Ontological Argument

[Betterave]

But things are prior to concepts, since concepts are either created or “noticed” by humans. Of course, you might say that God has concepts, but I think this is an anthropomorphism. God comprehends, which I don’t think involves conceptualizing (though nothing hangs on this point).

Are things prior to concepts? Prior in what sense? Logically prior?? So how do you answer the question: is ‘thing’ a concept? Do you check the concept or do you check things?

Words don’t get to realities. Concepts don’t get to realities. The concept is shorthand.

What does get to realities then??

Consider the statement “Here is a chair.” Is this true because some thing has the property of chairness? No! It is true because there IS a thing that we conventionally call a chair. What is included in the concept of chair? Perhaps, being able to be sat in, being of a certain shape, etc. But is this concept contained within the chair? No indeed. It is contained in the idea of the builder, perhaps, but not in the chair.

I’m confused. I would say of course “being able to be sat in” is “contained within the chair” (i.e., properly characterizes the chair). You say “no indeed”?

Still, if someone should say that the chair has the “property of being a chair”, I would agree – for I take this as shorthand for “We call this thing a chair.” (This view is somewhat based on Wittgenstein).

I would ask why this person was making such a strange-sounding assertion (this is also based on Wittgenstein).

But what is a property, in itself? I agree with Kant that this is a step into the noumenal world, in which things exist and have a certain essence (and perhaps certain accidental qualities) we know nothing of.

I’m simply asking what is a property in this (phenomenal) world? What is “possession” of a property in this (phenomenal) world? And be sure not to create your own version of a noumenal world in answering these questions (if you are really determined not to go there)…

 

[Betterave]

I’m talking about the Greek atomists’ conception of atoms, not our modern conception. Perhaps we should give them a different name. We can call them “motas”.

So was I (although I don’t think it makes any difference.)

See, this is precisely what I think is impossible. Knowledge must have reference to the world. It cannot simply be implied by concepts (unless those concepts, such as “number”, clearly have counterparts in the world).

But the notions of divisibility and indivisibility also clearly have counterparts in the world.

You seem to have missed premise four. If we don’t say that there is a material world, then our definitions and premises are useless. You cannot claim the *existence *of something – such as “motas” – starting only from definitions!

Interesting. I didn’t miss it, I interpreted it in light of premise one:

1. The physical world is made up of matter. (Trivially true – even if there is no such thing as a physical world).

I took you to state here that there is a PHENOMENAL physical world made up of matter, even if there is no such NOUMENAL thing. And clearly premise four refers to the PHENOMENAL world again, not the noumenal (that is, *if *you still don’t want to go there ).

No. The physical world could be real, and there could be no motas. But only if premise three is false.

Okay, but your premise three was false. As corrected, it is true - or so I claim; do you deny this? Please explain.

Concepts are never “consequences” of other concepts. Suppose I have the concepts of solidity, extension, shape, and color. These concepts could equally well be explained by a material object’s existence or the orchestrations of an omnipotent God. Neither hypothesis is entailed by the other concepts.

Which does not prove your point. What do you think of this suggestion: The concept of “God’s orchestrations” is what causes your concept of “the unascertainability of the material existence .”

I’d accept this, although I’m unclear on which definition of “form” is meant. Platonic?

More like Aristotelian.

But there are many possible structures of a possible physical world, and we don’t know what they are. Perhaps a physical world is possible without atoms. I don’t know.

Well why don’t you know? It can only be because you have no clear idea of the meaning of ‘physical world.’ You might as well say, perhaps a physical world is possible that is not amenable to something like my a priori forms of intuition. IOW, I think you’re just talking about the possibility of a noumenal world that is different from the phenomenal world.

Doesn’t this rely on the premise that “If God did not exist, then nothing would exist”? If so, this is an appeal to the *cosmological *argument. (Personally, I like such an appeal, since I think the ontological argument can’t stand on its own).

How so? (Personally, I suspect that cosmological arguments are all just variations of the ontological argument.)

