Pascal's Wager Argument

[PRmerger]

On its own, PW is a poor argument for a variety of reasons including the fact that there are more possible outcomes than the argument allows

Again, there is no reason to insist that PW must stand on its own.

It does not stand alone. It’s just one more argument that’s proffered. It’s not a very good reason to believe, to be sure, but it also cannot be refuted as a rational, reasoned approach to this discussion.

It simply makes sense to believe rather than not believe, per PW.

 

[PRmerger]

I hire someone because when you’re already paying someone for (40-X) hours of their time, those last X hours are usually a bargain, and they take care of the entire trip–driving, finding goods, waiting in line, paying for them, bringing them to the car, driving them back, bringing them into the home, and sometimes putting them away. That’s the big picture.

I’m just wondering a few things.

How does this work when you travel? Does this hireling travel with you? Do the airport officials accept this proxy–or do they make you stand in line as well? If not, what do you do while waiting?

Have you tried this at Disney World? Do they allow hirelings to stand in line for you? (And do you pay for this hireling’s ticket?)

Finally, do you hire someone to predict traffic jams? If so, then how does this work if you’re in traffic? Does this hireling sit in the car for you while you are otherwise engaged?

 

[The_Exodus]

Now let us suppose our sincere seeker is not convinced of the truth of the proposition after thinking about the arguments. The question is, speaking from a purely logical perspective, is there a meaningful sense in which she would not regard all of these arguments as flawed or fallacious in some way? Because if she concedes that just one of these arguments is logically correct then she must concede that its conclusion is true regardless of the merits of the rest of them. So, in the case that she doesn’t assent to any of them, PW logically stands on its own.

The seeker may see that, in examining the arguments, she is “conceding” the truth or falsity of them. Indeed, she may even find some compelling, but she may still in her mind realize that the truth of such propositions does not rest on her subjective certainty, or the feeling of certitude she has. For instance, I may think all my reasons are good for believing OJ Simpson was a murderer. At the same time, however, I am aware that I am not omniscient, and I do not have *all *the facts. There may be some evidence or argument which I have not seen. In this case, though I find the current reasons good, they may not compel the mind to assent, nor give the subject a feeling of utmost certainty.
hec:

Ah, you say, but perhaps there are arguments she is agnostic about - perhaps she simply doesn’t understand them, or perhaps they are inductive and she simply cannot find what she regards as a reliable data set in support of them - in that case she doesn’t think that they necessarily flawed - she just doesn’t know whether they are good arguments or not. But look, these are no help to PW either - for how would you logically use an argument that you can neither believe to be correct nor flawed to help assent to another argument.

See above. The agnosticism is not due to the fact that she doesn’t understand the arguments, but rather that, based on her understanding, she is at the same time aware that there may be another explanation of the current facts – there may be other arguments – which contradict the 19. So long as she is not omniscient, she cannot be absolutely certain that there aren’t better arguments, though she can at the same time them “reasonable” or “probable.”
hec:

And there is another point - the 19 argue for one proposition; PW argues for something else, so where is the logical connection between them?

PW gives a reason why the will ought to bear on the mind in such a way that excludes doubting the propositions. Doubt is always possible, since the seeker is not omniscient. PW gives a good (in my opinion), practical reason why the mind ought not to give such doubts any time of day.
hec:

On its own, PW is a poor argument for a variety of reasons including the fact that there are more possible outcomes than the argument allows - in fact it assumes a certain sort of theology which is unwarranted by the argument. By the way the choice is not between two opposite propositions but between assenting to or dissenting from a single proposition.

I don’t think the wager ought, or indeed can be, presented on its own. It assumes some previously existing agnosticism, and it gives a practical reason for casting aside that agnosticism and willing the mind to assent, insofar as that is possible.

I have no idea how possible, or to what extent the will is able to do this, though I do think (from experience), the will has some power of bending the mind to accept or reject certain propositions, particularly if it sees manifestly good practical reason for doing so.
hec:

Are people who hold to absurd ideas in the face of all evidence to the contrary sincere in thinking themselves rationally justified, or do they know somewhere in their minds that they are wrong? Can we will ourselves to beliefs or only the outward show of belief? Is PW an argument for belief or the simulacrum of belief?

