One final time: freedom of will does NOT logically lead to evil actions

[Spock]

You know very well how I would respond to this. Bait left intact.

I must be very dumb, since I have no idea… and I did not mean it as a bait - I am not fishing.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

I must be very dumb, since I have no idea… and I did not mean it as a bait - I am not fishing.

OK, then…

But, you see, they are not “bullied” at all. They are completely free to do anything they choose. It just so happens that they choose the “right thing”.

They are free, because their decisions are theirs and no one else’s. In no particular case is this objectionable (it is possible for a human to be righteous, e.g. Mary), but as a generalized reality it is objectionable. By choosing this particular world to actuate, God has stacked the deck and made “freedom” as a metaphysical concept invalid.

Of course, if God does not pick *any *particular world to actuate (randomness) or if He actuates all possible worlds, the actuated world (or worlds) may, in point of fact, contain no evil decisions. But He has not determined this to be the case, nor is freedom meaningful if He did.

 

[tonyrey]

What is your problem with it? Is it possible for one person to make one morally correct action? If the answer is “yes”, then it can be extended via mathematical induction.

I know from experience that when we have a flurry of questions it’s easy to leave one (or more) unanswered. I hope you don’t mind if I post mine again. I also hope that anyone who hasn’t received a reply from me will do the same. Of course if you don’t wish to answer feel free not to.
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Do you really believe mathematical induction solves the problem of free will? Your argument is based on the assumption that God can give us **conditional **free will, i.e. the power to make some choices and not others. But if we are genuinely free we can frustrate God’s will and make evil decisions about anything we choose whenever we choose. By giving us free will He restricts His omnipotence **unconditionally. **Right from the start it is possible for a person to make one morally correct action but it is also possible for the same person to make one morally incorrect action. Whatever decision we make is beyond God’s control. He is not a detached Creator, Observer and Manipulator of what we do. He makes Himself as well as others vulnerable to the consequences of evil choices and decisions.

 

[tobias]

This is the method to be used in our discussion. No statistical uncertainty is involved, no reference to "non-deterministic " events is needed. We have a sequence of all the possible worlds and we can examine those. Simple!

No statistical uncertainty is neccessary, only actual uncertainty. As long as agents are free to choose other than x, then a world of only choice x can never be guaranteed (without removed freedom to do otherwise).

The fact that you have to start with 1 agent making 1 choice to supposedly prove what is possible for billions of people making vast numbers of decisions in billions of different circumstances, with multitudes of variables, makes the use of mathematical induction to prove what free agents can do ridiculous.

So agent A, in circumstance A, with temperment A, with disposition A, with handicap A, with education A, with upbringing A…freely makes choice A.
Somehow you can know that there is a world where agent B, in circumstance C, with disposition X, with handicap L, with education R, with upbringing F… freely makes choice A, and all other agents inbetween?
I know that somehow you think these factors are irrelevant, but again, go back to your coin toss analogy. It assumes there is nothing abnormal about the coin, what if a nick was taken out of one side? Wouldn’t the toss be skewed because one side is heavier than the other? What if the coin is 2 headed? what if one side is weighted? What if there is a sticker in one side? What if one side is sticky? What if one side has been filed down?.. Or do you reject these variables as indeterminant?

Human freedom and use of the will is beyond the scope of mathematics.(unless the will were fixed)

 

[tdgesq]

It seems to me that we are on two wavelength on the two focal points of this thread. One is the concept of a “possible world”, the other one is the nature of “mathematical induction”. So let me elaborate on these concepts.

We are actually on the same wavelength with respect to possible worlds and mathematical induction. Where we are not on the same wavelength is the concept of a contingent truth and non-contingent truth in possible worlds.

Of course there is a possible world, where everyone makes at least one immoral decison. There is another possible world where everyone only makes ]moral decisons. All of these are possible worlds. Not two possible worlds overlap

Note that I changed your second sentence. I’m not sure whether you meant to say moral or immoral there, but I changed it to “moral” for demonstrative purposes. Let’s look at the four possible worlds again to explore the concept of contingent vs. non-contingent propositions:

W1: (a) God creates persons with free will; (b) God does not causally determine people in every situation to choose what is right; and (c) There is evil in W1.

