One final time: freedom of will does NOT logically lead to evil actions

[nuntym]

Sorry, I made a mistake.

because the moment man asks God in prayer “What is right, and what is wrong?”

should read

because the moment man asks God in prayer “Can I do wrong?”

Sorry

EDIT: Actually, I realized that my original question “What is right, and what is wrong?” cannot also be answered by God. Because once mankind realizes that he cannot do the things that God says are evil…well, then, the gig is up

 

[nuntym]

Now this is an argument, which merits and needs a response.

Let’s examine a simple scenario. There are two moral agents (A and B), and each makes one decison, which can be either moral (M) or immoral (I). There are 4 possible worlds.

1. Both decisons are moral (M + M)
2. Both decisons are immoral (I + I)
3. A makes a moral decision, while B makes an immoral one.
4. A makes an immoral decision, and B makes a moral one.

Is there a free will in all of them? In scenario 1) there are no immoral decisions. But the decisions are made without coersion, so they are free. In scenario 2) all decisons are immoral. Is this a world with “more” freedom? Or do you think that in the first world God “forces” everyone to do good, while in the second one God “forces” everyone to do bad? Are scenarios 3) and 4) the only “really” free ones, when both good and bad decisons are actualized?

We are talking about the odometer syndrom here. Our intution simply rejects the seemingly ordered sequence as being “forced” and the seemingly random sequence as “free”. But that is just a misconception. All scenarios are equally “free”.

If you really want to argue, you could say that choosing any one of the aforementiontioned scenarios, God predestines or preordaines everyone’s choices, while leaving the individual freedom alone. That is defintely true. But it is true for all the worlds. Catholics state that there is no strong “predestination” and God’s foreknowledge does not “force” anyone to act in a “predifefined” manner. The individual acts of decisions are still free from coersion. But by choosing any one of the possible scenarios and actualizing any one of them, God decides up front, who will make moral and immoral decisons. And that is strong predestination.

This simplified scenario should suffice. I could go and analyze the generalized picture, with “N” moral agents and “M” decisons made by all of them, but there is no need. It might be even more confusing for the mathematically disadvantaged (or challenged).

Again, I would point to the practical aspect.

Your argument would hold water IF the moral agents in the world are 1) few, and 2) of just a few generations. For if the moral agents are many and of many generations, then they WILL notice that no one can make immoral acts (unless these people are stupid and have no memories what so ever…but then, they wouldn’t be humans)…and after that all hell would break lose.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Again, I would point to the practical aspect.

Your argument would hold water IF the moral agents in the world are 1) few, and 2) of just a few generations. For if the moral agents are many and of many generations, then they WILL notice that no one can make immoral acts (unless these people are stupid and have no memories what so ever…but then, they wouldn’t be humans)…and after that all hell would break lose.

Well…technically, all hell would not break loose. No one would do anything wrong, because God would have prescreened their behavior to root out “all hell”. However, I do imagine that these humans might ask themselves the question: why do I have the experience of having the free will to do wrong, and yet never “happen” to make that choice? Why, God? Am I a being of real dignity, or am I just your plaything, your pawn?

(Of course, maybe this “God” would not let them ask such questions – which just emphasizes the fact I’ve pointed out elsewhere, that such a god is a god who believes that “freedom is slavery”.)

 

[Confessor01]

Eucharisted,

For one, you won’t find me making red herrings such as “heaven doesn’t exist”…primarily because I am not an atheist, but a Reformed Presbyterian. I reject free will, but it doesn’t follow that I’m an unbeliever (not that you’re making such an accusation, though).

You said, “Regarding one, God did not create everyone full of grace because He knew that not everyone would accept His graces.” But this reason will not do for the simple reason that there does exist a possible world in which everyone would accept His graces. And so long as it’s possible, God could have actuated it.

You said, “And so I go back to my original point in showing you that by your sin, a world where there is no possible evil is not possible. You have chosen to sin, to rejct the grace of faith, and so, you have disproven your own claim that God could force everyone to accept His graces and be morally good. Free-will, in and of itself, cannot be forced; it can be pushed and influenced, but not forced.” But we are not arguing so much that God could force people to act a certain way. Rather, we are arguing that there exists a possible world in which everyone freely (without being forced) chooses never to sin. You can say it’s not “feasible” or something like William Lane Craig attempts to do, but as long as you concede that it’s possible, Spock’s argument retains its full effect.

