Only reason directs to an action to an end?

[reggieM]

I certainly find the basis of your opinion valid, which is why in the OP I said it is possible he is just referring to human actions as he cites this in his section on law. However, I find the contrary more likely. As you quote, he says it (reason directing to an end) is the first principle in all matters of actions and then he cites Aristotle’s Physics, Bk ii, which seems to be referring to actions in general. The objection reply you quote is more to answer whether will or reason is the first principle, not to delegate what he earlier said to human acts alone.

Good points, and I agree. I admit - I was more confused by my answer than when I started to reply. I’m sorry for the confusion, but it took me a while … I think I have a solution that will work for the broader statement on “all matters of action”.

I was going to try to dismiss that, but it’s a big claim.

I think I’ve got it here:

Without reason, it is not possible to determine the End of any action.
Actions in themselves do not establish Ends for themselves or others.
If there was no reason, nothing could be directed to an end, because Ends could not exist.
If an End exists, it only exists because Reason determined that it does.

Since every action can be said (by reason) to have an end, and reason is required in order to determine the end of any action – then:

In order for an action to be directed to an End, reason is required.
Since reason is the only thing that can establish an End, then Reason is the first principle In all actions directed to an End and reason necessarily directs all actions to an end.

Does that work?

One objection:
Why can’t Ends just be part of any action, regardless of the use of reason?

Answer:
All actions that take place in time are on a continuum. It requires reason to determine what the end of the action is.
A ball moves from point X to point Y.
It take reason to declare that point Y is the end. The ball can’t declare it.
Plus, what happens after the ball is at point Y?
Someone picks it up and uses it for — 100 years more? It does various things, and it never can state that “this is the End” of whatever action it had.
Reason determnies that certain actions have Ends – and without reason, nothing has an End.

 

[Dranu]

Without reason, it is not possible to determine the End of any action.
Actions in themselves do not establish Ends for themselves or others.
If there was no reason, nothing could be directed to an end, because Ends could not exist.
If an End exists, it only exists because Reason determined that it does.

But why the first premise? Why is it not possible to determine the end of any action without reason?

A ball moves from point X to point Y.
It take reason to declare that point Y is the end. The ball can’t declare it.

I think you are on to something here. Perhaps an end is inherently a rational thing for some reason, and since it is inherently a thing of reason reason is thus a cause of it (by the obvious necessity the fact reason is an element of it).

 

[reggieM]

But why the first premise? Why is it not possible to determine the end of any action without reason?

This really goes deeper than I thought. St. Thomas’ writings do that sometimes, at least for me. You look at a simple phrase but then it just goes deeper with more meaning – and everything fits around it.

In this case, if there was no reason, then there could be no end to any action – because there would be nothing that could determine that it was the end. Only reason can do that.
Without reason, all actions just move on a continuum – and they can’t really have an end. Or, even if they did somehow have an end, there would be nothing to determine it.

There could be an action like the wind blowing some dust. With reason, we could determine an action and an end. The wind blows the dust up in the air, and then the dust lands on a car, for example. The end of that action is the dust on the car. But that end was determined only by reason. After the dust landed on the car, the car then went to the car wash and the dust was washed off and went into the drain – is that the end of the action? Without reason, there would be nothing to determine it. The dust goes down the drain and into the river, then to the bottom and it feeds the plants, then when the water level changes it drys out and becomes dust again and the wind picks it up …

All of those actions are just continuous. It’s only with reason that an end can be established. Even the example St. Thomas uses would be the same. The archer shoots the arrow and the arrow hits the target – but is that really the end? The arrow comes back out of the target and it is shot somewhere else, etc.

It goes on beyond that, I think – without reason, there couldn’t even be any action at all because all of that continual activity eventually is traced back to the first mover – the first cause of all the actions. That first cause must have been reason because if it wasn’t, then no action could ever get started and therefore there could never be any end at all.

So, reason was necessary for the first action – and therefore is involved in every possible action (which is the result of one to the next to the next).