W2: (a) God does not create persons with free will; (b) God causally determines people in every situation to choose what is right; and (c) There is no evil in W2.

W3: (a) God creates persons with free will; (b) God causally determines people in every situation to choose what is right; and (c) There is no evil in W3.

W4: (a) God creates persons with free will; (b) God does not causally determine people in every situation to choose what is right; and (c) There is no evil in W4.

W1 is a proposition that constitutes a possible world. We all agree on that. The question is whether it is a possible world that is contingent or non-contingent. So which is it? It is contingent. What is it contingent upon? It is contingent upon the free choice of the actor. This world’s possibility is contingent upon at least one possible person choosing a morally wrong action (there is evil in W1). If every possible person freely chooses to always do what is right, then W1 is not a possible world. In other words, the possibility of W1 is contingent upon the free choices of all possible persons.

W2 is a proposition that constitutes a possible world. We all agree. Is it contingent or non-contingent? Insofar as the free acts of a possible persons is concerned, it is non-contingent. Now it is certainly contingent upon God’s choice to causally determine the acts of people in every situation to choose what is right, but that isn’t what we are talking about.

W3 is never a possible world because it contains a logical contradiction. I think we agree on that.

W4 is a proposition that constitutes a possible world. Is it contingent or non-contingent upon the free choice of the actor? Just like W1 it is contingent. So, if every possible person freely chooses to commit one morally bad act, then W4 is not a possible world.

If you stipulate that it is possible that at least one agent will commit one immoral act, of course I concede that. It is just another possible world.

What you aren’t considering though is that the possibility of W1 and W4 are contingent upon the free choice of the actor. If at least one possible person freely chooses to commit one morally bad act, then W1 is possible. If all possible persons freely choose to always do what is right, then W4 is possible. However, in both cases the possibility of those worlds is contingent upon the free choices of all possible persons.

Based upon this, it is of utmost importance we come to a conclusion about my starting scenario: one agent makes one choice (of moral nature) and then God immediately stops the experiment. This serves as the starting point for the induction. (Strictly speaking, the induction is not necessary. As long as there is one world, in which one agent makes one morally correct decision, and then he dies the case is proven. It may not be a “big” world, it may not be an exciting world, but it is possible, so God could have instantiated it.

The inductive part is just icing on the cake.

If you understand what I have said up to this point, then you can see that the “inductive part” had better work or else the possibility of W4 cannot be established as even likely. And I think that is where we are. Unless I can get you to understand and engage on this point, then I think moving on to induction is a waste of time. Do you recognize that some worlds are possible only if certain contingencies are met? And do you admit that it could be the case that all possible persons may freely choose to commit at least one morally bad act?

 

[Spock]

Note that I changed your second sentence. I’m not sure whether you meant to say moral or immoral there, but I changed it to “moral” for demonstrative purposes.

I did mean immoral.

Let’s look at the four possible worlds again to explore the concept of contingent vs. non-contingent propositions:

W1: (a) God creates persons with free will; (b) God does not causally determine people in every situation to choose what is right; and (c) There is evil in W1.

W2: (a) God does not create persons with free will; (b) God causally determines people in every situation to choose what is right; and (c) There is no evil in W2.

W3: (a) God creates persons with free will; (b) God causally determines people in every situation to choose what is right; and (c) There is no evil in W3.

W4: (a) God creates persons with free will; (b) God does not causally determine people in every situation to choose what is right; and (c) There is no evil in W4.

No problem at all. We already agreed upon this.

What you aren’t considering though is that the possibility of W1 and W4 are contingent upon the free choice of the actor. If at least one possible person freely chooses to commit one morally bad act, then W1 is possible. If all possible persons freely choose to always do what is right, then W4 is possible. However, in both cases the possibility of those worlds is contingent upon the free choices of all possible persons.

