One final time: freedom of will does NOT logically lead to evil actions

[davidv]

I am glad to be mistaken.

It is not incorrect. That is the beauty of mathematics. The Pythagoras theorem will never be refuted, because it is correct.

I am not interested in that. I am simply concerned about getting rid of the illogical and incorrect “free-will” defense.

How does the lack of logical necessity eliminate free-will as a contributing cause of evil?
Even if we grant you your mathematical premise, the logic connecting “not logically necessary” to “incorrect “free-will” defense” has not been shown. If fact, evidence of day-to-day living demonstrates the opposite.

 

[Spock]

How does the lack of logical necessity eliminate free-will as a contributing cause of evil?

It eliminates it as the logical causative factor. The existence of free will is the necessary, but not sufficient cause. Let’s be precise: the existence of free will is the logical causative factor for the possibility of evil, but not for the **actuality **of it.

Even if we grant you your mathematical premise, the logic connecting “not logically necessary” to " incorrect “free-will” defense" has not been shown. If fact, evidence of day-to-day living demonstrates the opposite.

I am not talking about this particular world, rather about a different, logically possible, hypothetical state of the affairs, where the potential never gets actualized or realized. You use the current state of affairs, which is but one possible scenario, and wish to generalize based upon that. A typical error of popular induction.

A bit more math is in order here. Let’s say that there are “n” morally significant decisons which are made by the entire population from the beginning of times all the way to hypothesized end of it. This “n” can be as large as you wish. In each case there are two possible outcomes: a moral decision is made or an immoral decision is reached.

In this case the number of possible worlds is 2^n, which comes from the binomial theorem. Look it up in en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binomial_theorem if you wish. The possible worlds are subdivided based upon the number of moral decisions.

Let’s say that exactly “k” immoral deicions were made and (n - k) moral ones (where k goes from 0 to n). Then the number of such worlds is (n | k) pronounced “n over k”, which is n! / (k! (n - k)!) where the exclamation point designates the factorial (that is n! = 1 * 2 * 3 * 4 * … * n), indeed a huge number.

If k = 0, the number of possible wolrds is (n | 0) which is 1. If k = 1, the number of possible worlds is (n | 1), which is “n”, if k = 2, the number of possible worlds is (n | 2), which is n * (n - 1) / 2 etc… all the way until the end, when every decision is decided to be an immoral one, which is (n | n) also 1. The sum of these numbers (the number of all the possible worlds) is 2^n. There is exactly one of these worlds, (k = 0), where no immoral decisons are made. Q. E. D.

This is a direct proof, not an inductive one, and the math behind it is rather elementary. I know, however, that formulae like this can be difficult to grasp, that is why I chose to go the other route, and use the inductive method.

It should obvious to everyone that in the simplest possible world (where there is one moral agent, who makes one morally siginficant decision, therefore n = 1) there are two possible outcomes, he makes a moral choice, or an immoral one. God can actualize either one. If we take the story of original sin seriously (which you do), he happened to actualize the one where the incorrect decison was made, with all the hypothesized consequences. However, he could have actualized the other one, where the “fall” never took place. From this simple scanario we can extend the number of agents and the number of decisions until we get a fully generalized picture.

I am not interested in the analysis of why’s and wherefore’s, I am simply pointing out that it could have happened the other way. To reiterate: there is one possible world, where everyone, always chooses the “right” way, and it happens without infringing on the free will of the inhabitants. God did not do it, even though he could have. You draw your own conclusions.

 

[fhansen]

You still use the words “possible” and “actualized” interchangably. That is the obstacle in our path. Let me reiterate: just because something did not happen it does not make it impossible. Just because it so happened that a pine tree grew in my back yard, it is not impossible that in a different possible world an oak tree could not have grown there. Just because one person made a morally incorrect choice, it is not impossible that in a different hypothetical world he actually made the right choice.

I still don’t understand why you think that, necessarily, that there could be one possible world actualized where no one makes an immoral choice. Catholic teaching proposes that humankind began with a single pair of parents and those people chose wrong when faced with their first moral choice. How can we know that things could’ve necessarily been otherwise?

 

[Spock]

I still don’t understand why you think that, necessarily, that there could be one possible world actualized where no one makes an immoral choice. Catholic teaching proposes that humankind began with a single pair of parents and those people chose wrong when faced with their first moral choice. How can we know that things could’ve **necessarily **been otherwise?