In other words, the point is not that this current world could be transformed into a sinless one, but whether God could have at the beginning decided to actuate a world in which no one ever sins.

---

seductus_sum,

In order to logically reject Spock’s argument and declare that God would be forcing people to carry out certain decisions, you must reject outright the entire notion of God actualizing possible worlds. For if you conceded that the concept of God’s actualizing possible worlds accurately depicts what goes on in the process of His divine decrees, then you must admit that God could have actualized a sinless world, for a sinless world is possible.

And if you reject outright the notion of God actualizing possible worlds, then you must reject Molinism, meaning that it will be substantially more difficult to understand how God is sovereign, how predestination works, etc.

---

This rebuttal (i.e., against seductus_sum) also applies to nuntym. It is a misunderstanding and a red herring to immediately say that in a world where no one sins we would have no free will. That is the point in dispute. To assert the conclusion is to beg the question.

 

[Spock]

Again, I would point to the practical aspect.

Your argument would hold water IF the moral agents in the world are 1) few, and 2) of just a few generations. For if the moral agents are many and of many generations, then they WILL notice that no one can make immoral acts (unless these people are stupid and have no memories what so ever…but then, they wouldn’t be humans)…and after that all hell would break lose.

There is no practical aspect here. The number of people (“N”) and the number of their decisons made in their lifetime (“M”) is unspecified, both can be as large as you wish. Nor does the argument that they must live concurrently hold any water, because that idea is not utilized in the proof I gave. Yes, they would notice the lack of immoral acts, and they would find it normal.

 

[Spock]

Eucharisted,

For one, you won’t find me making red herrings such as “heaven doesn’t exist”…primarily because I am not an atheist, but a Reformed Presbyterian. I reject free will, but it doesn’t follow that I’m an unbeliever (not that you’re making such an accusation, though).

You said, “Regarding one, God did not create everyone full of grace because He knew that not everyone would accept His graces.” But this reason will not do for the simple reason that there does exist a possible world in which everyone would accept His graces. And so long as it’s possible, God could have actuated it.

You said, “And so I go back to my original point in showing you that by your sin, a world where there is no possible evil is not possible. You have chosen to sin, to rejct the grace of faith, and so, you have disproven your own claim that God could force everyone to accept His graces and be morally good. Free-will, in and of itself, cannot be forced; it can be pushed and influenced, but not forced.” But we are not arguing so much that God could force people to act a certain way. Rather, we are arguing that there exists a possible world in which everyone freely (without being forced) chooses never to sin. You can say it’s not “feasible” or something like William Lane Craig attempts to do, but as long as you concede that it’s possible, Spock’s argument retains its full effect.

In other words, the point is not that this current world could be transformed into a sinless one, but whether God could have at the beginning decided to actuate a world in which no one ever sins.

---

seductus_sum,

In order to logically reject Spock’s argument and declare that God would be forcing people to carry out certain decisions, you must reject outright the entire notion of God actualizing possible worlds. For if you conceded that the concept of God’s actualizing possible worlds accurately depicts what goes on in the process of His divine decrees, then you must admit that God could have actualized a sinless world, for a sinless world is possible.

And if you reject outright the notion of God actualizing possible worlds, then you must reject Molinism, meaning that it will be substantially more difficult to understand how God is sovereign, how predestination works, etc.

---

This rebuttal (i.e., against seductus_sum) also applies to nuntym. It is a misunderstanding and a red herring to immediately say that in a world where no one sins we would have no free will. That is the point in dispute. To assert the conclusion is to beg the question.

Thank you again Confessor. Your contribution helps me and saves time to concentrate on the important issues.

 

[Spock]

Well…technically, all hell would not break loose. No one would do anything wrong, because God would have prescreened their behavior to root out “all hell”. However, I do imagine that these humans might ask themselves the question: why do I have the experience of having the free will to do wrong, and yet never “happen” to make that choice? Why, God? Am I a being of real dignity, or am I just your plaything, your pawn?

