Ontological Argument

[JohnDamian]

John, thanks for your thoughts. As MindOverMatter mentioned, I’m not sure if the argument is correct, either. However, I don’t think the issue is numerical, but a matter of potentia. An existing man would have more potentia than a non-existent God. It’s not that two is better than one or one is better than zero numerically, but that something non-existent can literally have no power (potential with respect to act) at all. Also, I don’t think the concept of two omnipotent beings is coherent, so I’m not sure the counter-argument is analogous to Spinoza’s version of the ontological argument.

It certainly seems that it is numerical; for being itself inheres in finite individuals numerically; insofar as the predicate being operates with numerical unicity. We cannot predicate being in this way to a quiddity that is a per se identical to being; particularily in the case of an infinite; which is clearly not numerical; thus equivocation.

In terms of potency; a finite person may have more potential than an omnipotent person only if that finite person has being; and the omnipotent entity does not have being; thus to talk of them in terms where one is perfected; and the other unperfected elicits an equivocal fallacy.

Futhermore; a perfected finite entity is still bound by the numerical unity of it’s inherance of being; and thus is still less perfect than an infinite entity without any perfection. Thus; it does not follow that an existing finite entity is superior to a non existent infinite being; for being operates differently in these distinct entities.

A non existent omnipotent being is a contradiction in terms; per se an omnipotent being has in it’s quiddity an essential being; identical to it’s existence (see divine simplicity). We cannot speak of a “conceptual omnipotent” as this is a contradiction; especially accepting premise1.

Two omnipotent beings are coherant in regards to church teaching (see De Divina Omnipotenta) as a potency only needs to elicit the substantial and not be by necessity wholly capable of all conceivable. Thus; there is no contrarity entailed.

 

[punkforchrist]

John, I can’t recall: are the contents of St. Peter Damian’s De Divina Omnipotentia official doctrine?

From what I can tell, you are adopting Kant’s position on existence as a non-predicate. But, would you say there is a difference between, say, an imaginary unicorn and a (presumably) real unicorn?

In any case, I have a preference for cosmological and teleological arguments. But hey, ontological arguments sure are fascinating.

 

[JohnDamian]

John, I can’t recall: are the contents of St. Peter Damian’s De Divina Omnipotentia official doctrine?

From what I can tell, you are adopting Kant’s position on existence as a non-predicate. But, would you say there is a difference between, say, an imaginary unicorn and a (presumably) real unicorn?

In any case, I have a preference for cosmological and teleological arguments. But hey, ontological arguments sure are fascinating.

I am adopting the position of Proclus from Elements of theology; that being is first in the heirachy of existence with regards to finite entities; and understanding the concept of divine infinity (/simplicity) with regards to the formal distinction.

St Peter Damians De Divina Omnipotentia is not itself official doctrine; but his declaration as a Doctor of the Church gives some credance to his work (alongside Anselm; Augustine; Aquinas etc.). Peter Damians position reflects an understanding of the Augustinian position on the nihil nature of sin.

 

[punkforchrist]

Do you have a kind of neo-Platonic philosophical method? Unfortunately, I can’t say I’m very familiar with Proclus. I am, however, very familiar with Augustine (which also happens to be my confirmation name). Since you mention divine simplicity, though, I take it you agree that God’s essence and existence are identical? Would you agree that even if existence is not a perfection, that necessary existence is a perfection? In other words, is necessary existence greater than contingent existence?

Sorry if I’m overwhelming you with questions. I should look into buying a copy of Proclus’ works.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

…therefore ‘thing’ is not a concept? I would say something like: a thing is only constituted as such insofar as it has a concept proper to it. Therefore things necessarily instantiate concepts.

But things are prior to concepts, since concepts are either created or “noticed” by humans. Of course, you might say that God has concepts, but I think this is an anthropomorphism. God comprehends, which I don’t think involves conceptualizing (though nothing hangs on this point).

