On the Immortality of the Soul

[Portofino]

Do they continue to exist, individuated? That is what I submit is the only possibility, given the falsity of the other two disjuncts.?

The more I think about it, the more I think that what separates the “temperament” or “personality” or “flavoring” of blue horizon vs. polytropos vs. portofino has to do with non-intellective parts of the human personality – those having to do with temperament, taste, style, or emotional constitution. If those cannot clearly exist independently of being instantiated in matter – unlike intellective soul – then I would indeed posit that disembodied intellective soul may be without “personality” or “temperament” or “individual flavor” and, in this sense, one disembodied intellect may be indistinguishable from other disembodied intellects.

That is, disembodied intellect may be separate in the case of distinct – kept separated-- but nonetheless may be all but identical in nature to other disembodied intellect (like a replication of something – a photocopy or clone of sorts, based on an identical pattern). In other words, disembodied Blue Horizon intellect may be distinct from disembodied polytropos intellect – not merging together, as it were – but nonetheless without distinctive qualities that one could articulate (similar to there being no discernible personality in a correct mathematical equation as written out by one individual, versus another; there is a universality in the intellectual operation, in that sense). Thus, distinct in terms of “kept separate, kept separated”, but not distinct in term of any qualities that could be ascribed to them. The reason I can tell the difference between the operation of intellect of one individual, versus another is the peculiar style of a human personality, a peculiar temperament. Yet these things do not clearly exist indpendently of the vegetative or animal aspects of a human existence (anyone who has had more than one cat knows that cats have different personalities or temperaments, having nothing to with intellect, per se). Ironically, one remain distinct in the sense of separated – computer A versus computer B, or adding machine A versus adding machine B – and still be otherwise indistinguishable. The “snowflake” aspect of an individual human personality – its non-replicability, its inimitability – is more manifest, I submit, in the emotional, temperamental, aesthetic aspects of the human person.

 

[polytropos]

Would it then, be accurate to say that the human being has different kinds of “souls”? Or different kinds of “forms”? It sounds as if Aquinas is saying, "one aspect of the form of the body survives death – namely, the intellect – while other aspects of the form of the body do not (for example, the vegetative and appetitive aspects of the form of the body).

This is a confusing concept because it complicates the distinction between form (singular) and matter (singular). It makes form into a plurality and even, arguably, makes “soul” into something of a plurality – a human person has souls, including an intellective human soul-- or a human person has forms, including an intellective form that is separable from matter.

I would intuitively think of “soul” as something that is more of a unity and does not admit of such splitting or division. Yet it would seem that some aspects of the “form” of the body – those aspects that humans have in common with animals or plants – are inseparable from material instantiation, while one other (the intellect) is not inseparable – and that both soul and form are, indeed, when posited of the human being, posited in the plural.

To answer your first question, no, I do not think it would be accurate to say that a human being has different kinds of souls.

This is a basic feature of a hylemorphic account of substances. Substances are unified by their forms, which correspond to various “specifying potentialities” (ie. powers, dispositions to act). The forms of bears, for example, have both vegetative and appetitive powers. That does not mean that they have both a vegetative and appetitive soul; they just have one soul that has both powers.

The case is the same with humans. Humans have one soul that has vegetative, appetitive, and rational capacities. The former two can perhaps only be actualized when embodied, but it is a single form that has all of the specifying powers, and that same form which persists. It would be at odds with the hylemorphic analysis elsewhere to start dividing up forms.

(One would essentially be designating separate substantial forms for each property, which in the Aristotelian account is an essential accident. Since “vegetative,” “appetitive,” and “rational” are all somewhat general designations, ie. they refer to a group of similar powers, taking this “formal-pluralistic” approach would lead to absurdity, as we’d seem to be positing a huge number of forms for each substance, which clearly is not the intent. In effect, it would perhaps be a denial of substantial forms in favor of only accidental forms, in which case the hylemorphic account loses its explanatory power with respect to natural kinds. We would be left with a “bundle theory” of natural substances.)