(Of course, maybe this “God” would not let them ask such questions – which just emphasizes the fact I’ve pointed out elsewhere, that such a god is a god who believes that “freedom is slavery”.)

Actually such questions would never arise, since the normal, sinless behavior would be the only one they ever see. They all could imagine “abnormal”, sinful behavior, but they would reject it outright.

An example might be cannibalism. We can all imagine to practise it, but we would not want to practise it. No one “forces” us to avoid it, yet we all reject the concept. (Yes, I know about the airplane which went down in the Andes many years ago, and people had to resort to cannibalism on order to survive, but in such dire circumstances no one accused them of “sinning”).

 

[Biggie]

First, I am uncomfortable with the idea that God *actualizes *worlds. The world was not a multiple choice selection. God created the potential for the world and then the created the actual world.

Second, one need not do the math to come to the OP’s correct statement that free will does not logically (inevitably) lead to evil actions. The logic is that God who is perfect is incapable of an imperfect design. Perfection is of God and is therefore good since God is good. Imperfection is not of God and is therefore evil. Free will is God’s design for the human being. Free will is therefore good and does not inevitably lead to evil.

Third, God did create a world in which all the “moral agents” chose to do good. That world was the earth, until the “moral agents” chose to cease doing good.

Finally, worlds do not possess free will or do evil. Individuals do. To that extent, the world is an army of one.

 

[Confessor01]

You’re welcome, Spock.

 

[Spock]

There are a couple possible responses to this. In the above theorizing, you switch (or attempt to switch) the burden of proof from quality to quantity. If it is accepted that a two-decision universe may be free despite the absence of wrongdoing, then it must be acceded that an x-decision universe may be free despite the absence of wrongdoing, as x approaches infinity. Either way is strong predestination.

I agree.

My original point was that the universe you described was not free. When you tell me it is characterized by “strong predestination,” I gather that you agree with me. Yes, I know that the individuals’ decisions have been free from coercion, but this is not anything like ultimate freedom. (I am sure you are familiar with compatibilism, which is – in my humble opinion – an outrageously flawed take on free will.)

My first thought on the matter is that if God is, He obviously knew all this before the creation of the world. I can find no justification for the statement that “God is good” that can coexist with a reality of strong predestination. So I will be willing to reject “all of the above” ideas, as it were, at least provisionally.

The question then becomes: Is God capable of setting into motion a world which contains certain characteristics – free will, goodness, etc – but is otherwise randomized? This strikes me as a wonderfully interesting question.

In other words, my claim is that – whatever Einstein says – God plays dice.

I don’t think that omniscience is an insurmountable problem to this view, although I see why some might think it so. I hope it is clear what the rationale for such a claim is: God, knowing that strong predestination is involved in any thought-out choice of universe, and knowing that strong predestination is not reconcilable with free will, and thereby incompatible with justice, creates the world such that strong predestination is not. Whether God is capable of random action is a fascinating question, but I very much doubt that anyone can give a confident answer.

To be clear, I’m just following the course of the argument here, looking for a truth that will best conform to the reality of this world. I imagine there are other alternatives, and I’d love to hear them mentioned.

As promised, I am coming back to your excellent post. Let me present an analogy of tossing coins, and observe the result. Let’s “call” the result of a single coin-toss as the manifestation of “free will”. (I know they are not the same, but as an analogy it will be interesting).

Now, for the sake of brevity, I will make a sequence of 5 tosses. The same would apply to 1 billion-trillion tosses, but the resulting table would be quite large. The number of possible “worlds” is 2^n (where “n” is the number of tosses - each of which corresponds to the decision making process). Here are the possibilities, each corresponding to a different “world”:

H H H H H

H H H H T
H H H T H
H H T H H
H T H H H
T H H H H

H H H T T
H H T H T
H T H H T
T H H H T
H H T T H
H T H T H
T H H T H
H T T H H
T H T H H
T T H H H

H H T T T
H T H T T
H T T H T
H T T T H
T H H T T
T H T H T
T H T T H
T T H H T
T T H T H
T T T H H

H T T T T
T H T T T
T T H T T
T T T H T
T T T T H

T T T T T

Overall there are 32 different “worlds”. Now let’s assume that we can actualize any one of these worlds. In each world, there is no “coersion” involved, the coins will use their “free will” to land of their heads or tails. We have two options: we can say that regardless of the “world” created the coins made their “free decisions” or we can say that by virtue of the selection of which “world” will be created: the sequence is “predetermined”. Truly, both interpretations are correct.

