R
ribozyme
Guest
mfoundation.org/files/sens/HETHR-PP.pdfA pervasive reaction to the idea of extreme or indefinite postponement of human aging – one heard from many professional bioethicists and also from a high proportion of the general public – is that aging differs morally from other causes of debilitation and death in a manner that exempts us from the duty to combat it that we perceive as so self-evident in respect of those other causes. Precisely what characteristic of aging underpins this alleged distinction? I argue here that it is in fact a false distinction, perpetuated only by unwarranted psychological forces posing as philosophical arguments. In particular, I note that even an argument based ultimately on the currently unpopular meta-ethical concept of non-cognitivism cannot logically permit one to regard aging as a phenomenon that we can morally desist from combating to the best of our ability.
conclude that a cognitivism-agnostic line of reasoning, based on reflective equilibrium, offers the best chance for influencing hearts and minds on this issue in the near term.
Another paper:
mfoundation.org/files/sens/me11957.pdf
I found this paper from my favor “pro-life” scientist - Aubrey de Grey. He also talked about his goals of defeating aging at several “transhumanism” conferences. For example, here is an abstract at a transhuman conference called “Human Enhancement Technologies and Human Rights.”
ieet.org/index.php/IEET/HETHR_bios/degrey/Our Right to Life
Humanity has long demonstrated a paradoxical ambivalence concerning the extension of healthy human lifespan. Modest health extension has been universally sought, whereas extreme (even indefinite) health extension has been regarded as a snare and delusion—a dream beyond all others at first blush, but actually something we are better off without. In my talk I will consider whether our present caution concerning the wisdom of truly curing aging is likely to survive the increased scrutiny that it will receive in coming years as a result of biomedical advances. I will argue that it will not, because of its irreconcileability with values that are more deeply held by the large majority of humanity than any values that argue against the quest for a cure. Foremost among these is the view that humans have a right to live as long as they wish to. Once we realise this, our determination to consign human aging to history will be second only to our shame that we took so long to break out of our collective trance.
I wonder if it is more important to defeat aging than to fight abortion.