One final time: freedom of will does NOT logically lead to evil actions

[fhansen]

Not exactly. The “existence” of free will not responsible for anything. The usage (improper usage) is resposible. That is the difference.

OK, I think I’m back on track and I’ll try to sum it up for my own clarification.

For the purpose of this thread you maintain that, if absolute objective morality exists as the CC teaches, then, while free will is the cause of moral evil, it doesn’t necessarily cause it, i.e. moral agents won’t necessarily commit evil acts and the main contention is whether or not this is so. There are also some differences as to the definition of free will as well as of evil acts.

As a side note you personally believe in moral responsibility but not in absolute morality.

 

[Spock]

OK, I think I’m back on track and I’ll try to sum it up for my own clarification.

For the purpose of this thread you maintain that, if absolute objective morality exists as the CC teaches, then, while free will is the cause of moral evil, it doesn’t necessarily cause it, i.e. moral agents won’t necessarily commit evil acts and the main contention is whether or not this is so. There are also some differences as to the definition of free will as well as of evil acts.

As a side note you personally believe in moral responsibility but not in absolute morality.

I agree with your clarification.

 

[Spock]

While I am waiting for John to come back and reflect on my previous post analyzing the world W(2), I figured I might as well go ahead and finish the proof in general. As I said before the proof depends on the concept of mathematical induction.

In a nutshell: mathematical induction is based on the following process. We have a proposition F and wish to prove that this propostion is true for any “n”. Since the number of positive integers is infinite, such a proof cannot be conducted directly, that is by substituting every “n” into the proposition. It is not even enough to substitute millions of “n”-s and verify the truth of the proposition for each case.

However, the trick is simple. We assume the truth of F for an unspecified value of “n”.** If **we can prove that this property is inherited from “n” to “n + 1”, and we find a starting value for which the propsition is true, then we proved that it is true for any “n”. It is like a domino-effect: the property is verified for a starting value (the first domino) and it is inherited to the next value, from that again to the next… and so on.

An example for those who want to see it in action (it can be bypassed):

We shall prove that the sum of the first “n” odd numbers is “n^2” (n squared), in other words:

(1) 1 + 3 + 5 + … + (2 * n - 1) = n^2 for any “n” from 1 to infinity.

For the value of “1” it is obvious: 1 = 1^2.

Now let us **assume **that (1) is true. Let’s add the next odd number to both sides:

2 * n + 1 = 2 * n + 1

The left side will become

(2-1) 1 + 3 + 5 + … + (2 * n -1 ) + (2 * n + 1)

while the right side will become

(2-2) n^2 + 2 * n + 1, which can be written as (n + 1)^2.

Therefore the proposition is **inherited **from any “n” to the next value: “n + 1”, and as such it is true for each positive integer.

This method will be used. Here it comes.

Let’s assume that for any unspecified “n” the world W contains exactly “n” moral decisions and no immoral ones. (As agreed before God can create this world in the sense that god starts the ball rolling, and the free agents will “fill it up”).

Now let’s add one more moral dilemma to this world and analyze W(n +1). There are two possibilities: (a) either the (n + 1)-st dilemma can be resolved in a moral fashion, or (b) it cannot. If (a) is true, then we are done, the creation of the world with (n + 1) moral decisions is possible. If (b) is true, then the (n + 1)-st decision cannot be resolved morally, which means that the agent confronted by this dilemma necessarily will choose the immoral solution, which contradictes to the concept of free will (PAP is not present). Therefore (a) is possible.

This concludes the proof. Since there is a starting value of “1” - W(1), and the property is inherited from “n” to “n + 1”, we can determine that for any “n”, there is a possible world where all the “n” decisions are resolved in a moral fashion.

This world is “sufficiently close” to ours. It contains untold number of moral agents, who are confronted by untold number of decisions, all resolved morally. God can start the “ball” and the free agents will fill it up with moral decisions.
The concept of free will is heavily exploited in this proof. The LCC (local of causal control) assures that the outcome of other decisions can influence, but not determine the outcome of th newly added dilemma. The PAP (principle of alternate possibilities) ensures that there is always a morally correct option for the agent.

This proof does not make judgment on this world. It only deals with Plantinga’s “free will defense”, which stipulated that the **existence **of free will “may” render the world with only morally upright choices impossible. Plantinga’s attempt is now proven to be false. Another defense may be attempted (maybe the morally upright world lacks sufficient other qualities which would render it “undesirable” for God). If there is we can deal with that, in due course. But not in this thread.

 

[john_doran]

We have two possibilities: (a) either there is a possible world where the second dilemma is also resolved morally, or (b) there is no such world (the resolution of the second dilemma can only happen in an “unsatisfactory” manner). If the first assumption is true, we are done - we have a world with 2 moral decisions, and both of them are resolved in a moral fashion. Is it possible that first one is impossible? (I wish that I would not have to use the word “possible” so many times in the same sentence ). In that case we can say that the fact, that the first dilemma was resolved morally - necessarily leads to the scenario that the second one can only be resolved immorally (in other words - there is no possible world where the second dilemma is also resolved morally). That leads to the contradiction that the decisions are “significantly independent” - because the result of the first decision **determines **the outcome of the second one. This contradiction ensures that (a) is a possible world.

i think you’ve kind of lost me here…

why do you suppose that the first choice would determine the second choice in W2 just in case only the immoral alternative of the second choice could be actualized? that sounds a lot like post hoc ergo propter hoc to me (after this, therefore because of this).

