On the Immortality of the Soul

[Blue_Horizon]

In ST IIIa5.3, Aquinas says, “For flesh and the other parts of man receive their species through the soul. Hence, if the soul is absent, there are no bones nor flesh, except equivocally, as is plain from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9; Metaph. vii, 34).” So as Stump says, “On his view, flesh existing on its own does not have the same form as flesh in an animal. That is because flesh in an animal can perform the functions proper to that flesh, as flesh existing on its own cannot.” He grants that flesh on its own is a substance but says that it is equivocal with flesh-as-integral-part-of-man, since it does not have the form of man (since it does not have the same whatness of flesh in man, its whatness is equivocal with flesh in man).

In any case, I’m not sure why you picked out that clause. Stump was considering a potential objection, “Since Aquinas is willing to grant that the flesh existing on its own is a substance, it seems that it must be a substance when it is in an animal as well.” “Willing-to-grant” and “believes/holds” are of course two different things. All “willing-to-grant” need mean is that Aquinas, in handling the objection, would refute it in some other way than denying that flesh on its own is a substance.

I was, I suppose, simply objecting to the phrase “flesh existing on its own” and “He grants that flesh on its own is a substance”.

Flesh cannot properly exist “on its own” - even that it seems is an equivocal use of the word.
I think “flesh on its own” could not really be considered a substance as that would require some form of over-arching coherence/purpose which dead flesh does not have. It is just a complex collocation of biological elements that happen to be placed together.

Perhaps “flesh on its own” just refers to an understanding of living flesh abstracted from its particular “owner”. If that is the case isn’t really just playing with concepts that is ultimately not rational (like talking of wax without a shape).

Its only a small point.

 

[polytropos]

I was, I suppose, simply objecting to the phrase “flesh existing on its own” and “He grants that flesh on its own is a substance”.

Flesh cannot properly exist “on its own” - even that it seems is an equivocal use of the word.
I think “flesh on its own” could not really be considered a substance as that would require some form of over-arching coherence/purpose which dead flesh does not have. It is just a complex collocation of biological elements that happen to be placed together.

Perhaps “flesh on its own” just refers to an understanding of living flesh abstracted from its particular “owner”. If that is the case isn’t really just playing with concepts that is ultimately not rational (like talking of wax without a shape).

Its only a small point.

I don’t think it’s a conceptual distinction. But I think the bolded portion is the heart of the matter. Consider a chair made of oak. It is an artifact, so it has an accidental chair-form. The wood that comprises it is itself a substance. But the wood that comprises it is dead.

As flesh-on-its-own is distinct from flesh-in-a-body, it seems to me like wood-on-its-own is distinct from wood-in-a-tree. The wood-on-its-own has a form. It is not the form of tree. But it has a form. The wood in the chair is only equivocally wood, if by wood we mean wood in the tree.

You’re right, it’s a small point, and you, me, Stump, and Aquinas seem to agree that it’s equivocal.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I don’t think it’s a conceptual distinction. But I think the bolded portion is the heart of the matter. Consider a chair made of oak. It is an artifact, so it has an accidental chair-form. The wood that comprises it is itself a substance. But the wood that comprises it is dead.

As flesh-on-its-own is distinct from flesh-in-a-body, it seems to me like wood-on-its-own is distinct from wood-in-a-tree. The wood-on-its-own has a form. It is not the form of tree. But it has a form. The wood in the chair is only equivocally wood, if by wood we mean wood in the tree.

You’re right, it’s a small point, and you, me, Stump, and Aquinas seem to agree that it’s equivocal.

Very well elucidated and I agree.
This is a good example of how the matter/form distinction can be used “relativistically” instead of absolutely when applied to concrete examples - esp artifacts.

That is, what is matter and what is form really depends on the assumed POV (point of view). Yes a copper rendition of DaVinci’s statue of “David” has a “shape” (of a man) and a material (copper) that stand in a relationsip to each other of form and matter. Yet that is not the absolute understanding of matter and form in this block of copper. As you say the shape of David is a mere accidental rendition of something more “form-ish.”

if we speak of only accidental change then there is no reason to go deeper than this because any change of shape does not change the underlying substratum (copper). So for all intents and purposes “copper” is the “practical” matter of this statue.

