One final time: freedom of will does NOT logically lead to evil actions

[Biggie]

Let us assume (which I don’t believe for one minute) that you have proved your point. What follows? That God is not justified in creating a world with moral evil? So there cannot be a benevolent God - or any God at all?

The answer is to be found in two simple words used by the church at Easter: “felix culpa” (happy fault). Without Adam’s fault Christ’s love would not have been manifested. In other words it is good that some evil exists. God allows evils to happen in order to bring about a greater good. This is incomprehensible from the hedonist point of view but pleasure and comfort are not the most important things in life. Genuine love and nobility entail hardship and suffering. Commonsense tells us that we have to take the rough with the smooth, that everything has its price and that every advantage has a corresponding disadvantage. The motto used by the RAF during the Second World War sums it up perfectly: Per ardua ad astra (through adversity to the stars).

I would stop just short of this by offering that it is not God’s intention that any evil exists. Accepting the fact that man has chosen evil, the rest of your statement follows.

 

[Spock]

Well, you sure gave me a lot to think about… just the way I like it!

Let us be clear that you are in complete agreement with the following:

(1) God is omnipotent.
(2) If God is omnipotent, he can create any logically possible state of affairs. Therefore,
(3) God can create any logically possible state of affairs. (1,2)
(4) That all free persons do what is right on every occasion is a logically possible state of affairs. Therefore,
(5) God can create free men such that they always do what is right. (4,3)

For the purposes of this discussion, yes. I am sure you know that I do not believe in God. For clarification, (1) should read: “(1) Let’s assume that God is omnipotent”

You are incorrect. Item (b) is a conclusion. Yes, it is a contradiction. That is the point. Premise (2) and premise (a) yield a contradictory conclusion (b). This shows that premise (2) is false, as nobody can seriously contest the truth of premise (a) or can contest that conclusion (b) necessarily follows. Let me be more explicit:

(2) If God is omnipotent, he can create any logically possible state of affairs.
(a) It is a logically possible state of affairs that there are men not created by God. Therefore,
(b) God can create persons who are not created by God.

Conclusion (b), as you have noted, is clearly a contradiction. Why? Because premise (2) is false. God cannot create any (all) logically possible state of affairs. This serves as an example that premise (2) is false and is in need of revision.

Very nice analysis. Though there is one glitch to it: Since it is not stipulated that God must “directly” create those people who are not created by God, the argument falls apart. If (a) would read: “(a) It is a logically possible state of affairs that God can **directly **create persons, who are not directly created by God”, your analysis will fail - since (a) is clearly logically contradictory. As always, the devil is in the details. As you stated (a), it was purposefully vague.

My question now: “can God create a stone, which is so heavy, that God cannot lift it?”. All you have shown, very conclusively, that the concept of omnipotence is nonsensical. And you have my total agreement! Now, let’s go on. This is where it becomes very interesting. Fortunately “omnipotence” is not needed here.

The short answer is that in neither world is their necessarily an inconsistency depending upon the role of God’s causal determination. To show why that is, let’s take look at the four possible worlds:

W1: (a) God creates persons with free will; (b) God does not causally determine people in every situation to choose what is right; and (c) There is evil in W1.

W2: (a) God does not create persons with free will; (b) God causally determines people in every situation to choose what is right; and (c) There is no evil in W2.

W3: (a) God creates persons with free will; (b) God causally determines people in every situation to choose what is right; and (c) There is no evil in W3.

W4: (a) God creates persons with free will; (b) God does not causally determine people in every situation to choose what is right; and (c) There is no evil in W4.

W1 is clearly possible. W2 is also possible. God could causally determine everything we do such that we always do right. W3 is not a possible world because God causally determining a person to choose what is right in every situation is logically inconsistent with free will. W4 is a possible world, although unlikely. It could happen that people exercise their free will to always do what is right without any causal determination by God.

However, once God determines to create a set of persons in a particular world that all have the property “will always choose what is right,” he has necessarily limited their choice to that. This is contradictory to freedom of choice. The world you propose is W3, and as shown, it is not a logically possible world.