 

[Betterave]

2.) Would you say rather, that “’‘Matter’ should be defined as that which is a subject of motion, and generally consists of uniformly (consistent) individual sensible material.” Whenever we divide matter into smaller pieces than its atom, then we are destroying that particular matter. But, we can divide matter without destroying it, except not actually physically, but by abstraction. Hmmm. . . conceptually.​

I think I agree with PunkFC’s comment on this. But yes on your last thought.

Within conceptual reason. Considering physical reality to be on common grounds with mathematical abstraction, is problematic - don’t you think?

To say that something is divisible simpliciter is never to say that I know how it can be physically divided. So no, I don’t think so.

But wouldn’t this only be true if somehow mobile being(s) existed.

My comment is based on the distinction between phenomenal and noumenal (as mentioned in my reply to Prodigal).

This is very interesting. Don’t you think that the concept of the atom is derivative of dividing things into smaller and smaller bits of itself?

Yes, sort of: not literally from dividing things, but from the concept of dividing things and the concept of not being able to do so at some point.

This would be normally known as “abstraction,” wouldn’t it?

Yes, it seems that way to me.

 

[AntiTheist]

That’s exactly right! How, then, can we create whole-cloth something brand new? God was not a compound to our early ancestors. Nor, to Anselm. How then do we have a conception of God when we have never seen, witnessed, sensed, or read anything that might give a hint about Him? All of a sudden, God appeared to early man. And, it’s not enough - besides I am tired of the balogna comparisons with lightening and unexplainable physical phenomena. There is no other concept like the concept of God. None. Tell me one.

Primitive man see tools. Man make those tools. Primitive man see great sky. Primitive man imagine big man who make great sky.

Primitive man have some knowledge. Primitive man can imagine a man who knows everything. Primitive man attribute all knowing to big man who make great sky.

Primitive man have a social concept he call goodness. Primitive man live up to this concept some of the time. Primitive man can imagine a man who live up to this concept all the time. Primitive man attribute all goodness to big man who make great sky.

Primitive man have physical location. Primitive man is limited by only one location at a time. Primitive man imagine man who is not so limited. Primitive man imagine a man who can be everywhere. Primitive man attribute omnipresence to big man who make great sky.

Primitive man have location in time. Primitive man is limited by only one location at a time. Primitive man imagine man who is not so limited. Primitive man imagine a man who beyond time. Primitive man attribute timelessness to big man who make great sky.

It’s really that simple. Add to that thousands upon thousands of years of idle imaginings and “sophisticated” arguments (like the real whopper in the OP of this thread), and you get people wondering where the concept of god came from, as if it’s unfathomable that human beings sitting around looking at the vast universe would never have ever dreamed up such an idea themselves.

 

[Betterave]

Primitive man see tools. Man make those tools. Primitive man see great sky. Primitive man imagine big man who make great sky.

Primitive man have some knowledge. Primitive man can imagine a man who knows everything. Primitive man attribute all knowing to big man who make great sky.

Primitive man have a social concept he call goodness. Primitive man live up to this concept some of the time. Primitive man can imagine a man who live up to this concept all the time. Primitive man attribute all goodness to big man who make great sky.

Primitive man have physical location. Primitive man is limited by only one location at a time. Primitive man imagine man who is not so limited. Primitive man imagine a man who can be everywhere. Primitive man attribute omnipresence to big man who make great sky.

Primitive man have location in time. Primitive man is limited by only one location at a time. Primitive man imagine man who is not so limited. Primitive man imagine a man who beyond time. Primitive man attribute timelessness to big man who make great sky.

It’s really that simple. Add to that thousands upon thousands of years of idle imaginings and “sophisticated” arguments (like the real whopper in the OP of this thread), and you get people wondering where the concept of god came from, as if it’s unfathomable that human beings sitting around looking at the vast universe would never have ever dreamed up such an idea themselves.

In other words (ignoring the idle question-begging): primitive man too had the native human intelligence to be able to conceive of God? “For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. His eternal power also and divinity: so that they are inexcusable” (Romans 1, 20).

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Are things prior to concepts? Prior in what sense? Logically prior?? So how do you answer the question: is ‘thing’ a concept? Do you check the concept or do you check things?

Things are logically prior to concepts. Without the thing, the concept cannot be. (Or rather, without the “raw materials” of things, no concept can be formed. Hence the concept of unicorn, which is combined from other concepts).