But if we talk of substantial change then we must search for a deeper understanding of the matter of this statue - when it decomposes into green copper oxide for example. Not only will the statue lose its “shape-form” but it loses its “copper-ness” as well. Is this “copper-ness” form or matter? In a substantial change what was formerly considered matter (copper metal) now itself is lost. therefore it could not have been the deepest level of matter. In fact the copper was also a form, and in substantial change it is lost and is replaced by a new form called verdigris.

So what is the deeper level of matter that underlies this substantial change of the copper?
Perhaps it is the copper atoms? Maybe, maybe not. Because in copper-oxide we have a new compound with properties quite different from both copper and oxygen alone. I suppose we could say we have “copper ions” because it has given its two electrons to be shared with the oxygen atom. Yet even this may not really be true because “copper ions” in verdigris act differently from “copper ions” in copper sulphate. So if the matter underlying the change from copper metal to verdigris is not copper atoms then maybe its neutrons/electrons/protons. This may be logical - though its messy because Aristotle thought of matter as always being uniform and ultimately non-atomic (ie infinitely divisible without change).

And what if we talk of a “very substantial” change of the copper statue at the sub-atomic level - thus completely splitting the copper atoms into their constituent particles (neutrons, protons and electrons) and making a completely different smaller atom out of those particles - eg beryllium. This is an even deeper change of form. What is the underlying “matter” of this change - is it still neutrons/electrons/protons or quarks? Probably not yet quarks. This still has issues similar to the previous example.

And what if we talk of a very,very substantial change such as at the level of the neutrons/protons/electrons themselves? If we split these into their constituent quarks we could annihilate a lot of them (turning them into massless energy) and then the remainder would automatically “pair-up” again) and form back into brand new neutrons/electrons and protons forming who knows what mixture of elements/compunds. Here the real “form” would be quarks (though there are 6 different types) and the matter is…well we don’t know. There may be no “matter” but just a massless insensible “Higgs field” and when a quark speeds through it the quark is given mass! Perhaps the “Higgs” field is as close as we can ever get to “prime matter” and the “quark” is the most substantial and irreducible of all forms - there is no “sub-form” from which it is composed (though there are 6 varieties).

Such are artifacts.

But living substances seem to be treated differently from the above. Because all the above levels of “form/matter” are brought into a single purposeful whole by the “soul” Aristotle (and Aquinas) tell us there is only one form and it is the “top one”, the soul. Obviously the above matter/form levels still seem to operate semi-autonomously - but they only come into their own when the living substance dies.

I don’t know if I have made things clearer or worse. I suppose what I am trying to say is that in artifacts (like “wood” as PT says) the wood is not really a “substance.” That is an equivocxation because the true “substance” is at a deeper level. Howe deep depends on what sort of change we want to talk about (eg carving wood or burning wood).

For ensouled substances things are more clear-cut. The substance is clearly the highest level of living organisation. And when that falls over one of the lower levels of “substance” asserts itself.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Can it be demonstrated that the soul does indeed survive after death, and doesn’t cease to exist? Note: I am not interested in Theological Arguments, theologically the immortality of the Soul is a given via revelation- I am after a purely Philosophical argument. So if you need to quote scripture, and Church documents- you’re doing it wrong.

Also:

If the soul can be held to subsist after death, how is the soul individuated? For in the classical metaphysics it is matter which individuates the form/soul, how can the soul be individuated if it is not united to matter?

That is incorrect. It is true that matter individuates form, It remains individuated before and after insoulment and after death. The soul was never a universal form like the rest of material creation. The only thing the matter of man individuates is human nature. It does not individuate the soul.

