the Wisdom that comes from faith, as Aquinas also states:

SCG 1:2 The Authors Purpose*
“…Mohammedans and Pagans, do not agree with us in recognising the authority
of any scripture, available for their conviction, as we can argue against the Jews from the Old Testament, and against heretics from the New.
But these receive neither: hence it is necessary to have recourse to natural reason, which all are obliged to assent to…”*

So if everyone had in fact clearly seen the truth that Jesus professed you would be right - we would all start with ourselves and our own interior life.
But insofar as not everyone has heard of Jesus or his Father then we must use the denominator we have in common with all other men and women - the light of natural reason - by which to dialogue with them and so win over those destined for the interior wisdom you speak of.

 

[tonyrey]

Your contribution reminded me of Aquinas’s introduction to his Summa Contra Gentiles (aimed at assisting Christians in non Christian apologetics) where he takes up your very
concern.

You may find his own words interesting:
*
SCG 1:3 two Modes of Truth*
The truths that we confess concerning God fall under two modes. Some things true of God are beyond all the competence of human reason, as that God is Three and One. Other things there are to which even human reason can attain, as the existence and unity of God, which philosophers have proved to a demonstration under the guidance of the light of natural reason. That there are points of absolute intelligibility in God altogether beyond the compass of human reason,
most manifestly appears… The human understanding cannot go so far of its natural power as to grasp His substance, since under the conditions of the present life the knowledge of our understanding commences with sense; and therefore objects beyond sense cannot be grasped by human understanding except so far as knowledge is gathered of them through the senses. …
Nevertheless our understanding is thereby led to some knowledge of God, namely, of His existence and of other attributes that must necessarily be attributed to the First Cause. There are, therefore, some points of intelligibility in God, accessible to human reason…"

** SCG 1:9 The Order and Mode of Procedure in this Work**
THERE is then a twofold sort of truth in things divine for the wise man to study: one
that can be attained by rational enquiry, another that transcends all the industry of reason.
…To the declaration therefore of the first sort of truth we must proceed by demonstrative reasons that may serve to convince the adversary. But because such reasons are not forthcoming for truth of the second sort, our aim ought not to be to convince the adversary by reasons, but to refute his reasonings against the truth …"

I suppose the whole point of the SCG is to use reason so that we may start dialogue with those who do not accept the Wisdom that comes from faith, as Aquinas also states:

SCG 1:2 The Authors Purpose*
“…Mohammedans and Pagans, do not agree with us in recognising the authority
of any scripture, available for their conviction, as we can argue against the Jews from the Old Testament, and against heretics from the New.
But these receive neither: hence it is necessary to have recourse to natural reason, which all are obliged to assent to…”*

So if everyone had in fact clearly seen the truth that Jesus professed you would be right - we would all start with ourselves and our own interior life.
But insofar as not everyone has heard of Jesus or his Father then we must use the denominator we have in common with all other men and women - the light of natural reason - by which to dialogue with them and so win over those destined for the interior wisdom you speak of.

Thank you for those examples of St Thomas’s own wisdom. I believe he is the greatest philosopher of all time because he reconciles the physical and spiritual aspects of reality so logically and convincingly.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

I suppose the reticence of many to trust subjective experience is because:
(i) reason tells us, in many cases, that our experience/senses in fact “lie” to us and reality can sometimes be reasonably shown to be non-intuitive.
(ii) Ockam’s razor suggests that if something inexplicable can be explained by a valid material hypothesis (which is in theory falsifiable) rather than a spiritual one (usually not falsifiable) … then chances are that the former is the more reasonable way to go 99% of the time. The Church’s “mystical investigation division” appears to use these principles.

You are right to say this so far as dialogue between opposing parties is concerned.

However, the conviction of the apostles that they had known the Son of God and had seen his miracles was not for them a subjective one. It cannot be for us a subjective one either when we commune with God and believe it is real communion rather than subjective wishful thinking.

No amount of appealing to Ockham’s razor is going to decide that. And the only way true skeptics can ever believe in Jesus Christ is to throw aside Ockham’s bloody razor.

 

[Counterpoint]

Can it be demonstrated that the soul does indeed survive after death, and doesn’t cease to exist?

The human soul is a subsistent form. As such, it is capable of surviving bodily death. Why? Because there is an asymmetry between act and potency. Act can exist independently of potency (e.g. God is pure act), but potency cannot exist independently of act. Form is a kind of act and matter is kind of potency. So, the same holds true for form and matter. That is, form can exist independently of matter, but matter cannot exist independently of form.