Spock:

This concludes the analysis of W(2). Within all the possible worlds containing exactly 2 moral dilemmas there is always one where both dilemmans are resolved morally.

i don’t see how this conclusion follows from your premises.

incidentally, as a matter of clarification, even if it is true that no possible world sufficiently similar to this one that contains moral good but no moral evil can be actualized, worlds with good and no evil are still*** possible*** for all that (i.e. “unactualizable” is not synonymous with “impossible”).

 

[john_doran]

If (b) is true, then the (n + 1)-st decision cannot be resolved morally, which means that the agent confronted by this dilemma necessarily will choose the immoral solution, which contradictes to the concept of free will (PAP is not present). Therefore (a) is possible.

this does not follow: as i said in my last post, just because a free moral agent would not choose the moral alternative if the conditions of that choice were made actual does not make it ***impossible ***for her to choose morally: there is, after all, a possible world in which the choice is made, and it is within the power of the free agent to actualize such a world - it’s just that the agent does ***not ***actualize that world.

 

[Alindawyl]

You are still assuming that “decision” is interchangeable with “moral decision made by agents who possess free will”.

And you will no doubt continue to assert that you have no idea what I’m talking about…

 

[Spock]

i think you’ve kind of lost me here…

why do you suppose that the first choice would determine the second choice in W2 just in case only the immoral alternative of the second choice could be actualized? that sounds a lot like post hoc ergo propter hoc to me (after this, therefore because of this).

Then some clarification is in order.

The scenario under consideration is this: the first choice was resolved morally and the second choice cannot be resolved morally - that is in no possible world will the second choice be resolved morally - as long as the first dilemma was resolved morally.

We assume that the second choice can be resolved morally in some other possible worlds, where the first choice was resolved immorally.

If this is not true, then the second choice cannot be resolved morally in any possible world, therefore it is necessarily true that the second choice can only be resolved immorally. And that contradicts the concept that the agent has free will. If there is no PAP, there is no free will.

If the second choice cannot be resolved morally in those possible worlds where the first one was resolved morally, then the two resolutions are not significantly independent, and as such the second choice is not free. In other words, the moral outcome of the first choice **prevents **the second one to be resolved also morally. That is not the “post hoc, ergo propter hoc” fallacy. There is some connection between the two choices, so they are not sufficiently independent.

Does this help?

I am using the same method here as I did in the analysis of W(1).

In W(1) there are 2 possible worlds, one with a moral outcome and one with the immoral outcome. If either one is impossible, then there is no free will.

In W(2) there are 4 possible worlds:

1. with 2 moral decisions,
2. where the first one was resolved morally and the second one was resolved immorally,
3. where the first one was resolved immorally and the second one was resolved morally, and
4. where both were resolved immorally.

If any one of there would be impossible, then there would be no free will. Play it out for yourself. If only 1) or 4) were possible, then we would deal with “robots”. If either 2) or 3) are possible, we have interdependence. To have free will, all 4 must be possible.

i don’t see how this conclusion follows from your premises.

incidentally, as a matter of clarification, even if it is true that no possible world sufficiently similar to this one that contains moral good but no moral evil can be actualized, worlds with good and no evil are still*** possible*** for all that (i.e. “unactualizable” is not synonymous with “impossible”).

I don’t understand. What is the difference? If something is “possible”, it can be “actualized”. The word “actualized” is used here in the sense that God can foresee the unfolded events, and if the result contains immoral choices (i.e. unsatisfactory results), then refrains from setting the ball into motion. If the result is satisfactory, God will start the ball rolling - and the free agents will decide as foreseen (that is: morally). Foreknowledge is supposed to be no hindrance on the freedom of the agents. If the agents would do something not foreseen, then God’s omniscience is proven wrong.

 

[Spock]

You are still assuming that “decision” is interchangeable with “moral decision made by agents who possess free will”.

Yes, I am using the word “decision” as a shortcut which is exactly the same as “moral decision made by agents who possess free will”. I do this to save bandwidth (and I am also lazy to type in so many words).

 

[john_doran]

I don’t understand. What is the difference? If something is “possible”, it can be “actualized”.

no, not every possible world is actualizable (at least not compatibly with the free choices of created moral agents); how could it be?

look, take two worlds, W1 and W2, identical in their world-segments up to the moment i am confronted with the choice either to go home from a party (W1), or cheat on my wife (W2). which of W1 or W2 is actualized is up to me, and up to me alone: both W1 and W2 are possible worlds (or else my choice wouldn’t be free), but only one can be actualized by me in those circumstances.

which means that if i choose to actualize W1, then W2 cannot be actualized (who would actualize it?); but it is (or was) still a possible state of affairs. The same applies, mutatis mutandis to W1 should i make the choice to actualize it.

which of course means that the rest of your analysis doesn’t go through: even if there are a myriad of possible worlds where every free moral agent chooses correctly, perhaps none of those worlds are actualizable. and that’s what is at the core of plantinga’s (molinist) argument from transworld depravity.

 

[Alindawyl]

which of course means that the rest of your analysis doesn’t go through: even if there are a myriad of possible worlds where every free moral agent chooses correctly, perhaps none of those worlds are actualizable. and that’s what is at the core of plantinga’s (molinist) argument from transworld depravity.

Hmmm, that’s a much better way of saying it. Once agents have free will, their decisions are not being made in a vacuum by random chance like the probability of heads or tails in a coin toss. They are being made based on the knowledge and past experience of an agent with free will. Agents without full knowledge of the past (previous decisions made and WHY those decisions were made), full knowledge of present circumstances, and full knowledge of possible future repercussions may be unable to make the free choice in each possible decision which will result in a specific world.

