Pascal's Wager Argument

  • Thread starter Thread starter Charlemagne_II
  • Start date Start date
Status
Not open for further replies.
Without knowing the context of that quote, we cannot be certain whether he was or was not a proponent.
Agreed.

Pascal was a mathematician, and a Catholic philosopher. This is the context in which his quote should be understood.
 
I don’t believe that Pascal ever professed that.

In fact, he is attributed with saying this: “Two errors: to exclude reason; to include only reason.”
This is a misquote - at least according to the site you’re quoting! It’s “2 extremes” - not “2 errors” - making it even more ambiguous…

Being such a big fan of the wager, I should actually read the guy really - some other quotes on the site indicate he may well be one of the warmer philosophers! 🙂
 
hecd2,

I hope you’re still around. Here are some replies to your comments. I might try to summarize my general view on its own in another post. But for now…
But you would be ready to accept that it’s ultimately acting as if p is true?
I meant to say that I’m not ready to reject the notion of belief as being simply a reliance on the truth of p without certainty in p’s truth, where “reliance” includes outward activity. Basically, mentally accepting p may just mean the choice of acting as if p is true regardless of knowing so, without being intellectually compelled. Belief may perhaps be characterized as the subject’s attempt to fill a perceived gap between truth and knowledge (in the attempt to attain the recognized potential benefits surrounding knowledge of some truth).

Re: religious faith, there are degrees of it. After all, faith is considered one of the highest virtues. This is obviously much more than simply the mental/verbal affirmation of theism.
To justify one’s axiom that one’s senses usually correspond to an external reality does not strike me as whimsical or based on blind faith…] I can’t think of anything less whimsical or with more concrete consequences than to deny that what our senses tell us usually corresponds to reality, and no-one could live for any significant time who acted on a contrary belief.
Sense-data is meaningless until it’s interpreted. The senses don’t judge that there’s a gap between internal and external, nor do they make any metaphysical commitments. Further, your justifications here are mostly pragmatic, so I don’t see the necessary truth-conducive aspect.

The EW correspondence axiom is whimsical and arbitrary unless one has established its preference as being rooted in something other than an undetermined free will. What makes the property of being preferred since birth non-arbitrary? Are your preferences themselves rationally based? But if they are, then perhaps your “axiom” is based in reason after all.
For me they look like demonstrations that decisions to act, based on our senses, get us through the world at all (hence the pragmatism), which would be impossible in the absence of some substantial degree of correspondence.
This sounds like rational justification to me. As such, it also still seems incomplete. You’d need to establish that practical impossibility has truth-conducive implications, for one. Plus, “getting through the world” is vague; it appeals to a standard of success, which would arguably be contingent on the truth of an external world. If radical solipsism is true, for instance, then could one “fail” in any sense? Perhaps there is no real value. This is what I mean when I say pragmatism presupposes a justified end. It’s impossible to judge whether anything “works” without assuming a worthy goal as the standard. But this standard would likely stand/fall according to the truth (or else to the whims of some non-rationally chosen standard).
Well, I don’t feel like I’m in a nightmare of nihilism, not for a second. I don’t see that fallibilism leads necessarily to nihilism. I’m pretty comfortable with where I am in my epistemic philosophy - it gives me what I need to underpin my epistemics which are frankly empirical and verificationist. … M]y response to radical solipsism is to laugh at it - like I laugh at Gosse’s Omphalos.
And Samuel Johnson “refuted” Berkeleyan idealism by kicking a stone. Though you may be justified, you haven’t p(name removed by moderator)ointed the source of that justification.
There is no choice in the EWW. In order to get through the world, all entities, including humans, that use sensory (name removed by moderator)uts to make decisions to act have to work in a system that axiomises the EWW. Sure, humans have more smarts, and so we don’t just act on our sensory (name removed by moderator)uts, but find patterns and conceptualise about underlying causes and so on to arrive at statements about the external reality, but the basis of all of this is the axiom. Because, what would life be like if we reject the EWW? It would be painful and short. External reality doesn’t care about our metaphysical pretensions, but will just get on with mangling us if we don’t pay it any attention. So in that sense this isn’t a wager like PW at all. In the one case you can present the argument to the agnostic, and she can say 'I hear you but I think your logic’s screwed up for this or that reason and I’m just going to go on living as though God doesn’t exist - I’m betting against". In the other case you don’t need to present an argument because there are no agnostics and no-one bets against - it’s not a wager at all because acting agnostically is just not a viable option. Those who choose it soon remove themselves from the scene.
I called the axiom weak, and so it is in the sense that it isn’t logically foundational, and because the correspondence on which it’s based is far from perfect. But in another sense it’s very strong because everyone is forced to accept it in how they act (even if they entertain themselves in student dormitories by questioning it as a metaphysical concept). I’m forced to live with it and it’s good enough for me in ways that PW isn’t.
Suppose that all EW deniers (apparently!) struggle within this world and die. Or pretend you did decide to forever doubt your EW axiom and that, further, this caused you horrible suffering.