 

[Portofino]

Humans have one soul that has vegetative, appetitive, and rational capacities. The former two can perhaps only be actualized when embodied, but it is a single form that has all of the specifying powers, and that same form which persists…)

This seems a stretch, to me, as the vegetative form of plants does not persist; nor does the vegetative or appetitive form of animals persist; yet hylomorphism would be positing that, because the rational form persists in humans, so too does the vegetative and appetitive forms (even if they are not actualized). It would thus be not only the rational form of humans that is special, but also their vegetative and appetitive forms, as well, in the sense that “vegetative form as found in humans” and “appetitive form as found in humans” can persist after the dissolution of the body, whereas vegetative form and appetitive form in plants or animals cannot. Colloquially put, vegetative and appetitive are piggy-backing on the survival of “intellective.” One could just as well argue that, because human beings are indeed a special case, intellective form survives even though appetitive and vegetative do not.

 

[polytropos]

This seems a stretch, to me, as the vegetative form of plants does not persist; nor does the vegetative or appetitive form of animals persist; yet hylomorphism would be positing that, because the rational form persists in humans, so too does the vegetative and appetitive forms (even if they are not actualized). It would thus be not only the rational form of humans that is special, but also their vegetative and appetitive forms, as well, in the sense that “vegetative form as found in humans” and “appetitive form as found in humans” can persist after the dissolution of the body, whereas vegetative form and appetitive form in plants or animals cannot. Colloquially put, vegetative and appetitive are piggy-backing on the survival of “intellective.” One could just as well argue that, because human beings are indeed a special case, intellective form survives even though appetitive and vegetative do not.

First, I would repeat that I don’t accept the language of “rational form” as opposed to “vegetative and appetitive forms” in humans; they are the same, single form.

The disembodied human soul persists because the intellect has no bodily organ. The question is: is it just intellective powers that survive, or do the vegetative and appetitive powers survive as well? Can sense be made of whether or not they persist, though inactive?

I would say yes, simply as an extension of a more basic feature of the theory of forms. If I am wounded in battle, and the surgeon must amputate both of my legs, I no longer have the power to walk. But I’m still human; I still have a human form, which itself has the power of walking. That power just is not active in me anymore. If I were to die and receive a new body, then I might be able to exercise the power again. But powers are inherent in forms irrespective of whether they can be exercised.

So there is nothing odd about humans having a single, rational form (which likewise has vegetative and appetitive powers). The vegetative powers and appetitive powers will not be exercised without a body, but the form still has them.

The reason they persist is that the form persists, and the reason the form persists is that it is a rational soul. The vegetative and appetitive powers of animals do not persist simply because the form doesn’t persist. (But a bear still has one form, which is both vegetative and appetitive.)

 

[Blue_Horizon]

This is all assuming that my disjunction is complete. If you suggest a fourth possibility, then that would have to be argued against as well.

Exactly, you hold that of the alleged 3 disjuncts the one of Aquinas is correct only because the other two cannot. This is not perfect logic.

There is always a disjunct+1 … i.e. that which is completely outside the “Venn Diagram Set” completely as it were. In other words I say that all disjuncts are significantly imperfect. Therefore I must conclude the frame of reference (ie hylomorphism) unaided is not good enough to explain all the truths that both sense and revelation asks of Catholics.
Yes, agreed, Aquinas’s system is the best of the three by far, but it still has holes.

This is what I have been saying all along. That is, Hylemorphism is weak on this point.
Its a bit sad that we can only say Aquinas is right on this point because the other possibilities are clearly wrong. Your “disjunct” logic only seems to work if we do not question the adequacy of hylomorphism on this point to start with. In which case hylomorphism on this point will never be falsifiable for you.

As I expressed earlier in this thread, I am not so sure about the necessity of positing a separate species for each angel, although I have not read up on it sufficiently.

Oh dear. I never saw you say such a thing below. If so we probably cannot discuss Aquinas further on this point until you have read up on it. It is a core conclusion deriving from Aquinas’s understanding of individuation. Now I understand why you do not see the problem. The very problem is that identical substances (ie forms without matter) cannot have separate acts of existence - at least according to Aquinas.

If you can prove me wrong on that I would be grateful because it has been a block to my resolving hylomorphism and the credible individuation of separated souls in Aquinas for a long time.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Also, the soul still contains all the individual memories, experiences, vices and virtues of the particular individual. Since it is still the soul OF a particular person, it is different from all other souls.