There is no full proof argument for the immortality of the soul. The usual ( the Thomistic argument ) is that man engages in some activities which do not rely on the body ( i.e. thinking, willing, judging between good and evil, self awareness, remembering, the principle of life for man ) which are spiritual activities or powers because their objects are non-material. This indicates that there is a spritual principle in man. But spritual beings have no matter which can corrupt. Therefore the soul is immortal. And since its proper mode of existence is its union with the body, the whole man is essentially immortal. Man may die and corrupt, but since the proper mode of existence of the soul is its union with its body, the body will be resurrected and be reunited with the soul and live forever.

Linus2nd
Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I don’t think this really answer’s the OP’s question.
"… how is the (disembodied) soul individuated? …matter individuates the form/soul, how can the soul be individuated if it is not united to matter? "

Above Aquinas seems to only be saying that non-material substances by definition must be singular (eg Plato’s forms or Angels). Therefore non-material substances must be multiplied by differences in form. This is quite true, “angel” defines a group/genus not a single species common to many individuals. Each angel is its own uniques species (ie each a unique non-material form).

But this is not the poster’s question really. He is talking about “disembodied material substances” (DMS’s) which are not the same as “non-material substances”.

I think that we have to assert that DMSs must inherently retain some sort of unique potentiality wrt matter (matter is totally “generic”) which makes them different from other DMSs. This means DMSs must have some sort of “sub-species” differences.

Could my DMS come back as a female (I am a male) and still be me?
Yes I think so, the differences between DMSs is probably much deeper than a superficial potential towards a particular hair color or skin colour or sexual identity or even DNA code.

Or perhaps it is not really about “form” at all.
Maybe DSM’s are unique and individuated on the basis of non “ontological” causes - e.g. personal history. That is, my prev material life represents a particular causal thread running through the giant tapestry of the Cosmos/Time that is uniquely identified not only in itself but also by reason of the “gap” that would remain in the Universe’s fabric if this little thread were pulled out.

That little thread cannot be “pulled out” of existence because to do so would mean all the other “threads” I had a causal influence on could no longer be themselves either.
That means, like the Persons of the Trinity, we can only be uniquely identified by our unique causal relationship of origin to each other (ie to other DMSs).

But how is the “causal complex” that each DMS uniquely represents imputed to us in ontological terms (which is what “disembodied soul” is surely meant to represent). How is it held together in a disembodied non-material “existence” as “me”. Somehow it is in God.
Perhaps “disembodied souls” are in fact “embodied” in another dimension of materiality we know nothing about.

OR, the soul retains an imprint, a sort of memory of our causal history. Like the soul’s of the baptised/confirmed/priests are said to bear a “character” other souls do not possess.

OR, each human soul, even though material, is its own species (like the angels).
“Species” is not the best word as “material species” are known to be different apparantly because they cannot breed together. Back to the each human form is a “sub-species” of “human” thesis above then.

Hmmmn, perhaps the Scholastics got that wrong. Two males cannot breed together, does that mean they are different species? Yet a male and a female (obviously from different planets) can breed togther! I am confused .

Hey, you got started wrong. The O.P. is not about disembodied material substances but about disembodied souls and also about how the soul could be individuated by matter according to the classical explanation offered by Thomas. See my explanation above.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

As to this your first question.
I think understanding of how the brain works at a biological level makes some of Aristotles “clearly self-evident” propositions no longer self-evident.

But this is not because the arguments are not convincing, it is because those who disagree have a world view that won’t tolerate it.

or example memory.
Now an Aristotelian may well correct me but I was under the understanding that the concept of “biological matter being able to store sensible experience” was not something the ancients would have considered possible in their wildest dreams.
Therefore a spiritual power of the 'soul" was posited to explain this material impossibility.
I believe Augustine for this reason not only considered intellect and will to be of the rational soul - but also memory (this is the Trinitarian likeness in the human soul).

Well, I don’t think modern moderate realists are very strong on memory being a power of the soul anymore are they? Even Aquinas seems to soft pedal that one.

I disagee, all the Thomists I know hold that memory is a power of the intellect in the soul.