“Thing” is a concept, and what’s more a vague concept. Unless we simply say that things are self-identical. (x)x=x. (All x, such that x=x.) But aren’t we implicitly defining “x” as a thing, and thus making the definition circular?

What does get to realities then??

Words are descriptions of reality. But descriptions are nothing like the realities themselves! Ideally, words trigger certain experiences, and these experiences are some dull, distorted version of reality. Our communication is “through a glass, darkly” – why should we say that the words get to realities, then? (Doubtless, the words get to our perceptions of realities – what you call the “phenomenal”, I suppose).

This is all why Jesus is the Word made flesh – to get us to reality. But then, even if we get there, how do we communicate this Word to those who know it not? This is like the problem of Plato’s philosopher-kings, keen to contemplate the Forms. How can they put into words what they have seen?

I’m confused. I would say of course “being able to be sat in” is “contained within the chair” (i.e., properly characterizes the chair). You say “no indeed”?

I think that “sittings” are logically prior to potentialities of sittings. Thus, if you don’t have anyone who sits – thus introducing the concept of sitting – you cannot have anything that is (in itself) able to be sat in. Thus, it is accurate for us (who sit) to say that it is able to be sat in. But consider that same object (the chair) in a world without sittings!

I would ask why this person was making such a strange-sounding assertion (this is also based on Wittgenstein).

I’m simply asking what is a property in this (phenomenal) world? What is “possession” of a property in this (phenomenal) world? And be sure not to create your own version of a noumenal world in answering these questions (if you are really determined not to go there)…

There are no properties in a phenomenal world, only concepts one seeks to apply to the noumenal world. To say that there are properties in a phenomenal world seems equivalent, to me, to saying that there are “subjective truths”.

I suppose I overstated when I said we know nothing of properties in the noumenal (real) world. I would say (with Kant, I think) that we have to assume certain things of the noumenal world: that there are objects, that our beliefs are causally related to those objects, that we have some level of freedom, etc. I also think that we know that other people are “like us”, in some general way, and that other people are not objects. There may be other kinds of properties we know of, which are not merely our concepts.

 

[Ignatias20]

"Ontology recapitulates Phylogeny"

The above statement come from university training. Simply it means the development of one living indevidual from fertilized egg all the way to adulthood goes through the stages of development that that the Phylum to which that individual belong went through.

Will someone tell me if in the title of this thread, “Ontological Argument” the word
“Ontology” is used with the meaning that I just wrote?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

But the notions of divisibility and indivisibility also clearly have counterparts in the world.

OK, let’s rewind here. You said that “Atoms are divisible, speaking absolutely; it is only a matter of contingent fact that they cannot be divided.” But I am taking “atom” to MEAN “a thing which composes matter, and is indivisible”. I wouldn’t call it an atom if it were divisible. (Compare with JDaniel’s point that properties are determinants, which tell us what to look for).

Thus, an atom is not divisible. It may be that there are no atoms, but it cannot be that something that “counts” as an atom could be divided (not even by God). Dividing something indivisible is a contradiction.

Interesting. I didn’t miss it, I interpreted it in light of premise one:

1. The physical world is made up of matter. (Trivially true – even if there is no such thing as a physical world).

I took you to state here that there is a PHENOMENAL physical world made up of matter, even if there is no such NOUMENAL thing. And clearly premise four refers to the PHENOMENAL world again, not the noumenal (that is, *if *you still don’t want to go there ).

I meant premise one as a definition. “Physical world = world made of matter”. If there is no matter, there is no world.

Then, premise 4 states that “Material things exist”. This is somewhat controversial, I agree, but it is perhaps a necessary postulate of belief. Like Berkeley, I am tempted to disagree with premise 4. Nevertheless, **if **we have any ability to understand – and we must assume that we do! – then **something **explains our perceptions. So perhaps we should try another argument.

1a. The mental world is composed of concepts (among other things).
2a. Concepts cannot exist independently.
3a. If there were no realities that “composed” a concept, then the concept wouldn’t exist.
4a. Concepts exist.
5a. There are realities that compose every concept.

