Original Sin and Death

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I’m not sure just which part from the Summa you don’t understand. If you can quote the part, or give the reference so I can look it up, that would help.

To address “death” in it’s spiritual/supernatural sense:
Essentially, being born in the “state of original sin” means being born without the supernatural life of grace (sanctifying grace) in our souls. When God created Adam and Eve, He infused this supernatural gift of life into their natural souls. It was always an added gift - not a part of what constitutes human nature. When Adam sinned, He lost/forfeited this gift - not only for himself, but for all his descendants as they would be conceived and born. Thus we are born in the “state of original sin” - we are born without sanctifying grace in our souls. At Baptism this life of grace is infused into our souls. That is why we say Baptism removes original sin.

(Jesus, being God Himself, the fountain of supernatural life, is of course an exception to being born without sanctifying grace. Mary is the other exception in that at the moment of her conception God infused her soul with the life of sanctifying grace.)
From the Summa:

Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men born of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch as they have one common nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as in civil matters, all who are members of one community are reputed as one body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says (Praedic., De Specie) that “by sharing the same species, many men are one man.” Accordingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so many members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body, of the hand for instance, is voluntary not by the will of that hand, but by the will of the soul, the first mover of the members. Wherefore a murder which the hand commits would not be imputed as a sin to the hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it as something belonging to man and moved by man’s first moving principle. In this way, then, the disorder which is in this man born of Adam, is voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of his first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate from him, even as the soul’s will moves all the members to their actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first parent to his descendants is called “original,” just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily members is called “actual.” And just as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the body, is not the sin of that member, except inasmuch as that member is a part of the man, for which reason it is called a “human sin”; so original sin is not the sin of this person, except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from his first parent, for which reason it is called the “sin of nature,” according to Ephesians 2:3: “We . . . were by nature children of wrath.”

So how is it that we are like members of a body which Adam heads?
 
From the Summa:

Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men born of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch as they have one common nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as in civil matters, all who are members of one community are reputed as one body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says (Praedic., De Specie) that “by sharing the same species, many men are one man.” Accordingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so many members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body, of the hand for instance, is voluntary not by the will of that hand, but by the will of the soul, the first mover of the members. Wherefore a murder which the hand commits would not be imputed as a sin to the hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it as something belonging to man and moved by man’s first moving principle. In this way, then, the disorder which is in this man born of Adam, is voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of his first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate from him, even as the soul’s will moves all the members to their actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first parent to his descendants is called “original,” just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily members is called “actual.” And just as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the body, is not the sin of that member, except inasmuch as that member is a part of the man, for which reason it is called a “human sin”; so original sin is not the sin of this person, except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from his first parent, for which reason it is called the “sin of nature,” according to Ephesians 2:3: “We . . . were by nature children of wrath.”

So how is it that we are like members of a body which Adam heads?
We are like members of a body headed by Adam because the source or origin of our fallen/wounded human nature can be traced back to Adam as its cause. Adam voluntarily chose to disobey God and forfeit life - to experience death in his human nature; death in his human body and soul. (Gen. 2:17 …you will die.)
*

The sin Adam (and Eve) committed had consequences on his/their human nature. It was in their fallen nature that procreation began. Thus it was their fallen human nature that was passed on and received by their descendants — received prior to any voluntary sin on the part of us descendants. It is because we share the same fallen nature caused by Adam’s sin that he is considered the head of this “body” that suffers the consequences of his sin.

I don’t know if anything I said helps. It seems to me that I’m doing nothing more than repeating what Aquinas said. But I don’t know how else to verbalize it.

For those interested, here is a link to the Summa text cited:
newadvent.org/summa/2081.htm*
 
We are like members of a body headed by Adam because the source or origin of our fallen/wounded human nature can be traced back to Adam as its cause. Adam voluntarily chose to disobey God and forfeit life - to experience death in his human nature; death in his human body and soul. (Gen. 2:17 …you will die.)
*

The sin Adam (and Eve) committed had consequences on his/their human nature. It was in their fallen nature that procreation began. Thus it was their fallen human nature that was passed on and received by their descendants — received prior to any voluntary sin on the part of us descendants. It is because we share the same fallen nature caused by Adam’s sin that he is considered the head of this “body” that suffers the consequences of his sin.