So, in the example of the dust – that is just matter that is moving. Maybe that matter could be traced back to the Big Bang and the beginning of the universe. So, without reason creating the universe – that dust could never have one single end in all the actions that it had over eons of time (becoming a star, then breaking off as a comet, then hitting a planet, then hitting earth … etc.)

I think you are on to something here. Perhaps an end is inherently a rational thing for some reason, and since it is inherently a thing of reason reason is thus a cause of it (by the obvious necessity the fact reason is an element of it).

I think that’s it. An end is inherently a rational thing. It does not exist anywhere in nature or in objects themselves – it can only exist as a product of reason. It has to be caused by reason.

 

[JDaniel]

1. If the statement “only reason directs actions towards ends” is true, then it is the case that all actions which have ends are reason based.
2. If all actions with ends are reason based, then the implication is that there is a choice. The choice is between reason and unreason?
3. Therefore, it is possible that some actions with ends are not directed by reason.

John:

This isn’t making sense to me. Why would that which is reasonable act unreasonably? One can imagine a man (a reasonable creature otherwise) running out of water in the dessert, then wandering aimlessly to his death. But, why would an otherwise reasonable creature choose to act in defiance, for all intents and purposes, of reason? That would be an aberration.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

I underlined the pertinent sentence in your response.

If we look up a dictionary definition of “unreason”, we get this -
Your sentence, which I underlined, is this - The way that sentence is phrased suggests that not all actions have ends. After all, you wrote "when an action has an end…". The obvious inference is that sometimes, at least, actions don’t have ends.

However, you are asserting that actions are deliberately caused to achieve a particular end. That then rules out those adjectives used in the dictionary definition of “unreason”. Thus, you are giving the world of human actions an order and predictability that is not always true. We don’t have to think very hard to recall examples of human decision making that is chaotic, unreasonable, confused and/or disordered.

Your first sentence tells us that reason is required to establish an end. Therefore, when we see unreasonable ends, or irrational ends, or chaotic ends, according to you, there is reason behind them and not unreason. That doesn’t hold true in the observable world. Your archer, for example, might try to shoot an arrow into a target, but, not having allowed for the wind, shoots dead a stranger instead. He will be charged before a court with non-proper use of his reason and he daren’t plead intention, as your example suggests!!

John:

All examples of aberrations, i.e., reason thwarted.

The problem is, we can only postulate that we can know (all of) what is reasonable and what is not. Why a brain surgeon slices this or that may appear to be unreasonable to the rest of us, but, we simply don’t know what the reasoning is behind the slicing. A stone comes loose on a cliff and rolls down the hill. From all appearances, a totally unreasonable action. Are we sure? Is this not an arrogance?

To say that there are those acts which do not have ends are acts of unreason is to think that one can know the thoughts, and thus the reasons, of each and every exigency, in existence, that acts, don’t you think? Or, is this what you are saying?

God bless,
jd

 

[John21652]

John:

This isn’t making sense to me. Why would that which is reasonable act unreasonably? One can imagine a man (a reasonable creature otherwise) running out of water in the dessert, then wandering aimlessly to his death. But, why would an otherwise reasonable creature choose to act in defiance, for all intents and purposes, of reason? That would be an aberration.

God bless,
jd

Hi JD.

It’s oretty late where I am and so I wont go into any great detail. Not even sure I could at this hour (12.18 am and I’m about to turn into a pumpkin!)

I had going through my head that human agents don’t always behave, nor choose, reasonably; that reason isn’t always ‘right’.

Have a read through what reggieM and I discussed and all else he wrote of. I’ll get back here as soon as I can.

Cheers,

John

 

[JDaniel]

Good points. I think the difference here is between what we might call “right reason” versus the distinction between a deliberate act and randomness.
Human reason is not perfect - true. Just because a human being thinks of a goal, doesn’t mean that the action will achieve the goal.

So I think the statement “any action directed at an end” assumes that we can determine that the action was directed at the end that it achieved. It was something that was purposeful.

Reg:

But how do we know, i.e., how can we be so sure that any action isn’t purposeful? Here is where consensus helps - to some extent. But even consensus may leave us in no better position than we were before. There may be simply too many variables, too many mitigations to obtaining clear knowledge of purpose.