You state, and I agree that W4 is possible. (Whether it is likely or not, it is possible - and that is all that counts!) This means that God can accidently create a world with free agents, who happen to act rightly all the time, but he cannot create the same world **purposefully **and intentionally! As soon as God intends to create a world with any kind of charateristics, it becomes logically impossible to have that world and have free agents in it! Mindboggling! The conclusion is much worse that my attack was. God cannot intend any world, and instantiate it, because the **intent **itself will rob us our free will! The world where everyone acts rightly in every instance is not “special”. The same reasoning applies to any world, with any mixture of righteous and evil acts in it.

So the final conclusion: God is unable to create any world with free agents, intentionally! He may be able to do it by accident, but that is all. Wow!!! And you wish to “worship” such a “creator”? Who is unable to create what he wants to?

 

[Spock]

The answer is to be found in two simple words used by the church at Easter: “felix culpa” (happy fault).

Which is a typical instance of “sour grapes”. Let’s explain away the unpalatable conclusion, and pretend that “bad is good”… or as it was stated in 1984: “freedom is slavery” and “ignorance is strength”.

Without Adam’s fault Christ’s love would not have been manifested.

So what? Do you pound your thumb with a hammer, because it feels soooo good, when you stop it?

In other words it is good that some evil exists.

I am sure you think so, as long as it happens to someone else… if it happens to you… it might make you reconsider.

 

[tonyrey]

I would stop just short of this by offering that God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good therefrom. Accepting the fact that man has chosen evil, the rest of your statement follows.

Thank you for clarifying my statement. It is clearly not God’s intention that evils exist but He foresees and allows them to happen in order to bring a greater good therefrom.

 

[fosio]

Case closed. The argument that freedom of action inevitably leads to immoral choices is null and void. Please do not use it again. Of course I am not naive to hope that all of you will read this post, or that those who read it can understand it. But be as it may, if anyone ever brings up the incorrect argument, I will only point them to this thread.

I confess I skipped your case but I didn’t need to read it since I fully believe God could have arranged the world such that everyone lived morally abundant lives.

I assume you are using this in a problem of evil argument. Well, it fails. The reason is that past moral imperfection is an integral feature of a certain kind of gratitude, namely that which comes from forgiveness. Certainly, we can have a different kind of gratitude not related to forgiveness but that would be gratitude in a different key or flavor and evidently God values instantiating diverse forms of gratitude. Perhaps doing so makes the world more beautiful or perhaps doing so is necessary to instantiate every possible kind of person (defined by their life careers). Maybe God loves not just the perfect but also the imperfect who become more perfect over time. I don’t believe there are any essential personal properties. If I am I , all my properties should be the same. In any event, the problem of evil is not a problem at all.

 

[tonyrey]

Which is a typical instance of “sour grapes”. Let’s explain away the unpalatable conclusion, and pretend that “bad is good”… or as it was stated in 1984: “freedom is slavery” and “ignorance is strength”.

It’s a case of sour grapes on your part because you are unable to refute the argument I have presented. You oversimplify morality. We are often faced with a choice not between good and evil but between two evils.

So what? Do you pound your thumb with a hammer, because it feels soooo good, when you stop it?

It’s a striking image but quite unrelated to the issue…

I am sure you think so, as long as it happens to someone else… if it happens to you… it might make you reconsider.

You have still failed to address the issue.
Do you believe pleasure and comfort are the most important things in life?
Do you believe there can be genuine love and nobility without hardship and suffering? Do you deny that we have to take the rough with the smooth, that everything has its price and that every advantage has a corresponding disadvantage?

 

[buffalo]

Irrelevant. The proof I presented is mathematical and irrefutable. Among all the possible worlds there is at least one, where there is no need for God to restrict his will, because everyone always chooses the moral way to act, out of their own volition.

.

I think you are describing heaven. That is essentially the beatific vision.

 

[Spock]

It’s a case of sour grapes on your part because you are unable to refute the argument I have presented.

Actually I merely pointed out that you failed to substantiate your case.

You oversimplify morality. We are often faced with a choice not between good and evil but between two evils.

If our only choice is between two evils, then it is not a moral dilemma. Besides, how do you know that such dilemmas exist? An example, please.

Do you believe pleasure and comfort are the most important things in life?

And, happiness, and contentment, and health and love, and…

Do you believe there can be genuine love and nobility without hardship and suffering?

Of course I do.

Do you deny that we have to take the rough with the smooth, that everything has its price and that every advantage has a corresponding disadvantage?

Maybe in this world, but not necessarily. And I am talking about what could be, not what is…

 

[Spock]

I think you are describing heaven. That is essentially the beatific vision.