These are difficult and, I think, fascinating questions. Unfortunately, I cannot really say any more than I have already said. I will say, however, that I am not a proponent of pragmatism or William James’ philosophy.
hec:

Now I don’t think I agree with that. If one is already religious, what need does one have to wage?. Dark night of the soul? But then PW would, I suppose, be a better argument than for agnostics, because its theological assumptions would already have assent.

I am speaking more along the lines of a religious person who is contemplating doing a certain action, which they feel may be immoral, but are not “sure” as they say. It is always best, in my mind, to err on the side of caution, and not to do such an action. “Better safe than sorry,” so to speak.

Of course, the wager has nothing to do with the truth of the immorality of action x. The truth is unchanged. But, practically speaking, since one cannot be absolutely certain, it is best to err on the side of caution. At least that is my view.

I’m enjoying our dialogue tremendously, by the way.

 

[PRmerger]

I don’t think the wager ought, or indeed can be, presented on its own.

'zactly.

 

[FightingFat]

I guess the reason I kept re-quoting that example is because when I don’t others pretend I was talking about promiscuity rather than sex within a marriage.

You are approaching the topic from completely the wrong angle. You have an understanding which places your position as the best one and anything which discards options you hold on to as something which limits freedom. Catholics see freedom as something more that the radically arbitrary ability to do whatever we want. We understand that because we exist in relationship, every action comes with responsibility. Understanding this connection and respecting the effect we have on others constitutes true freedom, freedom lived to our template of manufacture if you like.

There are many atheists and agnostics in long-term committed relationships.

Absolutely, but these are clearly sharing ideals that Catholics hold paramount. What makes a good long-term committed relationship? Love, fidelity, etc.

 

[LogisticsBranch]

hecd2;7503509:

Now let us suppose our sincere seeker is not convinced of the truth of the proposition after thinking about the arguments. The question is, speaking from a purely logical perspective, is there a meaningful sense in which she would not regard all of these arguments as flawed or fallacious in some way? Because if she concedes that just one of these arguments is logically correct then she must concede that its conclusion is true regardless of the merits of the rest of them. So, in the case that she doesn’t assent to any of them, PW logically stands on its own.

The seeker may see that, in examining the arguments, she is “conceding” the truth or falsity of them. Indeed, she may even find some compelling, but she may still in her mind realize that the truth of such propositions does not rest on her subjective certainty, or the feeling of certitude she has. For instance, I may think all my reasons are good for believing OJ Simpson was a murderer. At the same time, however, I am aware that I am not omniscient, and I do not have *all *the facts. There may be some evidence or argument which I have not seen. In this case, though I find the current reasons good, they may not compel the mind to assent, nor give the subject a feeling of utmost certainty.

My personal observations:

1. Exodus, you were the one in post #50 that first mentioned the word “she” that you both are now speaking about. Who is the member you both are now talking about? You both appear to be analyzing a female person. My concern is simple. Please see my #3.
2. The dialogue has elements of chance and necessity. That is good.
3. The dialogue brings to mind what Francis Collins said, “But look at identical twins, who have exactly the same DNA but often don’t behave alike or think alike. They show the importance of learning and experience—and free will. I think we all, whether we are religious or not, recognize that free will is a reality. There are some fringe elements that say, “No, it’s all an illusion, we’re just pawns in some computer model.” But I don’t think that carries you very far.” ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0702/voices.html . Bye the way, Francis Collins is now on the Vatican’s Scientific Advisory Committee and involved in other responsiblities. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Collins_(geneticist

 

[Charlemagne_II]

There still seems to be a disconnect between Pascal’s wager and what we are talking about.

Back to the original question.

If you are an atheist and there is a God, and the God is Christ, what is your prognosis for eternity?

“Everyone who acknowledges me before others I will acknowledge before my heavenly Father. But whoever denies me before others, I will deny before my heavenly Father.” Matthew 10:32-33

 

[ronnie_bonigli]

To my knees Julie.

It’s her birthday today. She would have been 9.