Why and how would that suggest these beliefs are in fact false?

Maybe it wouldn’t suggest any such thing. In that case, is anything “justified”? Wouldn’t it be more correct to just say: “**** happens”?
 
hecd2,

I’d like to add my endorsement of the following:
The truthfulness or coherence of the propositions are not used at all to justify the wager. They are not epistemically connected to it in any way, expect insofar as they are “unknowns.”

The wager derives its force from the *outcome *of the arguments. It seems to me that you are assuming that the outcomes of the propositions are entirely untintelligible (or potentially so.) If this were the case, I agree, the wager would be ultimately senseless. It would partner with absurdity, so to speak.

But the outcomes do not seem to me to be unintelligible. Either God exists or he doesn’t. Argument does not support either hypothesis, but one hypothesis must be true, and the other false, regardless of belief. But, it happens to be the case that if God exists is true, belief in him matters very much, whereas, if he does not exist, belief matters nothing at all. Therefore, it seems plainly reasonable to believe, since one is not risking anything by doing so, even if one is in error.

By their *potential *truth value. ******

It seems to me that you’re squeezing lemons and wanting orange juice. The wager has nothing to do with theoretical reason. Pascal himself pretty much said that once you grasp the wager, you ought to delude yourself into believing that God exists and never look back.

But this is debasing, you say, for it may be entirely fallacious to conclude that God exists, and the wager doesn’t speak to the speculative side of the question at all. You are afraid of deluding yourself. To which Pascal would (and did, specifically) respond: “Why: what do you have to lose?”

I’m not sure we can either, but I do think the mind has power to bend the will in a certain way, as I’ve previously said.

A reply to this would be relevant to my thinking on the subject.
 
hecd2,
A reply to this would be relevant to my thinking on the subject.
hecd2 will speak for himself, but for my part, The Exodus has a solid answer right in his reply. When Pascal wonders what I’ve got to lose, I’m perplexed. I’ve just been asked to debase my mind, and he wonders what I have to lose???

The mind is something one has “in hand”, so to speak, or “in head”. It’s a real and current asset. What I have to lose is the debasement of that current asset for an intangible, inscrutable benefit.

There’s something beautifully self-selecting about the proposition; only the minds where debasement isn’t an issue will find it attractive.

If I came to you and proposed that without handing me $10, you’re at risk of having everything you care about taken away – money, kids, Barbra Streisand records (!), everything you value. Giving me $10, on the other hand, qualifies you for a $10MM payout 50 years from now. Trust me!

So that’s pretty high stakes. Complete loss, big winnings, all for a measly $10 (or suppose it’s just $1 or a dime, makes no difference). Think of what might be on the line here. What have you got to lose?

Why, ten bucks, that’s what. And any self-respect I might have in not showing myself a fool, a chump, a mark in accepting such a proposition.

$10 is a trifle compared to Pascal’s Wager. You gotta look in the mirror at some point, and ten bucks just doesn’t compare.

-TS
 
hecd2 will speak for himself, but for my part, The Exodus has a solid answer right in his reply. When Pascal wonders what I’ve got to lose, I’m perplexed. I’ve just been asked to debase my mind, and he wonders what I have to lose???
I do see your point and your criticism may indeed be correct in the end. Mostly, I’m curious as to what sort of value, if any, a fundamentally pragmatic argument could potentially have. I also wonder whether we could ever derive any theoretical conclusions based on some recognition of an undeniable pragmatic value.