This is an interesting point. If unreasonable, irrational and chaotic results are actually “ends”, then you could argue that every act has an end.

I agree.

If that was the case, then reason would not be required since whatever action that took place anywhere would have some kind of end. This, however, would destroy the meaning of the words “end” or “goal” – as well as the words “purpose” or “by design”

IMHO, we need not destroy the meaning of the words “end” or “goal.” We need to attempt, as best we can, to see the purpose of the act. Will we always see the purpose, probably not. But, we have seen so many actions and purposes that we can do more than merely surmise purpose, don’t you think?

First, he could be charged with something if he didn’t follow necessary precautions. If he set up his target in a heavily populated shopping area, he couldn’t claim that the killing of a person was totally unrelated to the end or goal he had in mind.

In law, there is a term for this type of action: it is called “negligence.” What is negligence? Is it the taking of all possible precautions with a pinch of acceptable risk thrown in?

But let’s say it was wildly random, with no fault of his own …

I’m sure you meant “chancy.”

The reason we look at intention is because we know the arrow could not have hit a person on its own. The fact that an “end” for the action was established beforehand (it was meant to hit the target) is actually the thing that will save this archer from going to jail.

He might go to jail, but he might not go to the electric chair.

We see it was a deliberate, purposeful act and not just a random shooting. It was intended to hit a target. We see the target, we see where he was standing, etc.

Was it pure chance or actually negligence?

When an action has an end it has been established with a purpose

More than likely.

Was it the purpose of the arrow to kill a person?

Arrogance? How can we know the answer to this?

I can see where this gets difficult.

No question!

The arrow itself doesn’t have a purpose of killing people or even of hitting targets, necessarily.

The question might be: “what kind of end or purpose can we determine from random acts”?

Again, I’m sure you meant “chancy” occurrence. To perhaps answer your question: God’s purpose?

… this leads to the questions …

Are any actions truly random (or ultimately the product of unreason)? and … Is it possible for any action in the universe to not have an end or a goal?

Well, what do we think?

If we could look at it from God’s perspective, every action has purpose, so there is nothing -]random/-] purely chancy. But from a human perspective, we make a distinction between deliberate and -]random/-] chancy actions.

I took the liberty, with your tacit permission, to fix the above words. Randomness is homogeneity. Chance entails the juxtaposition of non-related, non-homogeneous things, or stuff. (You might call me an ultra-perfectionist when it comes to the use of these two words! IMO, it is precisely the mis-use [by replacement] of these two words that lends credence to evolutionism. )

Another way to read this is like this:

“If an action is directed to an end, it must necessarily be done by reason”.

But the possibility of arrogance crops up again, does it not?

BTW, great discussion!

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

and if that is true, then all are directed by reason since all acts come to a end (any change from point A to B, B being the end).

Dranu:

“End,” in this case must be defined more broadly - to mean “purpose,” or “reason.” It only means “stopping point” in a corollary fashion. (If that is what you meant, I can’t tell because of the way your question is phrased.)

However, I am trying to get at is why it is true that actions can only be directed to an end by reason.

If an action possesses a purpose or reason, then there must be a reasoning, purposeful agent directing, or controlling said action.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

I think you are now getting onto the right track. The OP wrote that "…only reason directs actions to ends." By adding in the term “right”, it changes the nature of the debate and allows for the fact that all ends of actions are not reason based.

True indeed. However, unintended goals might also eventuate because, to use your term, “right reason” wasn’t used.

An act can be purposeful, but not achieve the end it was directed at. I think it would be more correct to write “..any action directed at an end" assumes that we can determine that the action was directed at an end.…”

True, but you can’t argue that every end is the result of “right reason”!

All actions have ends. But not all ends are ‘goals’ and not all ends are by ‘purpose’ or ‘design’.

John:

So, if I read you correctly, you are saying that God’s reasons, ends and purposes can often be lost to chance?

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

All actions have ends. But not all ends are ‘goals’ and not all ends are by ‘purpose’ or ‘design’.

John:

Can you think of some and will you share them with us?