Not “necessarily”, rather possibly.

Besides, I am not particularly concerned with Catholic teachings. This is a purely logical problem, contemplating the concept of free will, and it possible effects. If - as you say - they could not have chosen otherwise, then they had no freedom to do so. When facing a dilemma and one only has the immoral choice to “select”, then there is no freedom in that case. It is precisely the stipulated freedom to make a moral or immoral choice which assures that there is always a moral choice. That is all.

 

[buffalo]

Yes and it’s possible to roll a pair of dice an infinite number of times and have the result always equal 7 without the dice being loaded- infinitely unlikely, but possible.

If that were the case that universe would be designed that way. Randomness would be designed out.

 

[liquidpele]

If that were the case that universe would be designed that way. Randomness would be designed out.

 

[fhansen]

Not “necessarily”, rather possibly.

Besides, I am not particularly concerned with Catholic teachings. This is a purely logical problem, contemplating the concept of free will, and it possible effects. If - as you say - they could not have chosen otherwise, then they had no freedom to do so. When facing a dilemma and one only has the immoral choice to “select”, then there is no freedom in that case. It is precisely the stipulated freedom to make a moral or immoral choice which assures that there is always a moral choice. That is all.

I guess what I’m saying is that while their free will may’ve been somewhat mitigated-or “less free” by degree- due to limitations inherent in created things, in the Catholic scenario they are still culpable because a wrong choice can, in time, be made right by making a right choice. In this case humans are bound to fall but free to rise.

 

[Spock]

I guess what I’m saying is that while their free will may’ve been somewhat mitigated-or “less free” by degree- due to limitations inherent in created things, in the Catholic scenario they are still culpable because a wrong choice can, in time, be made right by making a right choice. In this case humans are bound to fall but free to rise.

Two points. I disagree that it is possible to “undo” anything, be it right or wrong. Mitigation is just a human concoction for the lack of ability to “undo” past events. However, that has no bearing on the issue. The whole point of this thread is to deal with the “free will” defense, which is purported to be an explanation why there is “evil” in the world.

 

[tdgesq]

You still use the words “possible” and “actualized” interchangably.

Spock, with respect, it is you who are conflating these two concepts. The reason why you are is because you do not understand that some propositions are contingent even in possible worlds. Here. I just looked this up on Wiki. What I’m telling you is not something new in the realm of philosophy.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_world

That is the obstacle in our path. Let me reiterate: just because something did not happen it does not make it impossible. Just because it so happened that a pine tree grew in my back yard, it is not impossible that in a different possible world an oak tree could not have grown there. Just because one person made a morally incorrect choice, it is not impossible that in a different hypothetical world he actually made the right choice.

I agree with all of this. I am not speaking of any actual world. I am only speaking of possible worlds. There are many possible worlds that God can actualize. Some of those possible worlds though are only possible contingent upon some other proposition, such as the free decision of an actor. No world needs to be actualized for me to posit the possibility that all possible persons (as opposed to actual persons) choose to commit one morally wrong act. Out of all the possible persons available to God, there may not be a single one who chooses to only do what is good.

No, the possibility is not contingent, only the actuality is. The concept of a possible world is simply a logical construct, pondering a “what if” scenario.

Yes, its possibility is contingent because it contains a contingent proposition. I agree with you that it is simply a “what if” scenario and not a literal “world.” Perhaps to avoid anymore confusion (and I know you believe it to be on my part), let’s just stop using the word “world” and use a phrase free of images like “state of affairs.”

It is a logically possible state of affairs that (a) God creates persons with free will; (b) God does not causally determine people in every situation to choose what is right; and (c) There is no evil. Of course this proposition is only possible if there are enough possible (not actual) persons who freely choose to never commit a morally wrong act. We would say that this state of affairs is contingently true.

There are certainly other propositions that are necessarily true, such as, “there are no square circles.” I could say that it is a logically possible state of affairs that God creates a world where there are no square circles. We would say this state of affairs is necessarily true. It is not contingent upon anything.

 

[tdgesq]

. . . continued

Yes, it is possible that in **one specific possible world **a person makes an immoral choice. And it is also possible that in another possible world he makes the correct choice.