FightingFat, thank you for sharing your beautiful Ruth with us. I’ve had my own trials with my daughter, and reading your words really moved me. Stay strong

 

[In_Spiration]

Bill Vallicella’s blog has a helpful category on doxastic voluntarism. One of his posts, “A Pieperian Argument for Doxastic Voluntarism”, seems relevant to PW with regard to what I was getting at earlier (viz. how our will’s desire of the good might be a reliable basis for finding, and maybe eventually knowing, the truth):

Josef Pieper (1904-1997) is a 20th century German Thomist. I read his Belief and Faith as an undergraduate and am now [December 2007] re-reading it very carefully. It is an excellent counterbalance to a lot of the current analytic stuff on belief and doxastic voluntarism. What follows is my reconstruction of Pieper’s argument for doxastic voluntarism in Belief and Faith. His thesis, to be found in Augustine and Aquinas, is that “Belief rests upon volition.” (p. 27. Augustine, De praedestinatione Sanctorum, cap. 5, 10: [Fides] quae in voluntate est . . . .) I shall first present the argument in outline, and then comment on the premises and inferences.

**1. Belief and knowledge are mutually exclusive. He who knows does not believe, and he who believes does not know.

Therefore

1. It is not the self-evident truth of the proposition believed that motivates the believer’s acceptance of it.

Therefore

1. The believer’s acceptance is motivated by the insight that “it is good to regard the subject matter as true and real on the strength of someone else’s testimony.” (p. 27)
2. “It is the will, not cognition, that acknowledges the good.” (p. 27)

Therefore

1. Wherever there is belief, the will is operative. “We believe not because we see, perceive, deduce, something true, but because we desire something good.” (p. 27)**
   [Emphasis In Spiration’s.]

Interpretive gloss: We desire contact with the truth, as with something good. But in some cases we are not in a position to know the truth; so we must believe it on the basis of the testimony of a credible witness. We will our acceptance of the testimony of the witness. Our acceptance of the testimony is voluntary. One’s coming to believe is thus subject to voluntary control.

Ad (1). Most philosophers nowadays think of knowledge as including belief. Thus, on their use of ‘believes’ and ‘knows,’ if S knows that p, then S believes that p, though not conversely. Accordingly, if I know that the sun is shining, by seeing that it is, then I believe that the sun is shining. But Pieper, basing himself on Aquinas, doesn’t view the matter in this way. For Pieper, if S believes that p, S unconditionally accepts p as true without knowing whether or not p is true. Accordingly, I do not believe that the sun is shining; I know that it is. This corresponds to ordinary usage. One can imagine Ron Radosh saying, “I don’t believe that the Rosenbergs were guilty of espionage for the Soviets; I know they were!” Pieper quotes Aquinas (p.10): “Belief cannot refer to something that one sees. . .; and what can be proved likewise does not pertain to belief.” Thus he who knows does not believe, and he who believes does not know.

Ad (2). This is supposed to follow from (1) and it does.

Ad (3). Since I did not see O. J. Simpson kill his ex-wife Nicole, I do not know that he killed her. But I believe he killed her on the basis of a massive amount of mutually supportive facts and testimony. Now what motivates (Aquinas would say ‘causes’) my unconditional acceptance of the proposition that O.J. killed Nicole? I want contact with the truth because the truth is good. Now I cannot in a case like this achieve contact via knowledge. So if I am to achieve truth- and reality-contact, it must be through belief, which is subordinate to knowledge in value though not included in knowledge.

There is a sort of value-judgment here that needs to be treated fully in a separate post: it is better to achieve reality-contact via belief despite the epistemic risk involved, than to stick to what can strictly be known thereby foregoing reality-contact. We must of course try to avoid error. But the acquisition of truth is also an epistemic desideratum. I would argue that it is a mistake to let one’s fear of error deprive one of second-rate reality-contact, i.e., reality-content via belief. Believing a proposition on the basis of credible testimony is admittedly of less value than knowing it; but second-rate reality-contact is better than no reality-contact.

Ad (4). This is a premise and it seems true. Good and evil are not ‘visible’ except to conative/desiderative beings. If we were merely intellectual beings, mere cognizers, without wish, will, need, desire, appetite, then good and evil would be ‘invisible.’ This is not to be confused with the presumably false claim that good and evil would not exist in a world without conative/desiderative beings.