So what are properties? Not concepts? Do you take a nominalist approach to “possession” as well as to properties? How does that work?

Words don’t get to realities. Concepts don’t get to realities. The concept is shorthand.

Consider the statement “Here is a chair.” Is this true because some thing has the property of chairness? No! It is true because there IS a thing that we conventionally call a chair. What is included in the concept of chair? Perhaps, being able to be sat in, being of a certain shape, etc. But is this concept contained within the chair? No indeed. It is contained in the idea of the builder, perhaps, but not in the chair.

Still, if someone should say that the chair has the “property of being a chair”, I would agree – for I take this as shorthand for “We call this thing a chair.” (This view is somewhat based on Wittgenstein).

But what is a property, in itself? I agree with Kant that this is a step into the noumenal world, in which things exist and have a certain essence (and perhaps certain accidental qualities) we know nothing of.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Is this so? I should think the reason that there cannot be an infinite regress is that there’s no such thing, in reality, of an actual infinity. Not with matter, in any event. (I suppose there could be an actual infinity of exigencies of an immaterial stuff of some sort.)

I spoke hastily when I said that that premise forbade infinite regress. In short, I agree.

In which case there could be an existing actual infinity, right?

I’m not sure I follow. An infinity of what?

 

[MindOverMatter2]

What follows from such equivocal fallacies is the following;

1. Inability to exist is impotence. (Premise)
2. Ability to exist is power. (Premise)
3. If there is only one omnipotent being, then one infinite being is more powerful than two omnipotent beings.
4. One omnipotent being is not more powerful than two omnipotent beings (Premise)
5. Therefore, two omnipotent being exists. (From 3 and 4)

There cannot be two omnipotent beings.

 

[JohnDamian]

There cannot be two omnipotent beings.

Absolutely; thats why I said what follows from such equivocal fallacies. For there to be two omnipotent entities; an omnipotent entity must inhere being numerically rather than essentially; from this it follows that two omnipotent beings IF they inhered being numerically that there could be two; which would be really identical; which would be absurd. Thus; the premise of the argument; ie; that the inherance of being is univocal would be incorrect (at least if we refer to being in a Thomistic sense).

Alternatively; using Scotist premises for being; the argument is also fallacious because although being can be predicated univocally; it is a greater than numerical unicity that is present in all agencies; viz. essence is identical to existence in both finite and infinite senses.

From both perspectives (Thomist/analagorical and Scotist/univocal) on being; it follows that the argument is fallacious.

Do you have a kind of neo-Platonic philosophical method? Unfortunately, I can’t say I’m very familiar with Proclus. I am, however, very familiar with Augustine (which also happens to be my confirmation name). Since you mention divine simplicity, though, I take it you agree that God’s essence and existence are identical? Would you agree that even if existence is not a perfection, that necessary existence is a perfection? In other words, is necessary existence greater than contingent existence?

The method I am using is alternating between Thomist & Scotist insofar as I am trying to approach the argument in a way that makes the argument at least make sense. Personally it seems the case that essence is identical to existence in both finite and infinite entities; accepting of course the premises of realism and not nominalism or conceptualism – see Scotus Opus Oxoniense I III.

But it follows from each understanding of being an equivocal absurdity.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Three points (with any of which you may disagree ):

1. Atoms are divisible, speaking absolutely; it is only a matter of contingent fact that they cannot be divided.

I’m talking about the Greek atomists’ conception of atoms, not our modern conception. Perhaps we should give them a different name. We can call them “motas”.

1. We know this to be metaphysically true because it is implied by the relevant concepts.

See, this is precisely what I think is impossible. Knowledge must have reference to the world. It cannot simply be implied by concepts (unless those concepts, such as “number”, clearly have counterparts in the world).