Correct. And what is that logically possible state of affairs dependent upon? The possible person’s free choice. Remember, this possible person’s free choice cannot be determined by God in advance or else it contradicts free will. It is indeterminate in that it is up to the possible person to decide whether he makes an immoral act or not. Let’s put it in logical form. There is a set of all possible persons (S). There is a property (I) that is “commits at least one morally wrong act.” Property I is indeterminate because it cannot be determined by God, but instead must be determined by the possible persons S. Now – who is to say that all possible persons S don’t choose property I? Here is the question that Plantinga puts to Mackie (who was never able to answer it) and that you need to answer if this discussion is to go any further:

“[W]hat reason is there for supposing that there are any possible persons . . . having the indeterminate property in question? For it is clear that, given an indeterminate ] property I, the proposition every possible free person freely performs at least one morally wrong action is possibly true. But if every possible free person performs at least one wrong action, then every actual free person also freely performs at least one wrong action . . . .”

To prove that W4 is impossible you must show that in each possible world there is necessarily at least one person who will make at least one immoral choice - which fundamentally different from showing that in one specific world he possibly makes an immoral choice. How do you plan to do that?

But Spock, I don’t need to prove that W4 is impossible. All I need to show is that it may be impossible (that its possibility is contingent). You brought an affirmative claim in the OP. The burden of proof is not on me to prove W4 impossible. All I have to show is that W4 may be impossible because it is a logically possible state of affairs that every possible person commits at least one morally wrong action. I have done that. What that means is God may not have any possible persons to actualize to create W4. What is the likelihood of that? It is very likely under my worldview.

Why do you shy away from analyzing the simple scenario I presented? The number of moral agents and the number of moral decisons has no bearing on the problem at hand, but the analysis is much simpler in a simple setup.

You mean this one?

One agent, one decision, made freely, uncoerced. There are only two possible worlds there. One, where the agent makes the moral choice, and other one, where the agent makes the immoral one.

Do you see now why I’ve been avoiding it? It doesn’t tell us anything new. Both of those worlds are dependent upon a contingent proposition. Whether or not one or the other of those states of affairs is possible is up to the free decision of the possible person. Who’s to say that there is any possible agent who makes the “moral choice” in this scenario? You admit that may be the case - that there is no possible person who would make the moral choice; and you are right. But if it is the case then it necessarily follows that W4 is not a possible world for God to actualize. It is all contingent upon what the set of possible persons freely decide.

I hope this helps to clarify matters.

 

[tdgesq]

Why would it be? The number positive integers is infinite.

The concept of infinity is a being of reason. It cannot exist in the concrete material world. We can use a simple thought experiment to verify that this is the case. I am too busy right now to give you one of my own, so I offer a stock internet example:

Hilbert’s Hotel is a (hypothetical) hotel with an infinite number of rooms, each of which is occupied by a guest. As there are an infinite number of rooms and an infinite number of guests, every room is occupied; the hotel cannot accomodate another guest. However, if a new guest arrives, then it is possible to free up a room for them by moving the guest in room number 1 to room number 2, and the guest in room number 2 to room number 3, and so on. As for every room n there is a room n + 1, every guest can be moved into a different room, thus leaving room number 1 vacant. The new guest, then, can be accommodated after all. This is clearly paradoxical; it is not possible that a hotel both can and cannot accommodate a new guest. Hilbert’s Hotel, therefore, is not possible.

philosophyofreligion.info/theistic-proofs/the-cosmological-argument/the-kalam-cosmological-argument/maths-and-the-finitude-of-the-past/

 

[tobias]

It eliminates it as the logical causative factor. The existence of free will is the necessary, but not sufficient cause. Let’s be precise: the existence of free will is the logical causative factor for the possibility of evil, but not for the **actuality **of it.

Let’s be more precise here, we’re talking about ‘imperfect’ free wills. Since evil is an imperfect choice of the will, then imperfect free wills are the actual causitive factors of it. (math or no math)

I am not talking about this particular world, rather about a different, logically possible, hypothetical state of the affairs, where the potential never gets actualized or realized. You use the current state of affairs, which is but one possible scenario, and wish to generalize based upon that. A typical error of popular induction.

A bit more math is in order here. Let’s say that there are “n” morally significant decisons which are made by the entire population from the beginning of times all the way to hypothesized end of it. This “n” can be as large as you wish. In each case there are two possible outcomes: a moral decision is made or an immoral decision is reached.

In this case the number of possible worlds is 2^n, which comes from the binomial theorem. Look it up in en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binomial_theorem if you wish. The possible worlds are subdivided based upon the number of moral decisions.

