Ontological Argument

[Marc_Anthony]

I’m trying to understand the ontological argument. I got this form of the argument from this link: ocw.mit.edu/courses/linguistics-and-philosophy/24-00-problems-of-philosophy-fall-2005/lecture-notes/ontarg05.pdf

Ontological Argument
One of the distinctive features of the ontological argument is that it attempts to prove the existence of God simply from the concept of God. In other words, you don’t need to go searching about for God in the world; simply knowing what God is supposed to be, i.e., simply having the concept and seeing its implications, should be enough to demonstrate that God exists. So what is the concept of God we’re using?
God =df an absolutely perfect being, i.e., a being than which nothing greater is possible, a being than which nothing greater can even be conceived.
Let’s grant this concept of God (for the moment). Now you might still think that to answer whether God exists, we should get clearer on what we mean by exists. First, let’s note the difference between existing in reality and existing “in the understanding” or “in the mind”. Here are some examples:
Existent: Non-existent:
The Charles River The Fountain of Youth
Chipmunks Unicorns
Boston Atlantis 24.00 lecture 1 9/12/05
George W. Bush Sherlock Holmes
Obviously, the issue before us is not whether God exists in the mind…whether some people have an idea of God. Many people do (or seem to). The question is whether the concept they have–the idea that they associate with the term “God”–is real in the world external to the mind.
Philosophers such as Anselm and Descartes have reasoned that just as we can argue that there are things that necessarily don’t exist, we can show that there are some things that necessarily exist. It is plausible that some concepts necessarily don’t have instances because the concept is self-contradictory:
A squircle =df a square circle.
Argument for the non-existence of squircles:

1. The concept of a squircle is a concept of a figure that is both square and circular.
2. Something square and circular cannot possibly exist.
3. The concept of a squircle is a concept of something that cannot possibly exist.
4. Therefore, (necessarily) no squircles exist.
   But are there also concepts that necessarily have instances? The suggestion before us is that the concept of God is such a concept.
   In order to follow the reasoning we need to consider the idea that existence is a perfection. What does this mean? Consider a fictional character, e.g., Sherlock Holmes. Sherlock Holmes, is imperfect. He’s imperfect in many ways (e.g., he smokes, he is impatient, can be arrogant, etc.). But one of his imperfections, it seems, is that he doesn’t exist! The claim seems to be that any merely possible (non-actual) object would be more perfect if it existed. So Sherlock Holmes is not perfect, in part because he doesn’t really exist, but only exists in stories.
   So, putting these ideas together, here is one version of the ontological argument:
5. The concept of God is the concept of an absolutely perfect being, i.e., that than which nothing greater is possible.
6. Existence is a perfection, i.e., a “great making” property: it is greater to exist than not to exist.
7. Because existence is a perfection, i.e., a “great making” property, if God didn’t exist in reality (but only in the understanding), then it would be possible for there to be something even greater than God, i.e., with all of God’s qualities plus existence. But this is impossible, given the definition of God.
8. So the concept of God is the concept of an existent being.
9. Therefore, God exists.

Now, the problem I have with this is that, frankly, it seems to be a terrible argument. And yet it’s one of the most common proofs for God!

The refutation is maddeningly simple.

1. The Perfect Island
   For Anselm there is only one thing whose essence includes existence, and that is God. But where is this restriction coming from? Why can’t there be other things whose essences have this marvelous feature? And why can’t we then prove these other things to exist just as Anselm has proved God to exist?
   Note that the same form of argument Anselm offered to prove God exists can be offered in support of the existence of a perfect island. Suppose:
   X is a superisle iff x is an absolutely perfect island.
   24.00 lecture 2 9/12/05
   If you substitute ‘superisle’ for ‘God’ in the argument above, it should show that there exists a superisle. But there is no superisle. So something must be wrong with the argument.

I mean, this is MIT’s version of the refutation, but it’s one I thought of a refutation like it literally as soon as I read it.

So I think there must be something both and I and this MIT Professor are missing. Refuting it can’t be THAT easy.

What am I missing here?

 

[j1akey]

Well, actually it is that easy. You can easily substitue “God” with any number of things to prove that because of X then Y exists. The ontological argument is basically just a bunch of buildup to say that because I believe something exists then it exists, the lead up is just filler to make it sound like a logical argument to someone that doesn’t take a good look at it.