The fact remains, however, that there is no difference between any of the sequences, we cannot say that sequence of “H H H H H” is more surprising than (for example) the sequence of “H T T H T”. If there is free will in any world, then there is free will in all of them.

Going back to the original problem, if there is free will in our world, then there is free will in the other one, where everyone chooses “correctly”, or in the one where everyone chooses “incorrectly”. Mathematically speaking, all the worlds are the same.

 

[Spock]

First, I am uncomfortable with the idea that God *actualizes *worlds. The world was not a multiple choice selection. God created the potential for the world and then the created the actual world.

There is no difference between saying that God “actualizes” a world or “created” it. The word “actualize” is a bit more techincal, but covers the same meaning.

Second, one need not do the math to come to the OP’s correct statement that free will does not logically (inevitably) lead to evil actions.

I agree, but the fact is that this incorrect argument keeps coming back…

 

[Prodigal_Son]

As promised, I am coming back to your excellent post. Let me present an analogy of tossing coins, and observe the result. Let’s “call” the result of a single coin-toss as the manifestation of “free will”. (I know they are not the same, but as an analogy it will be interesting).

Now, for the sake of brevity, I will make a sequence of 5 tosses. The same would apply to 1 billion-trillion tosses, but the resulting table would be quite large. The number of possible “worlds” is 2^n (where “n” is the number of tosses - each of which corresponds to the decision making process). Here are the possibilities, each corresponding to a different “world”:

H H H H H

H H H H T
H H H T H
H H T H H
H T H H H
T H H H H

H H H T T
H H T H T
H T H H T
T H H H T
H H T T H
H T H T H
T H H T H
H T T H H
T H T H H
T T H H H

H H T T T
H T H T T
H T T H T
H T T T H
T H H T T
T H T H T
T H T T H
T T H H T
T T H T H
T T T H H

H T T T T
T H T T T
T T H T T
T T T H T
T T T T H

T T T T T

Overall there are 32 different “worlds”. Now let’s assume that we can actualize any one of these worlds. In each world, there is no “coersion” involved, the coins will use their “free will” to land of their heads or tails. We have two options: we can say that regardless of the “world” created the coins made their “free decisions” or we can say that by virtue of the selection of which “world” will be created: the sequence is “predetermined”. Truly, both interpretations are correct.

The fact remains, however, that there is no difference between any of the sequences, we cannot say that sequence of “H H H H H” is more surprising than (for example) the sequence of “H T T H T”. If there is free will in any world, then there is free will in all of them.

Going back to the original problem, if there is free will in our world, then there is free will in the other one, where everyone chooses “correctly”, or in the one where everyone chooses “incorrectly”. Mathematically speaking, all the worlds are the same.

I absolutely agree that there is free will in the world where everyone chooses heads, provided the choices of ultimately freely made. I am, per our conversation, assuming that God must have (somehow) randomly chosen which world would be actualized, and (by chance) the actualized world had no wrongdoing. This hypothetical world – call it Eden – would have free will, just like ours.

I object to the idea that God “should” have chosen to create that world, because as soon as He chooses to create any particular world, as opposed to a randomized world within certain parameters, He chooses to negate free will. Human beings must be, as it were, co-creators of the universe (in their own very very small way); otherwise, they are not even participants in the universe, only spectators of determinism.

But yes, it is possible that our world, due to chance or other factors (I know not what), could have been Eden. And Eden would have free will.

This reminds me of a planet in C.S. Lewis’s Space Trilogy - Perelandra? - on which the Fall had never happened. (Someone will remind me of the details, I hope.) The inhabitants had free will, but never chose to do wrong. And, you are right, they didn’t sit around asking why; it didn’t strike them as at all curious.