This is what both you and AntiTheist seem to have in mind, though you come to different conclusions from the argument. But, once again, it’s the third premise that creates problems. Since it does not stipulate that the realities must be *similar to *the concept (nor do we have any non-question-begging reasons to believe this), the argument fails to show that our concepts are concepts OF any thing.

Which does not prove your point. What do you think of this suggestion: The concept of “God’s orchestrations” is what causes your concept of “the unascertainability of the material existence .”

I don’t have a concept of the unascertainability of material existence. I just don’t think we can tell whether properly material objects exist. This isn’t a “conceptualizing”, but a “thinking” (doxa). It is (I hope) the logical consequence of other beliefs that I have.

Well why don’t you know? It can only be because you have no clear idea of the meaning of ‘physical world.’

I’ll admit to that. I think.

How so? (Personally, I suspect that cosmological arguments are all just variations of the ontological argument.)

I think I misunderstood. On a second reading, this is what I can make of your statement: if we are to say it is possible for God to exist, then God must exist. If this is what you mean, then I agree. But how do we know that it is possible for God to exist?

(Unless, as it were, He says hi. Which, lucky for us, He did.)

 

[Betterave]

"Ontology recapitulates Phylogeny"

The above statement come from university training. Simply it means the development of one living indevidual from fertilized egg all the way to adulthood goes through the stages of development that that the Phylum to which that individual belong went through.

Will someone tell me if in the title of this thread, “Ontological Argument” the word
“Ontology” is used with the meaning that I just wrote?

No, that’s a very different use of the word.
(And I think it’s actually supposed to be “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.”)

 

[Betterave]

Let’s just take one thing at a time here:

Things are logically prior to concepts. Without the thing, the concept cannot be. (Or rather, without the “raw materials” of things, no concept can be formed. Hence the concept of unicorn, which is combined from other concepts).

Without the thing [God] the concept ‘God’] cannot be? …Wait a minute! Wasn’t that what you were arguing against?

So take ‘unicorn.’ ‘Unicorn’ is derived from what raw materials? (A horse and a narwhal?) The notion of ‘derived from raw unicorn materials’ is derived from what raw materials?

“Thing” is a concept, and what’s more a vague concept. Unless we simply say that things are self-identical. (x)x=x. (All x, such that x=x.) But aren’t we implicitly defining “x” as a thing, and thus making the definition circular?

Aren’t all definitions ‘circular’? But not all circularity is vicious. If it were, we would all have to be skeptics.

 

[Ignatias20]

In post 67 I spelled the term the very same way that it was spelled by the thread starter in post 1.

Someone stated, "No, that’s a very different use of the word.
(And I think it’s actually supposed to be “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.”)

I agree that it should be ontogEny and not ontology when used in Embryology or Taxonomy.

But here the thread starter was esoterically using that unrational exemplification of a falsehood.

Hey college football starts in three weeks.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Let’s just take one thing at a time here:

Without the thing [God] the concept ‘God’] cannot be? …Wait a minute! Wasn’t that what you were arguing against?

You know that I mean “raw materials” when I said “thing”.

So take ‘unicorn.’ ‘Unicorn’ is derived from what raw materials? (A horse and a narwhal?) The notion of ‘derived from raw unicorn materials’ is derived from what raw materials?

A horse + a flying thing + a horn + some other things = a unicorn. What’s the competing option? Do we perceive the unicorn in the world of forms? Did God make us with the idea of unicorns? Do unicorns actually exist?

Aren’t all definitions ‘circular’? But not all circularity is vicious. If it were, we would all have to be skeptics.

Yes, but some definitions are informative. “Thing” = (x) x=x is not informative.

 

[Betterave]

You know that I mean “raw materials” when I said “thing”.

It was a joke, but I actually didn’t know that ‘raw materials’ was supposed to mean ‘thing.’ I think this is not at all a clear use of terms. Do you disagree?

A horse + a flying thing + a horn + some other things = a unicorn. What’s the competing option? Do we perceive the unicorn in the world of forms? Did God make us with the idea of unicorns? Do unicorns actually exist?