Also, keep in mind that human beings are endowed with both intellect and will. The intellect can perceive abstractions while the senses can only perceive physical things. What this means is that the intellect is immaterial and cannot be reduced to sensation.

“The intellect…grasps objects universal and incorporeal” - St. Thomas Aquinas (SCG II.67.3).

“Free will is the cause of its own movement, because by this free will man moves himself to act.” - St. Thomas Aquinas (ST I.83.1)

If the soul can be held to subsist after death, how is the soul individuated? For in the classical metaphysics it is matter which individuates the form/soul, how can the soul be individuated if it is not united to matter?

A person is both soul (form) and body (matter). Catholicism believes in the resurrection of the body which requires divine intervention.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

However, the conviction of the apostles that they had known the Son of God and had seen his miracles was not for them a subjective one. It cannot be for us a subjective one either when we commune with God and believe it is real communion rather than subjective wishful thinking.

Its an interesting question.
I suppose it comes down to what was traditionally called “motives of credibility”.
The basic premise being that there is an impassable gulf between reason (objective) and faith (subjective). However, in Catholicism, reason has never been seen as an intrinsic obstacle to faith - quite the opposite, it can be a springboard.

Reason, especially in the face of miracles, even by Ockam’s razor, is suggestive of the reasonability of faith.

However I believe that perasonal faith itself can never break free of what you probab;ly mean by “subjectivity.” Miracles do not prove faith. If this were so then Jesus would never have said to Thomas, “you believe because you have seen.” What did Thomas now believe in? Surely not Jesus’s resurrection (he saw him with his own eyes, there is nothing to believe). However this miracle served as a springboard to belief in something else … Jesus as the Messiah, the Holy One sent by God, indeed God himself. So even the miracle of the Resurrection does not prove Jesus is God - it is a springboard that points to the reasonability of leaping to that proposition in faith. This belief, while it can be judged reasonable if the resurrection actually happened, is not itself able to be proven - so in this sense such faith is still personal and subjective, not objective.

Hence, in the absence of miracles comparable to those of Apostolic times, there is lessculpability in those who hear the Word but are not convinced enough to believe. But the greater the miracle the greater the risk of sinning by not believing - for in the face of miracles reason itself testifies that faith is reasonable. And Jesus own words appear to bear this out.

Aquinas asserts that the survival and blossoming of the Church is itself God’s modern miracle for enabling a reasonable leap of faith. Hmmmn. A lot of us would find that rather hard to sustain these days.

It is also interesting to note that only followers/believers saw the risen Jesus. There seems to be no report that anyone opposed to him in life ever saw him risen.

 

[Counterpoint]

There is an alternative school of thought - namely, the belief in the soul’s immortality is the source of our suffering.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Abstracted forms are immaterial.

Of course they are. This is an apriori analytic statement.

As I have defined earlier, a soul is said to be immaterial just in case its highest power is essentially immaterial. (Power just being a disposition to act in a particular way, highest just being that power which entails other “lower” powers.) Here are some comments by David Oderberg, who has probably articulated the most complete Aristotelian-Thomistic hylemorphism in contemporary metaphysics:

I was really looking for Aristotle’s understanding of “immaterial soul” not Aquinas’s. I believe the two are quite different. But Oderberg’s quote is intgeresting. In the end though this does not seem to actually define “immaterial”. Yes it says a bit about what it is not (it is not about the immateriality of abstracted universals). Yes it seems to say immateriality is about existing without an instance…but if so then that seems to be Aquinas not Aristotle. I want to understand what Aristotle meant by “immaterial soul.”
Did he ever use that phrase?

BH: OK. This assumes that a point of view “that there are no intellective acts in this life essentially independent of body” is intrinsically indicative of persons who hold all the other materialistic positions.

PT: Uhh, I don’t think it does. (I did not intend it to.) There are a lot of positions in contemporary philosophy of mind. I am just saying that my view is the hylemorphism has a pretty good standing.

You originally mentioned “I think the Thomistic account of the soul avoids many of the problems that beset …materialism.” I do not quite see that denying Aquinas’s understanding of intellective acts as independent of the body necessarily leads to materialism where soul is also denied.

We have discussed (a) at paralyzing length. Aquinas says different things at different times, apparently. But in several places, we have seen, he cites the need for angels or God for the separated soul to perform intellective acts. I don’t think the other passages rule that out, even if they do not mention it. So I don’t see how (a) is problematic for him; it does not seem like it is an issue he intended to surmount without recourse to revelation.

I don’t think either Portofino or myself experienced this as paralyzing . In fact it revealed Aquinas had problems with his own position if anything. Ockam’s razor suggests that when you start positing outside “fixes” (like god or angels) to preserve a novel position…maybe that position is over-complicated if not plain weak .