1. The physical world is made up of matter. (Trivially true – even if there is no such thing as a physical world).
2. Matter is divisible. (One definition of matter).
3. If there were no smallest constituents of a divisible thing, then the thing would -]not exist/-] BE INFINITELY DIVISIBLE.
4. Material things exist. (Reference to the world)
5. -]There are smallest constituents of matter/-]. THIS IS TRUE EVEN IF THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A PHYSICAL WORLD!

You seem to have missed premise four. If we don’t say that there is a material world, then our definitions and premises are useless. You cannot claim the *existence *of something – such as “motas” – starting only from definitions!

Suppose there are no “atoms”, no smallest constituents. (Many sane people believe just such a thing). Nevertheless, I still have a clear concept of a smallest constituent. The fact that I have -]a/-] THIS concept is -]unexplained/-] A NECESSARY COROLLARY OF MY CONCEPT OF A PHYSICAL WORLD, but the fact that I have such a concept does not entail the ‘REAL’ instantiation of this concept IF THE PHYSICAL WORLD IS NOT ‘REAL’.

No. The physical world could be real, and there could be no motas. But only if premise three is false.

The concept may merely be a -]“compound”/-] CONSEQUENCE of various ideas: smallness, constitution, PHYSICAL WORLD, etc.

Concepts are never “consequences” of other concepts. Suppose I have the concepts of solidity, extension, shape, and color. These concepts could equally well be explained by a material object’s existence or the orchestrations of an omnipotent God. Neither hypothesis is entailed by the other concepts.

The concept of an atom, if atoms exist, -]points to/-] INSTANTIATES THE ‘FORM’ OF atoms AT THE LEVEL OF THE INTELLECT.

I’d accept this, although I’m unclear on which definition of “form” is meant. Platonic?

If atoms do not exist, the concept points to -]nothing/-] POINTS TO THE NECESSARY STRUCTURE OF A POSSIBLE PHYSICAL WORLD.

But there are many possible structures of a possible physical world, and we don’t know what they are. Perhaps a physical world is possible without atoms. I don’t know.

If God is (conceptually) a necessary being, then God (syntactically) carries the predicate “existing”. But from the fact that a concept has certain predicates, you cannot jump to the conclusion that a person exists**, UNLESS THE ASCRIPTION OF THOSE CONCEPTS TO THAT PERSON IS GROUNDED IN THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR CONCEIVING ITSELF TO BE POSSIBLE**.

Doesn’t this rely on the premise that “If God did not exist, then nothing would exist”? If so, this is an appeal to the *cosmological *argument. (Personally, I like such an appeal, since I think the ontological argument can’t stand on its own).

Perhaps I’m not following this last point, though.

 

[JDaniel]

Three points (with any of which you may disagree ):

1. Atoms are divisible, speaking absolutely; it is only a matter of contingent fact that they cannot be divided.
2. “Matter” should not be defined as divisible, but as composed of material atoms (properly understood) or simply as extended in space or constituted in space.
3. We know this to be metaphysically true because it is implied by the relevant concepts.

2.) Would you say rather, that “’‘Matter’ should be defined as that which is a subject of motion, and generally consists of uniformly (consistent) individual sensible material.” Whenever we divide matter into smaller pieces than its atom, then we are destroying that particular matter. But, we can divide matter without destroying it, except not actually physically, but by abstraction. Hmmm. . . conceptually.​

Let me analyze what you wrote earlier then:

Perhaps it would be best to step away for a moment, to figure out something of the relationship between a) concepts and b) things that exist.

Go back 500 years, if you will, to when the “atom” was merely a concept. [Was the ‘atom’ ever ‘merely a concept’?] There were arguments for the existence of “atoms”, that went something like this:

1. The physical world is made up of matter. (Trivially true – even if there is no such thing as a physical world).
2. Matter is divisible. (One definition of matter).
3. If there were no smallest constituents of a divisible thing, then the thing would -]not exist/-] BE INFINITELY DIVISIBLE.