It may be the case, as Lewis suggested, that there actually *are *many different worlds, whether in our universe or elsewhere, that God enacted. One or more of them may be sinless. Ours isn’t – and, not surprisingly, this draws people to agnosticism. It does not present a proof of God’s nonexistence, however.

I’m also reminded of a computer game I used to play, called Civilization. The goal was to inhabit/conquer a given world. You could customize the world to certain specifications (even how aggressive your enemies were), or you could randomize it. I always felt like customizing the world would be cheating. I’m not saying there is any philosophical significance in that feeling, but it is interesting.

 

[Spock]

I absolutely agree that there is free will in the world where everyone chooses heads, provided the choices of ultimately freely made. I am, per our conversation, assuming that God must have (somehow) randomly chosen which world would be actualized, and (by chance) the actualized world had no wrongdoing. This hypothetical world – call it Eden – would have free will, just like ours.

That is an interesting idea. If God randomly chose a world, then one must assume that he had no “plan” to carry out at all… he chose a world, and let the chips fall as may - so to speak.

I object to the idea that God “should” have chosen to create that world, because as soon as He chooses to create any particular world, as opposed to a randomized world within certain parameters, He chooses to negate free will. Human beings must be, as it were, co-creators of the universe (in their own very very small way); otherwise, they are not even participants in the universe, only spectators of determinism.

Well, I did not wish to hypothesize about which particular world God “should” have chosen to actualize. The fact is that by “randomly” selecting a world, God’s omniscience is in question, as well as God’s benevolence. Omniscience because God did not use his assumed omniscience at the time of creation (closed his eyes and did not “peek”), and benevolence, because this world is not particularly desirable. If we assume that God is a purposeful being, then his purpose could only have been to create a random world, and see how it pans out. This scenario is logically sound, and reminds me of an experimenter, who creates lots of “cultures” in a Petri dish, and observes how they evolve. But such a concept cannot be reconciled with omnisicence. Why would anyone create an experiment, if he already know the outcome? Makes no sense at all.

I’m also reminded of a computer game I used to play, called Civilization. The goal was to inhabit/conquer a given world. You could customize the world to certain specifications (even how aggressive your enemies were), or you could randomize it. I always felt like customizing the world would be cheating. I’m not saying there is any philosophical significance in that feeling, but it is interesting.

Ah, good old Civ… I used to be addicted to the game for a long time… eventually I could will the game even on Emperor level, if I chose to play Montezuma Oh, how much fun I had! And how many hours I “wasted”!

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Well, I did not wish to hypothesize about which particular world God “should” have chosen to actualize. The fact is that by “randomly” selecting a world, God’s omniscience is in question, as well as God’s benevolence. Omniscience because God did not use his assumed omniscience at the time of creation (closed his eyes and did not “peek”), and benevolence, because this world is not particularly desirable.

I’m aware that some difficulty is inherent in reconciling randomness with omniscience, although, as I’ve said, I’m not sure this difficulty is irreconcilable. It seems hard to believe that a sufficiently sophisticated computer can generate a random number, and yet the all-powerful Creator of the universe cannot.

As far as questioning God’s benevolence, I think a full acquaintance with the Christian story would help. I said there were certain parameters that would be inflexible, throughout all possible universes.

1. No matter how bad the actualized universe might be, there is a Redeemer who will bring goodness and justice to it.
2. The character of man is such that it will (often) naturally respond to the goodness and justice embodied in the Redeemer. (This is, from a Christian perspective, an empirical observation. Consider how common death-bed conversions are, for example).
3. The injustices experienced on earth (because of sin) cannot strip the believer of his virtue, which carries within it the promise of vindication (as seen in the book of Job). This vindication is enacted through the realities of the afterlife.

This is just a sketch of what I mean, of course. My point is that the moral choices of men do not circumscribe the goodness or badness of the universe. All universes “randomly” created by God are good, because of the parameters He can embody in them without trespassing against free will.

 

[Spock]

I’m aware that some difficulty is inherent in reconciling randomness with omniscience, although, as I’ve said, I’m not sure this difficulty is irreconcilable. It seems hard to believe that a sufficiently sophisticated computer can generate a random number, and yet the all-powerful Creator of the universe cannot.