I don’t know if anything I said helps. It seems to me that I’m doing nothing more than repeating what Aquinas said. But I don’t know how else to verbalize it.

For those interested, here is a link to the Summa text cited:
newadvent.org/summa/2081.htm*

But if that is true, then how does he being our head equate to us bearing an indirect voluntary responsibility for original sin?
 
Firstly, Adam & Eve did not actually exist

Secondly, even if they did exist, physical death existed long before humans came on the scene.

Which makes the fact that death still exists despite Christ’s death & resurrection not surprising in the least.
 
But if that is true, then how does he being our head equate to us bearing an indirect voluntary responsibility for original sin?
Aquinas does not use the word “responsibility” in describing how original sin can be said to be indirectly voluntary in us. (“Reponsible” means to be the primary cause; Adam was the primary cause.)

It is voluntary in us in the sense that there is only one human species - the one present in Adam. It was the species present and involved in the first voluntary sin committed by him personally in the Garden of Eden. We have his human species (present when he voluntarily sinned) because it is the species of the parents that is passed through generation. It is through the “species” that we can be said to be “one man” [Indeed Porphyry says (Praedic., De Specie) that “by sharing the same species, many men are one man.”] ** It is “voluntary” in us, not because it is willed by us, but only in the sense that it was willed by the one who is the generative source of the species present in us. **

A couple of excerpts from the next article in Q. 81 that might help in distinguishing between “nature” and “individual/person”:
Part I-II Q.81 Article 2
The reason is that a man begets his like in species but not in individual. Consequently** those things that pertain directly to the individual, such as personal actions **and matters affecting them, **are not transmitted by parents **to their children: … On the other hand, those things that concern the nature of the species, are transmitted by parents to their children, …
…
… In this way original justice, as stated in the I, 100, 1, was a gift of grace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This gift the first man lost by his first sin. Wherefore as that original justice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder. Other actual sins, however, whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as the nature of that person, i.e. in respect of the proneness to sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted.
 
Re your “I prefer…”:
Here is what the Catholic Church teaches regarding physical death:
CCC #1008 Death is a consequence of sin. The Church’s Magisterium, as authentic inter0reter of the affirmation of Scripture and Tradition, teaches that death entered the world on account of man’s sin. Even though man’s nature is mortal, God had destined him not to die. Death was therefore contrary to the plans of God the Creator and entered the world as a consequence of Sin. ** “Bodily death, from which man would have been immune had he not sinned”** is thus "the last enemy"of man left to be conquered.
Well you got me here:D. However, suffering can still help us to grow closer to God and to be better people. I think that fall or not there would be suffering but it would either be not as extreme as today, or we would be willing and would accept this suffering making it even better.
And someone asked for a reference to where Agustine states this so Agustine says in The literal Interpretation of Genesis
We should not jump to the conclusion that it was only then that these plants came forth from the earth. For it could be that, in view of the many advantages found in different kinds of seeds, these plants had a place on earth without afflicting man in any way. But since they were growing in the fields in which man was now laboring in punishment for his sin, it is reasonable to suppose that they became one of the means of punishing him. For they might have grown elsewhere, for the nourishment of birds and beasts, or even for the use of man. Now this interpretation does not contradict what is said in the words, Thorns and thistler shall it bring forth to you if we understand that earth in producing them before the fall did not do so to afflict man but rather to provide proper nourishment for certain animals, since some animals find soft dry thistles a pleasant and nourishing food… I do not mean that these plants once grew in other places and only afterwards in the fields where man planted and harvested his crops. They were in the same place before and after; formerly not for man, after- wards for man. And this is what is meant by the words to you. (p. 94)
He also says
He was mortal … by the constitution of his natural body, and he was immortal by the gift of his Creator. For if it was a natural body he had, it was certainly mortal because it was able to die, at the same time immortal by reason of the fact that it was able not to die. Only a spiritual being is immortal by virtue of the fact that it cannot possibly die; and this condition is promised to us in the resurrection. Consequently, Adam’s body, a natural and therefore mortal body, which by justification would become spiritual and therefore truly immortal, in reality by sin was made not mortal (because it was that already) but rather a dead thing, which it would have been able not to be if Adam had not sinned. (pp. 204-205)
He is essentially saying that our bodies are mortal but God may preserve them from death making them technically immortal but because we sinned we lost what God would have given us because we spiritually died making us what we physically are, mortal.