 

[promethius]

Now, the problem I have with this is that, frankly, it seems to be a terrible argument. And yet it’s one of the most common proofs for God!

The refutation is maddeningly simple.

I happen to think it’s a terrible argument, but not for the reason you listed below.

1. The Perfect Island
   For Anselm there is only one thing whose essence includes existence, and that is God. But where is this restriction coming from? Why can’t there be other things whose essences have this marvelous feature? And why can’t we then prove these other things to exist just as Anselm has proved God to exist?
   Note that the same form of argument Anselm offered to prove God exists can be offered in support of the existence of a perfect island. Suppose:
   X is a superisle iff x is an absolutely perfect island.
   24.00 lecture 2 9/12/05
   If you substitute ‘superisle’ for ‘God’ in the argument above, it should show that there exists a superisle. But there is no superisle. So something must be wrong with the argument.

I mean, this is MIT’s version of the refutation, but it’s one I thought of a refutation like it literally as soon as I read it.

This MIT professor should not be taking credit for the above objection, since it’s almost a direct lift from Gaunilo’s objection, which was published almost immediately after Anselm’s argument. Plaguerism at MIT, tsk tsk…

So I think there must be something both and I and this MIT Professor are missing. Refuting it can’t be THAT easy.

What am I missing here?

Well, as regards an island, there are two such refutations of Guanillo’s argument:

1. by anselm himself: the Island is an object which is defined as a body of land surrounded by water… which means an Island predicates it’s existance dependent on something else. In that case, it is a dependent being. God’s existance is not predicated by anything else, and as such is a unique case, so the idea of a super island is not analogous to the idea of a perfect God.
2. Unknown writers: A perfect island has no upper limit to it’s supreme characteristics. If adding trees and beaches makes an island more perfect, then any concept of an island we have, if we add just one more tree or beach, becomes an even MORE perfect island. Thus there is no upper limit to the concept of a perfect island so the idea itself is non-sensical. In contrast, God’s characteristics can be defined by infinite properties which do have meaning, so again the idea of a super island is not analogous to the idea of a perfect God.

I, however, prefer Kant’s objection: that existance is not a predicate (aka, that it is not a property a thing can possess, but rather a state of being). God does not HAVE existance or NOT have existance. God either is and exists, or does not exist and is not. Thus existance is not a property of which one can compare quantities to state that existance is greater than non-existance.

 

[Betterave]

I, however, prefer Kant’s objection: that existance is not a predicate (aka, that it is not a property a thing can possess, but rather a state of being). God does not HAVE existance or NOT have existance. God either is and exists, or does not exist and is not. Thus existance is not a property of which one can compare quantities to state that existance is greater than non-existance.

Good post. Except for the part quoted above, which all seems a little muddy. Would you mind trying to clarify? It’s cant, not just Kant, to say that existence is not a predicate. It’s not a ‘real’ predicate, perhaps, but certainly it really is a predicate… is it not?

 

[promethius]

Good post. Except for the part quoted above, which all seems a little muddy. Would you mind trying to clarify? It’s cant, not just Kant, to say that existence is not a predicate. It’s not a ‘real’ predicate, perhaps, but certainly it really is a predicate… is it not?

Meh, I think Kant is using it in the grammatical sense, as in a predicate is the part of a sentence which asserts or denies something about a subject. What Kant is getting at is that existance does not operate in that sense.

In other words, if I think about power vs a perfect God:
If God has X power, then he is a good God.
If another God has X+1 power, then he is a better God.
Therefore the perfect God is a God who has X power as X goes to infinite.

If we substitute love, understanding, knowledge, etc, into the above argument, we arrive that the perfect God is infinite in all of His characteristics. However, when we substitute in “existance”, the argument no longer makes sense. That’s because existance is not a characteristic of an existing being. You either exist or you don’t exist, but you don’t POSSESS existance, and therefore existance can’t be used to compare to other beings because it’s not a characteristic but a state of being.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

The problem with the ontological argument is a matter of reference. Let’s look at one version:

1. God possesses all perfections.
2. Existence is a perfection.
3. Therefore, God exists.

What must be true, in order for Premise #1 to be true? There must be a thing, namely God, that possesses other things, perfections. But wait – haven’t we just *assumed *that God exists?

Here’s what the argument looks like, if you don’t cheat.

1. If God exists, God possesses all perfections.
2. Existence is a perfection.
3. Therefore, if God exists, then God exists.