I don’t see (b) as a prima facie difficulty. It seems only to have force if one is proceeding with the wrong view of forms. We are speaking of forms as particulars. We are not speaking of abstracted intellected forms, nor are we speaking of the Forms of Plato. Human bodies don’t “borrow” from intellectuality in the abstract, so there is no reason to suppose that their intellects, without a principle of matter, collapse into some common, universal intellect.

I don’t see how “we are speaking of forms as particulars” if we are speaking of separated souls which are indeed forms without matter. Matter is the principle of individuation. No matter, no multiplicity (except on the basis of differences in essential form). Where is my understanding mistaken?

 

[polytropos]

I was really looking for Aristotle’s understanding of “immaterial soul” not Aquinas’s. I believe the two are quite different. But Oderberg’s quote is intgeresting. In the end though this does not seem to actually define “immaterial”. Yes it says a bit about what it is not (it is not about the immateriality of abstracted universals). Yes it seems to say immateriality is about existing without an instance…but if so then that seems to be Aquinas not Aristotle. I want to understand what Aristotle meant by “immaterial soul.”
Did he ever use that phrase?

I think we have different interests here. I am interested in whether or not there exists a coherent hylemorphic account, and you seem to be interested in exegesis, which I don’t think I can help you with. I am not particularly bothered if Aristotle or Aquinas do not use a phrase that their interpreters have, since both of them changed some views over time and both of whose works are limited presentations of their complete views (Aristotle’s being like lecture notes, Aquinas’s, in standard scholastic fashion, touching upon major points while most debate was had in person).

Oderberg is distinguishing two senses of immaterial with respect to forms. All forms are immaterial1 (as abstracted, they exist as mind-dependent, intentional, universal entities, and do not need to be instantiated to exist in this way). Some forms are immaterial2 if “because there is something about the instances of the relevant universal such that they themselves are properly to be regarded as immaterial. In the human case, this is the idea that the human intellect is immaterial in its essential operations, hence that the physical essence of the human being is immaterial.”

But those are “different” forms we are talking about. Treeness and humanity are both immaterial1. That does not interest us. Treeness is material2; there is nothing about its instances that requires that we regard it as immaterial2. Humanity is immaterial2, however.

To restate, “As I have defined earlier, a soul is said to be immaterial just in case its highest power is essentially immaterial. (Power just being a disposition to act in a particular way, highest just being that power which entails other “lower” powers.)” Oderberg gives a similar definition, not in the part where I quoted him. If you are interested I can dig it up.

You originally mentioned “I think the Thomistic account of the soul avoids many of the problems that beset …materialism.” I do not quite see that denying Aquinas’s understanding of intellective acts as independent of the body necessarily leads to materialism where soul is also denied.

I don’t either. I said that I thought that the account avoided problems with substance dualism, property dualism, and materialism, which are the dominant positions in philosophy of mind today. Obviously one is not bound to be a hylemorphic dualist as the only alternative to materialism. As I said, there are lots of positions in philosophy of mind. It would be silly to attempt to canvass them here.

Ockam’s razor suggests that when you start positing outside “fixes” (like god or angels) to preserve a novel position…maybe that position is over-complicated if not plain weak .

Who says that they are “fixes”? You speak as though Aquinas started with some goal in mind, got as far as he could with philosophy, and then tried to patch up the holes with theology. That does not seem to me to be a charitable interpretation. I think it is simply a fact that a disembodied soul is in certain ways limited by not having a body. That is just its natural situation, according to philosophical analysis. Without revelation, we do not have a reason to suppose that it is in the position more consonant with Christian theology of the afterlife. I don’t see where the problem is.

You could say that the theological additions are extraneous as well. But on that principle, it seems like we would reject revelation wholesale as unparsimonious.

I don’t see how “we are speaking of forms as particulars” if we are speaking of separated souls which are indeed forms without matter. Matter is the principle of individuation. No matter, no multiplicity (except on the basis of differences in essential form). Where is my understanding mistaken?

The souls were individuated when they were instantiated in matter. What is your argument to the effect that the principle of individuation has to be present at all times, and without it, souls will somehow collapse together?

 

[tonyrey]

A person is both soul (form) and body (matter). Catholicism believes in the resurrection of the body which requires divine intervention.

Without divine intervention God would be the apotheosis of inaction!

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I think we have different interests here. I am interested in whether or not there exists a coherent hylemorphic account, and you seem to be interested in exegesis, which I don’t think I can help you with.** I am not particularly bothered if Aristotle or Aquinas do not use a phrase that their interpreters have**, since both of them changed some views over time and both of whose works are limited presentations of their complete views (Aristotle’s being like lecture notes, Aquinas’s, in standard scholastic fashion, touching upon major points while most debate was had in person).