I think a good way to think about it is that God would probably have treated us as he did Elijah, Enoch, and Mary. Although they were mortal (and the catechism up there says "even though man’s nature is mortal) they were brought up to heaven without dying. And they would all experience suffering in their lives, with or without original sin.
 
Aquinas does not use the word “responsibility” in describing how original sin can be said to be indirectly voluntary in us. (“Reponsible” means to be the primary cause; Adam was the primary cause.)

It is voluntary in us in the sense that there is only one human species - the one present in Adam. It was the species present and involved in the first voluntary sin committed by him personally in the Garden of Eden. We have his human species (present when he voluntarily sinned) because it is the species of the parents that is passed through generation. It is through the “species” that we can be said to be “one man” [Indeed Porphyry says (Praedic., De Specie) that “by sharing the same species, many men are one man.”] ** It is “voluntary” in us, not because it is willed by us, but only in the sense that it was willed by the one who is the generative source of the species present in us. **

A couple of excerpts from the next article in Q. 81 that might help in distinguishing between “nature” and “individual/person”:
Part I-II Q.81 Article 2
The reason is that a man begets his like in species but not in individual. Consequently** those things that pertain directly to the individual, such as personal actions **and matters affecting them, **are not transmitted by parents **to their children: … On the other hand, those things that concern the nature of the species, are transmitted by parents to their children, …
…
… In this way original justice, as stated in the I, 100, 1, was a gift of grace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This gift the first man lost by his first sin. Wherefore as that original justice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder. Other actual sins, however, whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as the nature of that person, i.e. in respect of the proneness to sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted.
Still we are being punished for original sin, so if we did not intend it directly, in what way did we intend it?

And in what way does sharing the same nature equal sharing the same volition -how does the equality of our nature’s with Adam’s make Adam’s sin our sin from the POV of the will?
 
…And someone asked for a reference to where Agustine states this so Agustine says in The literal Interpretation of Genesis
He also says He is essentially saying that our bodies are mortal but God may preserve them from death making them technically immortal but because we sinned we lost what God would have given us because we spiritually died making us what we physically are, mortal.
I was the one that asked for the reference. You had thought Augustine said we would die even if we had never sinned (Post #12 "While there’s nothing wrong in believing suffering is connected with original sin, personally, I follow a belief similar to Agustine’s (I think). Essentially, the belief is that whether we had sinned in the beginning or not, we would die, we would get sick, there would be suffering, and the world would be filled with earthquakes and the like.) As you can see from the quotes you provided, Augustine does not say we would have died, suffered, etc. even if Adam had not sinned.
… Although they were mortal (and the catechism up there says "even though man’s nature is mortal) …
Yes, our human nature has always been mortal – had the potential for dying.
 
I was the one that asked for the reference. You had thought Augustine said we would die even if we had never sinned (Post #12 "While there’s nothing wrong in believing suffering is connected with original sin, personally, I follow a belief similar to Agustine’s (I think). Essentially, the belief is that whether we had sinned in the beginning or not, we would die, we would get sick, there would be suffering, and the world would be filled with earthquakes and the like.) As you can see from the quotes you provided, Augustine does not say we would have died, suffered, etc. even if Adam had not sinned.

