Hmm you’ve got me thinking about the Chain of Being now, but even though I take your point that it is a theological concept (even though, when I said scientific and compared it to geocentrism I meant something like “worldview”), it is not a theological doctrine nor a matter of morality, and so isn’t a province over which the Church has jurisdiction in the same sense as abortion or the divinity of Christ.
Could you enlighten me on the difference between a theological concept that has been taught by the church and theological doctrine? If there is a difference at all, is it a difference in kind or only degree?
I’m not sure if there has even been a clear, dogmatic stipulation that a person is ensouled from conception but there has been clear, dogmatic stipulation that all humans are ensouled. Now, what’s a soul? It isn’t something I have, like a heart or liver, but is rather the inextricable, non-material, life-giving and organising element of a living thing, as Aristotle wisely put it, the form of the body, and being human, we have human or rational souls. The conclusion is that any human being must, by definition, be ensouled. You cannot have an un-ensouled human being, or else they wouldn’t be human (e.g. a zombie). So we can ask: is the unborn a human being? Scientifically, though only in the early stages of development, the unborn, whether a foetus or zygote or whatever, is a human being. Therefore, the unborn must have soul.
I agree that the church makes a clear stipulation that people are ensouled, but I’m not so sure they’ve made a definitive statement about what exactly the soul is–and I’m even less certain that the function of the soul you and aristotle describe apply in this situation.
Don’t get me wrong, that quality of the soul–the animating principle, the organizing element–is certainly one of its qualities. However, That aspect of the soul is share by all living creatures, and is entirely physical. When I speak of attaining personhood when flesh is ensouled, I’m speaking strictly about when the flesh gains the spiritual, supernatural nature of the soul. Actually, a human’s “spirit” is probably a better word for what I’m considering here. I would say that it is when a person recieves his “spirit” that he truly becomes a person, distinct from any other living thing.
Now then, this spirit is not necessarily tied to humanity. God has the ability to put a human spirit into anything, or withold it from humans if he so chooses. it is not
necessarily tied to biological humanity. Thus, our spirits, the supernatural aspects of our souls, can come into existence at any arbitrary point in the development of a biological human being, from sentience, to birth, to baptism, to the development of a distinct personality.
Of course, If you assume that conception is the earliest possible point at which a person can be ensouled, then conception certainly stands out from the other points I mentioned. But this is by no means the case. A person could very well be ensouled before conception. As I’ve mentioned, conception is thought of as when there comes into existence a distinct
biological human being, with his own set of unique DNA. But DNA does not, by itself, make for a distinct human being. As I’ve mentioned, my father and his brother are identical twins. At the moment of their conception, they were the
same person, If you think that unique DNA is what causes God to bring about ensoulment. But when they split, their DNA ceased to be unique. Does this mean that that their soul cease to exist? Or does it mean that, at some basic level, They are still the same person?
However, I don’t even think we need to go that far. The Church clearly and dogmatically teaches that it is immoral to kill an innocent human being. Whether, for the same of argument, that human being is ensouled or not is by the by, it is still a human being, and so would be immoral to kill. Again, is the unborn a human being? Yes. Therefore, it would be immoral to kill him or her.
But the church obviously means here that it is wrong to kill an
ensouled human being.
After all, our omponent cells have human DNA. Some of them (certain stem cells) have the potential to become other human beings with the right conditions and sufficiently advanced technologies (cloning). And yet, we bear absolutely no moral culpability for killing them.
I might also add that if you specify
unique DNA, our mitochondria have a separate DNA code from us, but it is still human DNA.
I think I understood your argument, but I’m not convinced that your conclusions are valid just yet.
The philosophical basis behind the pro-life movement is different from the theological one, so not something the Church directly influences. I’d say the philosophical basis is one that recognises the inherent dignity and worth of human beings and contends that it is always wrong to kill an innocent human being. I’d say this basis is mostly from natural law, which is, after all the natural moral law. Science can give us facts about biology but not morality. Certainly, it’s connected with Church teaching but only in an indirect way. The pro-life movement is broader than simply Catholics (obviously meaning that it also involves non-Catholics and even non-Christians).
let me quickly stipulate that I think it is a natural moral law not to kill any
person, not necessarily a human being. The big sticky points in this whole issue are:
under what conditions can you classify an organism as a distinct biological human being, without those classifications being arbitrary?
and
Does ensoulment occur when there exists a distinct biological human being, or at some later (or earlier!) date?