I have no problem with your analysis, save for one point. Let me rephrase your sentence: “If at least one possible person freely chooses to commit one morally bad act, then W1 is actualized”. And the other one: “If all possible persons freely choose to always do what is right, then W4 is actualized”. Of course every one of these worlds is contingent upon the decisons actually made. But that does not make any of the other worlds impossible. Each and every one of these worlds is possible. It seems to me that our difference is covered by the usage of words: “possible” and “actualized”.

If you understand what I have said up to this point, then you can see that the “inductive part” had better work or else the possibility of W4 cannot be established as even likely. And I think that is where we are. Unless I can get you to understand and engage on this point, then I think moving on to induction is a waste of time. Do you recognize that some worlds are possible only if certain contingencies are met? And do you admit that it could be the case that all possible persons may freely choose to commit at least one morally bad act?

Sure, I agree. Just like they all make only moral decisions, or only make immoral ones, or any combination of these. I really don’t see what is your point. What does the fact that these worlds are contingent upon the actual decisons made have to do with anything?

This is the reason that I really would appreciate to stick to my simplest scenario. One agent, one decision, made freely, uncoerced. There are only two possible worlds there. One, where the agent makes the moral choice, and other one, where the agent makes the immoral one. Neither one of these wolrds contains or leads to a logical contradiction, therefore God can actualize either one - without imposing any coersion. They just happen. Do you agree to this?

 

[Spock]

The fact that you have to start with 1 agent making 1 choice to supposedly prove what is possible for billions of people making vast numbers of decisions in billions of different circumstances, with multitudes of variables, makes the use of mathematical induction to prove what free agents can do ridiculous.

It is not. You only demonstrated that you don’t understand what I am talking about. Which is not surprising, since very few around here are mathematicians, who understand the finer points of probability theory. Hopefully it will be clear at the end.

 

[davidv]

I did mean immoral.

No problem at all. We already agreed upon this.

I have no problem with your analysis, save for one point. Let me rephrase your sentence: “If at least one possible person freely chooses to commit one morally bad act, then W1 is actualized”. And the other one: “If all possible persons freely choose to always do what is right, then W4 is actualized”. Of course every one of these worlds is contingent upon the decisons actually made. But that does not make any of the other worlds impossible. Each and every one of these worlds is possible. It seems to me that our difference is covered by the usage of words: “possible” and “actualized”.

Sure, I agree. Just like they all make only moral decisions, or only make immoral ones, or any combination of these. I really don’t see what is your point. What does the fact that these worlds are contingent upon the actual decisons made have to do with anything?

This is the reason that I really would appreciate to stick to my simplest scenario. One agent, one decision, made freely, uncoerced. There are only two possible worlds there. One, where the agent makes the moral choice, and other one, where the agent makes the immoral one. Neither one of these wolrds contains or leads to a logical contradiction, therefore God can actualize either one - without imposing any coersion. They just happen. Do you agree to this?

Whether I agree with this or not matters not. The world we live in is the world we have. The problem of life is not a math problem. What if scenerios may make for challengely thought experiments, and if they contain the right ingredients, they may even be useful relative to real world problems. Please explain how this what if can be meaningful to the problems in this world.

 

[Spock]

Whether I agree with this or not matters not. The world we live in is the world we have. The problem of life is not a math problem. What if scenerios may make for challengely thought experiments, and if they contain the right ingredients, they may even be useful relative to real world problems. Please explain how this what if can be meaningful to the problems in this world.

I suspect you did not read through the whole thread, which is understandable. Your objection has been answered before. In a nutshell, I am sick and tired of the “argument” that the existence of free will logically and inevitably leads to evil, and wanted to have a thread to demolish this nonsense.

 

[tdgesq]

I have no problem with your analysis, save for one point. Let me rephrase your sentence: “If at least one possible person freely chooses to commit one morally bad act, then W1 is actualized”.

That is incorrect. It is God who actualizes the world, not the person who freely chooses. The point is, unless one possible person freely chooses to commit one morally bad act, then God by definition cannot actualize W1. The possibility, not just the actualization (although that too), is contingent upon the free choice of the actor. If there is no possible person who freely chooses to commit one morally bad act, then W1 is not a possible world.