Ad (5). To believe that p is to give my unconditional assent to the truth of p. I commit myself to p’s truth despite my lack of knowledge of the subject matter. Thus my believing that O.J. killed Nicole is my unconditional acceptance of that proposition on the basis of inconclusive, but adequate, evidence. What motivates my acceptance is my will-to-truth. I am free to believe, to disbelieve, and to suspend jusdgment. How then can anyone deny that belief, disbelief, and suspension of belief are under the control of the will?

 

[Charlemagne_II]

In Spiration

How then can anyone deny that belief, disbelief, and suspension of belief are under the control of the will?

I have believed the sentence above to be true for some time now. Is it therefore so that I do not** know** it to be true?

 

[In_Spiration]

Is (4) true? Perhaps what Thomas called the “agent intellect” – as distinct from the possible intellect – acknowledges the good, instead of the will.

I’ll have to work out and elaborate on my ideas re: DV and PW later. But maybe we can see how closely we agree on important terms. In brief, my understanding of the topic’s relevant concepts is something like:

The true is the known or the intelligible, any beings at least possibly in and relative to an intellect (and upon an intellectual act of reflection, the true transforms into knowledge); and the good is the desired or the desirable, any beings at least possibly wanted by and relative to a will (and upon an act of volition, the good transforms into virtue). Both truth and goodness, it seems, are rooted in actuality, or the respective potential acts of existing things/substances. [The substantial mode of x (that is, x insofar as it’s called a thing) =df x’s merely potential existence – x taken as *a being only in its power to stand forth and exist, either in reality or to some mind – i.e., x solely in potency without any actuality.]

So the existence of all things, taken strictly as such, is *true *insofar as it stands forth to the intellect and *good *insofar as it stands forth to the will. Anything that’s either true or good necessarily exists already. The intellect is naturally inclined to intentionality, existence within the mind (a.k.a. intentions, or the ideal, as distinct from real things). The will is naturally inclined toward reality, to the real, beings existing outside the mind. [The **reality of x =df the aspect of x which actually stands forth externally (and potentially exists internally) – x’s mode of existing beyond the intellect in a definite act. The **intentionality **of x =df the ideal mode of x, i.e., the aspect of x which stands forth internally and only potentially stands forth externally – x’s (merely) being by itself in the act of an intellect.]

 

[Spock]

How then can anyone deny that belief, disbelief, and suspension of belief are under the control of the will?

I am constantly amazed. Is it really true that some people are that dumb?

It takes no rocket scientist to test this proposition. All one has to do is to “decide” (an act of will) to believe that one can breathe under water (for example), or to make a decision that one will believe that lead is lighter than feathers. It becomes blindingly obvious that these “acts of will” cannot change one’s belief that it is impossible to breathe water and that lead is heavier than feathers. And yet, people keep propagating that incredible nonsense. Einstein was right, when he said: “there are two things which are infinite, the universe and human stupidity - and I am not sure of the universe”.

 

[Spock]

How then can anyone deny that belief, disbelief, and suspension of belief are under the control of the will?

I have believed the sentence above to be true for some time now. Is it therefore so that I do not** know** it to be true?

If you believe it, then here is a simple experiment for you. Try to use your volition to change that belief into disbelief. There are two posible outcomes.

1. You were successful in changing your belief to disbelief, so now you do not believe any more that beliefs are under volitional control.
2. You failed to change your original belief, so you have now positive proof that beliefs are not under volitional control. Both the success and the failure lead to the logical conclusion that beliefs are not under volitional control.

However, if you still maintain your original belief, then you will believe something that you know is false! In this case all you can do is knock on the door of the next insane asylum, and ask for admittance. Only an insane person would believe something he knows to be false.

 

[In_Spiration]

If you believe it, then here is a simple experiment for you. Try to use your volition to change that belief into disbelief. There are two posible outcomes.

1. You were successful in changing your belief to disbelief, so now you do not believe any more that beliefs are under volitional control.
2. You failed to change your original belief, so you have now positive proof that beliefs are not under volitional control. Both the success and the failure lead to the logical conclusion that beliefs are not under volitional control.

However, if you still maintain your original belief, then you will believe something that you know is false! In this case all you can do is knock on the door of the next insane asylum, and ask for admittance. Only an insane person would believe something he knows to be false.