To add to the degree of complexity, in many cases a decision isn’t a simple boolean manner. There could be multiple good and/or multiple evil options to choose from, not merely one good and one evil. Some future good decisions may only be possible to actualize if a specific good decision in the past was made by someone, rather than any possible good decision in the past. Some future good decisions may also only be possible if at least one morally neutral decision in the past is made in a specific way. If the “correct” decision is not evident or at the time seems significantly less good than any incorrect decision, why would a free agent choose it? It would take an act of divine intervention to convince the agent to make the correct decision, a decision going against the knowledge and experience of said agent. That intervention would violate the agent’s free will.

 

[Spock]

no, not every possible world is actualizable (at least not compatibly with the free choices of created moral agents); how could it be?

look, take two worlds, W1 and W2, identical in their world-segments up to the moment i am confronted with the choice either to go home from a party (W1), or cheat on my wife (W2). which of W1 or W2 is actualized is up to me, and up to me alone: both W1 and W2 are possible worlds (or else my choice wouldn’t be free), but only one can be actualized by me in those circumstances.

which means that if i choose to actualize W1, then W2 cannot be actualized (who would actualize it?); but it is (or was) still a possible state of affairs. The same applies, mutatis mutandis to W1 should i make the choice to actualize it.

which of course means that the rest of your analysis doesn’t go through: even if there are a myriad of possible worlds where every free moral agent chooses correctly, perhaps none of those worlds are actualizable. and that’s what is at the core of plantinga’s (molinist) argument from transworld depravity.

I thought that we already went through this and came to an understanding. I will use your example.You have only two options: 1) either you cheat on your wife, or 2) you do not.

It comes from the concept of free will that you can do (hypothetically) either one of these. However you can do only one of these in any already actualized world. Once the world is actualized, it will play out as foreseen - and it cannot be changed. But this is **not **what I am talking about. I am talking about God’s omniscience, which allows him to make a decision to actualize or not actualize any possible world (as long as it contains no logical contradiction).

There are two hypothetically possible worlds: 1) the one where you cheat and 2) the other one where you do not cheat. But God has not created anything yet. Nevertheless, from God’s omniscience it follows that God can “preview” these two possible worlds. It is God’s prerogative **NOT **to create the world, if your choice does not meet his approval. It is also the Catholic view that God’s foreknowledge does not impact the freedom of your choice.

However, it is God’s prerogative to **initialize **either one of these two worlds, and make it possible for you to actualize whichever route you are about to take. He can set the ball in motion, and actualize (with your active participation) either one of these worlds. In other words, both worlds are actualizable, and it is up to God’s decision which one will be actualized. There is no contradiction here. God starts the process, and you finish it - as he has foreseen.

When I speak of possible worlds, I speak of actualizable possible worlds. The only worlds that cannot be actualized are the ones which contain a logical contradiction, for example: a world where you cheat and not cheat on your wife. Let me reiterate: when I speak of possible worlds, I speak of those worlds which can be previewed by God, **before **any act of creation has taken place. And that makes my analysis correct.

 

[john_doran]

I thought that we already went through this and came to an understanding. I will use your example.You have only two options: 1) either you cheat on your wife, or 2) you do not.

It comes from the concept of free will that you can do (hypothetically) either one of these. However you can do only one of these in any already actualized world. Once the world is actualized, it will play out as foreseen - and it cannot be changed. But this is **not **what I am talking about. I am talking about God’s omniscience, which allows him to make a decision to actualize or not actualize any possible world (as long as it contains no logical contradiction).

but it is what you’re talking about: i am only able to choose ***if i am made actual ***in some set of circumstance of choice, and that is precisely what it is of which god’s omniscience grants him knowledge: what i would, in fact, freely choose in any actual state of affairs containing me and a free choice.

in the instant case, god can only actualize one relevant state of affairs: me at the party at the point of having the choice of whether or not to commit an act of marital infidelity. there just isn’t one world-segment corresponding to my eventual choice of faithfulness and some other world-segment corresponding to my choice to be unfaithful - there is just the one world-segment that god can actualize: the one containing me-and-the-conditions-of-my-free-choice-between-fidelity-and-infidelity.

and what god sees is just that: if i were to be actualized in those precise circumstances, that i would choose to actualize the world where i am faithful to my wife (let’s say). which, ex hypothesi, means that the world containing my infidelity is not actualized by me, and thus not actualizable by anyone.

Spock:

There are two hypothetically possible worlds: 1) the one where you cheat and 2) the other one where you do not cheat. But God has not created anything yet. Nevertheless, from God’s omniscience it follows that God can “preview” these two possible worlds. It is God’s prerogative **NOT **to create the world, if your choice does not meet his approval. It is also the Catholic view that God’s foreknowledge does not impact the freedom of your choice.

Spock:

However, it is God’s prerogative to **initialize **either one of these two worlds, and make it possible for you to actualize whichever route you are about to take. He can set the ball in motion, and actualize (with your active participation) either one of these worlds. In other words, both worlds are actualizable, and it is up to God’s decision which one will be actualized. There is no contradiction here. God starts the process, and you finish it - as he has foreseen.

again, god cannot actualize “either” post-free-choice worldline, since only one worldline following a morally free choice is capable of being actualized by the moral agent making the choice; and the world-line instantiating the alternative not chosen is never actualized.

god can do nothing to make either alternative of a (dyadic) choice actualizable by me: he can only actualize me in those circumstances, at which point i will choose one or the other; and whichever choice i reject joins the set of possible-but-actualizable worlds.

of course, as you say, god knows all this beforehand; what the argument from transworld depravity claims is that all of the possible worlds that contain morally praiseworthy free choices and no blameworthy ones might be members of the set of possible-but-unactualizable worlds, since what god knows is that there is no morally free agent that exists at one of those worlds such that, if she and the circumstances of choice were to be made actual by god, she would always choose correctly.