If you wish. So what is wrong with it?

 

[tdgesq]

For the purposes of this discussion, yes. I am sure you know that I do not believe in God. For clarification, (1) should read: “(1) Let’s assume that God is omnipotent”

I wasn’t sure if you believed in God or not, although I did see on your profile that you designated you religion as “none.” The only reason I restated the proof was for ease of reference. I am fine with “(1) Let’s assume that God is omnipotent.”

Very nice analysis. Though there is one glitch to it: Since it is not stipulated that God must “directly” create those people who are not created by God, the argument falls apart. If (a) would read: “(a) It is a logically possible state of affairs that God can directly create persons, who are not directly created by God”, your analysis will fail - since (a) is clearly logically contradictory.

You are inserting an equivocation that is unwarranted by the language of proposition (2) or (a). The pertinent language “create” is the same in both premises and, therefore, by definition means the same thing in both premises. Whether you want to make both mean “directly create” (which I assume means creation somewhere further down the causal chain) or some other kind of creation (ultimate cause, for example), so long as both terms “creation” mean the same thing, the conclusion (b) will necessarily contain a contradiction. It is only when you, Spock, insert the word “directly” in premise (a) and not in premise (2) that we suddenly have an ambiguity – an equivocation – and not one that was ever intended or would be warranted by the language used.

As always, the devil is in the details. As you stated (a), it was purposefully vague.

It would be somewhat difficult for me to have made proposition (a) “purposefully” vague since the original syllogism is Dr. Alvin Plantinga’s. I suppose you could accuse Plantinga of being purposefully vague. On the other hand, I suppose I could accuse you of purposefully inserting an ambiguity into what is otherwise a well known and recognized proof of the invalidity of premise (2). Since I assume at the outset that everybody here is arguing in good faith though, I won’t do that unless circumstances begin to show otherwise.

My question now: “can God create a stone, which is so heavy, that God cannot lift it?”. All you have shown, very conclusively, that the concept of omnipotence is nonsensical. And you have my total agreement!

Then I take it you now agree that the proposition (2) “If God is omnipotent, he can create any logically possible state of affairs” is false. That’s a start. As for the notion that the concept of omnipotence is nonsensical: It is only nonsensical if one presents a caricature or otherwise doesn’t understand what Christianity has always taught about God’s omnipotence. Atheists and agnostics are often in this situation as are, sadly, many theists who are ignorant of the concept. The following are all demonstrably contained within the Christian Bible: God is unable to lie, to be unwise, to die, to be mistaken in his beliefs, to be evil, etc. Affirmatively, Christianity teaches that God has enormous creative power, that he created the universe, that his thoughts are incomparably above ours, that he loves his creation. Put in this way, rather than the false notion that God “can do anything,” God’s omnipotence is credible to people throughout the world.

 

[tdgesq]

. . . continued

You state, and I agree that W4 is possible. (Whether it is likely or not, it is possible - and that is all that counts!) This means that God can accidently create a world with free agents, who happen to act rightly all the time, but he cannot create the same world purposefully and intentionally!

W4 isn’t the issue here. The issue is whether the conclusions in your initial post are true or not. Here is one of them:

If God wanted to, he could have actualized this world [where every person chooses what is right]. Ours is not that world. Why God chose not to actualize that world is none of my concern. But the fact is that he did not, even though he could have done it.

No, he couldn’t have done it if he chose to without destroying free will. Your conclusion is false. Btw, you’re incorrect on the rest of the above statement as well. Because God cannot causally determine a world where every person always chooses what is right does not entail that he accidentally created that world. Furthermore, there is the possibility that every possible free person performs at least one wrong action. Since that isn’t the subject of the OP, I won’t treat it any further.

As soon as God intends to create a world with any kind of charateristics, it becomes logically impossible to have that world and have free agents in it! Mindboggling!

You are incorrect again. A world can obviously have determined characteristics without one of the determined characteristics being that free agents must act in a certain way. Present the proof if you claim otherwise.

So the final conclusion: God is unable to create any world with free agents, intentionally! He may be able to do it by accident, but that is all. Wow!!! And you wish to “worship” such a “creator”? Who is unable to create what he wants to?