Plus, I’m not so much interested in a proper exegesis per se of Pascal; if any conceivable argument could be mounted to the same general result, that would be intriguing enough.
The mind is something one has “in hand”, so to speak, or “in head”. It’s a real and current asset. What I have to lose is the debasement of that current asset for an intangible, inscrutable benefit.
Pascal might deny that you’ve got any reason to call what you’ve got “a real and current asset.” We would have to have a set of criteria by which to judge something either valuable/pragmatic/successful or not. Let’s just suppose – for argument’s sake – that Pascal believes, and that it really is true, that if God doesn’t exist, then nothing is valuable or good. If we assume that nihilism is entailed by God’s non-existence (and I know you and hecd2 deny this, but entertain it for now), then ipso facto haven’t we necessarily eliminated all possible justification for accepting atheism?

At this point, it would seem the options are:

(1) Accept theism.
(a) God exists, and you’re possibly justified.
(b) God doesn’t exist, and you’re not justified.
(2) Don’t accept theism.
(a) God exists, and you’re not justified.
(b) God doesn’t exist, and you’re not justified.

2(a) seems to offer the only initial wiggle room for the PW denier here. It looks like the key point lies in whether we know, and whether it’s true, that if God doesn’t exist there’s no (basis for) meaning or purpose. To reject theism w/such knowledge would amount to saying this:
“I know that, logically speaking, if God doesn’t exist, then nothing is justified (as a result of all value being merely illusory). Also logically speaking, a proposition can only be legitimately justified if it’s true (or possibly true?). (Or: Also logically speaking, the acceptance of a proposition can only ever be justified if one at least believes it is true.) If I believe that God doesn’t exist, then I cannot believe or know I’m justified in such a belief – in fact, I could only ever have justification if I were wrong, so my acceptance of atheism is necessarily irrational and unjustified.”

From here, one might offer some “logical consequences” that don’t directly follow, but which would be consistent with the logic. E.g.:
(i) “While other arguments for God’s existence aren’t immediately compelling, we are immediately sure of the fact that justification in general is real or at least possible (and if it’s even possible, then God exists).”
(ii) “The fact our wills are effectively forced, or irresistibly disposed, to adopt certain beliefs is a sure sign that the object/content of such beliefs is true, or rooted somehow in truth. And it’s indeed impossible, not just practically beneficial, to believe our beliefs are false or unjustified. (If we cannot believe x, then x is false.)”
(iii) If someone’s ever given the option between affirming or denying x, then he will ultimately never decide unless he sees at least some benefit (some good/positive value) to affirmation/denial. If there is absolutely nothing for or against p, he will never believe in p or not-p. If we know that p is possibly justified, and that not-p is necessarily unjustifed, then we have some reason to push the belief threshold. In the absence of theoretical, truth-conducive reasons, practicality might step in?
There’s something beautifully self-selecting about the proposition; only the minds where debasement isn’t an issue will find it attractive.
I agree that there’s an apparent degree of intellectual debasement when one prioritizes self-interest over truth, but I’m not so sure this would be the case if one already established that any truth can’t be known as such. Also, if someone thinks that debasement is only possible/unjustified if and only if God exists, then he’d see nothing better than debasement in refusing the wager – in fact, he’d probably view nihilism as a worse outcome than any personal debasement.

To get to the point: would you be willing to grant the merits of PW, or anything like it, if it’s indeed true that one’s essentially choosing between possible meaning and utter absurdity? If so, would the argument be theoretical, or would we just be allowing a “pure faith”/pragmatic “wager” sort of thing? If the justification is pragmatic, what’s the basis and how do we know?

If anyone admits the “God or nihilism” dilemma, maybe that’s where this argument must lead. I, for one, think it’s a legit dilemma, but that would launch us into a lot of arguing about what’s necessary for a true, justified ground for any ultimately meaningful ethics/value system. And I’ll bet we’ve got differences on what’s satisfactory.
 