Yes, our human nature has always been mortal – had the potential for dying.
Yeah it appears I may have been wrong when I said we would die no matter what. I should have said (as I believe now) that no matter whether we sinned or not we would be mortal and be able to suffer (as suffering outside of childbirth and in farming wasn’t perscribed in Genesis. Suffering is also a good and honorable thing to do for what greater love is there than to die for ones friends. To sacrifice and suffer is a great form of love that we would be at least be given the possibility to partake in.) But this is only if Genesis is literally right in all ways. Evidence from the fossil record would say that there was death for a long time before humans but thats beyond the point in this discussion so, I’m sorry for anything that I was mistaken about and anything I wasn’t clear about.
 
Still we are being punished for original sin, so if we did not intend it directly, in what way did we intend it?
We didn’t “intend” it. “Intend” would involve a personal choice. We did not exist yet as individuals - as individual persons.
I’m not sure how to help you grasp that “human nature” is not the same as an actual individual person. Individual persons “intend”; human nature does not.
And in what way does sharing the same nature equal sharing the same volition -how does the equality of our nature’s with Adam’s make Adam’s sin our sin from the POV of the will?
{Volition: the act of willing, choosing, or resolving; exercise of willing; a choice or decision made by the will; the power of willing; will.}

We do not share the same volition as Adam.
Adam freely chose to sin and thus, thru that act of volition was guilty of a personal sin. We did not share in his choice and we do not share his personal guilt. But we do “share” the consequences that resulted in his human nature from that sin. His human nature is our human nature; it has been passed on to us through procreation. We do not have a different nature from Adam.

It is as the Catechism says:
CCC#404 By yielding to the tempter, Adam and Eve committed a personal sin, but this sin affected *the human nature *that they would then transmit in a fallen state., It is a sin which will be transmitted by propagation to all mankind, that is, by the transmission of a human nature deprived of original holiness and justice. And that is why original sinb is called “sin” only in an analogical sense: it is a sin “contracted” and not “committed” - a state and not an act.,

I’m wondering if perhaps it’s Aquinas’ use of the word “voluntary” that is causing the problem. In our ordinary usage, “voluntary” does involve personally choosing. But you have to disregard that ordinary definition because he clarifies that he does not mean voluntary in the sense of personally choosing.
Quote from Q.81 "In this way then, the disorder which is in this man born of Adam, is voluntary, NOT BY HIS WILL, but by the will of his first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate from him, …

I think the Catechism, especially paragraphs #404 and #405 are less confusing - at least for those of us who are not as schooled in theology and Aristotelian philosophy as Aquinas was. 🙂
vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P1C.HTM
An important sentence in CCC #404: “Still, the transmission of original sin is a mystery that we cannot fully understand.”
 
… Suffering is also a good and honorable thing to do for what greater love is there than to die for ones friends. To sacrifice and suffer is a great form of love that we would be at least be given the possibility to partake in…
You are so right. I feel bad when I realize there are so many who do not know the value of suffering; how it can be offered up for the salvation of souls. As Jesus said, “Take up your cross and follow Me.”
 
We didn’t “intend” it. “Intend” would involve a personal choice. We did not exist yet as individuals - as individual persons.
I’m not sure how to help you grasp that “human nature” is not the same as an actual individual person. Individual persons “intend”; human nature does not.

{Volition: the act of willing, choosing, or resolving; exercise of willing; a choice or decision made by the will; the power of willing; will.}

We do not share the same volition as Adam.
Adam freely chose to sin and thus, thru that act of volition was guilty of a personal sin. We did not share in his choice and we do not share his personal guilt. But we do “share” the consequences that resulted in his human nature from that sin. His human nature is our human nature; it has been passed on to us through procreation. We do not have a different nature from Adam.