Then you have just conceded the point. You have presented W3 as a possible world – that God creates persons with free will and God causally determines people in every situation to choose what is right. Yet it has been proven here not to be a possible world. It doesn’t matter whether your “accidental” versus “intentional” distinction is accurate or not (it isn’t) – or whether I swallow the reductio ad absurdum or not – you just lost the debate.

As it turns out, I don’t need to swallow the reductio. Nobody can create a world where free agents can act as free agents yet something determines their every action. Not even God. And he did create what he wanted. He created human beings who could choose to love him or not to love him. From the theists’ perspective, that it is far better than creating automatons that are preprogrammed to do everything right. Apparently God agrees.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

It is not a question of ability. The fact is that random choice does not give a satisfactory solution. No matter how the world is “chosen”, randomly or purposefully, as soon as the “ball starts rolling”, the events will unfold - unless there is true randomness in the universe - and indeed that seems to be case. And in this case there can be no omniscince, in principle.

I’m not sure you’re appreciating one key aspect of what I’ve described: the aspect of shared sovereignty. It is the only way to avoid both determinism and predestination, because it posits that the content of the universe is created by God *and *those whom God designates as co-creators – all beings with free will. Their decisions are written into the nature of the universe, as it comes to be.

As far as God’s omniscience goes, I would claim that any power a being has may be a) exercised or b) not exercised. Omnipotence is the ability to do any logically possible thing, not the present instance of doing every possible thing. Some of the potentialities in omnipotence may never be actualized. Omniscience is the ability to know every existent thing (whether “future” or “past”). **But God need not exercise that ability at every moment. **If you say that He does, then you have to prove to me why your definition of omniscience is the only definition reconcilable with the Christian God.

Elsewhere in this thread, you seem to say that God giving *any * kind of characteristic to a universe negates free will. I have no idea where you have proven this. I fail to see any flaw in tdgesq’s argument. All that has been proven, of course, is the possibility of God’s existence.

That is hardly consolation to those who were born before this Redeemer arrived.

Are you familiar with the Catholic teaching on the topic? Those who died before Jesus can have salvation. And, I would argue, they would have it immediately upon death – because God is outside of time.

Unfortunately I cannot accept this. This world can only be evaluated on its own merit, without postulating an “expansion” into some afterlife.

I would not expect you to accept the idea of the afterlife on its intellectual merits, Spock. This aspect of the Christian faith, like the resurrection, is seen with eyes of faith. It can be proven that heaven and hell are possible – and, by the way, I would argue they must be physical realities in the universe we know, in some form – but you cannot accept a faith without faith.

 

[tonyrey]

If our only choice is between two evils, then it is not a moral dilemma.

Of course it’s a moral dilemma. As Sartre pointed out we cannot evade committing ourselves in one way or another. Not to help some one who is in danger is morally wrong but when we put ourselves in great danger by doing so and have a family to support we have to decide which is the** lesser** evil.

  Besides, how do you know that such dilemmas exist? An example, please.

You have one. Here is another:
Sometimes people are faced with the choice of letting the mother or the baby die…

Do you believe pleasure and comfort are the most important things in life?
And, happiness, and contentment, and health and love, and…

Which entail self-sacrifice, a struggle to overcome obstacles, perseverance and dogged determination in spite of disappointments, hardships and suffering.

• Do you believe there can be genuine love and nobility without hardship and suffering? *Of course I do.

I leave others to judge whether you are mistaken…

Do you deny that we have to take the rough with the smooth, that everything has its price and that every advantage has a corresponding disadvantage?
Maybe in this world, but not necessarily. And I am talking about what could be, not what is…

You still haven’t substantiated your hypothesis that a life without any evil at all is feasible and worth having…

 

[buffalo]

If you wish. So what is wrong with it?

Nothing. Catholics agree there is such a place. That is where we would like to get to. It is the reason for our trial of choices, pain and suffering here on earth.

 

[SonofMonica]

For one final time I am going to show that it is possible to have a world, where there is free will and there are no evil choices.

I don’t think Christianity needs your thesis to be false. Christianity (Catholic) simply holds that (1) we do have free will in our world, (2) there are evil choices made in our world, and (3) these choices were made possible by the fact that we have free will to choose them.

We do not need separate, actualized worlds to understand free will. It is conceivable that man would not make any evil choices, in our world, as actualized. In fact, I posit that it must be so. Free will, by definition, implies the lack of restriction upon all possible outcomes. But in our world, man did make evil choices. Those choices are what necessitate the various constrictions we place on free will, through conscience, society, laws, religion and familial relationships.