Let’s say that exactly “k” immoral deicions were made and (n - k) moral ones (where k goes from 0 to n). Then the number of such worlds is (n | k) pronounced “n over k”, which is n! / (k! (n - k)!) where the exclamation point designates the factorial (that is n! = 1 * 2 * 3 * 4 * … * n), indeed a huge number.

If k = 0, the number of possible wolrds is (n | 0) which is 1. If k = 1, the number of possible worlds is (n | 1), which is “n”, if k = 2, the number of possible worlds is (n | 2), which is n * (n - 1) / 2 etc… all the way until the end, when every decision is decided to be an immoral one, which is (n | n) also 1. The sum of these numbers (the number of all the possible worlds) is 2^n. There is exactly one of these worlds, (k = 0), where no immoral decisons are made. Q. E. D.

This is a direct proof, not an inductive one, and the math behind it is rather elementary. I know, however, that formulae like this can be difficult to grasp, that is why I chose to go the other route, and use the inductive method.

It should obvious to everyone that in the simplest possible world (where there is one moral agent, who makes one morally siginficant decision, therefore n = 1) there are two possible outcomes, he makes a moral choice, or an immoral one. God can actualize either one. If we take the story of original sin seriously (which you do), he happened to actualize the one where the incorrect decison was made, with all the hypothesized consequences. However, he could have actualized the other one, where the “fall” never took place. From this simple scanario we can extend the number of agents and the number of decisions until we get a fully generalized picture.

I get that you think that your premise is beyond my reasoning. It matters not. What you seem unwilling to grasp is the fact that you are taking unequal sums and giving them the same measure. For instance, to clarify-- a free willed 21 year old agent of no discernable loss of capacities can in no way be said to equal a 21 year old free willed agent with several discernable incapacities, or for that matter a 7 year old free willed agent with limited social skills. You keep trying to say that 1 and 3 are the same. Free wills are not like ping pong balls that can be added up and counted that same because of sameness of size, matter, density… Free wills could more closely be likened to spheres which differ greatly in size, matter, density… So the will of agent 1 ( a ping pong ball) and the will of agent 3 (a planet) are somehow to be called equal— 1 = 3

On another note, as I stated earlier in this thread, if agent 1 were to be put in world 2 and makes a choice other than x (which he did in world 1), then it is no longer agent 1 but agent 1’. He has to be an other agent, because he would have chose other than what he actually chose. His making of an other choice makes him a different agent since his other choice means he is no longer the same. So if your math were vallid in its grouping of wills, it would only show God could have made other agents in other worlds, but not the agents of this world other than they are. Are you suggesting that God should not have made you, because He could have made you different? That, it seems to me, is illogical.

 

[Spock]

Spock, with respect, it is you who are conflating these two concepts. The reason why you are is because you do not understand that some propositions are contingent even in possible worlds. Here. I just looked this up on Wiki. What I’m telling you is not something new in the realm of philosophy.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_world

Thanks, but I was already familiar with this article.

I agree with all of this. I am not speaking of any actual world. I am only speaking of possible worlds. There are many possible worlds that God can actualize. Some of those possible worlds though are only possible contingent upon some other proposition, such as the free decision of an actor. No world needs to be actualized for me to posit the possibility that all possible persons (as opposed to actual persons) choose to commit one morally wrong act. Out of all the possible persons available to God, there may not be a single one who chooses to only do what is good.

Unfortunately “may” just does not cut it. I will explain below in the next post.

Yes, its possibility is contingent because it contains a contingent proposition. I agree with you that it is simply a “what if” scenario and not a literal “world.” Perhaps to avoid anymore confusion (and I know you believe it to be on my part), let’s just stop using the word “world” and use a phrase free of images like “state of affairs.”

I have no problem with this, but since I am a lousy typist I will just use the abbrevaition “S”. Since we both know what we are talking about it should suffice.

It is a logically possible state of affairs that (a) God creates persons with free will; (b) God does not causally determine people in every situation to choose what is right; and (c) There is no evil. Of course this proposition is only possible if there are enough possible (not actual) persons who freely choose to never commit a morally wrong act. We would say that this state of affairs is contingently true.

The word “enough” is vague. Otherwise I agree. The point is that it is possible that everyone will always choose “rightly” - meaning that everyone always choosing rightly does not have nor lead to a logical contradiction. If you wish to contend this, you should point out the contradiction, and then I will concede the conversation to you. (Just like I conceded that not all logically possible “S”-s can be created by God - to wit: God cannot create a “S”, where God does not exist and never existed.)