Within conceptual reason. Considering physical reality to be on common grounds with mathematical abstraction, is problematic - don’t you think?

1. Material things exist. (Reference -]to the world/-] MOBILE BEING.)
2. -]There are smallest constituents of matter/-]. THIS IS TRUE EVEN IF THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A PHYSICAL WORLD!

But wouldn’t this only be true if somehow mobile being(s) existed.

Then we called the POSSIBLE smallest constituents “atoms”, and said that atoms necessarily existed (AS CONSTITUENTS OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD… EVEN IF THERE IS NO SUCH THING!). (This is nothing like our current definition of atoms, by the bye.) What I want to focus on here is the CONCEPT “atom”, which may alternately be called “smallest constituent of a divisible thing”.

This is very interesting. Don’t you think that the concept of the atom is derivative of dividing things into smaller and smaller bits of itself?

Suppose there are no “atoms”, no smallest constituents. (Many sane people believe just such a thing). Nevertheless, I still have a clear concept of a smallest constituent. The fact that I have -]a/-] THIS concept is -]unexplained/-] A NECESSARY COROLLARY OF MY CONCEPT OF A PHYSICAL WORLD, but the fact that I have such a concept does not entail the ‘REAL’ instantiation of this concept IF THE PHYSICAL WORLD IS NOT ‘REAL’. The concept may merely be a -]“compound”/-] CONSEQUENCE of various ideas: smallness, constitution, PHYSICAL WORLD, etc.

The concept of an atom, if atoms exist, -]points to/-] INSTANTIATES THE ‘FORM’ OF atoms AT THE LEVEL OF THE INTELLECT. If atoms do not exist, the concept points to -]nothing/-] POINTS TO THE NECESSARY STRUCTURE OF A POSSIBLE PHYSICAL WORLD. -]At any rate, there is a world’s difference between the concept and the thing/-]. JDaniel, you talk about the “objects of conceptualization”. And it is true that conceptions are necessarily conceptions OF, but they are not necessarily conceptions of some existing thing. -]I don’t imagine I’m saying anything controversial here/-].

This would be gormally known as “abstraction,” wouldn’t it?

If atoms are (conceptually) the smallest constituents of matter, then they (syntactically) carry the predicate of being constituents of matter.

If God is (conceptually) a necessary being, then God (syntactically) carries the predicate “existing” (TO EXIST or TO BE). But from the fact that a concept has certain predicates, you cannot jump to the conclusion that a person exists**, UNLESS THE ASCRIPTION OF THOSE CONCEPTS TO THAT PERSON IS GROUNDED IN THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR CONCEIVING ITSELF TO BE POSSIBLE**.

Precisely.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

I spoke hastily when I said that that premise forbade infinite regress. In short, I agree.

I’m not sure I follow. An infinity of what?

If atoms were immaterial objects. So, I meant an infinity of atoms.

jd

 

[JDaniel]

The Church teaches that the “Supreme fact naturally known to man is that the ultimate reality is a self-subsistent being. The ultimate reality cannot become itself, or received its existence as an event, it simply is, and never has been otherwise.” - The Teachings of the Catholic Church, Vol I, p 79.)

(Now, here is where this really takes on weighty reality!) Further, it says, “It is in every respect independent of all else, because it embodies in itself all the fullness of which being is capable.” (Ibid.)

This is different from finite being in that the two natures (existence and essence) though inseparable, to an extent, are not an intrinsic composition. Neither can they be a composite where God is concerned, obviously.

To get back to the OP, it would look more and more as though there must be two essential aspects to reality that are somehow intertwined and may be inseparable. (That is very poorly stated, but, it conveys what I mean.) On the one hand, there is the reality of physical being(s). It is best delineated by the facts of it, that it persists even though no one is around to observe it (perhaps the most imperative of its facticals because I can conceive it persisting WITHOUT actually witnessing it). On the other hand, there is the conception of ((at this point, probably) real) things (mental being(s)). This reality doesn’t have the seemingly impenetrable properties of the former, but, is presupposed by and presupposes the properties of matter.