It is as the Catechism says:
CCC#404 By yielding to the tempter, Adam and Eve committed a personal sin, but this sin affected *the human nature *that they would then transmit in a fallen state., It is a sin which will be transmitted by propagation to all mankind, that is, by the transmission of a human nature deprived of original holiness and justice. And that is why original sinb is called “sin” only in an analogical sense: it is a sin “contracted” and not “committed” - a state and not an act.,

I’m wondering if perhaps it’s Aquinas’ use of the word “voluntary” that is causing the problem. In our ordinary usage, “voluntary” does involve personally choosing. But you have to disregard that ordinary definition because he clarifies that he does not mean voluntary in the sense of personally choosing.
Quote from Q.81 "In this way then, the disorder which is in this man born of Adam, is voluntary, NOT BY HIS WILL, but by the will of his first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate from him, …

I think the Catechism, especially paragraphs #404 and #405 are less confusing - at least for those of us who are not as schooled in theology and Aristotelian philosophy as Aquinas was. 🙂
vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P1C.HTM
An important sentence in CCC #404: “Still, the transmission of original sin is a mystery that we cannot fully understand.”
Then how can we be punished for original sin if we didn’t intend it in any sense?

What I wanted to get at, is that there was some sense in which we did intend original sin, since a sin must be sin if and only if it is voluntary. But since it is not contracted freely, then we should not be punished yet we are. Indeed, so much is admitted by Aquinas when he says that one is not punished for inheriting a defect, but one is pitied. Yet, as I wrote, we are punished.
 
Then how can we be punished for original sin if we didn’t intend it in any sense?
God does not punish us for any willed participation in Adam’s sin. We are included in the consequences (not the personal guilt) that resulted.

I’ll try to give a sense in which we are part of Adam, one “body” with him. When God decided to create human beings, He said “Let us create man”. “Man” here is a reference to the human race - not just one individual, His vision, you might say, of what He was creating was the whole human race. He placed in the human nature He created for Adam, the “seed” for all subsequent humans, (Adam understood this - “Multiply and fill the earth.”) Adam was the head/source/origin of all subsequent beings born with a human nature. And because of this, it was not only his personal human nature that was present, but also ours. He made his choice as/knowing he was the head of the human race. That is the sense in which we were present in the Garden when he sinned.
So when Adam sinned, any consequences that affected human nature ended up being passed on to us. The guilt of personal sin, of personally disobeying God, did not get passed on to us. That sin was an act of volition on Adam’s part.
What I wanted to get at, is that there was some sense in which we did intend original sin, since a sin must be sin if and only if it is voluntary. But since it is not contracted freely, then we should not be punished yet we are. Indeed, so much is admitted by Aquinas when he says that one is not punished for inheriting a defect, but one is pitied. Yet, as I wrote, we are punished.
No, I don’t think you’ll find anywhere in Church teaching that all human persons in some way “intend” to commit original sin. We are not punished in the same way as Adam. Adam and Eve also had to suffer the consequences of a willed personal act of disobedience for that original/first sin. That is a guilt we do not share. (We have enough of our own!!:))

Have to quit and get ready for Church.
 
God does not punish us for any willed participation in Adam’s sin. We are included in the consequences (not the personal guilt) that resulted.

I’ll try to give a sense in which we are part of Adam, one “body” with him. When God decided to create human beings, He said “Let us create man”. “Man” here is a reference to the human race - not just one individual, His vision, you might say, of what He was creating was the whole human race. He placed in the human nature He created for Adam, the “seed” for all subsequent humans, (Adam understood this - “Multiply and fill the earth.”) Adam was the head/source/origin of all subsequent beings born with a human nature. And because of this, it was not only his personal human nature that was present, but also ours. He made his choice as/knowing he was the head of the human race. That is the sense in which we were present in the Garden when he sinned.
So when Adam sinned, any consequences that affected human nature ended up being passed on to us. The guilt of personal sin, of personally disobeying God, did not get passed on to us. That sin was an act of volition on Adam’s part.