Spock:

When I speak of possible worlds, I speak of actualizable possible worlds. The only worlds that cannot be actualized are the ones which contain a logical contradiction, for example: a world where you cheat and not cheat on your wife. Let me reiterate: when I speak of possible worlds, I speak of those worlds which can be previewed by God, **before **any act of creation has taken place. And that makes my analysis correct.

ok, i’ll bite: but it is logically contradictory for any moral agent in a set of circumstances, C, to choose both P and ~P. and therefore logically contradictory for both WP** and** W~P to be actualized.

 

[Spock]

but it is what you’re talking about: i am only able to choose ***if i am made actual ***in some set of circumstance of choice, and that is precisely what it is of which god’s omniscience grants him knowledge: what i would, in fact, freely choose in any actual state of affairs containing me and a free choice.

in the instant case, god can only actualize one relevant state of affairs: me at the party at the point of having the choice of whether or not to commit an act of marital infidelity. there just isn’t one world-segment corresponding to my eventual choice of faithfulness and some other world-segment corresponding to my choice to be unfaithful - there is just the one world-segment that god can actualize: the one containing me-and-the-conditions-of-my-free-choice-between-fidelity-and-infidelity.

and what god sees is just that: if i were to be actualized in those precise circumstances, that i would choose to actualize the world where i am faithful to my wife (let’s say). which, ex hypothesi, means that the world containing my infidelity is not actualized by me, and thus not actualizable by anyone.

again, god cannot actualize “either” post-free-choice worldline, since only one worldline following a morally free choice is capable of being actualized by the moral agent making the choice; and the world-line instantiating the alternative not chosen is never actualized.

god can do nothing to make either alternative of a (dyadic) choice actualizable by me: he can only actualize me in those circumstances, at which point i will choose one or the other; and whichever choice i reject joins the set of possible-but-actualizable worlds.

Everything you say is exactly correct up until this point and I took all that into consideration in my analysis.

ok, i’ll bite: but it is logically contradictory for any moral agent in a set of circumstances, C, to choose both P and ~P. and therefore logically contradictory for both WP** and** W~P to be actualized.

Perfectly true. However, it is possible to actualize either one of them.

of course, as you say, god knows all this beforehand; what the argument from transworld depravity claims is that all of the possible worlds that contain morally praiseworthy free choices and no blameworthy ones might be members of the set of possible-but-unactualizable worlds, since what god knows is that there is no morally free agent that exists at one of those worlds such that, if she and the circumstances of choice were to be made actual by god, she would always choose correctly.

This is where the problem lies. You say that the “transworld depravity claims…”. Ok. This is a claim. Where is the proof for it?

Within the last 22 pages I put down (several times now) the mathematical proof, which says that there is at least one possible and actualizable world where every moral agent will resolve every moral dilemma in moral fashion. What is there to dispute? The proof is mathematical and precise. The “transworld depravity claim” has been proven false.

We already agreed that the simplest hypothetical world is the one where there is only moral decison to be made (regardless of the number of moral agents, and regardless of the not-morally-significant dilemmas). We agreed that there are two possibly actualizable worlds, 1) where the agent will make the correct decision, and 2) where the agent will make the incorrect decision. We agreed that God does not “directly” actualize either one of these worlds, rather God can foresee how the agent “would decide” and based upon the “foreseen” decision God will go ahead and either initialize the world (and thus allows the agent to make the decision) or not.

Your only objection was that this world is not “sufficiently similar” to ours. When I asked what “sufficiently similar” means, you gave only a vague analogy. You see, when I see something so vague, I get suspicious. I am afraid that after having done a thorough analysis and prove my point, there will come an objection like this: “Ok, you proved your point, but the world you described is without immoral decisions, and since our present one does contain immoral decisions, it is not sufficiently similar to ours”. Now, I don’t think that you would use such dirty pool. That is why I offered the definition: “the world is sufficently similar if it is comprized of “N” of moral agents who are confronted by “M” morally significant dilemmas - where “N” and “M” can be billions and trillions”. You accepted this definition.

Then I went ahead and proved (via mathemantical induction) that for any “n” (the number of moral dilemmas) there exists at least one world where all the dilemmas are resolved in a moral fashion. The essence of the proof utilizes both the existence of free will, and God’s foreknowledge about the events-to-unfold. I ask again, what is there to talk about?

 

[john_doran]

Perfectly true. However, it is possible to actualize either one of them.

it’s only possible to actualize both of them up until the point the choice is made, at which point it becomes impossible to actualize the one that is not chosen.

what god knows is which worlds will not be chosen, and which thus will not be actualized.

Spock:

Within the last 22 pages I put down (several times now) the mathematical proof, which says that there is at least one possible and actualizable world where every moral agent will resolve every moral dilemma in moral fashion. What is there to dispute? The proof is mathematical and precise. The “transworld depravity claim” has been proven false.

We already agreed that the simplest hypothetical world is the one where there is only moral decison to be made (regardless of the number of moral agents, and regardless of the not-morally-significant dilemmas). We agreed that there are two possibly actualizable worlds, 1) where the agent will make the correct decision, and 2) where the agent will make the incorrect decision. We agreed that God does not “directly” actualize either one of these worlds, rather God can foresee how the agent “would decide” and based upon the “foreseen” decision God will go ahead and either initialize the world (and thus allows the agent to make the decision) or not.