Yes, revelation forces us to accept this truth.
But, is hylomorphism (Aquinas’s variety) actually adequate to this task?

You are in fact saying that every separated soul is in fact different from every other SS.
Just like angels which do not in fact belong to the same species. Each is its own species for “angel” defines a genus (perhaps “office”) according to Aquinas.
How then are separated souls of the same essential species (“human”)?

So it seems we must posit that SSs are essentially the same but different due to accidental modifications.

But how does this work? I believe Aristotle founded the difference between human individuals solely on the basis of the accidental modification of the potentiality inherent in cojoined matter.

If we say these accidental differences after death are somehow retained in the soul then whence the potentiality in the separated form that can be modified per accidens? Aristotle never dreamt of such an understanding of hylomorphism (that is why he did not believe in immortality I suppose).
We are in totally unchartered territory. There is no evidence in sensible experience that demands such is even possible let alone to be logically inferred. I accept it may not absolutely contradict Aristotelian hylomorphism but if we start speaking of some potentiality in form itself then are we not talking “spiritual matter”? If so we are now entering Bonaventurian Theology.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

• Forms are not material causes and so all forms could be said to be “immaterial” in some sense

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Would it then, be accurate to say that the human being has different kinds of “souls”? Or different kinds of “forms”? It sounds as if Aquinas is saying, "one aspect of the form of the body survives death – namely, the intellect – while other aspects of the form of the body do not (for example, the vegetative and appetitive aspects of the form of the body).

This is a confusing concept because it complicates the distinction between form (singular) and matter (singular). It makes form into a plurality and even, arguably, makes “soul” into something of a plurality – a human person has souls, including an intellective human soul-- or a human person has forms, including an intellective form that is separable from matter.

I would intuitively think of “soul” as something that is more of a unity and does not admit of such splitting or division. Yet it would seem that some aspects of the “form” of the body – those aspects that humans have in common with animals or plants – are inseparable from material instantiation, while one other (the intellect) is not inseparable – and that both soul and form are, indeed, when posited of the human being, posited in the plural.

This would not be Aristotle but it would be close to Scotus’s understanding of hylomorphism where there are subordinate “layers” of matter/form united by a top dog form. This better explains how at death of the “top dog” form the usual suspect lesser subsumed forms logically re-assert themselves.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

First, I would repeat that I don’t accept the language of “rational form” as opposed to “vegetative and appetitive forms” in humans; they are the same, single form.

The disembodied human soul persists because the intellect has no bodily organ. The question is: is it just intellective powers that survive, or do the vegetative and appetitive powers survive as well? Can sense be made of whether or not they persist, though inactive?

I would say yes, simply as an extension of a more basic feature of the theory of forms. If I am wounded in battle, and the surgeon must amputate both of my legs, I no longer have the power to walk. But I’m still human; I still have a human form, which itself has the power of walking. That power just is not active in me anymore. If I were to die and receive a new body, then I might be able to exercise the power again. But powers are inherent in forms irrespective of whether they can be exercised.

So there is nothing odd about humans having a single, rational form (which likewise has vegetative and appetitive powers). The vegetative powers and appetitive powers will not be exercised without a body, but the form still has them.

The reason they persist is that the form persists, and the reason the form persists is that it is a rational soul. The vegetative and appetitive powers of animals do not persist simply because the form doesn’t persist. (But a bear still has one form, which is both vegetative and appetitive.)

Largely agreed but Portofino does point to some easily glossed over difficulties.
Why is the human soul called a “rational soul” more than a “human soul”? Some authors go on about the power of the Intellect as if this power is the soul itself.
Obviously the soul is a whole and so always retains its vegetative and sentient powers even if these cannot be exercised (that is pretty much the definition of a “power” and why it is posited in the first place).

I believe Portofino is right when he says that many authors seem to think that the veg and sent powers hitch a free ride of immortality on the back of the intellective power.
It is a problem because I believe it isn’t true. It is the human soul as a whole that is immortal by nature - just as its nature is also to have an intellective power.