If the archer hits and kills someone, he will be brought before a court and questioned about the “forseeability” of the consequences (end) of his action. In all the circumstances, if it was reasonably forseeable that his intended goal might not eventuate and the risk of killing someone was high, then he will be found guilty of having not used his “right reason”, the very concept you introduced into the debate!

(Possibly not, here in the States! ) You are here referring to culpability from foresee-ability. Negligence. That usually won’t get the electric chair here. However, some punishment will be sought - if only to entice onlookers into being less negligent!

This then makes much more sense than to simply assert, as the OP did, that only "reason directs actions to ends". Not all ends are directed by reason and some ends, wrong ends, are the result of non-reason, or the lack of ‘right reason’.

Do you think that is how it should be thought?

The end for this action was established before the act. It required the use of reason. The end for this act was that the arrow was supposed to hit the target.

The “purpose” of the action was subverted. It didn’t hit the target and so the end of the action was something not intended, despite the “intention” of the actor.

Aberration?

Intent and ends are not always conjoined.

And this we call “chance.” But, is this whence God looses control?

If an action has an intent and the intended end does not eventuate, then the ‘reason’ that was behind the action was not “right”. It was unreason!

Do you really think that is so?

Well, the archer was not carrying out a -]random/-] chancy act. He was being deliberate. However, the end of his action was -]random/-] chance, with no directly attributable reason behind it. He did not reason that he would hit an innocent bystander.

And so, God does lose control.

Don’t we need to differentiate between actions done with intent, that is, by someone with the ability to reason and those actions which are the result of mechanical, or physical processes? After all, if we are discussing ‘reason’ and ‘right reason’, then we are discussing the actions of entities that have minds and can make choices.

Do we not build in intent and purpose into every machine we build?

What if the end is unreasonable? Does that infer the reasoning was unreasonable? What about if the end is -]random/-] chancy? Does that infer that the reason was not ‘right reason’?

Could it be that our intentions were thwarted by some other interested party? (Is this too hard to imagine?)

Evolutionists say that all things complexify by random mutations. Really? All things? That is why they use the word, “random.” If I take 600 red beans and mix them thoroughly together with 400 white beans, then in any scoopful of 100 beans, I will get 60% red beans and 40% white ones. That is homogeneity. That is mathematical randomness. What the evolutionist has done is usurped the proper word, “chance” or, “chancy,” and replaced it with the less blatant word, “random” or, “randomness.” This waters down the meaning, don’t you see? It makes the meaning palatable. But, is it possible that all things improve their lot by chance?

“Chance” is the accidental. If, for example, the mixing container, for the aforementioned beans, was left in the barn for an extended period and birds could easily have gotten to the beans and eaten some, that is “chance.” Chance is so far from homogeneity that it is impossible to presume that all things improve their beingness by reliance on it. I think the world, and the living creatures on it, would have to be well over 4.5 billion years old! And, especially, considering what we can discern from the past half-billion years! Anyway, sorry for the digression.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

True, but we need not add additional complexities to the philosophical term. I see no reason from distinguishing ‘goal’ from ‘final result.’ If all action only moves because of an end then any completed movement was for the end result (the ball moving to x was for the sake of being at x, even if that end is incidental to another). And if things are only directed to an end by reason, then all things only move because of reason. My big issue (one I buy but am looking for a reason for) is how only reason can direct towards ends.

Dranu:

I knew it. I knew that was what you intended by your earlier post.

I agree with all that you have stated above.

The argument is really not that difficult to imagine: if it is not “directed,” i.e., "“controlled,” action, then it is “chancy” action. But even chancy, to us, may be purposeful to a more powerful and all-knowing exigency. If the mitigations are too numerous for men to grasp, or too complicated to render into useful comparisons, for our thinking processes, they may be present, but remain unseen. Don’t you think?

Is it safe to conclude that 50% of the activities in this world are intentional, and the rest are not? (For the sake of postulation, I said “50%.” It could be more or less; it doesn’t matter.) But, such a conclusion would seem to beg more questions, wouldn’t it? Does this satisfy?