And the other one: “If all possible persons freely choose to always do what is right, then W4 is actualized”. Of course every one of these worlds is contingent upon the decisons actually made. But that does not make any of the other worlds impossible. Each and every one of these worlds is possible. It seems to me that our difference is covered by the usage of words: “possible” and “actualized”.

Again, that is wrong. God actualizes the possible world. And yes, each of those worlds is contingent upon the decisions made. But let me rephrase - each of the possible worlds is contingent upon the decisions made. If all possible persons choose to commit one morally wrong act, then by definition W4 is not a possible world. And if there is no such possible world, then God cannot actualize it. W4 is only possible based upon a contingent truth that “no possible person commits one morally wrong act.”

Sure, I agree. Just like they all make only moral decisions, or only make immoral ones, or any combination of these. I really don’t see what is your point. What does the fact that these worlds are contingent upon the actual decisons made have to do with anything?

Nothing, but notice that you insert “actual” in place of “possible.” You affirm my statement that there could be a state of affairs where all possible persons choose to commit one morally wrong act. That means there could not be any possible world W4 for God to actualize. Until you realize that the possibility of W1 and W4 depend upon a contingent truth - the free choice of all possible persons - we simply can’t go any further.

 

[tjm190]

Yes and it’s possible to roll a pair of dice an infinite number of times and have the result always equal 7 without the dice being loaded- infinitely unlikely, but possible.

 

[tdgesq]

Yes and it’s possible to roll a pair of dice an infinite number of times and have the result always equal 7 without the dice being loaded- infinitely unlikely, but possible.

I assume this is in answer to my post.

1. In fact, it isn’t possible to roll a pair of dice an infinite number of times. An actual infinite is logically impossible.
2. At least you recognize that there is a distinction between necessarily true propositions and contingent propositions, and, therefore, that some worlds are only possible if a contingency is met.
3. Why you would use a pair of dice to model the property “every possible person freely chooses to commit one morally wrong act” is a little bit puzzling to me. It looks like a number of unspoken statistical assumptions are being made. Perhaps you could explain how this model helps us understand the probability that “every possible person freely chooses to commit one morally wrong act.”

 

[davidv]

I suspect you did not read through the whole thread, which is understandable. Your objection has been answered before. In a nutshell, I am sick and tired of the “argument” that the existence of free will logically and inevitably leads to evil, and wanted to have a thread to demolish this nonsense.

You suspect incorrectly.

I could not refute your mathematical proof even if it is incorrect.

But, so what. Evil exits. Free will exists. This is the world we have. So how does your “proof” help us deal with it?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

But, so what. Evil exits. Free will exists. This is the world we have. So how does your “proof” help us deal with it?

He’s trying to prove that God did not have to create a universe that contained evil actions, with the implication that either: a) God is not good, or b) God does not exist.

Don’t worry, though. God is still good, and God still exists. (Phew! That was a close one!)

 

[davidv]

He’s trying to prove that God did not have to create a universe that contained evil actions, with the implication that either: a) God is not good, or b) God does not exist.

Don’t worry, though. God is still good, and God still exists. (Phew! That was a close one!)

Yes. I realize that. I couldn’t resist commenting.

 

[fhansen]

Completely irrelevant. The world is not judged based upon any arbitrary criterion, whether it is 'boring" or too simplistic, or anything else.

Similar objection was brought up against a hypothetical scenario where there is no crime, no murder, no rapes, no tortures, no holocausts, no genocides, and the opponent complained that such a world would be “boring”. Who cares? (Besides, it would not be boring.) I am simply presenting a mathematical proof to finally dispose of the argument which blames the existence of evil on the existence of “free will”, which effectively says that God had to “compromise” because the existence of free will necessarily and logically leads to immoral (or evil) behavior. That is all.

The world is judged based on whether or not it can provide a life worth living for its inhabitants. My argument is that it can do so, given time, if time is required for its inhabitants to cease doing evil- and that a choice for evil is probably an inevitable one for each of them to make eventually. An argument that claims that a moral world is possible if one moral agent never has time to make a wrong choice begs the question.