It is not a question of ability. The fact is that random choice does not give a satisfactory solution. No matter how the world is “chosen”, randomly or purposefully, as soon as the “ball starts rolling”, the events will unfold - unless there is true randomness in the universe - and indeed that seems to be case. And in this case there can be no omniscince, in principle.

Let me elaborate. Omniscience cannot mean “to know everything”, it can only mean “to know everything that can be known”. For example consider a non-existent book, which was never written due to the fact that the writer was never born. It simply makes no sense to say that an omniscient being can “know” the contents of this book. Something that does not exist, cannot be known. Knowledge can only mean to have information about something If something does not exist, there can be no information gathered about it. But this would bring us too far from the original topic, soI suggest we explore it elsewhere.

As far as questioning God’s benevolence, I think a full acquaintance with the Christian story would help. I said there were certain parameters that would be inflexible, throughout all possible universes.

That is just an assumption.

1. No matter how bad the actualized universe might be, there is a Redeemer who will bring goodness and justice to it.

That is hardly consolation to those who were born before this Redeemer arrived.

This is just a sketch of what I mean, of course. My point is that the moral choices of men do not circumscribe the goodness or badness of the universe. All universes “randomly” created by God are good, because of the parameters He can embody in them without trespassing against free will.

Unfortunately I cannot accept this. This world can only be evaluated on its own merit, without postulating an “expansion” into some afterlife.

 

[tdgesq]

1. The final possible scenario is where there are “N” moral agents, and each of them makes “M” decisons. Both “N” and “M” can be any arbitrary number, so this scenario precisely reflects our current world. Since each agent makes “M” decisions, the number of possible worlds is “(N + 1)*(M + 1)”. Of these possible worlds there is one where each agent makes only moral decisions. In all the other ones at least one agent makes at least one immoral decision. God can also instantiate or actualize any one of these worlds, since none of them contains a logical contradiction.

Result: No matter how many moral agents are in a world, and no matter how many decisions are made, there is at least one possible world where all the agents make only morally upright decisions - while retaining their free will. God can actualize this world since it contains no logical contradiction.

The argument you set forth does not require an extensive possible worlds analysis or mathematical formulas to understand it. In fact, it seems to me only to obfuscate the real issues involved, which are philosophical in nature – not mathematical. J.L Mackie and Antony Flew were making this argument decades ago in a much more concise format.

Take the following propositions:

(1) God is omnipotent.
(2) If God is omnipotent, he can create any logically possible state of affairs. Therefore,
(3) God can create any logically possible state of affairs. (1,2)
(4) That all free persons do what is right on every occasion is a logically possible state of affairs. Therefore,
(5) God can create free men such that they always do what is right. (4,3)

This is your argument in a nutshell. It fails for several reasons. First, premise (2) is false. God cannot create any logically possible state of affairs (possible worlds). For example:

(a) It is a logically possible state of affairs that there are men not created by God. As a non-theist, I assume you find this to be the likely state of affairs; however, proposition (2) and (a) together entail:

(b) If God is omnipotent, God can create persons who are not created by God.

Clearly (b) is false. That is because proposition (2) is false. Theists (with a few notable exceptions) would affirm the following:

(2’) If God is omnipotent, then God can create any state of affairs S such that “God creates S” is consistent.

(3’) God can create any state of affairs S such that “God creates S” is consistent.

But it is obvious that the final conclusion - God creates free persons and brings it about that they always freely do what is right – is not consistent. And it does not matter here if you are talking about instantiation of persons (as Mackie did) or instantiation of worlds. At best we push the causal chain back a step to the creation of an actual world where only people who freely do what is right are created, although Christianity claims that God creates the human soul as well.

It is a logical contradiction to affirm that God creates free persons and that he can bring it about that they always freely do what is right. Some previous posters have intuitively concluded that, but the above analysis proves the point. God cannot engage in logical contradictions, just like he can’t lie or be mistaken.

 

[Spock]

The argument you set forth does not require an extensive possible worlds analysis or mathematical formulas to understand it. In fact, it seems to me only to obfuscate the real issues involved, which are philosophical in nature – not mathematical. J.L Mackie and Antony Flew were making this argument decades ago in a much more concise format.