Now, what are properties? I think properties are what we call determinants. It is knowledge that tells us what a thing is. But, it does not necessarily tell us that a thing is. That is part of the reason why we always think of things possessing existence rather than constituting it. However, outside of philosophy, though perhaps more ontologically, I’m not sure that we know anything about a thing unless we know that it is. Of course, it can be said that we can make stuff up and we do that all the time. Novels, movies, poems, pictures, statues, etc. But, have you ever seen something so novel (nuanced) that we are absolutely certain it did not exist in some form a priori? I don’t know of but I am open to reading about such an exigency that is so novel that we are absolutely sure it did not exist in some form a prior. By “some form” I mean, a compounded substance, for example, or an abstraction with essential parts dissected, etc.

(I’m still thinking this through, so, bear with me. If you can help, PLEASE!) :coffeeread:

jd

 

[punkforchrist]

An object is “material,” whether it be an atom or something even smaller, so long as it is an object extended in space. Every material body is capable of being moved, but not everything that is capable of being moved is a material body. Angels come to mind. However, God (being the cause of motion) is immutable, so He is neither material nor changing as even the fundamental particles are.

Okay, back to the ontological argument.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

However, outside of philosophy, though perhaps more ontologically, I’m not sure that we know anything about a thing unless we know that it is. Of course, it can be said that we can make stuff up and we do that all the time. Novels, movies, poems, pictures, statues, etc. But, have you ever seen something so novel (nuanced) that we are absolutely certain it did not exist in some form a priori? I don’t know of but I am open to reading about such an exigency that is so novel that we are absolutely sure it did not exist in some form a prior. By “some form” I mean, a compounded substance, for example, or an abstraction with essential parts dissected, etc.

(I’m still thinking this through, so, bear with me. If you can help, PLEASE!) :coffeeread:

jd

All creative knowledge is based on some form of real knowledge. Out of nothing comes nothing, and therefore we cannot truly have a thought or idea of something that does not derive its essential aspects from the knowledge of some other being or beings. That’s why I don’t believe that you can doubt freewill, as in admit that its possibly an illusion, because illusions are based on facts, and thus any illusion of freewill must be based on a true knowledge of freedom. I do not believe that you can truly mistake something for that which you have never known, since the knowledge of a mistake prepossess something that ought to be in its place. If you have never known freewill, how can you mistake it for something else?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

All creative knowledge is based on some form of real knowledge. Out of nothing comes nothing, and therefore we cannot truly have a thought or idea of something that does not derive its essential aspects from the knowledge of some other being or beings. That’s why I don’t believe that you can doubt freewill, as in admit that its possibly an illusion, because illusions are based on facts, and thus any illusion of freewill must be based on a true knowledge of freedom. I do not believe that you can truly mistake something for that which you have never known, since the knowledge of a mistake prepossess something that ought to be in its place. If you have never known freewill, how can you mistake it for something else?

But if freedom equals “doing what I want” (which seems to be our concept of free will), then we do have some amount of free will, and yet perhaps all our actions are nevertheless determined by our histories/circumstances. I don’t believe that, but it does prove that the idea of free will is not sufficient to prove the existence of real free will – the kind that makes you morally responsible.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

The Church teaches that the “Supreme fact naturally known to man is that the ultimate reality is a self-subsistent being. The ultimate reality cannot become itself, or received its existence as an event, it simply is, and never has been otherwise.” - The Teachings of the Catholic Church, Vol I, p 79.)

I agree that we naturally know this. But this shows merely that the ontological argument works from the inside out. It doesn’t work from the outside in; it doesn’t give an atheist any (perceived) reason to believe. Thus, I consider that it fails as an argument, although it may very well succeed as an explication of who God is.