Case closed. The argument that freedom of action inevitably leads to immoral choices is null and void. Please do not use it again. Of course I am not naive to hope that all of you will read this post, or that those who read it can understand it. But be as it may, if anyone ever brings up the incorrect argument, I will only point them to this thread.

If free will had to logically lead to immoral decisions, then it would not be free will. “Actualizing” such a world would necessarily involve a “script.” Moreover, Catholic Christianity would be impossible, as we hold that man is capable, with the help of Jesus Christ, of overcoming evil. Of becoming a new creation. If we were logically bound to commit evil actions, not only would free will not exist, but any hope in overcoming evil would be futile. We are not logically bound to commit good or evil. That is the point of free will. We have laws that govern what we are physically capable of doing, and there are consequences for our actions, but the choice is ours.

I would like to address the supposed “conflict” between omniscience and omnipotence. I see the proposed conflict as being just as silly as an atheist would see Occam’s razor, applied to a given religion. I will borrow an analogy from Vox Day, who coins the term “omniderigence,” which he defines as: “the infinite use of unlimited or universal power, authority, or force; all-controlling; all-dictating. Less formally, one can think of it as über control-freakdom or ultimate puppet-mastery.”

One of the great things about modern video games is that AI-controlled characters do not have to follow scripted movements and actions, but they can obey a set of governing laws and adapt to the circumstances in order to fight more like human-controlled characters. Let us suppose that the programmer is playing a game against his AI-controlled creation. When an AI-controlled character does something unexpected, and the programmer is surprised or caught off guard, does this mean that the computer programmer lacks omniscience or omnipotence with respect to the AI-world? Not according to Day:
"The Irrational Athiest" by Vox Day:

Surprise was possible because the programmer was not choosing to exercise either his knowledge or his power at that particular point where real-time intersected game-time. While he could have easily provided that particular character with a scripted path and prevented the character from being able to depart from it, he had already elected not to do so. He could have constructed the character in such a way that its head would have exploded for the sin of attempted deicide, or even as punishment for the sin of merely daring to look upon him in all his pasty geek glory, but he did not do that, either. And finally, while he could have been scanning that particular AI’s “thought” processes and known what it intended to do in the very instant the intention was born, instead he refrained and so learned about its actions through entirely “natural” means.

If it is not difficult to accept that an omniscient and omnipotent programmer can reject omniderigence, why should it be hard to imagine that an all-powerful God might choose to do the same? Even human lovers know that the lover cannot control the beloved, so it should not be difficult to believe that a loving God would permit His creatures to choose freely how they will live.

Now, a more interesting question to me is, if, as some have suggested here, heaven is the place where everyone always chooses what is morally correct, then why was God moved to create a world where that was not so? Was there something unfulfilling about heaven according to the beatific vision? If so, should we desire that place more than the world we currently have? Those are a bit more interesting questions, to me. The nature of free will and the faux conflict between omniscience and omnipotence seem elementary in comparison. Just my opinion, though.

 

[Spock]

My apologies to all… I don’t have a long enough access to a comp to answer the posts. Hopefully sooon I will.

Spock

 

[Spock]

You are inserting an equivocation that is unwarranted by the language of proposition (2) or (a). The pertinent language “create” is the same in both premises and, therefore, by definition means the same thing in both premises. Whether you want to make both mean “directly create” (which I assume means creation somewhere further down the causal chain) or some other kind of creation (ultimate cause, for example), so long as both terms “creation” mean the same thing, the conclusion (b) will necessarily contain a contradiction. It is only when you, Spock, insert the word “directly” in premise (a) and not in premise (2) that we suddenly have an ambiguity – an equivocation – and not one that was ever intended or would be warranted by the language used.

I don’t think the clarification (equivocation) is unwarranted. Let’s repeat the argument as stated.

(2) If God is omnipotent, he can create any logically possible state of affairs.
(a) It is a logically possible state of affairs that there are men not created by God. Therefore,
(b) God can create persons who are not created by God.

The problem is here that (b) is not a corollary of (2) and (a), though at first glance it seems to be due to its ingenious, but deceptive wording. The proper form of (b) would be:

(b’) God can create a state of affairs, where there are persons who are not created by God.