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

That’s not what St. Thomas means by the term “end” though. That’s why you’re having an issue with his statement.

If every possible action of every kind is “directed at an end”, then the term “purpose” would be meaningless.

When I deliberately roll a ball to point X, then I “directed it to an end”. Additionally, I gave the rolling ball a purpose, though the use of my reason.

Another ball that falls off of the back of a truck lands on point X. What gave that ball the purpose of landing on X?

In common terms, we have to either say “Nothing”, or “we don’t know”.

In either case, we can’t call the accidental movement of the ball an “action directed at an end” because either there was no direction, or we don’t know if there was a direction.

St. Thomas is talking about actions that are directed to purposeful ends. Like a group of beavers building a dam. They move the logs with a purpose, and the logs are in place not accidentally, but directed to an end.

We know that beavers do not possess reason. But we see an action directed to an end. Therefore, the beavers must have been moved by a greater reasoning power (their creator) to direct an action to a purposeful end.

Reggie:

But, St. Thomas is also saying that all motions have purpose(s): God’s purposes, if nothing that we can conceive. Right?

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

I was going to explain more, but let’s take a look at the passage in question:

ST 1-II, Q90, A1

I answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting: for “lex” [law] is derived from “ligare” [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated above (1, 1, ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of action, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii).

The first principle of human acts is the reason. Because human acts are intelligent and proceed from a being that has reasoning power.

It belongs to reason to direct to the end.

Now, the question is, what does the next part mean:

it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of action

In the Reply to Objection 3 it says:

Reason has its power of moving from the will, as stated above (Question 17, Article 1): for it is due to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason issues its commands as regards things ordained to the end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the will of the sovereign has the force of law; otherwise the sovereign’s will would savor of lawlessness rather than of law.

This entire section is talking about law, and whether that proceeds from reason or the will. St. Thomas is pointing out that it comes from reason. Reason directs the will to its end (the resulting action).

Reggie and Dranu:

End, for St. Thomas, means Final Cause. When defining the four principle causes, St. Thomas says,

The final cause of a thing has three characteristics: it is that for the sake of
which a thing acts; it is the good of the thing acting; it terminates the action
so that the agent in question comes to rest. - Commentary on the Metaphysics,
Bk. I, les. 4, n. 71

As we can see, any prior proofs regarding agency are herein presupposed. An agent could be one billiard ball that strikes another, but, that then begs the further question of what was the impulse to the first ball? Perhaps it was another. Eventually, we come to a mobile being of some sort. That mobile being might be a man, or it might be another living being, without what we call “rationality.” But, is that the end of this matter? (No pun intended!)

We always seem to stop our thought process as soon as we come to a “rational agent.” Why? An acorn falls to the ground, takes in nourishment and water, and begins to grow into a sprout. That sprout, through chance and intention, we may say, by its growing, moves a misplaced billiard ball out of its way, which happens to roll into another misplaced billiard ball, and so on.

What can we surmise from the foregoing? That God lost control over His Creations? That “chance” is outside of God’s control? That said motion, or series of motions, began at the initial growth movement of the sprout? That it began when the truck carrying billiard supplies lost a box of billiard balls and a few of them rolled under an oak tree? That a chuck-hole in the roadway caused the truck to lurch, sending the not-well-tied-down box of billiard balls onto the roadway? Etc., etc?

We can take notice of a “stopping point.” We can’t always take notice of the cause, or causes, of actions. But, we’ve seen enough of them to postulate other causes.

Ultimately, doesn’t it all resolve back to an agent with intentionality?

But, that’s another question. Suffice it to say that “all actions require an intentional agent.” Intentional agent presumes the ability to intend. Even the dog that accidentally steps on one of those wayward billiard balls, thereby setting it in motion, intended. Perhaps it intended to get home for supper!

God bless,
jd

 

[reggieM]

JD,

My attempt at an explanation changed over the course of this thread. I can reply to your comments on my earlier thoughts, but the better material to discuss is in posts 21 and 23.
I corrected some of the ideas that you pointed out by that time.

More later.