If I came to you and proposed that without handing me $10, you’re at risk of having everything you care about taken away – money, kids, Barbra Streisand records (!), everything you value. Giving me $10, on the other hand, qualifies you for a $10MM payout 50 years from now. Trust me!
So that’s pretty high stakes. Complete loss, big winnings, all for a measly $10 (or suppose it’s just $1 or a dime, makes no difference). Think of what might be on the line here. What have you got to lose?
You mean besides the supreme grace and timeless elegance of our generation’s most talented vocalist, right?
Why, ten bucks, that’s what. And any self-respect I might have in not showing myself a fool, a chump, a mark in accepting such a proposition.
Barbra resents that. Low blow.
$10 is a trifle compared to Pascal’s Wager. You gotta look in the mirror at some point, and ten bucks just doesn’t compare.
Certainly your thought experiment is wholly contingent on whether it’s true that I really am in the dilemma you propose. My potential justification would have to derive from whatever justification I have for believing you when you tell me that those are indeed my options. Not being so gullible, and always keen to spot greedy, two-timing shysters, I would declare you a liar and a thief before returning to my old life without worry. (Or if I lacked scruples, I’d gently advise you to work on a more effective scheme for that quick 10 bucks.)
 
In Spiration
Certainly your thought experiment is wholly contingent on whether it’s true that I really am in the dilemma you propose. My potential justification would have to derive from whatever justification I have for believing you when you tell me that those are indeed my options. Not being so gullible, and always keen to spot greedy, two-timing shysters, I would declare you a liar and a thief before returning to my old life without worry. (Or if I lacked scruples, I’d gently advise you to work on a more effective scheme for that quick 10 bucks.)
Not only that, but we are not speaking here of a material consequence. We are talking about putting what is potentially the most intimate relationship in Love into the format of a wager. I can think of a number of films based on the idea of winning a romantic interest on the basis of a dare or a bet. What happens when s/he finds out the actual motivation? Not good.

You either come to God in your own way on your own terms through experience and/or through grace. Pascal’s wager is to me like promoting marriage by kidnapping.

P.S. In Spiration, I really like your signature quote. Can we put it in every message frame, or have it flash on a banner before one can post?
 
Pascal’s wager is fundamentally an act of willing, as opposed to unwilling, surrender to God. If it is a true surrender of the heart and not merely of the head, it is a leap of faith that will be followed by many other leaps … such as the leap of understanding, the leap of virtue, and the leap of love. No atheist can understand this … nor is it likely that most atheists would want to understand it.
Hi Charlemagne. 🙂 First off, I’m not an atheist. As you know already from my previous messages to this topic, I don’t agree with Pascal’s wager or with what you have stated.

B. Sury from the Indian Statistical Institute, Bangalore has written about Pascal. Here is an excerpt from the pdf.

“Pascal wrote the philosophical work Pensées towards the end of his life. This is a collection of his thoughts on human suffering and faith in God which he began in late 1656 and continued to work on during 1657 and 1658. This work contains ‘Pascal’s wager’ which claims to prove that belief in God is rational with the following argument: “Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us consider the two possibilities. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Hesitate not, then, to wager that He is.” In the seventh chapter of Pensées, he tries to apply his probability theory to argue that it is worthwhile to be religious. He argues that, as the value of eternal happiness must be infinite, then, even if the probability of a religious life ensuring eternal happiness be very small, still the expectation (which is measured by the product of the two) must be of sufficient magnitude to make it worthwhile to be religious! Pascal died at the age of 39 in intense pain after a malignant growth in his stomach spread to the brain.”
ias.ac.in/resonance/Jan2004/pdf/Jan2004AIB.pdf

It appears to me that Pascal began to think of God when he was in physical pain. I wouldn’t consider that to be a logical reason to believe in God. Physical pain can distort a person’s mind.

I support these three quotes from the LETTER OF HIS HOLINESS JOHN PAUL II TO REVEREND GEORGE V. COYNE, S.J., DIRECTOR OF THE VATICAN OBSERVATORY on June 1, 1988:
  1. “The unity we perceive in creation on the basis of our faith in Jesus Christ as Lord of the universe, and the correlative unity for which we strive in our human communities, seems to be reflected and even reinforced in what contemporary science is revealing to us. As we behold the incredible development of scientific research we detect an underlying movement towards the discovery of levels of law and process which unify created reality and which at the same time have given rise to the vast diversity of structures and organisms which constitute the physical and biological, and even the psychological and sociological, worlds.”
  2. “Both the Church and the scientific community are faced with such inescapable alternatives. We shall make our choices much better of we live in a collaborative interaction in which we are called continually to be more. Only a dynamic relationship between theology and science can reveal those limits which support the integrity of either discipline, so that theology does not profess a pseudo-science and science does not become an unconscious theology. Our knowledge of each other can lead us to be more authentically ourselves.”
  3. “The Church does not propose that science should become religion or religion science.”
Pope John Paul II was against about pseudo-science and so am I. Therefore, I don’t accept Intelligent Design as a Theory of Information by William A. Dembski, BLAISE PASCAL FELLOW IN PROBABILITY, CENTER FOR THE RENEWAL OF SCIENCE AND CULTURE DISCOVERY INSTITUTE. I’m not a proponent of the Intelligent Design Movement. 😃
 
How come most of the actors/actresses I like are from Canada?