Your only objection was that this world is not “sufficiently similar” to ours. When I asked what “sufficiently similar” means, you gave only a vague analogy. You see, when I see something so vague, I get suspicious. I am afraid that after having done a thorough analysis and prove my point, there will come an objection like this: “Ok, you proved your point, but the world you described is without immoral decisions, and since our present one does contain immoral decisions, it is not sufficiently similar to ours”. Now, I don’t think that you would use such dirty pool. That is why I offered the definition: “the world is sufficently similar if it is comprized of “N” of moral agents who are confronted by “M” morally significant dilemmas - where “N” and “M” can be billions and trillions”. You accepted this definition.

Then I went ahead and proved (via mathemantical induction) that for any “n” (the number of moral dilemmas) there exists at least one world where all the dilemmas are resolved in a moral fashion. The essence of the proof utilizes both the existence of free will, and God’s foreknowledge about the events-to-unfold. I ask again, what is there to talk about?

you’re leaving out the logical fulcrum of your argument, to which i did not agree, and which i in fact rejected the first moment you insterted it into your discursion:

Now let’s add one more moral dilemma to this world and analyze W(n +1). There are two possibilities: (a) either the (n + 1)-st dilemma can be resolved in a moral fashion, or (b) it cannot. If (a) is true, then we are done, the creation of the world with (n + 1) moral decisions is possible. If (b) is true, then the (n + 1)-st decision cannot be resolved morally, which means that the agent confronted by this dilemma necessarily will choose the immoral solution, which contradictes to the concept of free will (PAP is not present). Therefore (a) is possible.

this assumes that any unactualizable world is impossible, which is a principle i reject, and which is required for your argument to go through.

 

[Spock]

you’re leaving out the logical fulcrum of your argument, to which i did not agree, and which i in fact rejected the first moment you inserted it into your discursion:

Now let’s add one more moral dilemma to this world and analyze W(n +1). There are two possibilities: (a) either the (n + 1)-st dilemma can be resolved in a moral fashion, or (b) it cannot. If (a) is true, then we are done, the creation of the world with (n + 1) moral decisions is possible.** If (b) is true, then the (n + 1)-st decision cannot be resolved morally, which means that the agent confronted by this dilemma necessarily will choose the immoral solution**

I presume that you used the highlight to indicate which part of the induction step you disagree with.

We deal with one specific dilemma here, which happens to be the (n + 1)-st in the sequence. Just what the dilemma happens to be is of no relevance, apart from the fact that it is a morally significant one.

If the agent has free will, then he must be able to decide the dilemma either way, so the continuation of W will fork, based upon the decision. If the agent decides in a “satisfactory manner”, we are home scot-free, the induction succeeded. But what if the agent happens to decide in an unsatisfactory manner?

In that particular case the W(n + 1) will contain one morally incorrect choice, and thus the induction will not go through. So far I agree with you. However, the case is not closed yet. If God foresees that this particular agent will choose incorrectly in** that particular dilemma**, he can pick another one, and see how the agent would behave in that one. Suppose the agent again chooses incorrectly. Then God can continue the process and examine yet another one. Even though there are infinitely many possible moral dilemmas, God can examine each and every one of them.

Now, let’s suppose that in each and every one of them this particular agent will choose incorrectly. In that case it seems that there is nothing for God to actualize, and it seems that the induction fails.

But the case is still not closed. If God sees that this particular agent will invariably choose the incorrect solution (for every dilemma), then God can pick another possible agent, and see how that agent would behave. Suppose that the newly selected agent will also fail to decide every possible dilemma in a satisfactory manner. Then God can pick yet another possible agent. There is again an infinite supply of possible agents, but God can “preview” all the agents presented with all the possible moral dilemmas.

Now we can have two possibilities again. One is that at least one possible agent facing one possible dilemma will choose correctly, and in this case the induction succeeds. Or no possible agent in no possible scenario will choose correctly.

What does that say about the free will? If in every possible world every possible agent presented with every possible dilemma will always choose incorrectly, then it is necessarily true that none of the agents in none of the scenarios will choose correctly. And that makes the following proposition necessarily true: “all possible agents confronted by all the possible dilemmas in all the possible scenarios will always choose incorrectly”. In this case where is the free will? In order for free will to have any meaning it must be possible that in at least one possible world, at least one possible agent, facing at least one possible moral dilemma will choose correctly. And in this case the induction succeeds.

I am using the same argument here what I used in the one agent, one dilemma situation. (forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=5620046&postcount=289) There you did not object, and we agreed that God can always find one possible agent, who would decide morally in some particular scenario. That is what free will entails. A “will” which can only be resolved in one way, but not the other cannot be called “free” by any stretch of imagination.