Uh-oh.

 

[Betterave]

Meh, I think Kant is using it in the grammatical sense, as in a predicate is the part of a sentence which asserts or denies something about a subject. What Kant is getting at is that existance does not operate in that sense.

In other words, if I think about power vs a perfect God:
If God has X power, then he is a good God.
If another God has X+1 power, then he is a better God.
Therefore the perfect God is a God who has X power as X goes to infinite.

[This is nonsense. By definition there is only one God. “Better than God” is a contradiction in terms.]

If we substitute love, understanding, knowledge, etc, into the above argument, we arrive that the perfect God is infinite in all of His characteristics. However, when we substitute in “existance”, the argument no longer makes sense. That’s because existance is not a characteristic of an existing being. You either exist or you don’t exist, but you don’t POSSESS existance, and therefore existance can’t be used to compare to other beings because it’s not a characteristic but a state of being.

Thank you. Now is it true that I either exist or I don’t exist? Suppose I cease to exist (that I cease to be capable of being posited as the object of a sensory intuition of others or of an internal intuition of myself (?), I think Kant might say), but you remember my existence - do I then not exist at all? I would certainly still be real, right? - unless the past is not real! But then not all real things exist…? (Do we have any good reason for saying that?)

Is existence really all or nothing (apart from someone simply defining it to be so)?

 

[Betterave]

The problem with the ontological argument is a matter of reference. Let’s look at one version:

1. God possesses all perfections.
2. Existence is a perfection.
3. Therefore, God exists.

What must be true, in order for Premise #1 to be true? There must be a thing, namely God, that possesses other things, perfections. But wait – haven’t we just *assumed *that God exists?

Here’s what the argument looks like, if you don’t cheat.

1. If God exists, God possesses all perfections.
2. Existence is a perfection.
3. Therefore, if God exists, then God exists.

Uh-oh.

No, I think it’s like this:

1b. God exists iff God possesses all perfections.
1a. By definition, God possesses all perfections.
2. Existence is a perfection.
3. Therefore, God exists.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

No, I think it’s like this:

1b. God exists iff God possesses all perfections.
1a. By definition, God possesses all perfections.
2. Existence is a perfection.
3. Therefore, God exists.

Good clarification. But, of course, 1a can only be true if “God” picks out some real object. It cannot be true “by definition”.

Unless you’re a metaphysician. Metaphysicians, I hear, can define things into existence. Pretty neat trick!

 

[Aristotle_1]

You cannot prove God exists or there would be no need of faith.

 

[AntiTheist]

1. A perfect mansion belonging to me exists iff it possesses all perfections.
2. By definition, a perfect mansion belonging to me possesses all perfections.
3. Therefore, I own a perfect mansion.

It sure is easy to make arguments when I get to define all of the terms and not even have to bother checking to see if my premises actually match reality!

Here’s an interesting comment:

You cannot prove God exists or there would be no need of faith.

Well, I think you’re right, but then that begs the question of why one would want to have “faith” in something that cannot be demonstrated to be true.

Why have “faith” in one assertion that can’t be disproven and not another assertion that can’t be disproven?

 

[Marc_Anthony]

Here’s an interesting comment:

Well, I think you’re right, but then that begs the question of why one would want to have “faith” in something that cannot be demonstrated to be true.

Why have “faith” in one assertion that can’t be disproven and not another assertion that can’t be disproven?

I disagree with aristotle (well, aristotle the CAF poster) sort of. God cannot be PROVEN to exist, or no to exist for that matter. I do believe you can have a reasonable faith by deciding that there is a PROBABILITY of God’s existence.

Take the first cause argument. It doesn’t 'prove" there’s a first cause, just establishes that a first cause is the most likely reason that the universe exists.

Of cours,e that’s an entirely seperate argument and I don’t want to get too off topic.

 

[Betterave]

You cannot prove God exists or there would be no need of faith.

An analogous claim would be: You cannot prove Pythagoras’ theorem or there would be no need of faith. (Pace Antitheist, you are clearly not right.)

p.s. Congratulations on your first post. Welcome to CAF.

 

[Betterave]

1. A perfect mansion belonging to me exists iff it possesses all perfections.
2. By definition, a perfect mansion belonging to me possesses all perfections.
3. Therefore, I own a perfect mansion.