No, I don’t think you’ll find anywhere in Church teaching that all human persons in some way “intend” to commit original sin. We are not punished in the same way as Adam. Adam and Eve also had to suffer the consequences of a willed personal act of disobedience for that original/first sin. That is a guilt we do not share. (We have enough of our own!!:))

Have to quit and get ready for Church.
God does punish us for original sin as it says in the Catholic encyclopedia: “Adam’s sin, therefore, is the sole cause of death for the entire human race.”

Then they show how it is voluntary in us:

“There can be no sin that is not voluntary, the learned and the ignorant admit this evident truth”, writes St. Augustine…Original sin is a state, a permanent privation, and this can be voluntary indirectly — just as a drunken man is deprived of his reason and incapable of using his liberty, yet it is by his free fault that he is in this state and hence his drunkenness, his privation of reason is voluntary and can be imputed to him.

But how can original sin be even indirectly voluntary for a child that has never used its personal free will? Certain Protestants hold that a child on coming to the use of reason will consent to its original sin; but in reality no one ever thought of giving this consent. Besides, even before the use of reason, sin is already in the soul, according to the data of Tradition regarding the baptism of children and the sin contracted by generation. The right solution is to be sought in the free will of Adam in his sin, and this free will was ours: “we were all in Adam”, says St. Ambrose, cited by St. Augustine (Opus imperf., IV, civ). St. Basil attributes to us the act of the first man: “Because we did not fast (when Adam ate the forbidden fruit) we have been turned out of the garden of Paradise” (Hom. i de jejun., iv). Earlier still is the testimony of St. Irenæus; “In the person of the first Adam we offend God, disobeying His precept” (Haeres., V, xvi, 3).

St. Thomas thus explains this moral unity of our will with the will of Adam.
Code:
"An individual can be considered either as an individual or as part of a whole, a member of a society . . . . Considered in the second way an act can be his although he has not done it himself, nor has it been done by his free will but by the rest of the society or by its head, the nation being considered as doing what the prince does. For a society is considered as a single man of whom the individuals are the different members (St. Paul, 1 Corinthians 12). Thus the multitude of men who receive their human nature from Adam is to be considered as a single community or rather as a single body . . . . If the man, whose privation of original justice is due to Adam, is considered as a private person, this privation is not his 'fault', for a fault is essentially voluntary. If, however, we consider him as a member of the family of Adam, as if all men were only one man, then his privation partakes of the nature of sin on account of its voluntary origin, which is the actual sin of Adam" (De Malo, iv, 1).
It is this law of solidarity, admitted by common sentiment, which attributes to children a part of the shame resulting from the father’s crime. It is not a personal crime, objected the Pelagians. “No”, answered St. Augustine, " but it is paternal crime" (Op. imperf., I, cxlviii). Being a distinct person I am not strictly responsible for the crime of another; the act is not mine. Yet, as a member of the human family, I am supposed to have acted with its head who represented it with regard to the conservation or the loss of grace. I am, therefore, responsible for my privation of grace, taking responsibility in the largest sense of the word. This, however, is enough to make the state of privation of grace in a certain degree voluntary, and, therefore, “without absurdity it may be said to be voluntary” (St. Augustine, “Retract.”, I, xiii).

now the question is, what is the evidence that demonstrates that the moral unity of wills so described, exists? Basically justify how a person can be held responsible for the fault of his father or family -it seems difficult to prove against the objection that “I didn’t do it personally”.
 
Then how can we be punished for original sin if we didn’t intend it in any sense?