 

[polytropos]

PT this appears sheer sophistry .
Form by definition is a co-substantal principle of existence and so stands over and against matter as immaterial by its very nature. But above you will only grudgingly allowing “form” to be called “non-material (immaterial).” This endeavour seems strange.

Sheer sophistry? I am agreeing with you that forms are by definition immaterial. As such, if we are using “immaterial” in that sense, then it adds nothing to add the differentia “immaterial” to “form.” So clearly when I speak of immaterial versus material souls I am talking about something else.

Of course. It would be interesting whether they both would still say this if they understood the brain is in fact related somehow to intellect (as sense organs to appetitive powers) in ways their science never realised.

Interesting, but not really relevant to the truth or falsity of their claims. The arguments they gave to the effect that the intellect has no bodily organ had to do with the nature of intellective acts; association with the brain does not undermine them.

It is impossible, of course, to say whether Aristotle and Aquinas would still be Aristotelians if they grew up in a contemporary philosophical milieu. But that gives us no basis for rejecting their arguments.

That is your and Oderbergs interpretation. I think the more widely acceptable one would be that the human soul has advanced powers that animal souls do not. (The human soul is the seat of the intellect not the intellect itself).

I am sure Oderberg can make a logical and consistent case for defining things how he likes. I am making a practical judgement that neither Aristotle nor Aquinas in fact do so and would not do so because it is in fact a subtle distortion of their system as I have suggested above.

Moreover, any cognitive faculty exercises its power of knowing in accord with the way the species of the object known is in it, for this is its principle of knowing. But the intellect knows things in an immaterial fashion, even those things that are by nature material; it abstracts a universal form from its individuating material conditions. Therefore the species of the object known cannot exist in the intellect materially; and so it is not received into a bodily organ, seeing that every bodily organ is material. (CT 79)

A necessary consequence of the foregoing doctrine is that the intellect whereby man understands is incorruptible. Every being acts in a way that is conformable to its existence. The intellect has an activity which it does not share with the body, as we have proved. This shows that it can act by itself. Hence it is a substance subsisting in its own being. But, as was pointed out above, intellectual substances are incorruptible.” Accordingly the intellect whereby man understands is incorruptible.

Again, the proper subject of generation and corruption is matter. Hence a thing is immune to corruption to the extent that it is free from matter. Things composed of matter and form are per se corruptible; material forms are corruptible indirectly (per accidens), though not per se. Immaterial forms, which are above material conditions, are wholly incorruptible. The intellect by its very nature is elevated completely beyond matter, as its activity shows: we do not understand anything unless we separate it from matter. Consequently the intellect is by nature incorruptible. (CT 84)

The human soul does have advanced powers that animal souls do not. Those powers are precisely immaterial. Furthermore, Aquinas does distinguish between material and immaterial forms. Substances composed of matter and form can be corrupted. The corruption is of substances, however; a substance with a material form is a substance with a form that, when the substance corrupts, the form does as well. A substance with an immaterial form is a substance with a form that, when the substance corrupts, the form does not.

His usage of course is reminiscent of Oderberg’s. But that is no surprise, as Oderberg is a pretty orthodox Thomist.

 

[polytropos]

Yes all forms are by definition immaterial. I think it is well known that form as “soul” is really only applied to living substances so yes that seems to extend to vegetative souls. Aristotle/Aquinas seem to have qualitative gradations between these immaterial souls with each grade aquiring additional sensitive or intellective powers in addition to that of “life” which is the root meaning/power of “soul” I suppose. Evidently these different gradations imply different types of souls, all of which are immaterial. The soul of man, in Christian understanding, is immortal. Why we do not know, it is primarily a fact of revelation/tradition (NT rather than OT). Aquinas posits an intimate connection between immortality and souls with the power of intellection.

As we see above, there is of course the simple sense in which all forms are immaterial because they are forms and not matter. But Aquinas does distinguish between material and immaterial forms, on the basis of whether or not their subsistence depends on matter, according to their operations.

So while Christians do take the immortality of a soul as a datum, Aquinas also claims that it is rationally demonstrable.

BTW I found an interesting quote wrt Descartes who violently opposed Aquinas - and took for granted Aquinas’s view on the point I have been opining. The following is obviously anti-Catholic Theosophy, but even the author accepts that Aquinas holds the position I maintain (that animal souls are immaterial). Lots of other things below do not necessarily follow from this (eg immateriality implies immortality or equality between man and animal souls).