Cheers, that is exactly what I suspected…“immaterial soul” was coined by their interpreters . And the reason I suspected this is because I believe I understand their system’s well enough to know they would never have intentionally coined such a phrase. Apologies if I had to drag this one out - it was my original question afterall.

Oderberg is distinguishing two senses of immaterial with respect to forms. All forms are immaterial1 (as abstracted, they exist as mind-dependent, intentional, universal entities, and do not need to be instantiated to exist in this way).

Hmmnn. Not sure I agree. That we cannot deal in these forms without a phantasm suggests the phantasm is somehow a reference/pointer type stand-in for the missing “instance”? Hence they still need to be “instantiated” to exist - though obviously they exist instantiated a way different from what the senses perceive.

Some forms are immaterial2 if “because there is something about the instances of the relevant universal such that they themselves are properly to be regarded as immaterial. In the human case, this is the idea that the human intellect is immaterial in its essential operations, hence that the physical essence of the human being is immaterial.”

Yes I understand the two asserted equivocal differences as noted prev.
As noted above I find the above to be a mere assertion with no intrinsic logic.
I appreciate your putting it into your own words but I find "*physical *essence…is immaterial " to be a somewhat contradictory and confusing.

But further, isn’t there a third meaning of immaterial here?
The soul of a dog is just as immaterial as that of a human (though you would say the human soul is “properly” immaterial). Now the dog’s soul is immaterial in a different way than immaterial1 (abstracted universals). It is the unseen teleological principle that unifies all the biological processes of the matter that is the dog. Yet it is real, and it isn’t immaterial2 from what I can see.

But those are “different” forms we are talking about. Treeness and humanity are both immaterial1. That does not interest us. Treeness is material2; there is nothing about its instances that requires that we regard it as immaterial2. Humanity is immaterial2, however.

You’ve lost me. Where did material2 come from and what does it mean?

Originally Posted by Blue Horizon
You originally mentioned “I think the Thomistic account of the soul avoids many of the problems that beset …materialism.” I do not quite see that denying Aquinas’s understanding of intellective acts as independent of the body necessarily leads to materialism where soul is also denied.

I don’t either. I said that I thought that the account avoided problems with substance dualism, property dualism, and materialism…

OK. I just don’t understand why you mentioned dualism/materialism when directly commenting on me when I said “I believe the logic…[is weak] which forces us to accept that human intellection must require an immaterial soul…”

Continued below…

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Who says that they are “fixes”? You speak as though Aquinas started with some goal in mind, got as far as he could with philosophy, and then tried to patch up the holes with theology. That does not seem to me to be a charitable interpretation. I think it is simply a fact that a disembodied soul is in certain ways limited by not having a body. That is just its natural situation, according to philosophical analysis. Without revelation, we do not have a reason to suppose that it is in the position more consonant with Christian theology of the afterlife. I don’t see where the problem is.

I am saying little more than Rickaby. Why would you think the above objectively based observation is uncharitable? The whole point of talking about form/nature/essence etc is to explain reality/change/causality etc without recourse to the all-purpose glue of the “God of the gaps” which make any old superstition “work.”

And when someone keeps changing their solutions for the difficult points that there system doesn’t quite explain…yes experience tells me they too are at a bit of a loss in those areas. All the more so when those messy “fix” explanations are extrinsic to the very principles they use to tidily explain/encapsulate a messy reality to start with.

That is why I find it hard to agree with you that Aquinas’s use of hylomorphism is a good fit for both this life and the next as christians understand it. If the next-life was more like Aristotle’s culture understood it (the sleepy underworld of Hades) then hylomorphism would then be a very good fit I think.

What is your argument to the effect that the principle of individuation has to be present at all times, and without it, souls will somehow collapse together?

It isn’t my argument it is Aquinas’s as I understand it. Aquinas asserts that immaterial forms can only be individuated by difference in essential form. Separated souls, in Aquinas’s view, are in this regard in the same boat as angels (no matter is present). Yet they are different from angels so far as the essence of the form is concerned. The essence is the same. I do not understand how these separated souls can therefore be understood as immateriallty multiple which Revelation obviously requires?
It is not enough to say that each soul/form, though essentially the same, is oriented to matter. Matter has to be actually present for individuation to occur. Neither can we appear to say that separated souls have different forms - then they would not be of the same human species. Perhaps we can say the forms are accidentally different, not substantially different. But I am not sure I even know what that might mean!