But the point I am making is that we easily throw in “soul” (or god for that matter) to fill the spaces that material nature seems unable to explain. Often enough at a later date we do get a perfectly acceptable natural explanation - and god disappears (eg lightning is no longer the bolt of Zeus hurled at sinners).

On the contrary, there are solid arguments for all this. There is no " filling of the gaps " involved. Have you read Aquinas by Edward Feser? Have you bothered to read his blog?

Maybe our definition of “rational soul” from Aristotle needs to be similarly peared back a little. Maybe its immortality is a conclusion of faith more than reason.

I don’t know how you could " pear " it back. What exactly do you mean? Of course Faith gives certain knowledge about the essential nature of the soul and its immortality and also man’s immortality.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Yes, in the Aristotelian view the spiritual powers are mediated through bodily organisation and if the tissue (eg memory) is damaged then those powers still exists but cannot operate.

We might question what “operate” actually means in this context. Obviously memory cannot operate in what we call daily conscious life on earth if the tissue is damaged. But does memory still operate in some other “spiritual” realm of consciousness we are not conscious of . Obviously while we live embodied we are only “conscious” of sensible consciousness. But after we die does a disembodied soul get “forced” to be conscious in some other fashion?

And then there is the further problem of how do memories get transferred to the soul and remain there? Aquinas holds there is a “one way” relationship between body and soul. The soul changes the body, not the other way around. Obviously cognition seems to deny that principle in some way. (Unfortunately my Thomism is not adequate enough to explain that one ).

But really your valid point above about the body mediating use of the soul’s powers…is not what I was really commenting on.

Below I was applying Ocham’s razor to Aristotle’s positing a “soul” in the light of modern biology.
Namely, if we can now explain by material causality that which was hitherto inexplicable and hence inferred by spiritual causality THEN Ocham tells us it is more reasonable to go with the solution that is the least involved. Do not multiply unneeded causes.

So I do not say that the Aristotelian explanation is either wrong or impossible for it is very
very possible but it now seems over complicated and unnecessary as simpler explanations suffice. The same use of Reason that made Aristotle posit the existence of a spiritual soul with power of memory, nowadays in the light of modern biology, seems to force us to adopt a more simple model.
Memory is not a power of the soul but of the body itself (like locomotion).

So if disembodied souls are philosophically even possible then there seems no intrinsic reason why they would have a personal memory - and Buddhists would agree (and go further).

Disembodied souls are still a weak point in Scholastic philosophy.
On this particular topic even Aristotle has not been of much help to Christian Revelation.
Yes Aristotle helped us escape much of the excessive “angelising” of pre-medieval theology (ie use of Plato) but when it comes to disembodied souls even Aristotle skids in the mud and we revert to our ancient Platonist legacy - which doesn’t gel well with Revelation any better now than it did in the Early Church.

You seem to be giving modern biology credit for something it has not done. Therefore Okahm’s Razor does not apply ( and did it ever? ). We always have Faith as a fall back.

Linsu2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I have not read every word in this thread, sorry if I am repeating anything. Just making a few comments.

This is correct. But in the Aristotelian view essential powers are intrinsic to whatever has a particular essence, whether it can exercise them or not. In the case of the mind, this isn’t an ad hoc principle being invoked. A fetus is essentially rational since it is essentially human. If you uprooted a tree, brushed all of the dirt from its roots, and hid it from sunlight, it would not be able to acquire any nutrients, but it would still retain the power of growth (until it died).

I don’t think an Aristotelian would accept such a bifurcation. An Aristotelian would hold that locomotion is a power of the soul as well. He’d hold that growth is a power of trees (which, according to Aristotle, have vegetative souls), even if he has a complete biological explanation of growth in trees. The soul and the body are not in the same category of being. The soul is the form of the body. A body without a soul is a dead body. But that is not to suggest that the soul is this Cartesian res cogitans hanging over the body and dictating its actions; that is not at all how forms are generally conceived in a hylemorphic ontology.