There are certainly other propositions that are necessarily true, such as, “there are no square circles.” I could say that it is a logically possible state of affairs that God creates a world where there are no square circles. We would say this state of affairs is necessarily true. It is not contingent upon anything.

No problem at all. I will expound on the rest in the reply to your next post. The contention can be summarized that you say it “may” happen that someone will always choose incorrectly, and I say that it “may” happen, that no one chooses incorrectly. No problem at all. Again, the meat will come in the next post.

 

[Spock]

Here is the question that Plantinga puts to Mackie (who was never able to answer it) and that you need to answer if this discussion is to go any further:

“[W]hat reason is there for supposing that there are any possible persons . . . having the indeterminate property in question? For it is clear that, given an indeterminate ] property I, the proposition every possible free person freely performs at least one morally wrong action is possibly true. **But if every possible free person performs at least one wrong action, then every actual free person also freely performs at least one wrong action . . . .” **

The answer is simple. The problem is with the second proposition, which I highlighted, which simply does not follow from the previous one, which I underlined. From the fact that something is “possibly” true, it simply does not follow that it will be “actually” true. The correct second proposition should read: “But if every possible free person MAY perform at least one wrong action, then every actual free person also freely MAY perform at least one wrong action . . . .” - and then what follows is a resounding: DUH!. I am not familiar with the transcript of this debate, but I would be surprised if the opponent missed this simple fact.

But Spock, I don’t need to prove that W4 is impossible. All I need to show is that it may be impossible (that its possibility is contingent). You brought an affirmative claim in the OP. The burden of proof is not on me to prove W4 impossible. All I have to show is that W4 may be impossible because it is a logically possible state of affairs that every possible person commits at least one morally wrong action. I have done that. What that means is God may not have any possible persons to actualize to create W4. What is the likelihood of that? It is very likely under my worldview.

Well, I guess, I will have to spell it out. I already did in a previous post, and I will repeat it here. For the sake of simplicity let’s disregard all the decisions which are not morally “charged” - since they are irrelevant. We shall also disregard all the random variations occurring in nature. In each morally singificant decision there are two possible outcomes, a morally right and a morally wrong outcome. To deny that would mean that at least in one instance the person is predestined to choose either rightly or wrongly, which would contradict free will. Are you OK with this?

Let there be “n” morally significant decisions which are made by all humanity from the hypothesized “Adam and Eve” scenario, all the way until the also hypothesized “Judgment Day”. This “n” is a huge number, but finite. The number of possible worlds (all of them are contingent upon the free decisions made by the free moral agents) is 2^n. The number “n” can go from 0 (when no morally charged decisons occur) to any arbitrarily large one.

This set of possible worlds can be categorized by the number of immoral choices that are made. Let’s say that the number of morally incorrect decisons is “k”, where “k” can go from “0” to “n”. Therefore the number of possible “S”-s is 2^n, and it can be divided into subsets, where exactly “k” immoral decisons are made. Let’s designate the subset where exactly “k” immoral decisions are made by S(k), where k = 0, 1, 2, 3,…, n. The number of S(k) is (n | k) where “n over k” is n! / (k! * (n - k)!).

Now let’s pick an arbitrary “S”. It will belong to one and only one S(k) set, based upon the number of immoral decisons that happen in it. To say that it may belong to a different subset (say S(m)) is nonsensical. The decision are all contingent, but once made, they become “set in stone”, so to speak.

My proposition is that S(k) is a possible “S” for any “k”. That is all. S(k) has exatly one property, namely that it has “k” immoral acts in it. The value of “0” plays no special role, S(0) is just as possible (without contradiction) as S(1), or S(1000), etc…

To disprove it, you must show that S(0) is an impossible “S”, namely that it has or can lead to a logically contradictory state of affairs. It is not enough to say that it “may” be impossible if someone makes a different choice. If someone makes a different choice, then S(0) does not get actualized. But it does not mean that it **could not have been **actualized.

Do you see now why I’ve been avoiding it? It doesn’t tell us anything new. Both of those worlds are dependent upon a contingent proposition. Whether or not one or the other of those states of affairs is possible is up to the free decision of the possible person. Who’s to say that there is any possible agent who makes the “moral choice” in this scenario? You admit that may be the case - that there is no possible person who would make the moral choice; and you are right. But if it is the case then it necessarily follows that W4 is not a possible world for God to actualize. It is all contingent upon what the set of possible persons freely decide.