In a sense, they do exist. But let’s not dwell on that; you’re missing what I suspect is the more important question: The notion of ‘derived from raw unicorn materials’ is derived from what ‘raw materials’?

Yes, but some definitions are informative. “Thing” = (x) x=x is not informative.

I disagree. I suppose I must ask what you mean by ‘informative.’

 

[stenlis]

1. The concept of God is the concept of an absolutely perfect being, i.e., that than which nothing greater is possible.
2. Existence is a perfection, i.e., a “great making” property: it is greater to exist than not to exist.
3. Because existence is a perfection, i.e., a “great making” property, if God didn’t exist in reality (but only in the understanding), then it would be possible for there to be something even greater than God, i.e., with all of God’s qualities plus existence. But this is impossible, given the definition of God.
4. So the concept of God is the concept of an existent being.
5. Therefore, God exists.

1. The concept of a green leprechaun is of a small magical man with a naturally green color
2. Greenness is i physical property
3. Because greenness is a physical property a thing has to exist in order to be green
4. So the concept must be of en existent being
5. Therefore green leprechauns exist.

 

[Betterave]

1. The concept of a green leprechaun is of a small magical man with a naturally green color
2. Greenness is i physical property
3. Because greenness is a physical property a thing has to exist in order to be green
4. So the concept must be of en existent being
5. Therefore green leprechauns exist.

There’s a cute variation. Here’s my assessment:

1. The concept of a green leprechaun is of a small magical man with a naturally green color (okay)
2. Greenness is a physical property (okay)
3. Greenness is a physical property, so a thing has to physically exist in order to be physically green (i.e., to instantiate the physical property of greenness)
4. So the concept must be of en existent being (though not necessarily a physically existent being)
5. Therefore green leprechauns exist (though obviously not necessarily physically)

 

[Betterave]

It was a joke, but I actually didn’t know that ‘raw materials’ was supposed to mean ‘thing.’ I think this is not at all a clear use of terms. Do you disagree?

To emphasize this point, referring to the context of your original remark:

Originally Posted by Prodigal_Son
Things are logically prior to concepts. Without the thing, the concept cannot be. (Or rather, without the “raw materials” of things, no concept can be formed. Hence the concept of unicorn, which is combined from other concepts).

…here you would appear to refer to the “things” of things…

 

[stenlis]

There’s a cute variation. Here’s my assessment:

1. The concept of a green leprechaun is of a small magical man with a naturally green color (okay)
2. Greenness is a physical property (okay)
3. Greenness is a physical property, so a thing has to physically exist in order to be physically green (i.e., to instantiate the physical property of greenness)
4. So the concept must be of en existent being (though not necessarily a physically existent being)
5. Therefore green leprechauns exist (though obviously not necessarily physically)

Excellent - now think similarly about the original argument.

A green leprechaun would be physically green if it physically existed. < = > An existing god would be greater then a conceptual one if such a thing as an existing god was real.

Or look at it this way:

If god does not exist in reality then ‘the greatest being possible’ is the conceptual one.

 

[Betterave]

Excellent - now think similarly about the original argument.

A green leprechaun would be physically green if it physically existed. < = > An existing god would be greater then a conceptual one if such a thing as an existing god was real.

Or look at it this way:

If god does not exist in reality then ‘the greatest being possible’ is the conceptual one.

With minor modifications , I think you’ve got it:

An existing god would be greater then a merely conceptual one, if such a thing as an existing god was real. [And how could an existing God NOT be real??]

If God did not exist in reality, then ‘the greatest being possible’ would be merely conceptual. The consequent is absurd. Therefore God does exist in reality.

 

[stenlis]

If God did not exist in reality, then ‘the greatest being possible’ would be merely conceptual. The consequent is absurd.

It’s only absurd for you because you believe in the existence of god to begin with.

You say, (or the ontoillogical argument does) that existing god would be greater then a merely conceptual one.

Sure. Just demonstrate that god exists and I’ll grant you that it is greater then the conceptual god. Otherwise you are just treading water.

 

[Betterave]

It’s only absurd for you because you believe in the existence of god to begin with.

No, you’ve quite missed the point of the ontological argument. It is absurd because of the nature of the concept itself, not because I believe in the existence of God to begin with.