Take the following propositions:

(1) God is omnipotent.
(2) If God is omnipotent, he can create any logically possible state of affairs. Therefore,
(3) God can create any logically possible state of affairs. (1,2)
(4) That all free persons do what is right on every occasion is a logically possible state of affairs. Therefore,
(5) God can create free men such that they always do what is right. (4,3)

This is your argument in a nutshell.

So far we are in complete agreement. My disagreement starts below.

It fails for several reasons. First, premise (2) is false. God cannot create any logically possible state of affairs (possible worlds). For example:

(a) It is a logically possible state of affairs that there are men not created by God. As a non-theist, I assume you find this to be the likely state of affairs; however, proposition (2) and (a) together entail:

(b) If God is omnipotent, God can create persons who are not created by God.

Clearly (b) is false.

Yes, it is false, but not because proposition (2) is false, rather because (b) is already a logical contradiction. And a logically possible world cannot contain a logical contradiction. Theists agree that God’s omnipotence does not extend into the realm of creating logical contradictions, like square circles and married bachelors.

That is because proposition (2) is false. Theists (with a few notable exceptions) would affirm the following:

(2’) If God is omnipotent, then God can create any state of affairs S such that “God creates S” is consistent.

(3’) God can create any state of affairs S such that “God creates S” is consistent.

But it is obvious that the final conclusion - God creates free persons and brings it about that they always freely do what is right – is not consistent. And it does not matter here if you are talking about instantiation of persons (as Mackie did) or instantiation of worlds. At best we push the causal chain back a step to the creation of an actual world where only people who freely do what is right are created, although Christianity claims that God creates the human soul as well.

Why isn’t it consistent? Where is the inconsistency? Please elaborate on the notion of consistency. It is quite vague.

It is a logical contradiction to affirm that God creates free persons and that he can bring it about that they always freely do what is right. Some previous posters have intuitively concluded that, but the above analysis proves the point. God cannot engage in logical contradictions, just like he can’t lie or be mistaken.

You only say that and the proof is not forthcoming. Where is the logical contradiction here?

Now, let’s go back to my first line of argument. It is much easier to analyze a simple example. One of the logically possible worlds is the one with one moral agent who makes one moral decision. There are only two possible worlds God can create: the one where the agent makes the moral choice, and the one where the agent makes the immoral choice. Which one is logically inconsistent? Both? Or only the one where the agent comes short and makes the immoral decision?

There are 4 possible scenarios here:

1. The world in which the agent makes the moral decision is inconsistent.
2. The world in which the agent makes the immoral decision is inconsistent.
3. Both worlds are inconsistent.
4. Neither world is inconsistent.

 

[tdgesq]

So far we are in complete agreement. My disagreement starts below.

Let us be clear that you are in complete agreement with the following:

(1) God is omnipotent.
(2) If God is omnipotent, he can create any logically possible state of affairs. Therefore,
(3) God can create any logically possible state of affairs. (1,2)
(4) That all free persons do what is right on every occasion is a logically possible state of affairs. Therefore,
(5) God can create free men such that they always do what is right. (4,3)

I posted:

It fails for several reasons. First, premise (2) is false. God cannot create any logically possible state of affairs (possible worlds). For example:
(a) It is a logically possible state of affairs that there are men not created by God. As a non-theist, I assume you find this to be the likely state of affairs; however, proposition (2) and (a) together entail:

(b) If God is omnipotent, God can create persons who are not created by God.

You said:

Yes, it is false, but not because proposition (2) is false, rather because (b) is already a logical contradiction.

You are incorrect. Item (b) is a conclusion. Yes, it is a contradiction. That is the point. Premise (2) and premise (a) yield a contradictory conclusion (b). This shows that premise (2) is false, as nobody can seriously contest the truth of premise (a) or can contest that conclusion (b) necessarily follows. Let me be more explicit:

(2) If God is omnipotent, he can create any logically possible state of affairs.
(a) It is a logically possible state of affairs that there are men not created by God. Therefore,
(b) God can create persons who are not created by God.

Conclusion (b), as you have noted, is clearly a contradiction. Why? Because premise (2) is false. God cannot create any (all) logically possible state of affairs. This serves as an example that premise (2) is false and is in need of revision.