That does not matter. God can foresee all the possible “S”-s, and choose which one to actualize. There is nothing special about “k = 0”. Either God can actualize any S(k), or he cannot actualize any one of them - which would make the proposition “God created the world” simply nonsensical. Of course I would agree to this, as a satisfactory conclusion of this conversation.

 

[Spock]

The concept of infinity is a being of reason. It cannot exist in the concrete material world. We can use a simple thought experiment to verify that this is the case. I am too busy right now to give you one of my own, so I offer a stock internet example:

Hilbert’s Hotel is a (hypothetical) hotel with an infinite number of rooms, each of which is occupied by a guest. As there are an infinite number of rooms and an infinite number of guests, every room is occupied; the hotel cannot accomodate another guest. However, if a new guest arrives, then it is possible to free up a room for them by moving the guest in room number 1 to room number 2, and the guest in room number 2 to room number 3, and so on. As for every room n there is a room n + 1, every guest can be moved into a different room, thus leaving room number 1 vacant. The new guest, then, can be accommodated after all. This is clearly paradoxical; it is not possible that a hotel both can and cannot accommodate a new guest. Hilbert’s Hotel, therefore, is not possible.

philosophyofreligion.info/theistic-proofs/the-cosmological-argument/the-kalam-cosmological-argument/maths-and-the-finitude-of-the-past/

I am familiar with the Hilbert hotel, but thanks for reminding me. The trouble is that he only speaks of one particular kind of infinity (Aleph-zero) which can be mapped onto the positive integers. There are infinitely many types of infinities, and this particular scenario does not tell anything about the rest. However, this is not really important for the purposes of this discussion.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Tdgesq & Spock,

You two have tremendous patience, and have educated me immensely. A quick external summary of where we seem to be at (correct me if I’m wrong):

B1: Spock says that there is a possible world in which no wrong decisions are made.

B2: Tdgesq says something slightly different: it is a logically possible state of events that a world exists without wrongdoing.

The difference between B1 and B2 is said to lie in the indeterminate factor of possible humans’ free decisions. The key question is:

C1: Is there a possible human that will freely do nothing wrong?

Tdgesq says the answer to C1 cannot be determined a priori. Spock has a mathematical proof to the effect that it can, and that there could, in effect, be an infinite number of such humans. The mathematical proof factors in indeterminacy, defined (so far as I can tell) as random 50/50 decision-making between right and wrong.

This idea of indeterminacy is contested by Tdgesq, who says that these decisions are indeterminate only in the sense that we do not know what the result will be, not in the sense that the result is random. Essentially, Tdgesq is saying that these could only be known empirically (that is, by someone playing out every possible scenario and “watching”), but only God can know them empirically. Perhaps there are an infinite number of possible persons, none of which choose good consistently.

From my perspective, all that remains to be hashed out is your definitions of indeterminacy. Why should we believe one or the other definition?

Note: If I’ve gotten this right, this would be an excellent post for people entering the conversation to launch off from.

 

[Spock]

Tdgesq & Spock,

You two have tremendous patience, and have educated me immensely. A quick external summary of where we seem to be at (correct me if I’m wrong):

B1: Spock says that there is a possible world in which no wrong decisions are made.

B2: Tdgesq says something slightly different: it is a logically possible state of events that a world exists without wrongdoing.

The difference between B1 and B2 is said to lie in the indeterminate factor of possible humans’ free decisions. The key question is:

C1: Is there a possible human that will freely do nothing wrong?

Tdgesq says the answer to C1 cannot be determined a priori. Spock has a mathematical proof to the effect that it can, and that there could, in effect, be an infinite number of such humans. The mathematical proof factors in indeterminacy, defined (so far as I can tell) as random 50/50 decision-making between right and wrong.

This idea of indeterminacy is contested by Tdgesq, who says that these decisions are indeterminate only in the sense that we do not know what the result will be, not in the sense that the result is random. Essentially, Tdgesq is saying that these could only be known empirically (that is, by someone playing out every possible scenario and “watching”), but only God can know them empirically. Perhaps there are an infinite number of possible persons, none of which choose good consistently.

From my perspective, all that remains to be hashed out is your definitions of indeterminacy. Why should we believe one or the other definition?