I think there is a slight distinction to be made between theorizing about humans having an Aristotelian soul and humans having an immaterial Aristotelian soul. In Aristotelianism, everything has a form. In the material world, forms are what account for the unity and essence of natural substances–and generally speaking, are fully material. A materialist considering a shift in philosophical views could conceivable become a hylemorphist without holding that the soul is immaterial. Additional arguments are required for that (based on, for instance, the universality of abstracted forms, or indeterminacy of the physical). The latter sort of argument is not directly tethered to hylemorphism. Hylemorphists tend to favor those types of argument because they are consonant with non-Cartesian, non-property dualism. But there does not obtain any mutual entailment between, for instance, hylemorphism and James Ross’s argument, even though they are compatible with each other.

I agree with this, but I think most Thomists would too. Human forms are subsistent. That, Thomists argue, can be known through natural reason. But human forms depend on bodily instantiation for action. After death, there seems no natural reason to suppose that one should have access to memories. Thomists only (I think) would hold that insofar as they have faith in revelation about some sort of supernatural access to memories, ie. a bodily resurrection or the beatific vision. It is akin to belief in the trinity. One might hold that some traditional argument for God’s existence is sound, but hold that one could only identify that being with the Christian God through faith.

Thomas disagrees. S.T., Part 1, ques 78, arts 6 & 7, memory resides in the intellect but is not a separate power. Therefore, disembodied souls would have access to their memories, which would included self awareness and memory of their sins and life decisions in general.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Good stuff but you completely lost me in a few places…

Hmmmn. Where is the soul these days in the allegedly circular motion of the super lunar bodies that both Aristotle (and even Aquinas) posited had to exist? We can explain that mechanisticly so “poof” their souls no longer are credible to us . I don’t think any modern Aristotelian or Thomist would still be pushing that these days would they?

We are not tied to these views. Obviously they are incorrect, the heavenly bodies are not eternal. Though their motion could well be under the power of Angels. But we can by pass that entire problem and go directly to the Prime, Unmoved Mover, God.

Once the false philosophic assumptions they were working from have been exposed it isn’t too hard to extrapolate to vegetation or even animals and suggest that locomotion is purely mechanical in explanation. Of course a spiritual principle (or a separate final cause) may be needed to explain the chain of causality that started the locomotion. But efficient and material and formal causes of locomotion seem adequately explained at the sensible level without recourse to an inferred spiritual substance?

You are making quite a few assumptions here yourself. Thomas’ First Way argument used in the S.T. does not rely on the Celestial Movements. It goes directly to the Prime, Unmoved Mover.

Local motion is not explained in mechanical terms. Mechanics and Science can explain what happens and measure the relationships, but they cannot explain why. The " why " and the " how " belong to philosophy. The First Way explains it briefly. See my thread " The First Way Explained, " now on page 2 of this Forum. It is well along now and contains much of interest for you and for others. I’m not finished yet, sort of working on it as I feel like it. ( I stil have about 800 posts left ).

I am not at all sure what the word “immaterial” means here. Or rather, what do you mean by a “material soul” - a soul by definition stands in opposition to “matter” as a co-principle of existant material substances Therefore a “material soul” is a contradiction in terms. .

There is no " material soul, " that is indeed a contradiction in terms.

Linus2nd

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Hey, you got started wrong. The O.P. is not about disembodied material substances but about disembodied souls …Linus2nd

Thats an interesting distinction.

If Man (along with animals) are defined as a “corporeal substances” and angels are defined as “incorproeal substances” then how is a “disembodied human soul to be defined”?

It can only be one of the two surely?
If it is “human” then it comes from Man.

So I punt for an incomplete “corporeal substance.”
Which is what “disembodied material substance” means in the context discussed above.

Or are you going to make some distinction between 1st and 2nd substance?
If so how would this resolve the matter?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Thomas disagrees. S.T., Part 1, ques 78, arts 6 & 7, memory resides in the intellect but is not a separate power. Therefore, disembodied souls would have access to their memories, which would included self awareness and memory of their sins and life decisions in general.