 

[john_doran]

But the case is still not closed. If God sees that this particular agent will invariably choose the incorrect solution (for every dilemma), then God can pick another possible agent, and see how that agent would behave. Suppose that the newly selected agent will also fail to decide every possible dilemma in a satisfactory manner. Then God can pick yet another possible agent. There is again an infinite supply of possible agents, but God can “preview” all the agents presented with all the possible moral dilemmas.

i’m not sure i follow you here: when you say “god can pick another possible agent”, are suggesting that in the case i used, for example, if god sees that i always chose to cheat on my wife, he can then just plug in a different individual - let’s say mark - to see what he’d do? and then, if mark also proves to be immorally intransigent, god can just plug in bob, and then dave, and so on? because worlds aren’t like this, and god’s choice of them also isn’t like this.

it’s not like god starts with one moral agent that makes one right choice, keeps that world and then initiates a recursive process of adding a moral agent and a choice and then looking through the infinite roster of moral agents for a candidate that, when added to the world he’s “building”, will make only the next right choice.

there are just an infinite number of possible worlds in logical space that have their properties independently of anything god does or does not do, and there is just an infinite number of possible worlds in the modal neighbourhood of this world. what i’m saying is possible, and what god would necessarily see, is that in none of those worlds would all moral agents always go right in their free choices (note: i am not saying that they would all always go wrong).

which means that god is stuck with the possible worlds as they are, and he can’t fiddle with them to see if he can get different results: moral agents will, in fact, make the free choices they make if actualized in the circumstances of their choosing (that’s what it means to be free). and possibly, they always make at least one wrong choice.

Spock:

What does that say about the free will? If in every possible world every possible agent presented with every possible dilemma will always choose incorrectly, then it is necessarily true that none of the agents in none of the scenarios will choose correctly. And that makes the following proposition necessarily true: “all possible agents confronted by all the possible dilemmas in all the possible scenarios will always choose incorrectly”. In this case where is the free will? In order for free will to have any meaning it must be possible that in at least one possible world, at least one possible agent, facing at least one possible moral dilemma will choose correctly. And in this case the induction succeeds.

i still don’t understand how you’re proposing to piece together a world where every one of, say, 6 billion moral agents, always choose correctly, but i will make this observation:

your proposition is actually this: “all possible moral agents would always freely choose to do wrong if the circumstances of their choosing were made actual”. and i can tell you that precisely nothing follows about free will from that proposition except that it indicates that it is possible to make free choices necessarily. not that i think that this propositon is entailed by anything you’ve said thus far.

look, perhaps the problem here is that what i ultimately reject is the idea that anything about the free choices of moral agents can be concluded via mathematical induction (which is at any rate a malapropism, since your conclusion seems to be derived with deductive force). even if it were true that one moral agent making one choice goes right in that choice, absolutely nothing about that choice can ground any conclusion about the subsequent free choices of that agent or any other agent.

Spock:

I am using the same argument here what I used in the one agent, one dilemma situation. (forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=5620046&postcount=289) There you did not object, and we agreed that God can always find one possible agent, who would decide morally in some particular scenario. That is what free will entails. A “will” which can only be resolved in one way, but not the other cannot be called “free” by any stretch of imagination.

so, to sum: god doesn’t “find” moral agents to fill spots in possible worlds. and choices can be free even if the free agents making those choices never choose correctly (just as they can be free if every moral agent always freely chooses correctly).

 

[Alindawyl]

Joe is a conscientious man and doesn’t go out of his way to inconvenience people, especially his wife Elaine. He loves his wife dearly but has a problem which no one is aware of because it involves future possibilities. If Elaine happens to die in a traumatic way, Joe will always choose evil by persisting in uncharitable thoughts of hatred toward God for allowing a world to exist in which Elaine dies horribly. But assuming such an event never happens, Joe will never commit an act of evil.

One day Joe is not feeling well and decides that he needs to go to the doctor. He tells his wife to go to work and not worry about him because he’s well enough to drive and doesn’t want to inconvenience her. She then offers to drive him to the hospital but he declines that as well with the same excuse that he doesn’t want to inconvenience her.

This wouldn’t be a problem except for it being a pivotal day in Joe’s destiny. If Elaine drives to work, she will be killed in an accident on the way. If she drives him to the hospital instead of going to work, she will avoid that accident but be killed in a different accident on the way to the hospital. Joe will survive that accident.

However, if Joe asks Elaine to stay home and take care of him, then he will be fine the next morning and Elaine will not die.

How does Joe actualize the world with the good outcome when the choice which does not result in evil requires that he do something against his personality? That choice is one which he can make in theory, but which he will never make in reality. To make that choice, he would need foreknowledge to actualize the good. That would create the logical contradiction of a causality violation.

This is pretty much off the cuff. I’m sure someone else could come up with a much better example.

Imagine thousands of choices to be made by humanity as a whole each and every day where the ones in which no evil exists are not apparent. We can’t see the “tapestry of fate”, so to speak, and don’t know all possible ramifications of our actions. We make our choices based on past experiences and present circumstances, not on knowledge of future results. If the only option which would result in no evil in some of these choices is one we would never freely choose if left to our own devices, it still remains a possibility in a mathematical sense but not in an “actualizable” sense.

 

[Spock]

i’m not sure i follow you here: when you say “god can pick another possible agent”, are suggesting that in the case i used, for example, if god sees that i always chose to cheat on my wife, he can then just plug in a different individual - let’s say mark - to see what he’d do? and then, if mark also proves to be immorally intransigent, god can just plug in bob, and then dave, and so on? because worlds aren’t like this, and god’s choice of them also isn’t like this.

it’s not like god starts with one moral agent that makes one right choice, keeps that world and then initiates a recursive process of adding a moral agent and a choice and then looking through the infinite roster of moral agents for a candidate that, when added to the world he’s “building”, will make only the next right choice.

Why not? And how could we know that? None of us can claim knowledge about what went on in God’s mind before he said: “Let there be light”. We are talking about hypotheticals here. Maybe he did precisely what I depicted here. He was tweaking the uncreated world until it met his specificatons. If there is a blasphemy, then the biggest one of all is to say that God created something that he did not intend to create.