What I wanted to get at, is that there was some sense in which we did intend original sin, since a sin must be sin if and only if it is voluntary. But since it is not contracted freely, then we should not be punished yet we are. Indeed, so much is admitted by Aquinas when he says that one is not punished for inheriting a defect, but one is pitied. Yet, as I wrote, we are punished.
When we are born in the state of original sin, we do not receive that state as a punishment for a sin we voluntarily committed. We receive it only because that state - a fallen nature - resulted from Adam’s sin. It was a judgement/punishment inflicted on Adam because of his personal guilt. We are born in that state only because God had designed from the first, that the nature present in Adam would be the nature handed on to those born from him. We are born in that state (original sin) only by “way of origin” - not as punishment for a willed participation in Adam’s sin.
As Aquinas states (again Q.81:
…nevertheless the fact of having a defect by way of origin (which is the way have a fallen nature seems to exclude the notion of guilt, which is essentially something voluntary. Wherefore granted that the rational soul were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on the child’s soul is not in its will, it would cease to be a guilty stain binding its subect to punishment;

Aquinas’ purpose therefore is attempting a rational explanation of how Adam’s descendants come to be born with his fallen nature – even tho they never committed the personal sin that deserved and was the cause of that punishment; even tho they never willed to be accomplices in any way; …
 
God does punish us for original sin as it says in the Catholic encyclopedia: “Adam’s sin, therefore, is the sole cause of death for the entire human race.”

Then they show how it is voluntary in us:

“There can be no sin that is not voluntary, the learned and the ignorant admit this evident truth”, writes St. Augustine…Original sin is a state, a permanent privation, and this can be voluntary indirectly — just as a drunken man is deprived of his reason and incapable of using his liberty, yet it is by his free fault that he is in this state and hence his drunkenness, his privation of reason is voluntary and can be imputed to him.

But how can original sin be even indirectly voluntary for a child that has never used its personal free will? Certain Protestants hold that a child on coming to the use of reason will consent to its original sin; but in reality no one ever thought of giving this consent. Besides, even before the use of reason, sin is already in the soul, according to the data of Tradition regarding the baptism of children and the sin contracted by generation. The right solution is to be sought in the free will of Adam in his sin, and this free will was ours: “we were all in Adam”, says St. Ambrose, cited by St. Augustine (Opus imperf., IV, civ). St. Basil attributes to us the act of the first man: “Because we did not fast (when Adam ate the forbidden fruit) we have been turned out of the garden of Paradise” (Hom. i de jejun., iv). Earlier still is the testimony of St. Irenæus; “In the person of the first Adam we offend God, disobeying His precept” (Haeres., V, xvi, 3).

St. Thomas thus explains this moral unity of our will with the will of Adam.

“An individual can be considered either as an individual or as part of a whole, a member of a society . . . . Considered in the second way an act can be his although he has not done it himself, nor has it been done by his free will but by the rest of the society or by its head, the nation being considered as doing what the prince does. For a society is considered as a single man of whom the individuals are the different members (St. Paul, 1 Corinthians 12). Thus the multitude of men who receive their human nature from Adam is to be considered as a single community or rather as a single body . . . . If the man, whose privation of original justice is due to Adam, is considered as a private person, this privation is not his ‘fault’, for a fault is essentially voluntary. If, however, we consider him as a member of the family of Adam, as if all men were only one man, then his privation partakes of the nature of sin on account of its voluntary origin, which is the actual sin of Adam” (De Malo, iv, 1).

It is this law of solidarity, admitted by common sentiment, which attributes to children a part of the shame resulting from the father’s crime. It is not a personal crime, objected the Pelagians. “No”, answered St. Augustine, " but it is paternal crime" (Op. imperf., I, cxlviii). Being a distinct person I am not strictly responsible for the crime of another; the act is not mine. Yet, as a member of the human family, I am supposed to have acted with its head who represented it with regard to the conservation or the loss of grace. I am, therefore, responsible for my privation of grace, taking responsibility in the largest sense of the word. This, however, is enough to make the state of privation of grace in a certain degree voluntary, and, therefore, “without absurdity it may be said to be voluntary” (St. Augustine, “Retract.”, I, xiii).

now the question is, what is the evidence that demonstrates that the moral unity of wills so described, exists? Basically justify how a person can be held responsible for the fault of his father or family -it seems difficult to prove against the objection that “I didn’t do it personally”.
Do you think there is a difference between “natural consequences” and “punishment”?