Linus2nd

Not quite,
Aristotle states: ““It is clear to which of the several portions of soul memory belongs, that it belongs where phantasy belongs…” (Of mem and recollection I,9)

Aquinas only allows “abstract intellectual impressions” of the Potential Intellect which is a far cry from what the modern english word “memory” means (ie recall of particular personal incidents and sensible facts.)
Recall of “Individualising conditions” is what we mean by memory in this discussion and
Aquinas seems to explicitly deny it of the intellect:

" … since there is no abstraction of its object from indi-vidualising conditions, memory does not belong to the intellectual side of our nature, which
deals with universals This however does not bar the potential intellect’s preservation of in-tellectual impressions, which are abstracted from all particular conditions."
SCG 1:74

Given the above I am not sure what " self awareness and memory of their sins and life decisions in general" actually means?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Thats an interesting distinction.

If Man (along with animals) are defined as a “corporeal substances” and angels are defined as “incorproeal substances” then how is a “disembodied human soul to be defined”?

Man is defined as a rational animal. It is a union of the spritual, immaterial, invisible with the material. And the former is the substantial form of the whole. Thomas explains that the disembodied sould is like a duck out of water ( my analogy ). Its proper mode of existence is as the substantial form of man. So I’m not sure we can define it because it is not properly in any of the categories of being. It is, so to speak, an oddity. It is a " lost soul " waiting for its proper union to exist again. Yet it is quite alive and suffering or enjoying Heavenly bliss.

It can only be one of the two surely?
If it is “human” then it comes from Man.

Oh, it is a soul, but a soul " out of water. "

So I punt for an incomplete “corporeal substance.”
Which is what “disembodied material substance” means in the context discussed above.

But that would be incorrect. The soul is properly the substantial form of the man. It is a spirit, it is real. But its greatest reality is as the substantial form of man. The Church makes the reality of the soul clear enough, so does Thomas.

You may call it the disembodied form of a material substance if you like. I think that would work very well.

Or are you going to make some distinction between 1st and 2nd substance?
If so how would this resolve the matter?

Perhaps the First substance could be applied to the underlying matter and form of man in its indepth material and formal causality. But you could not escape the soul when discussing the Second substance for much important activity of the intellect and will and memory are taking place which cannot be explained by analyizing the physical activities.

But once man dies then where are we with First and Second substance? Remember the two are looking at the same reality, but from two different aspects.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Not quite,
Aristotle states: ““It is clear to which of the several portions of soul memory belongs, that it belongs where phantasy belongs…” (Of mem and recollection I,9)

Aquinas only allows “abstract intellectual impressions” of the Potential Intellect which is a far cry from what the modern english word “memory” means (ie recall of particular personal incidents and sensible facts.)
Recall of “Individualising conditions” is what we mean by memory in this discussion and
Aquinas seems to explicitly deny it of the intellect:

" … since there is no abstraction of its object from indi-vidualising conditions, memory does not belong to the intellectual side of our nature, which
deals with universals This however does not bar the potential intellect’s preservation of in-tellectual impressions, which are abstracted from all particular conditions."
SCG 1:74

Given the above I am not sure what " self awareness and memory of their sins and life decisions in general" actually means?

Haven’t read Aristotle on the soul - not sure I will have time to get to it. I am aware of the distinction Thomas draws. As for the rest, surely the soul will be self conscious and will be aware of its sins and merits - shall it suffer in vain. Of course I can’t prove that, it is what I believe. It is not something the Church speaks about as far as I know.

You are doing good, keep it up.

Linus2nd

 

[dmwessel]

Can it be demonstrated that the soul does indeed survive after death, and doesn’t cease to exist? Note: I am not interested in Theological Arguments, theologically the immortality of the Soul is a given via revelation- I am after a purely Philosophical argument. So if you need to quote scripture, and Church documents- you’re doing it wrong.