*"Descartes very reasonably remarks: “if the soul of the animal is so distinct (in its immateriality) from its body, we believe it hardly possible to avoid recognizing it as a spiritual principle, hence–an intelligent one.”

The reader need hardly be reminded that Descartes held the living animal as being simply an automaton, a “well wound up clock-work,” according to Malebranche. …But if the animal is an “automaton,” why not Man? … Thus we find metaphysical Descartes as inconsistent as any one.

But what does St. Thomas say to this? Allowing a soul (anima) to the brute, and declaring it immaterial, he refuses it at the same time the qualification of spiritual. Because, he says: “it would in such case imply intelligence, a virtue and a special operation reserved only for the human soul.” But as at the fourth Council of Lateran it had been decided that "God had created two distinct substances, the corporeal (mundanam) and the spiritual (spiritualem), and that something incorporeal must be of necessity spiritual St. Thomas had to resort to a kind of compromise, which can avoid being called a subterfuge only when performed by a saint. He says: "This soul of the brute is neither spirit, nor body; it is of a middle nature.“9
This is a very unfortunate statement. For elsewhere, St. Thomas says that “all the souls–even those of plants–have the substantial form of their bodies,” and if this is true of plants, why not of animals? It is certainly neither “spirit” nor pure matter, but of that essence which St. Thomas calls “a middle nature.” But why, once on the right path, deny it survivance–let alone immortality? The contradiction is so flagrant that De Mirville in despair exclaims, “Here we are, in the presence of three substances, instead of the two, as decreed by the Lateran Council!”, …
For, if the soul of the animal is, as the Roman Church teaches, an informal, immaterial principle, then…”*

I am a little confused on context here. But it seems like this is an equivocation on “immaterial.” The animal soul is immaterial1, like all forms. But it isn’t immaterial2, like human forms, because it isn’t intelligent, and so it ain’t spiritual. (I don’t know if my numbering here is consistent with what I used earlier in the thread; I am just drawing a distinction.)

I think Descartes was obviously wrong to regard animals as automata. I of course cannot verify that my dog has experiences, but I am pretty certain. I do not think those experiences are intelligent, though, which is why man is spiritual but dogs are not.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I am a little confused on context here. But it seems like this is an equivocation on “immaterial.” The animal soul is immaterial1, like all forms. But it isn’t immaterial2, like human forms, because it isn’t intelligent, and so it ain’t spiritual. (I don’t know if my numbering here is consistent with what I used earlier in the thread; I am just drawing a distinction.)

I think Descartes was obviously wrong to regard animals as automata. I of course cannot verify that my dog has experiences, but I am pretty certain. I do not think those experiences are intelligent, though, which is why man is spiritual but dogs are not.

The only point I am making is that even the enemies of Aquinas and the Church agree that Aquinas held the animal soul is immaterial - and in a way different from “all forms”.
Only some forms are called souls.

 

[Portofino]

• Forms are not material causes and so all forms could be said to be “immaterial” in some sense.

Regarding material causes versus formal causes vis-a-vis the human organism, I would grateful if someone could clarify the following:

—as Aristotle/Aquinas maintain that the soul is the “form of the body”, what would be the hylomorphic understanding of the following:

 **DNA (per wikipedia: Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is a molecule that encodes the genetic instructions used in the development and functioning of all known living organisms and many viruses) --- is this truly a material cause, or rather formal  cause? Would a hylomorphic theory construe this as matter -- or as form? As body -- or as soul?  If body, in what sense can we call DNA a "blueprint" *without* describing it as a "formal cause" of sorts; indeed, without expanding the definition of "material cause" to mean something more extensive than mere raw material (for example, more elaborate than the notion of rubber as the raw material of a ball). 

 **Sperm cells containing mitochondrial DNA -- per hylomorphism, is there "soul-ness" in it? If so, how would "soulless" in sperm and "soul-ness" in egg be understood, in terms of the mechanism by which a single soul is produced at fertilization?