Yes, kind of. 🙂 No matter what, Love is the underlying Principle. That story goes on, as does ours. I am most certainly not an atheist or agnostic. And that is why, despite my very critical stance on religion, and because of it, that I claim that Pascal’s wager is flushable.
 
Scanning all the posts (not thoroughly, I’ll have to admit) I don’t think anyone has got the point of Pascal’s argument or read the material in Pensees (#233, pp 65-69, Dover edition of the Trotter translation) where it was first put forth. (all quotes from there.)
Point 1) Pascal thought that God being infinite, could not be known or proven to exist by reason:
If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible, since having neither parts nor limits, He has no affinity to us. We are then incapable of knowing either what He is or if He is/.
Point 2) We can know God by faith; after a carriage accident Pascal had a mystical experience, wrote about his beatific vision in a beautiful paean that was sewn into whatever coat he happened to be wearing.
**“But by faith we know His existence; in glory we shall know His nature.” **
This is what Pascal wants us to believe: that there is an afterlife, and its benefits are infinite. Whatever is lost by believing, even if there were no God, is finite, whereas that which is gained, if there is a God, is infinite:
“But there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite.
There is a mathematical problem with this analysis however. Introducing an infinite reward introduces paradoxes (e.g. like the St. Petersburg paradox), so it’s not a good probability argument after all.
However one can use modern decision analysis, the principle of “mini-max regret” to show that the argument is sound. (see facebook.com/notes/magis-center-of-reason-and-faith/the-pearl-of-great-pricepascals-wager-revisited/17
Pascal’s wager is addressed to the prudent agnostic, and even if this agnostic doesn’t believe at first, faith will come (i.e. as a catechetical priest once told me, you can fake it till you make it).
“Endeavor then to convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the abatement of your passions. You would like to attain faith and do not know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief, and ask the remedy for it…There are people… who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured. Follow the way by which they began (emphasis added); by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc.”
and
“…at each step you take on this road you will see so great certainty of gain, so much nothingness in what you risk, that you will at last recognize that you have wagered for something certain and infinite, for which you have given nothing.”
anselm
 
Scanning all the posts (not thoroughly, I’ll have to admit) I don’t think anyone has got the point of Pascal’s argument or read the material in Pensees (#233, pp 65-69, Dover edition of the Trotter translation) where it was first put forth. (all quotes from there.)
Point 1) Pascal thought that God being infinite, could not be known or proven to exist by reason:

Point 2) We can know God by faith; after a carriage accident Pascal had a mystical experience, wrote about his beatific vision in a beautiful paean that was sewn into whatever coat he happened to be wearing.

This is what Pascal wants us to believe: that there is an afterlife, and its benefits are infinite. Whatever is lost by believing, even if there were no God, is finite, whereas that which is gained, if there is a God, is infinite:

There is a mathematical problem with this analysis however. Introducing an infinite reward introduces paradoxes (e.g. like the St. Petersburg paradox), so it’s not a good probability argument after all.
However one can use modern decision analysis, the principle of “mini-max regret” to show that the argument is sound. (see facebook.com/notes/magis-center-of-reason-and-faith/the-pearl-of-great-pricepascals-wager-revisited/17
Pascal’s wager is addressed to the prudent agnostic, and even if this agnostic doesn’t believe at first, faith will come (i.e. as a catechetical priest once told me, you can fake it till you make it).

and

anselm
Interesting… this is actually subtley different to what I’ve been arguing all these years, and probably less cynical!

My argument was always roughly, that if there is no afterlife, the nullity of all consciousness upon death would render all our actions during life futile, both for ourselves and others. Only if there is eternal consciousness is purposeful life possible, and human experience of the possibility of the same is overwhelmingly tied into, and dependent upon, God, so therefore we should assume God is real in order to have meaningful purpose to our lives…

So are you saying this is this not quite what Pascal was arguing?
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top