Also:

If the soul can be held to subsist after death, how is the soul individuated? For in the classical metaphysics it is matter which individuates the form/soul, how can the soul be individuated if it is not united to matter?

soul = animal principle only/physical body
spirit = God’s image (Adam got in the garden and passed down to us)

The spirit is eternal (as it’s the same image as God, actually being a part of God).

“Who knoweth the **spirit **of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?” (Eccl. 3:21)

At death the eternal spirit “of man” goes upwards (back to God) but the beast (soul) back to the earth (dust to dust) from whence it came to await the resurrection from the dead.

“Then shall **the dust **return to the earth as it was: and **the spirit shall return unto God **who gave it.” (Eccl. 12:7)

 

[Blue_Horizon]

soul = animal principle only/physical body
spirit = God’s image (Adam got in the garden and passed down to us)

The spirit is eternal (as it’s the same image as God, actually being a part of God).

“Who knoweth the **spirit **of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?” (Eccl. 3:21)

At death the eternal spirit “of man” goes upwards (back to God) but the beast (soul) back to the earth (dust to dust) from whence it came to await the resurrection from the dead.

“Then shall **the dust **return to the earth as it was: and **the spirit shall return unto God **who gave it.” (Eccl. 12:7)

dmwessel you are well intentioned but, as your idiosyncratic contributions in the Adam and Eve discussion last month ably demonstrated, you have no real understanding of the Bible nor the long history of Catholic thought and philosophy of man in this area. If you would like people to help you precision your personal views in this area it may be better to start your own topic.

Please note the original words of the poster of this topic:
“I am after a purely Philosophical argument. So if you need to quote scripture, and Church documents- you’re doing it wrong.”

 

[dmwessel]

dmwessel you are well intentioned but, as your idiosyncratic contributions in the Adam and Eve discussion last month ably demonstrated, you have no real understanding of the Bible nor the long history of Catholic thought and philosophy of man in this area. If you would like people to help you precision your personal views in this area it may be better to start your own topic.

Please note the original words of the poster of this topic:
“I am after a purely Philosophical argument. So if you need to quote scripture, and Church documents- you’re doing it wrong.”

I thought we were discussing the Bible, unless of course the Bible and Catholicism are not the same things!! In which case you’re the idiot!

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Where is the soul these days in the allegedly circular motion of the super lunar bodies that both Aristotle (and even Aquinas) posited had to exist? We can explain that mechanisticly so “poof” their souls no longer are credible to us . I don’t think any modern Aristotelian or Thomist would still be pushing that these days would they?

L2 in your rush to defend Aquinas you have completely missed my small point.

My small point is simply this.
If Aquinas can be wrong about the “soul” of a heavenly body because of excellent logic applied to the poor scientific knowledge of his time…then there is no reason why he could not be wrong in some aspects of his teachings wrt the nature of the human soul because of his equally deficient scientific knowledge of the brain - again despite perfect logic.

I am not saying he is, I am saying it is within the range of possibility and more so now than 800 years ago.
Therefore, it is my belief that his position is indeed potentially falsifiable by science, though I know Polytropos disagrees.

That is all.

Please don’t respond to this re the necessary spiritual operations of the intellect etc as I am aware of the argument and its been done over many times below. Its a good enough one but personally, like Descartes/Hume, I find it less than fully intellectually coercive. That may well be a deficiency of my own intellect .

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I thought we were discussing the Bible, unless of course the Bible and Catholicism are not the same things!! In which case you’re the idiot!

Correct. The Bible and Catholicism are not the same things.
That Protestant turnpike was one exit back.

And no, you are not an idiot.
“Idiosyncratic” in this context simply means “personal definitions and views known only to yourself.”

 

[Linusthe2nd]

L2 in your rush to defend Aquinas you have completely missed my small point.

My small point is simply this.
If Aquinas can be wrong about the “soul” of a heavenly body because of excellent logic applied to the poor scientific knowledge of his time…then there is no reason why he could not be wrong in some aspects of his teachings wrt the nature of the human soul because of his equally deficient scientific knowledge of the brain - again despite perfect logic.