In the case of original sin the natural consequence was death, the punishment was banishment from the garden.

For us individually, original sin is a consequence, not a punishment. Although both consequences and punishment can involve suffering.
 
Then how can we be punished for original sin if we didn’t intend it in any sense?

What I wanted to get at, is that there was some sense in which we did intend original sin, since a sin must be sin if and only if it is voluntary. But since it is not contracted freely, then we should not be punished yet we are. Indeed, so much is admitted by Aquinas when he says that one is not punished for inheriting a defect, but one is pitied. Yet, as I wrote, we are punished.
I think you might prefer Cardinal Ratzingers relational model of original sin, which completely avoids these problems:
Code:
What does original sin mean, then, when we interpret it correctly?
Code:
     "Finding an answer to this requires nothing less than trying to understand the human person better. It must once again be stressed that no human being is closed in upon himself or herself and that no one can live of or for himself or herself alone.
We receive our life not only at the moment of birth but every day from without–from others who are not ourselves but who nonetheless somehow pertain to us. Human beings have their selves not only in themselves but also outside of themselves: they live in those whom they love and in those who love them and to whom they are ‘present.’ Human beings are relational, and they possess their lives–themselves–only by way of relationship. I alone am not myself, but only in and with you am I myself. To be truly a human being means to be related in love, to be of and for.
But sin means the damaging or the destruction of relationality. Sin is a rejection of relationality because it wants to make the human being a god. Sin is loss of relationship, disturbance of relationship, and therefore it is not restricted to the individual. When I destroy a relationship, then this event–sin–touches the other person involved in the relationship.
Consequently sin is always an offense that touches others, that alters the world and damages it. To the extent that this is true, when the network of human relationships is damaged from the very beginning, then every human being enters into a world that is marked by relational damage.
At the very moment that a person begins human existence, which is a good, he or she is confronted by a sin-damaged world. Each of us enters into a situation in which relationality has been hurt. Consequently each person is, from the very start, damaged in relationships and does not engage in them as he or she ought. Sin pursues the human being, and he or she capitulates to it."
–Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, ‘In the Beginning…’, pp. 71-73
 
Do you think there is a difference between “natural consequences” and “punishment”?

In the case of original sin the natural consequence was death, the punishment was banishment from the garden.

For us individually, original sin is a consequence, not a punishment. Although both consequences and punishment can involve suffering.
Then my question is, is there any punishment for our original sin, and are our deaths the punishment for our original sins?
 
Then my question is, is there any punishment for our original sin
Yes, Adam and Eve were banished from the garden
, and are our deaths the punishment for our original sins?
What are “our original sins”? The is only one original sin, that of Adam, all other sins are personal sins. Our punishment for these will be their natural consequences. Sometimes these punishments are administered by our parents, superiors, or law enforcement. The ultimate punishment might be our self-imposed exile from the kingdom of heaven.
 
Yes, Adam and Eve were banished from the garden

What are “our original sins”? The is only one original sin, that of Adam, all other sins are personal sins. Our punishment for these will be their natural consequences. Sometimes these punishments are administered by our parents, superiors, or law enforcement. The ultimate punishment might be our self-imposed exile from the kingdom of heaven.
Here I think you contradict Catholicism, for original sin is a punished for those unbaptized by the fact that they never see the face of God.

I’ve also looked back in the Catechism and it is pretty difficult to come to a conclusion based solely on the writings therein.

Perhaps you can point me to some authoritative document actually saying that original sin does not merit death? Or some document that says that original sin is explicitly not voluntary.

Still though, as was earlier written by me and by Aquinas, :"Wherefore granted that the rational soul were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on the child’s soul is not in its will, it would cease to be a guilty stain binding its subject to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5), “no one reproaches a man born blind; one rather takes pity on him.”

since this is a quote in connection with his discussion of original sin (newadvent.org/summa/2081.htm), then it seems that this authority implicitly believed that original sin merited death.
 
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