 

[JDaniel]

I certainly find the basis of your opinion valid, which is why in the OP I said it is possible he is just referring to human actions as he cites this in his section on law. However, I find the contrary more likely. As you quote, he says it (reason directing to an end) is the first principle in all matters of actions and then he cites Aristotle’s Physics, Bk ii, which seems to be referring to actions in general.

Dranu:

Correct. But, another way to say what St. Thomas means by stating his conclusion therein is to say that an approach to nature, from a mathematical or metrical point of view, does not consider the final cause or purposes of things, and because it must neglect final causes, it cannot decide between events that are intended and those which are not. This is from St. Thomas’ Commentary on the Metaphysics, Bk. iii, les. 4, 375, which refers back to Aristotle’s Bk ii.

The objection reply you quote is more to answer whether will or reason is the first principle, not to delegate what he earlier said to human acts alone.

Further, St. Thomas says, from the Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. iii, ch. 2, in Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. A. Pegis (New York, 1954), ii, 6-7:

“Were an agent not to act for a definite effect, all effects would be indifferent to it. Now that which is indifferent to many effects does not produce one rather than another. Therefore, from that which is indifferent to either of two effects, no effect results unless it [the agent] be determined by something to one of them. Hence it would be impossible for it to act. Therefore every agent tends to some definite effect which is called its end.”

As I have shown in a previous post, St. Thomas is not merely discussing “human actions.” He was speaking to “all actions of nature.”

Now, if we think this through, we can only conclude that the termination of an action cannot be prior to its intention. So, intention, or Final Cause, or End, comes first in causation but last in act. It is important to remember that what St. Thomas means here is that where an “efficient” cause, e.g., paper (burnt to ash) or an egg (kept warm and hatched into a chicken), is determined to an effect, that determination to the effect is not itself a cause but something that we have to explain. Such determination is not another quasi-efficient cause but precisely an exigency that must be accounted for.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

Good points, and I agree. I admit - I was more confused by my answer than when I started to reply. I’m sorry for the confusion, but it took me a while … I think I have a solution that will work for the broader statement on “all matters of action”.

I was going to try to dismiss that, but it’s a big claim.

I think I’ve got it here:

Without reason, it is not possible to determine the End of any action.
Actions in themselves do not establish Ends for themselves or others.
If there was no reason, nothing could be directed to an end, because Ends could not exist.
If an End exists, it only exists because Reason determined that it does.

Since every action can be said (by reason) to have an end, and reason is required in order to determine the end of any action – then:

In order for an action to be directed to an End, reason is required.
Since reason is the only thing that can establish an End, then Reason is the first principle In all actions directed to an End and reason necessarily directs all actions to an end.

Reggie:

Yes, you got it . . . finally!

And, yes, as I said, the Final Cause (or End) is not merely another quasi-efficient cause (as Descartes would have said) but the very determinating factor of the efficient cause, in other words, the cause of the efficient cause, the correlative to it. Efficient and final cause are two moments, we could say, of one effect, the one accounting for the production of the effect and the other accounting for its determination to be this rather than that.

One objection:
Why can’t Ends just be part of any action, regardless of the use of reason?

Answer:
All actions that take place in time are on a continuum. It requires reason to determine what the end of the action is.
A ball moves from point X to point Y.
It take reason to declare that point Y is the end. The ball can’t declare it.
Plus, what happens after the ball is at point Y?
Someone picks it up and uses it for — 100 years more? It does various things, and it never can state that “this is the End” of whatever action it had.
Reason determines that certain actions have Ends – and without reason, nothing has an End.

And that’s the problem for those who confuse Final Cause with mere indifference and purposelessness. No natural motion is indifferent to its result. None. The physicist attempts to prove it so by employing quantum mechanics, by saying that, at the quantum level, there is no determination. But, obviously, that is wrong. For, if it were true, there would be no sufficient reason why anything should act. And, of course, there would be no sufficient reason why any repeated action should produce the same (not self-same) result(s).

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

But why the first premise? Why is it not possible to determine the end of any action without reason?

Darnu:

Can you postulate an example?

I think you are on to something here. Perhaps an end is inherently a rational thing for some reason, and since it is inherently a thing of reason reason is thus a cause of it (by the obvious necessity the fact reason is an element of it).