A little clarification is in order. In my hypothetical setup God did not create anything yet. You were not presented with your choice yet. God merely contemplates what you would do in any specific instance, and if your choice is not “moral”, then he “imagines” you in another hypothetical scenario. If you happen to fail in all possible scenarios, then he can “abandon” your possible creation and starts with someone else.

The Mark, Bob and Dave you mention may well be your almost identical “copies”, who can be created instead of you (so the world is in the neighborhood of this one). Even if they are almost identical, their choice may be different from yours. Their free will allows them to come to a different conclusion, even if they are presented with the same dilemma.

there are just an infinite number of possible worlds in logical space that have their properties independently of anything god does or does not do, and there is just an infinite number of possible worlds in the modal neighbourhood of this world. what i’m saying is possible, and what god would necessarily see, is that in none of those worlds would all moral agents always go right in their free choices (note: i am not saying that they would all always go wrong).

Yes, there are. Yes, it is possible that all moral agents will go wrong with their choices. And it is also possible that all of them will go right. It is also possible that some of them will go right and some of them will go wrong. All of these are possible, and none of them is impossible to “initialize” (I purposefully evade the term “create” or “actualize” to avoid the implications of these terms). All God has to do is contemplate all the possible freely done choices, and when he finds the one which is to his liking, then say those famous words - and let the ball rolling. The agents will do as he envisioned them.

which means that god is stuck with the possible worlds as they are, and he can’t fiddle with them to see if he can get different results: moral agents will, in fact, make the free choices they make if actualized in the circumstances of their choosing (that’s what it means to be free). and possibly, they always make at least one wrong choice.

It means nothing of that kind. The circumstances are not the agents’ making either. God can tweak the circumstances and observe how the agents would do if they happened to be in those circumstances. How could we know? We are presented with the actual world, and we can hypothesize about alternatives.

your proposition is actually this: “all possible moral agents would always freely choose to do wrong if the circumstances of their choosing were made actual”…

My wording is a bit different. It goes like this: “all possible moral agents would always freely choose to do wrong in** all possible circumstances **if those circumstances were made actual”. (Your wording is ambiguous, it may imply that the agents can choose the circumstances. Maybe you meant the same thing.).

…and i can tell you that precisely nothing follows about free will from that proposition except that it indicates that it is possible to make free choices necessarily. not that i think that this propositon is entailed by anything you’ve said thus far.

And from that it does follow that they cannot have a free will in any meaningful sense of the word. It sounds like the saying of Ford when he said: “The customers can have a car of any color of their choosing, provided they want black”. Where is the freedom in that?

look, perhaps the problem here is that what i ultimately reject is the idea that anything about the free choices of moral agents can be concluded via mathematical induction (which is at any rate a malapropism, since your conclusion seems to be derived with deductive force). even if it were true that one moral agent making one choice goes right in that choice, absolutely nothing about that choice can ground any conclusion about the subsequent free choices of that agent or any other agent.

A mathematical model (and that is what I am building here) may be precise or may be imprecise. If it is imprecise than the logical conclusions will be incorrect - no question about that. If the model is precise, then the logical conclusions will be correct. You are welcome to criticize the model, of course.

There is another implication of free will, and that is of utmost importance. Whatever one agent does in any scenario, may have impact on someone else’s decision - but it cannot determine it. This means that the decisions are sufficiently independent. And that means that we can contemplate the complex world as a simple union of individual worlds, and we are justifed to examine the “one agent - one dilemma” scenarios, while disregarding all the other agents and their dilemmas. An analogy here: “it does not matter if you toss one coin a million times, or toss a million coins once - since the results are independent”.

 

[john_doran]

Why not? And how could we know that? None of us can claim knowledge about what went on in God’s mind before he said: “Let there be light”. We are talking about hypotheticals here. Maybe he did precisely what I depicted here. He was tweaking the uncreated world until it met his specificatons. If there is a blasphemy, then the biggest one of all is to say that God created something that he did not intend to create.

well, you and i have different ideas as to the nature of possible worlds: i think they’re abstract objects (like numbers nd propositions), and you don’t.

that said, i’m not sure anything rests on the distinction - i don’t believe that the possibility of all moral agents always going wrong at least once has anything to do with whether or not god does what you envision him to do here, or whether he selects one abstract object for actualization.

Spock:

Yes, there are. Yes, it is possible that all moral agents will go wrong with their choices. And it is also possible that all of them will go right. It is also possible that some of them will go right and some of them will go wrong. All of these are possible, and none of them is impossible to “initialize” (I purposefully evade the term “create” or “actualize” to avoid the implications of these terms). All God has to do is contemplate all the possible freely done choices, and when he finds the one which is to his liking, then say those famous words - and let the ball rolling. The agents will do as he envisioned them.

well, whether or not it’s possible for god to actualize a world where all of the moral agents in that world co-operate with him and also actualize only good moral choices is precisely the question which has yet to be resolved.

Spock:

My wording is a bit different. It goes like this: “all possible moral agents would always freely choose to do wrong in** all possible circumstances **if those circumstances were made actual”. (Your wording is ambiguous, it may imply that the agents can choose the circumstances. Maybe you meant the same thing.).

And from that it does follow that they cannot have a free will in any meaningful sense of the word. It sounds like the saying of Ford when he said: “The customers can have a car of any color of their choosing, provided they want black”. Where is the freedom in that?

A) if the proposition that is necessarily true is “all possible moral agents would always freely choose to do wrong”, then there’s your freedom: we’re stipulating it; just because the choice was necessarily free doesn’t make it any less free.