It sure is easy to make arguments when I get to define all of the terms and not even have to bother checking to see if my premises actually match reality!

Uh, right. You apparently skipped over post #3.

(Do most people just jump into a short thread like this and not check to see whether the weak argument they are about to offer has already been refuted in the first three posts? I guess maybe even MIT profs don’t bother to read Anselm’s replies to objections, and we have much lower standards here - so why not! )

 

[Betterave]

Good clarification. But, of course, 1a can only be true if “God” picks out some real object. It cannot be true “by definition”.

Unless you’re a metaphysician. Metaphysicians, I hear, can define things into existence. Pretty neat trick!

No doubt about it: if you don’t understand metaphysics/have a natural inclination for metaphysical reasoning, you won’t understand the ontological argument. Maybe that’s the argument’s biggest weakness - it goes over people’s heads because it can be summarized so simply that people don’t think they need to bother actually trying to understand it? It definitely often seems that way. (Check “The Greatest Proof…” thread for more evidence of this.)

 

[AntiTheist]

Uh, right. You apparently skipped over post #3.

I didn’t. I just didn’t think it had enough merit to reply to.

The “perfect mansion belonging to me” has every perfection that a mansion is capable of having.

Obviously, a perfect mansion belonging to me that exists is a more perfect mansion belonging to me than a perfect mansion belonging to me that doesn’t exist, given that – as everyone knows, apparently – existing is a “higher perfection” than not existing.

you don’t understand metaphysics/have a natural inclination for metaphysical reasoning, you won’t understand the ontological argument.

Translation: if you are averse to defining beings into existence, you won’t support the ontological argument.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Translation: if you are averse to defining beings into existence, you won’t support the ontological argument.

For once, we agree!

 

[Betterave]

I didn’t. I just didn’t think it had enough merit to reply to.

The “perfect mansion belonging to me” has every perfection that a mansion is capable of having. - er, no; obviously it doesn’t; I’ll bet you don’t even own a mansion!]

Obviously, a perfect mansion belonging to me that exists is a more perfect mansion belonging to me than a perfect mansion belonging to me that doesn’t exist, given that – as everyone knows, apparently – existing is a “higher perfection” than not existing.

And you don’t see how the refutations supplied in post #3 can easily handle this objection??

Translation: if you are averse to defining beings into existence, you won’t support the ontological argument.

Ah, I see. So the great unquestioned assumption is: there are some people who are averse to defining beings into existence - and obviously you believe that you are such a person.

But the question is: are you sure you (and Prodigal) understand that claim and that it is a safe assumption?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Ah, I see. So the great unquestioned assumption is: there are some people who are averse to defining beings into existence - and obviously you believe that you are such a person.

But the question is: are you sure you (and Prodigal) understand that claim and that it is a safe assumption?

I’m not sure if I understand your question.

I will admit that I am influenced by Frege and company, in my interpretation of existence. I do think that concepts have a kind of existence, however. But I think that it is a different thing for a concept to include a predicate than for an existing *being *to possess a property. Concepts cannot possess properties.

In saying that “By definition, God possesses all perfections”, we are saying that a certain concept – God – is necessarily attached to certain predicates – perfections. But this does not demonstrate that there is being that “falls under” that concept.

Personally, I’m all for Aquinas-type proofs (or demonstrations) of God, because they tend to be based on common sense. The ontological argument, in every version I’ve seen so far, asks me to grant assumptions that are far too questionable.

 

[AntiTheist]

I am indeed with Prodigal Son on this issue, and it takes me somewhat by surprise that Betterave is happy to admit that he’s merrily defining beings into existence.

So the great unquestioned assumption is: there are some people who are averse to defining beings into existence

There obviously are such people, and they are people who care about whether their beliefs are true or not.

If you’re just interested in “defining” the pals from your fantasy-life into reality and then pretending that your word games have any meaning whatsoever in the real world, then knock yourself out, but don’t expect other people to be wowed by it.

Watch, I’ll do it now:

1. The leprechaun TsiehtItna is defined as the most perfect leprechaun possible, possessing every perfection that it is possible for a leprechaun to have.
2. The leprechaun TsiehtItna that exists has a greater perfection that the leprechaun TsiehtItna that doesn’t exist.
3. The leprechaun TsiehtItna exists.

This line of reasoning is only true if the first premise is true, and you can’t make it true by thinking about it.