On the other hand, there is the conception of ((at this point, probably) real) things (mental being(s)). This reality doesn’t have the seemingly impenetrable properties of the former, but, is presupposed by and presupposes the properties of matter.

This is opaque to me. Are you saying that concepts presuppose matter? Do you mean physical matter? If so, I’m perplexed.

Now, what are properties? I think properties are what we call determinants.

Interesting.

It is knowledge that tells us what a thing is. But, it does not necessarily tell us that a thing is. That is part of the reason why we always think of things possessing existence rather than constituting it. However, outside of philosophy, though perhaps more ontologically, I’m not sure that we know anything about a thing unless we know that it is.

Well, I suppose we know conditionals about it. Like “If there are unicorns, then some animals have one horn” or some such thing. In other words, the concept can precede the ontological knowledge. A case in point: Suppose we discovered that Arthur Conan Doyle had not been writing fiction after all, but rather documenting the actions of one truly existing detective Sherlock Holmes. Then some action of Holmes, which we thought was a fiction, would reveal itself to be fact.

 

[JDaniel]

All creative knowledge is based on some form of real knowledge. Out of nothing comes nothing, and therefore we cannot truly have a thought or idea of something that does not derive its essential aspects from the knowledge of some other being or beings. That’s why I don’t believe that you can doubt freewill, as in admit that its possibly an illusion, because illusions are based on facts, and thus any illusion of freewill must be based on a true knowledge of freedom. I do not believe that you can truly mistake something for that which you have never known, since the knowledge of a mistake prepossess something that ought to be in its place. If you have never known freewill, how can you mistake it for something else?

That’s exactly right! How, then, can we create whole-cloth something brand new? God was not a compound to our early ancestors. Nor, to Anselm. How then do we have a conception of God when we have never seen, witnessed, sensed, or read anything that might give a hint about Him? All of a sudden, God appeared to early man. And, it’s not enough - besides I am tired of the balogna comparisons with lightening and unexplainable physical phenomena. There is no other concept like the concept of God. None. Tell me one.

jd

 

[JDaniel]

But if freedom equals “doing what I want” (which seems to be our concept of free will), then we do have some amount of free will, and yet perhaps all our actions are nevertheless determined by our histories/circumstances. I don’t believe that, but it does prove that the idea of free will is not sufficient to prove the existence of real free will – the kind that makes you morally responsible.

No, but it does prove that our abstractions/conceptions are products of our “histories/ circumstance.” If that’s so, where Oh where did the concept of God come from?

jd

 

[JDaniel]

I agree that we naturally know this. But this shows merely that the ontological argument works from the inside out. It doesn’t work from the outside in; it doesn’t give an atheist any (perceived) reason to believe. Thus, I consider that it fails as an argument, although it may very well succeed as an explication of who God is.

This is opaque to me. Are you saying that concepts presuppose matter? Do you mean physical matter? If so, I’m perplexed.

Interesting.

Well, I suppose we know conditionals about it. Like “If there are unicorns, then some animals have one horn” or some such thing. In other words, the concept can precede the ontological knowledge. A case in point: Suppose we discovered that Arthur Conan Doyle had not been writing fiction after all, but rather documenting the actions of one truly existing detective Sherlock Holmes. Then some action of Holmes, which we thought was a fiction, would reveal itself to be fact.

Doyle wrote stories about someone using what stuff, “stuff” from metaphysics, or philosophy, or prose, or newsprint? He did not create anything new. He juxtaposed things from a priori sense experience. Right?

jd

 

[JDaniel]

I am trying to figure out how came the concept of God. We all, well at least most of us, have some sort of fairly complex concept of God that does not align with anything we have had explained to us by the atheists. (BTW, that’s why they’re still here. they want us to figure it out!)

When I was an atheist, all I wanted was to be persuaded. I realize now that that was bad, but, at the time, it seemed right. Yet, I had an unshakable conception of God, albeit dim and foggy.

jd