No contradiction. And of course, (b) and (b’) are not the same. They cannot be, since (b) contains a logical contradiction, and (b’) does not.

It is obvious that the thread now must deal with the proper definition of omnipotence, before we can go any further.

The original (and currently rejected) definition of omnipotence was:

(2’) If God is omnipotent, he can create any state of affairs, whether logically contradictory or not. Or, in other words, God can create literally anything and everything.

This definition is rejected these days, due to its incoherence. (Side remark: The funny thing is, that according to theists, God actually can create logically contradictory states of affairs. For example, God in not a corporeal being, and does not reside in any kind of “time”. Yet, God can assume a human form, which is corporeal, and in this form he is subject to time. To be both corporeal and not corporeal is a simple logical contradiction. To be outside of time and inside it is another logical contradiction.)

It would be somewhat difficult for me to have made proposition (a) “purposefully” vague since the original syllogism is Dr. Alvin Plantinga’s. I suppose you could accuse Plantinga of being purposefully vague.

Thanks, I suspected it. Nevertheless, I am “accusing” Plantinga of playing fast and loose with words, since (b) is not he proper corollary of (2) and (a), while (b’) as suggested above - is. Proposition (b) is simply a syntactically correct and semantically meaningless proposition, very similar to the Russel-paradox.

Then I take it you now agree that the proposition (2) “If God is omnipotent, he can create any logically possible state of affairs” is false. That’s a start. As for the notion that the concept of omnipotence is nonsensical: It is only nonsensical if one presents a caricature or otherwise doesn’t understand what Christianity has always taught about God’s omnipotence. Atheists and agnostics are often in this situation as are, sadly, many theists who are ignorant of the concept.

Well, I don’t agree. However, If I provisionally accept that (2) is false, then just what does “omnipotence” mean? If God is unable to create logical contradictions, and cannot create some states of affairs which are logically non-contradictory, where does this chain of God-cannot-do-this stop?

It is also stipulated that God can create physical impossibilities (miracles) which violate the Law of Indentity. How come that the Law of Contradiction is held as “sacrosanct” while the Law of Indentity is trampled over? Also to create physical impossibilities is a violation of the Law of Contradiction, since a physically impossible event is now physically possible (since it happened).

The following are all demonstrably contained within the Christian Bible: God is unable to lie, to be unwise, to die, to be mistaken in his beliefs, to be evil, etc. Affirmatively, Christianity teaches that God has enormous creative power, that he created the universe, that his thoughts are incomparably above ours, that he loves his creation. Put in this way, rather than the false notion that God “can do anything,” God’s omnipotence is credible to people throughout the world.

Unfortunately the Bible is hardly a point to prove anything - for anyone who does believe in God. Can you draw the line in the sand (so to speak) in a secular manner, and define the concept of omniscience?

It is clear that a specific human is able to create problems, which he cannot solve. (Of course, others might or might not be able to solve them.) Therefore the proposition “person X is able to create a problem, which he cannot solve” does not contain a logical contradiction. What happens if we substitute “God” for “person X”? Does it become a contradiction, even though it is formally the same? It is a legitimate question.

The definition you offered: “God has enormous creative power, that he created the universe, that his thoughts are incomparably above ours”… is not a rigorous definition, it simply says that God is very powerful, which is hardly a substitute for a properly formatted definition.

So, how should one understand the concept of “omnipotence” or “maxipotence”?

 

[Spock]

W4 isn’t the issue here.

It certainly is. In W4 there are free agents, who just “happen” to choose correctly each and every time. Could God “actualize” that world? I say he could. You may agree or disagree. Which one will it be? If you say, he cannot, point out the contradiction.

To make things short and simple, please use my original proposition of having one agent, who makes one moral decision - as a template. No need to overcomplicate the matter.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

It is also stipulated that God can create physical impossibilities (miracles) which violate the Law of Indentity. How come that the Law of Contradiction is held as “sacrosanct” while the Law of Indentity is trampled over? Also to create physical impossibilities is a violation of the Law of Contradiction, since a physically impossible event is now physically possible (since it happened).

Miracles do not contradict the law of identity, nor are they – properly speaking – miraculous. They are indications that we do not fully understand the laws of physics. As Hume stated, the expectation that when I drop this pen, it will certainly fall to the ground is not purely rational. Inductive logic can only predict probabilities; it cannot establish certainty.