Note: If I’ve gotten this right, this would be an excellent post for people entering the conversation to launch off from.

First, I would like to thank you for your kind compliment. Tdgesq (truly an Esquire) is a wonderful conversation partner (and not an adversary) for exchanging ideas.

Second, I make no assumption about the nature of deciding what decison is to be made (and how) in any given dilemma. The people do whatever they do. No randomness is involved nor assumed.

Third, neither Tgdesq, nor Plantinga offers any substantiation for the assertion that “maybe there are no states of affairs where everyone consistently chooses rigthly”. As mathematics shows, it is not possible to rule out this world (or state of affairs) based upon a contradiction (either explicit or implied). The number of immoral decisions is not exploited anywhere in the proof. To say that it is possible to instantiate a state of affairs where “k” (the number of immoral decisions) is greater than zero, but it is maybe impossible to do the same if “k” equals to zero is not substantiated. All we have is an unsupported “maybe”. And that just is not enough… Mathematical proofs do not deal with “maybes”.

Finally, the proof exploits the Catholic view that God can “preview” any possible world, and can actualize it - without determining which person will do what in any given instance. So free will remains intact, people simply do whatever they do, and yet, everyone simply happens to choose “rightly”.

 

[Spock]

Let me add a few thoughts to the previous post. Most people who are not mathematicians - and that includes most of the posters around here (no offense is inteded) - are uneasy when they see “n”-s and “k”-s etc. This is why I keep coming back to my original scenario (one agent, one decison) where the number of possible worlds can be spelled out in minute detail. This is not obstinacy on my part.

If there is a reason to doubt that an “immorality-free” world can be instantiated for 3 billion people with trillions of decisons (for example) then the same kind of doubt would arise even in such a simple scenario. To say that up to “n” decisons it is possible to create an “immorality-free” world, but adding one more decision to it (“n + 1” decisons) suddenly it becomes impossible is nonsense. The number of decisions is left as an unspecified value.

This is why I keep insisting to examine the simplest possible starting state of affairs. There are only 2 possible worlds: 1) with a moral decision (let’s call it W1) and 2) with an immoral decison (let’s call it W2). Is it possible that somehow the moral world **cannot **be actualized? On what grounds? To say that “maybe the only moral agent will not make a right decison” is nonsense. If it were the case then it means that W2 was actualized, but it says nothing about the “actualizability” of W1. To say that of all the possible human beings there is not one, who will make a morally correct decison - EVER -is so obviously wrong that it does not have to be spelled out. Yes, we are not perfect, but we are not THAT imperfect!

 

[fhansen]

Not “necessarily”, rather possibly.

But aren’t you saying that, of necessity, the world could possibly be one in which all moral agents choose good? But isn’t it instead possible that such a world could, of necessity, not be possible, and we have no way of knowing?

 

[fhansen]

Let me add a few thoughts to the previous post. Most people who are not mathematicians - and that includes most of the posters around here (no offense is inteded) - are uneasy when they see “n”-s and “k”-s etc. This is why I keep coming back to my original scenario (one agent, one decison) where the number of possible worlds can be spelled out in minute detail. This is not obstinacy on my part.

If there is a reason to doubt that an “immorality-free” world can be instantiated for 3 billion people with trillions of decisons (for example) then the same kind of doubt would arise even in such a simple scenario. To say that up to “n” decisons it is possible to create an “immorality-free” world, but adding one more decision to it (“n + 1” decisons) suddenly it becomes impossible is nonsense. The number of decisions is left as an unspecified value.

This is why I keep insisting to examine the simplest possible starting state of affairs. There are only 2 possible worlds: 1) with a moral decision (let’s call it W1) and 2) with an immoral decison (let’s call it W2). Is it possible that somehow the moral world **cannot **be actualized? On what grounds? To say that “maybe the only moral agent will not make a right decison” is nonsense. If it were the case then it means that W2 was actualized, but it says nothing about the “actualizability” of W1. To say that of all the possible human beings there is not one, who will make a morally correct decison - EVER -is so obviously wrong that it does not have to be spelled out. Yes, we are not perfect, but we are not THAT imperfect!

I don’t think many understand the Christian thinking on human imperfection. Imperfection is simply to fall short of the standard designed by God for us. The only way this is even possible to begin with, of course, is if a free will is involved. If not, then everyone always does what’s right and none of us ever have the right to question anothers’ actions.