This is part of my general overarching question, namely – if the soul if the form of the body – giving its form, its structure – how does this interface with the notion of DNA as an informational blueprint of the body? Or if DNA is posited as material cause, not formal, would we not be expanding the notion of “material cause” to include formal, structural, or informational properties that Aristotle or Thomas had not envisioned? If such a broad definition of material cause were applied to the human body – encompassing something like DNA – it would seem to be the equivalent of saying that the material cause of a body is not merely the raw material of which it is composed, but also its formal blueprint (e.g., its DNA)…. And that, over and above this, there is then the “structure of the structure itself” or the “form of the form itself”-- in the case of the human body, the soul.

 

[polytropos]

Regarding material causes versus formal causes vis-a-vis the human organism, I would grateful if someone could clarify the following:

—as Aristotle/Aquinas maintain that the soul is the “form of the body”, what would be the hylomorphic understanding of the following:

 **DNA (per wikipedia: Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is a molecule that encodes the genetic instructions used in the development and functioning of all known living organisms and many viruses) --- is this truly a material cause, or rather formal  cause? Would a hylomorphic theory construe this as matter -- or as form? As body -- or as soul?  If body, in what sense can we call DNA a "blueprint" *without* describing it as a "formal cause" of sorts; indeed, without expanding the definition of "material cause" to mean something more extensive than mere raw material (for example, more elaborate than the notion of rubber as the raw material of a ball). 

 **Sperm cells containing mitochondrial DNA -- per hylomorphism, is there "soul-ness" in it? If so, how would "soulless" in sperm and "soul-ness" in egg be understood, in terms of the mechanism by which a single soul is produced at fertilization?

This is part of my general overarching question, namely – if the soul if the form of the body – giving its form, its structure – how does this interface with the notion of DNA as an informational blueprint of the body? Or if DNA is posited as material cause, not formal, would we not be expanding the notion of “material cause” to include formal, structural, or informational properties that Aristotle or Thomas had not envisioned? If such a broad definition of material cause were applied to the human body – encompassing something like DNA – it would seem to be the equivalent of saying that the material cause of a body is not merely the raw material of which it is composed, but also its formal blueprint (e.g., its DNA)…. And that, over and above this, there is then the “structure of the structure itself” or the “form of the form itself”-- in the case of the human body, the soul.

Good questions. DNA is an “integral part” of the human body. It is not in itself a “metaphysical part” (matter, form, act of existence, essence, etc.). DNA therefore is itself composed of matter and form; it is configured by the form of the whole human, which directs DNA towards its own ends. Some relevant comments by Eleonore Stump:

Since Aquinas is willing to grant that the flesh existing on its own is a substance, it seems that it must be a substance when it is in an animal as well. Consequently…*n an animal, there will be at least both the substantial form of the flesh and the substantial form of the animal.

But this objection to Aquinas fails to take into proper consideration his understanding of form. On his view, flesh existing on its own does not have the same form as flesh in an animal. That is because flesh in an animal can perform the functions proper to that flesh, as flesh existing on its own cannot. The proper function of flesh (or any other constituent of the whole) is given by the substantial form of the whole. When it exists on its own, without being configured by the form of the whole animal, no part of an animal functions as it does when it is in the whole. And so flesh in an animal, unlike flesh which exists on its own, is configured by the one substantial form of the animal and not by the substantial form of flesh.*

Hands and souls are parts of substances, although they represent different sorts of parts. A hand is an integral part, a matter-form composite which contributes to the quantity - the spatial extension - of the whole substance of which it is a part. A soul, on the other hand, is not itself a matter-form composite, and the spatial extension of a whole human being does not derive from the immaterial soul itself. A soul is thus not an integral part, but a metaphysical part. What keeps each sort of part from counting as a substance, for Aquinas, is that it is not a complete thing in its own right, and it can be defined only with some mention of the whole in its definition. A hand, for example, is an appendage of a human being; a (rational) soul is the substantial form of a human being.

So DNA is neither a “material cause” nor a “formal cause.” To call it a blueprint is to provide a teleological account of its contribution to the whole human being. That gives us a “formal cause.” But a DNA molecule is not merely a blueprint; it consists of matter configured by the entire animal.