And a logically possible world cannot contain a logical contradiction. Theists agree that God’s omnipotence does not extend into the realm of creating logical contradictions, like square circles and married bachelors.

That’s right. And that’s also why your possible world scenario fails. It contains a logical contradiction as I shall explain below.

Why isn’t it consistent? Where is the inconsistency? Please elaborate on the notion of consistency. It is quite vague.

.
Let me try to be clearer. What I mean by “inconsistency” is logical inconsistency or a logical contradiction. Let me restate propositions (2) & (3):

(2’) If God is omnipotent, then God can create any state of affairs S such that “God creates S”is consistent with and does not contradict the laws of logic.

(3’) God can create any state of affairs S such that “God creates S” consistent with and does not contradict the laws of logic.

You only say that and the proof is not forthcoming. Where is the logical contradiction here?

Going back to (5), which is really your conclusion:

(5) God can create free persons such that they always do what is right.

Of course, this is only true if:

(5a) God creates free persons such that they always do what is right is consistent with the laws of logic. Yet this is equivalent to:

(5b) God creates free persons and brings it about that they always freely do what is right.

The problem is that (5b) is not consistent with the laws of logic, because if God brings it about that the persons he creates always do what is right, then they don’t do what is right freely. Put another way, it is contradictory to say that on the one hand God can causally determine people to choose what is right in every situation, and on the other hand that these people have freedom of choice.

Which one is logically inconsistent?

There are 4 possible scenarios here:

1. The world in which the agent makes the moral decision is inconsistent.
2. The world in which the agent makes the immoral decision is inconsistent.
3. Both worlds are inconsistent.
4. Neither world is inconsistent.

The short answer is that in neither world is their necessarily an inconsistency depending upon the role of God’s causal determination. To show why that is, let’s take look at the four possible worlds:

W1: (a) God creates persons with free will; (b) God does not causally determine people in every situation to choose what is right; and (c) There is evil in W1.

W2: (a) God does not create persons with free will; (b) God causally determines people in every situation to choose what is right; and (c) There is no evil in W2.

W3: (a) God creates persons with free will; (b) God causally determines people in every situation to choose what is right; and (c) There is no evil in W3.

W4: (a) God creates persons with free will; (b) God does not causally determine people in every situation to choose what is right; and (c) There is no evil in W4.

W1 is clearly possible. W2 is also possible. God could causally determine everything we do such that we always do right. W3 is not a possible world because God causally determining a person to choose what is right in every situation is logically inconsistent with free will. W4 is a possible world, although unlikely. It could happen that people exercise their free will to always do what is right without any causal determination by God.

However, once God determines to create a set of persons in a particular world that all have the property “will always choose what is right,” he has necessarily limited their choice to that. This is contradictory to freedom of choice. The world you propose is W3, and as shown, it is not a logically possible world.

 

[Biggie]

There is no difference between saying that God “actualizes” a world or “created” it. The word “actualize” is a bit more techincal, but covers the same meaning.

But it is technically incorrect, or at least incomplete, in as much as God potentializes the world also.

 

[tonyrey]

For one final time I am going to show that it is possible to have a world, where there is free will and there are no evil choices. I am tired of seeing the nonsensical argument that there are only two possibilities, either having free will and actual evil choices, or dummies (or robots) who are preprogrammed to do everything “right”.

Let us assume (which I don’t believe for one minute) that you have proved your point. What follows? That God is not justified in creating a world with moral evil? So there cannot be a benevolent God - or any God at all?

The answer is to be found in two simple words used by the church at Easter: “felix culpa” (happy fault). Without Adam’s fault Christ’s love would not have been manifested. In other words it is good that some evil exists. God allows evils to happen in order to bring about a greater good. This is incomprehensible from the hedonist point of view but pleasure and comfort are not the most important things in life. Genuine love and nobility entail hardship and suffering. Commonsense tells us that we have to take the rough with the smooth, that everything has its price and that every advantage has a corresponding disadvantage. The motto used by the RAF during the Second World War sums it up perfectly: Per ardua ad astra (through adversity to the stars).