I think of it as, that for the sake of which a thing acts. If we cannot see a “purpose,” we might want to look deeper.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

This really goes deeper than I thought. St. Thomas’ writings do that sometimes, at least for me. You look at a simple phrase but then it just goes deeper with more meaning – and everything fits around it.

In this case, if there was no reason, then there could be no end to any action – because there would be nothing that could determine that it was the end. Only reason can do that.
Without reason, all actions just move on a continuum – and they can’t really have an end. Or, even if they did somehow have an end, there would be nothing to determine it.

There could be an action like the wind blowing some dust. With reason, we could determine an action and an end. The wind blows the dust up in the air, and then the dust lands on a car, for example. The end of that action is the dust on the car. But that end was determined only by reason. After the dust landed on the car, the car then went to the car wash and the dust was washed off and went into the drain – is that the end of the action? Without reason, there would be nothing to determine it. The dust goes down the drain and into the river, then to the bottom and it feeds the plants, then when the water level changes it drys out and becomes dust again and the wind picks it up …

Reggie:

You are limiting your perspective. Is is possible that there are seeds in that dust? And that those seeds with implant somewhere and grow? Or, perhaps the water from the car wash will begin the generation of a plant?

All of those actions are just continuous. It’s only with reason that an end can be established. Even the example St. Thomas uses would be the same. The archer shoots the arrow and the arrow hits the target – but is that really the end? The arrow comes back out of the target and it is shot somewhere else, etc.

That is correct. That indicates that subordinate causes exist. St. Thomas calls them “secondary” causes. Why? Because they are not Primary causes. A Primary cause is one that begins an action that is substantial, as opposed to accidental. A Primary cause results in, say, an oak tree, while an accidental cause produces a ten foot tall oak tree, or a twenty foot tall oak tree.

It goes on beyond that, I think – without reason, there couldn’t even be any action at all because all of that continual activity eventually is traced back to the first mover – the first cause of all the actions. That first cause must have been reason because if it wasn’t, then no action could ever get started and therefore there could never be any end at all.

Well reasoned explanation, in my opinion.

So, reason was necessary for the first action – and therefore is involved in every possible action (which is the result of one to the next to the next).

So, in the example of the dust – that is just matter that is moving. Maybe that matter could be traced back to the Big Bang and the beginning of the universe. So, without reason creating the universe – that dust could never have one single end in all the actions that it had over eons of time (becoming a star, then breaking off as a comet, then hitting a planet, then hitting earth … etc.)

I think that’s it. An end is inherently a rational thing. It does not exist anywhere in nature or in objects themselves – it can only exist as a product of reason. It has to be caused by reason.

Excellent. (I am not being condescending; I’m being honest.)

God bless,
jd

 

[reggieM]

Reggie:

You are limiting your perspective. Is is possible that there are seeds in that dust? And that those seeds with implant somewhere and grow? Or, perhaps the water from the car wash will begin the generation of a plant?

JD – thanks for your great comments on this thread (and I appreciate the encouragement).

On the above - -yes, all of that is possible, but none of it is relevant without the addition of your reasoning power to give boundaries to the topic.

In other words, we can’t even talk about “dust” as being distinct from “seeds” without reason.

The dust and the seeds don’t tell anyone that they are two distinct things – if there was no reason, there would be nothing to “know”.

So, in the same way with “Ends” – those are created by reason alone. A person could say, as you’ve done, that the scenario I sketched is “lacking the true ends” of the process, or “missing some important characteristics” – but there are no “true ends” or even any “importance” without the use of reason to provide boundaries around these actions which are on a continuum since the very beginning of time.

We “break up reality” into little beginnings and ends, because reason has the power to do that. But without reason – everything since the beginning is just one long action.

If things are created from nothing – yes, that is new to the continuum. But it takes a very powerful reasoning power to create something from nothing!

 

[reggieM]

How about this?

Purpose cannot exist except as a function of reason.

… and …

There can be no actions at all without reason.
or
Actions cannot exist except as a function of reason.