I am not saying he is, I am saying it is within the range of possibility and more so now than 800 years ago.
Therefore, it is my belief that his position is indeed potentially falsifiable by science, though I know Polytropos disagrees.

That is all.

Please don’t respond to this re the necessary spiritual operations of the intellect etc as I am aware of the argument and its been done over many times below. Its a good enough one but personally, like Descartes/Hume, I find it less than fully intellectually coercive. That may well be a deficiency of my own intellect .

I don’t see the logic here. Just because he was wrong about the Celestial " science, " it does not follow that the either the basic arguement is wrong, nor that his argument on the nature and immortality of the soul are wrong. I don’t think the passage of time has weakened the argument.

You posited biological science as being stronger. You will have to prove first that the science is more correct on these points ( the points about which you think Thomas is wrong ).

Of course biological science cannot be right, for then it would have proved that man does not have a spiritual and immortal soul and that would be contrary to Defined Catholic Dogma. And there can be no basic disagreement between Faith and Science on something related to either Defined Catholic Dogama or the Infallable Ordinary Teaching of the Church. Both cannot be right.

Of course I disagree with your assessment, so would all Thomists I have read. If you reject his reasoning then you are left with Faith alone. Nothing wrong with that, just saying-.

Linus2nd

 

[Aloysium]

Blue Horizon:

. . . And no, you are not an idiot.
“Idiosyncratic” in this context simply means “personal definitions and views known only to yourself.”

Blue you’ve got me confused with your “idiosyncratic views”.

Let’s back track; at one point, I read:

Blue Horizon:

When I say “matter has to be actually present for individuation to occur” I really mean present continuous tense, not past perfect! The moment matter disappears, poof individuality is lost. I am talking about separated souls. Can you explain how multiple individuals can exist when there is no designate matter to separate their identical human form?

To which I replied:

We must mean something different regarding “matter”. To me it is something studied by physics.
This screen, as an example, is material. It is part of a whole that includes the retinas of my eyes and my brain.
It is because it is all continuous and one, that I am able to perceive it as you would. **I do not understand what would separate matter from other matter. **
However, the reality of my experience and your experience is that they are separate. This is because we have a soul.
So even though we also exist within a psycho-social reality of shared information, understandings, emotions and such, we remain separate because our existence is separate - you exist as you, me as me.
When my body dies, my spirit, being eternal in nature, remains in relation to God and other spirits. I am not sure where you get the idea that once the body is dust the soul will not remain separate.
The only lack of separation occurs when in loving, self-giving union. That’s why there is a hell.

And you answered:

I will have to stop you there if you are saying what I think you are saying .
If you really mean this then we are in fact defining matter differently - you are on the side of Descartes/Hume/Netwon, I am on the side (I hope) of Aristotle/Aquinas and the understanding still used by the Magisterium.
That is, for me matter does not exist in itself.
For you it clearly does (even if you might say it is interconvertible with energy which Newton did not know).
On a different tack…the issue we are talking about is how immaterial forms can be distinguished (“separated”) from one another - we are not really talking about “separation of soul/form from body/matter” directly).

This did not warrant a reply.

Now you’ve gone on to say:

So I do not say that the Aristotelian explanation is either wrong or impossible for it is very
very possible but it now seems over complicated and unnecessary as simpler explanations suffice. The same use of Reason that made Aristotle posit the existence of a spiritual soul with power of memory, nowadays in the light of modern biology, seems to force us to adopt a more simple model.

and:

My small point is simply this.
If Aquinas can be wrong about the “soul” of a heavenly body because of excellent logic applied to the poor scientific knowledge of his time…then there is no reason why he could not be wrong in some aspects of his teachings wrt the nature of the human soul because of his equally deficient scientific knowledge of the brain - again despite perfect logic.
I am not saying he is, I am saying it is within the range of possibility and more so now than 800 years ago.

Maybe it makes sense to someone else.