Sperm and eggs are not “soulless” per se. But they are integral parts of parents rather than substances in themselves, so their activity is configured by the soul of the whole body, not their own souls. The serve the ends of the whole animal of which they are a part, ie. contributing to reproductive acts which result in the generation of a new substance with its own form, ie. its own unity and set of specifying potentialities distinct from those of the parents.

This does not seem to cause any sort of vagueness between formal and material causes. Integral parts like DNA have material causes themselves, but their structures and activities are ultimately “caught up” in the activity and form of the whole body.

 

[polytropos]

The only point I am making is that even the enemies of Aquinas and the Church agree that Aquinas held the animal soul is immaterial - and in a way different from “all forms”.
Only some forms are called souls.

This is the paragraph in question, I take it:

But what does St. Thomas say to this? Allowing a soul (anima) to the brute, and declaring it immaterial, he refuses it at the same time the qualification of spiritual. Because, he says: “it would in such case imply intelligence, a virtue and a special operation reserved only for the human soul.” But as at the fourth Council of Lateran it had been decided that "God had created two distinct substances, the corporeal (mundanam) and the spiritual (spiritualem), and that something incorporeal must be of necessity spiritual St. Thomas had to resort to a kind of compromise, which can avoid being called a subterfuge only when performed by a saint. He says: "This soul of the brute is neither spirit, nor body; it is of a middle nature.“9
This is a very unfortunate statement. For elsewhere, St. Thomas says that “all the souls–even those of plants–have the substantial form of their bodies,” and if this is true of plants, why not of animals? It is certainly neither “spirit” nor pure matter, but of that essence which St. Thomas calls “a middle nature.” But why, once on the right path, deny it survivance–let alone immortality? The contradiction is so flagrant that De Mirville in despair exclaims, “Here we are, in the presence of three substances, instead of the two, as decreed by the Lateran Council!”, …
For, if the soul of the animal is, as the Roman Church teaches, an informal, immaterial principle, then…”

I have some trouble following the argument here. But I think we can answer some of the objectors questions (“why deny [the animal’s soul] survivance–let alone immortality?”) by checking Aquinas’s argument on the matter (the passage gives the impression that it is a question Aquinas never considered). There he affirms that the relevant distinction between animal souls and human souls.

 

[mattdantuono]

So it seems we must posit that SSs are essentially the same but different due to accidental modifications.

But how does this work? I believe Aristotle founded the difference between human individuals solely on the basis of the accidental modification of the potentiality inherent in cojoined matter.

If we say these accidental differences after death are somehow retained in the soul then whence the potentiality in the separated form that can be modified per accidens?

I don’t know exactly who believed what in the particulars of this matter, but the fact is that the soul is an essence that is associated with matter. Separated souls are not complete things in and of themselves. They are lacking the body to which they belong. As essences of material things, they are different from each other since there cannot be one form of the same material. Material differentiates, and essences of material things are, by nature, differentiated, regardless of the accidental modifications that occur during a particular lifetime.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I don’t know exactly who believed what in the particulars of this matter, but the fact is that the soul is an essence that is associated with matter.

Even this is not as clear as it looks.
Aristotle, who invented this way of thinking, would go much further than this.
He would say this is only true of concrete individuals. It is not enough to have a Platonised view on the matter (ie a Platonic Form + need for bodiliness). Essence always involves the particular concrete for Aristotle. Matter must be actually present for the individual to exist. Whether Aristotle included “matter” along with the “soul” as part of the definition of “human essence/substance” I am not clear. I believe it is a point of debate.
But what is clear, whether materiality enters into the definition of human essence of not designate matter was always required by Aristotle to define/distinguish human individuality.

As essences of material things, they are different from each other since there cannot be one form of the same material.

Not quite sure what this means. Where we place “individuality” (I presume that is what you mean by “difference”) is the key question and the above sentence is ambiguous.
I do not believe Aquinas could agree with this if we see it in the disembodied essence.
For him only the Angels are essentially different, though they belong to the same genus (“pure existant forms”). While I tend to agree with you that Separated Souls could be regarded as essentially different just like Angels, this would destroy Aquinas’s system as I think it inconsistant with other principles he holds to.