 

[Spock]

That is incorrect. It is God who actualizes the world, not the person who freely chooses. The point is, unless one possible person freely chooses to commit one morally bad act, then God by definition cannot actualize W1. The possibility, not just the actualization (although that too), is contingent upon the free choice of the actor. If there is no possible person who freely chooses to commit one morally bad act, then W1 is not a possible world.

Again, that is wrong. God actualizes the possible world. And yes, each of those worlds is contingent upon the decisions made. But let me rephrase - each of the possible worlds is contingent upon the decisions made. If all possible persons choose to commit one morally wrong act, then by definition W4 is not a possible world. And if there is no such possible world, then God cannot actualize it. W4 is only possible based upon a contingent truth that “no possible person commits one morally wrong act.”

You still use the words “possible” and “actualized” interchangably. That is the obstacle in our path. Let me reiterate: just because something did not happen it does not make it impossible. Just because it so happened that a pine tree grew in my back yard, it is not impossible that in a different possible world an oak tree could not have grown there. Just because one person made a morally incorrect choice, it is not impossible that in a different hypothetical world he actually made the right choice.

Nothing, but notice that you insert “actual” in place of “possible.” You affirm my statement that there could be a state of affairs where all possible persons choose to commit one morally wrong act. That means there could not be any possible world W4 for God to actualize. Until you realize that the possibility of W1 and W4 depend upon a contingent truth - the free choice of all possible persons - we simply can’t go any further.

No, the possibility is not contingent, only the actuality is. The concept of a possible world is simply a logical construct, pondering a “what if” scenario. Yes, it is possible that in **one specific possible world **a person makes an immoral choice. And it is also possible that in another possible world he makes the correct choice. To prove that W4 is impossible you must show that in each possible world there is necessarily at least one person who will make at least one immoral choice - which fundamentally different from showing that in one specific world he possibly makes an immoral choice. How do you plan to do that?

Why do you shy away from analyzing the simple scenario I presented? The number of moral agents and the number of moral decisons has no bearing on the problem at hand, but the analysis is much simpler in a simple setup. Whether we talk about one person or 1 trillion of them, whether we talk about 1 decison of 1 billion-trillion-quadrillion of them, the problem is the same, except the number of possible worlds is huge in the latter scenario and thus is confuses the matter.

 

[Spock]

He’s trying to prove that God did not have to create a universe that contained evil actions, with the implication that either: a) God is not good, or b) God does not exist.

No, I am not interested in that. In the OP I explicitly disowned the ramifications of this problem. The only thing I am interested in is to show that the so-called free-will defense is logically incorrect - which it is.

 

[Spock]

1. In fact, it isn’t possible to roll a pair of dice an infinite number of times. An actual infinite is logically impossible.

Why would it be? The number positive integers is infinite.

But the point is the same if you simply consider a large (or small) number of die-tosses. It is better to speak of a coin-toss, where there are only 2 outcomes. Let “heads” represent a moral choice, and “tails” represent an immoral choice". The number of tosses can go from 1 to “N”, where “N” is an arbitrarily large number. The possible outcomes go from “all heads” to “all tails”, with any number of mixed outcomes in-between. Each and every one of these outcomes is equally valid.

To assert that the “all heads” scenario is less likely (not to say impossible) than any one of the mixed ones, is simply the “odometer syndrom”, where our common sense thinks that it is suspicious that a good coin will land on its “tail” 1000 (or one trillion) times. However, “common sense” is not an arbiter in mathematics.

 

[Spock]

You suspect incorrectly.

I am glad to be mistaken.

I could not refute your mathematical proof even if it is incorrect.

It is not incorrect. That is the beauty of mathematics. The Pythagoras theorem will never be refuted, because it is correct.

But, so what. Evil exits. Free will exists. This is the world we have. So how does your “proof” help us deal with it?

I am not interested in that. I am simply concerned about getting rid of the illogical and incorrect “free-will” defense.