The Christian says that miracles violate *apparent *laws of nature, not actual laws of nature. No true law of nature (if there is such a thing, which is uncertain) could ever be violated.

 

[tdgesq]

Let’s repeat the argument as stated.

(2) If God is omnipotent, he can create any logically possible state of affairs.
(a) It is a logically possible state of affairs that there are men not created by God. Therefore,
(b) God can create persons who are not created by God.

The problem is here that (b) is not a corollary of (2) and (a), though at first glance it seems to be due to its ingenious, but deceptive wording. The proper form of (b) would be:

(b’) God can create a state of affairs, where there are persons who are not created by God.

Even assuming (b’) is the correct conclusion, it still contains a contradiction – unless you insert an implied term in one of the premises and not the other. If (2) includes “ultimately create” and (a) means “ultimately create”, then (b’) now reads:

(b’’) God can create a logically possible state of affairs where there are persons who are not ultimately created by God.

Of course if God created the possible state of affairs, then he also ultimately created everything within the possible state of affairs. If you’d like, you can substitute “ultimately cause” instead of “ultimately create.” It yields the same contradiction. In any case, it appears that you no longer affirm the truth of proposition (2) whether you are convinced by this example or not.

The original (and currently rejected) definition of omnipotence was:

(2’) If God is omnipotent, he can create any state of affairs, whether logically contradictory or not. Or, in other words, God can create literally anything and everything.

Correct.

This definition is rejected these days, due to its incoherence. (Side remark: The funny thing is, that according to theists, God actually can create logically contradictory states of affairs. For example, God in not a corporeal being, and does not reside in any kind of “time”. Yet, God can assume a human form, which is corporeal, and in this form he is subject to time. To be both corporeal and not corporeal is a simple logical contradiction. To be outside of time and inside it is another logical contradiction.)

I think the Scriptures make it evident that (2’) was never accepted. The apparent contradictions you list are all due to the metaphysic you are using – naturalism/materialism. Theists, particularly Catholics, tend to hold to a Thomist metaphysic or some variant thereof. Even outside of theism, ontological dualism is still a consideration. I would argue all of your examples are consistent within a Thomistic metaphysical construct.

Thanks, I suspected it. Nevertheless, I am “accusing” Plantinga of playing fast and loose with words, since (b) is not he proper corollary of (2) and (a), while (b’) as suggested above - is. Proposition (b) is simply a syntactically correct and semantically meaningless proposition, very similar to the Russel-paradox.

You can always email him at Notre Dame University about it (I don’t think he is fully retired yet). I suspect he will give you the same answer I did.

Well, I don’t agree. However, If I provisionally accept that (2) is false, then just what does “omnipotence” mean? If God is unable to create logical contradictions, and cannot create some states of affairs which are logically non-contradictory, where does this chain of God-cannot-do-this stop?

In my last post I gave a preliminary answer to this question. It is enough for this topic to note that it is logically inconsistent to assert that free actors can exist where God determines that they always do what is right.

It is also stipulated that God can create physical impossibilities (miracles) which violate the Law of Indentity. How come that the Law of Contradiction is held as “sacrosanct” while the Law of Indentity is trampled over? Also to create physical impossibilities is a violation of the Law of Contradiction, since a physically impossible event is now physically possible (since it happened).

First, physical impossibilities are not necessarily logical impossibilities (flying pink elephants for instance.) Second, miracles do not require that physical laws be broken, much less that the law of identity be violated. At Cana, Jesus turned water into wine. A chemist could tell you theoretically how this could be done, even if we don’t have the scientific expertise to do so today.

Unfortunately the Bible is hardly a point to prove anything - for anyone who does believe in God. Can you draw the line in the sand (so to speak) in a secular manner, and define the concept of omniscience?

I obviously do not ask you believe anything that is in the Bible. What I do ask you to believe is that it is the primary criteria by which Christians understand the attributes of God. The most concise definition I can give you is that God can at least do everything attributed to him in the Bible.

It is clear that a specific human is able to create problems, which he cannot solve. (Of course, others might or might not be able to solve them.) Therefore the proposition “person X is able to create a problem, which he cannot solve” does not contain a logical contradiction. What happens if we substitute “God” for “person X”? Does it become a contradiction, even though it is formally the same? It is a legitimate question.

I apologize, but I don’t understand what you are asking here. I will take a crack at it if you restate it.