B) ford’s quote is totally inapposite: there can be no free choice without at least two alternatives. the appropriate analog for our example would be “the moral agents can choose freely among any alternatives they want, as long as those alternatives are either good or bad”. and that is the paradigm case of freedom of choice.

Spock:

A mathematical model (and that is what I am building here) may be precise or may be imprecise. If it is imprecise than the logical conclusions will be incorrect - no question about that. If the model is precise, then the logical conclusions will be correct. You are welcome to criticize the model, of course.

and i have: i do not believe it’s possible to derive any conclusions (inductive, deductive, or abductive) about the future free choices of moral agents from the (stipulated) correctness of some free moral choice of some moral agent.

spock:

There is another implication of free will, and that is of utmost importance. Whatever one agent does in any scenario, may have impact on someone else’s decision - but it cannot determine it. This means that the decisions are sufficiently independent. And that means that we can contemplate the complex world as a simple union of individual worlds, and we are justifed to examine the “one agent - one dilemma” scenarios, while disregarding all the other agents and their dilemmas. An analogy here: “it does not matter if you toss one coin a million times, or toss a million coins once - since the results are independent”.

you’re at it again: it is not possible to draw modal conclusions about what moral agents would choose in some actual state of affairs given the prior choices of other moral agents.

look, even though there are certainly possible worlds where some pedophile rapes my 6 year old son and i choose not to kill that man, there may be no ***actualizable ***world where i make that choice. but that ***still ***does not entail that the prior bad act of the pedophile in each of those worlds determines my own bad act.

in the same way, the moral complexity introduced into the scenario you’re considering by other moral agents and their good and bad choices is*** ineliminable***, and also, unfortunately, invisible to your inductive model. which makes that model otiose.

 

[Spock]

well, you and i have different ideas as to the nature of possible worlds: i think they’re abstract objects (like numbers and propositions), and you don’t.

that said, i’m not sure anything rests on the distinction - i don’t believe that the possibility of all moral agents always going wrong at least once has anything to do with whether or not god does what you envision him to do here, or whether he selects one abstract object for actualization.

Agreed. We look at the same thing from two different point of view, and I also don’t think that it matters.

well, whether or not it’s possible for god to actualize a world where all of the moral agents in that world co-operate with him and also actualize only good moral choices is precisely the question which has yet to be resolved.

Correct again. Now, it seems to me that you agree to a certain extent. You agreed that there might be a limited scope of agents, who all will act freely and morally. At least you agreed that there can be a very simple world with such characteristics. Incidentally, why did you agree? You could have made the assertion, that it “might be possible, that there is not even one free agent (alone), who will choose correctly in any given situation” - so God cannot even start the iteration process at all. Why didn’t you? I am curious.

It seems to me that you accept that the iterating process can succeed for a while, but eventually it will necessarily “peter out”. And it seems to me that you base this assumption on the observation that one cannot draw inferences in a complex world. (Another question: where is the line between “simple” and “complex”?) Of course Plantinga commits the same “error” (which I don’t consider an error), and you don’t seem to object to it. More on that below.

A) if the proposition that is necessarily true is “all possible moral agents would always freely choose to do wrong”, then there’s your freedom: we’re stipulating it; just because the choice was necessarily free doesn’t make it any less free.

Looks like I stand corrected. I still have some nagging doubts in my mind, which I have to think through. I might return to this point later, if I can clarify my thoughts. But, for the time being I admit my error.

and i have: i do not believe it’s possible to derive any conclusions (inductive, deductive, or abductive) about the future free choices of moral agents from the (stipulated) correctness of some free moral choice of some moral agent.

But I am not making any specific conclusions at all. I am simply stating that at any given moment of the iterating process there are infinitely many possible worlds for God to “examine”, and that among all those possible worlds “there might be some where some agents will choose correctly” - and thus the iterating process can continue. I agree that one agent’s decision will impact the decisions of the agents “down the line”. We agree that it cannot determine them. But the point is that there are still infinitely many possible worlds to “choose from”. And Plantinga also makes “inferences” about the possible choices of some agents - and you have no objection to that. You accept his model without reservations.

As a matter of fact, I am using Plantinga’s line of reasoning - but from the opposite perspective. (Always useful to learn from the “enemy”.) Plantinga says that “it might be possible that at some point there will be one agent who will act immorally” - and therefore the mere existence of free will does lead to immoral acts. I am reverting this stipulation: “it might be possible that at any given moment there will be one agent who will act morally” - and thus the iterating process can continue.

If you want to prove me wrong you must establish that at some point of the iterating process there will **necessarily **come a situation where all possible moral agents, confronted by all possible moral dilemmas in all possible circumstances will choose incorrectly. This requirement is much stronger than simply saying “there might be one, who will freely choose incorrectly”. How can you make that proof?

Plantinga’s error is that he merely says “might be”, which is not sufficient. What Plantinga does not even attempt to prove is that it is necessarily true that someone will make an incorrect decision. That would be the true proof for his theorem.

I have some advantage over Plantinga’s reasoning. Even if you could prove that at some point the iteration will necessarily break down, I would still have a partial “victory”. As long as there was one agent, who makes one moral decision, the world is not empty. I would also stipulate that it is in the modal “neighborhood” of this world, since it is comprized of a moral agent, making a moral decision (this is the definition I suggested and you accepted). I don’t think that you (or anyone else) can draw a line in the sand and say: “having ‘x’ agents is not sufficiently close, but having ‘x + 1’ agents is already sufficiently close”. Besides I find the “sufficiently close” stipluation totally arbitrary. Why would this world be the “measuring rod” for all the possible worlds?