If you mean by the above that **concrete human individuals **(with designate matter) are different from each other on the basis of their essences…well this too suffers the same difficulties vis-avis both Aristotle and Aquinas and they would disagree I believe. Aquinas specifically holds that there is indeed one and the same human form (essence) in every person we shake hands with on the street. They are different individuals not because of their difference in form but because of their difference in designated matter.

I do note you say "cannot be one form of the same material ".
Above, I have interpretted “same material” as “prime matter”. But if you mean “same designate matter” then of course that is true but then I don’t understand the significance of the comment.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

 **DNA (per wikipedia: Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is a molecule that encodes the genetic instructions used in the development and functioning of all known living organisms and many viruses) --- is this truly a material cause, or rather formal  cause?

I don’t think DNA falls cleanly into formal cause, though it certainly seems to be a very obvious instrumental cause (used by the soul to “make” the body) and maybe even an efficient (if not a sort of formal cause) for the more materialist amongst us.

Would a hylomorphic theory construe this as matter – or as form? As body – or as soul? If body, in what sense can we call DNA a “blueprint” without describing it as a “formal cause” of sorts; indeed, without expanding the definition of “material cause” to mean something more extensive than mere raw material (for example, more elaborate than the notion of rubber as the raw material of a ball).

It is pretty obvious that semi-autonomous sub-forms seem to be at work in the human organism (eg cells). Somebody recently stated that 30% of our body mass belongs to symbiotic organisms! However Aquinas (and my priest biology teacher) always reckoned that these sub-forms are so subservient and integrated into the over-arching purposes of the human body as a whole that despite appearances there is only one substantial form, the soul.

 **Sperm cells containing mitochondrial DNA -- per hylomorphism, is there "soul-ness" in it? If so, how would "soulless" in sperm and "soul-ness" in egg be understood, in terms of the mechanism by which a single soul is produced at fertilization?

I believe sperm must be considered separate substances. They are have vegetative souls by the looks of it. Though the scholastics would have seen semen completely differently due to a lack of corrrect biological understanding.

This is part of my general overarching question, namely – if the soul if the form of the body – giving its form, its structure – how does this interface with the notion of DNA as an informational blueprint of the body? Or if DNA is posited as material cause, not formal, would we not be expanding the notion of “material cause” to include formal, structural, or informational properties that Aristotle or Thomas had not envisioned? If such a broad definition of material cause were applied to the human body – encompassing something like DNA – it would seem to be the equivalent of saying that the material cause of a body is not merely the raw material of which it is composed, but also its formal blueprint (e.g., its DNA)…. And that, over and above this, there is then the “structure of the structure itself” or the “form of the form itself”-- in the case of the human body, the soul.

Yes, Matter/form can be used in a relative sense as well as an absolute sense.
Scotus takes this beyond Aquinas and seems to say that these other sub levels of evident matter/form relationships are in fact substantial. Aquinas would not.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Since Aquinas is willing to grant that the flesh existing on its own is a substance…

I don’t think so.
It isn’t living, its just a sophisticated collocation of organic substances that has started to slowly disintegrate into something even more elemental.

 

[polytropos]

I don’t think so.
It isn’t living, its just a sophisticated collocation of organic substances that has started to slowly disintegrate into something even more elemental.

In ST IIIa5.3, Aquinas says, “For flesh and the other parts of man receive their species through the soul. Hence, if the soul is absent, there are no bones nor flesh, except equivocally, as is plain from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9; Metaph. vii, 34).” So as Stump says, “On his view, flesh existing on its own does not have the same form as flesh in an animal. That is because flesh in an animal can perform the functions proper to that flesh, as flesh existing on its own cannot.” He grants that flesh on its own is a substance but says that it is equivocal with flesh-as-integral-part-of-man, since it does not have the form of man (since it does not have the same whatness of flesh in man, its whatness is equivocal with flesh in man).

In any case, I’m not sure why you picked out that clause. Stump was considering a potential objection, “Since Aquinas is willing to grant that the flesh existing on its own is a substance, it seems that it must be a substance when it is in an animal as well.” “Willing-to-grant” and “believes/holds” are of course two different things. All “willing-to-grant” need mean is that Aquinas, in handling the objection, would refute it in some other way than denying that flesh on its own is a substance.