Spock,

Is this post’s content intended to function as an argument for a theoretical conclusion? Or might we consider this primarily a form of “Spock’s Wager” in favor of disbelief regarding the will’s control over all potential beliefs? Am I somehow insane in thinking there’s a point behind this thought-experiment?

Everyone (including Spock),

Whoever refutes Spock’s experimental argument-by-suggestion with the fewest words wins. Bonus points shall be awarded to the author responsible for the decisive post in the event that Spock subsequently resolves to change his respective belief in light of the doubts it causes in him. Further points are due if one’s reply either tacitly includes or explicitly exhibits irony and/or satire.

 

[teachccd]

In the no God scenario you guys suffer pointlessly and we come out ahead.

In the “God scenario” you guys suffer eternally be it the mercy of God that you don’t…

 

[Charlemagne_II]

spock

*If you believe it, then here is a simple experiment for you. Try to use your volition to change that belief into disbelief. There are two posible outcomes.

1. You were successful in changing your belief to disbelief, so now you do not believe any more that beliefs are under volitional control.
2. You failed to change your original belief, so you have now positive proof that beliefs are not under volitional control. Both the success and the failure lead to the logical conclusion that beliefs are not under volitional control. *

Your thought experiment is not valid. Refusing to disbelieve does not mean I have lost the power of volition, for the simple reason that I am choosing not to disbelieve. Likewise, when you choose not to believe, you are exercising volition. But if you converted to belief, you would also be exercising volition. We cannot escape volition in either case, unless we are insane or psychological determinists.

Which are you?

 

[LaymanX]

However, if you still maintain your original belief, then you will believe something that you know is false! In this case all you can do is knock on the door of the next insane asylum, and ask for admittance. Only an insane person would believe something he knows to be false.

Actually, there is a way to do this without being clinically insane. It is called self-deception. There are some good literature on this popular topic. You’d be amazed at how easily people end up in a web of self-deception in order adjust (or survive) to their environment. However, whether or not we will to self-deceive or we are compelled to self-deceive would go into the whole discussion of free will (which I am not in the mood to discuss). Although cough libertarian freedom seems like nonsense to me.

Another problem with Pascal’s Wager is that if you could think of some religious worldview with something even worse than Hell (as a punishment for unbelief), then I would rather place my bet on that! …although I do not know how one could creatively conceive of something worse than Hell (which is usually defined as “that which no worse can be thought” in an Anselmian sense). In addition, there is also the problem of the “will” as mentioned above. Can we even “will” to believe such radical claims of Hell or other forms of metaphysical punishment when our intuition says it is a hoax?

I still like the Wager argument, but it has its limitations (as any argument for the existence of God).

Francis

 

[Spock]

Actually, there is a way to do this without being clinically insane. It is called self-deception. There are some good literature on this popular topic. You’d be amazed at how easily people end up in a web of self-deception in order adjust (or survive) to their environment.

Ah, but self-deception is not a volitional process either. It does not work like: “I believe that proposition X is true, but I am going to will myself to believe that it is false”. It is a sub-conscious acceptance of those arguments which support your belief and discarding those arguments which contradict your belief. You cannot “choose” to believe what your gut-feeling says is incorrect and vice versa. That was the whole point of the example. To repeat for the sake of clarity. Person “A” presents proposition “X”:

Proposition “X”: “I believe that I can volitionally choose to believe or disbelieve any proposition”.

Person “A” applies his volition to proposition “X” and successfully exercies his voliton to go from belief to disbelief so now he says: “I do not believe that I can volitionally choose to believe or disbelieve any proposition”.

Person “A” applies his volition to proposition “X” and fails to change it, so now he must say: "I tried to exercise my volition and I failed; and thus I still believe that proposition “X” is true. But now I have a positive proof that proposition “X” is false.

What else is there to be said?

 

[Charlemagne_II]

LAYMAN

Can we even “will” to believe such radical claims of Hell or other forms of metaphysical punishment when our intuition says it is a hoax?

UNLESS SAYING IT IS A HOAX IS ANOTHER FORM OF SELF DECEPTION.

 

[LaymanX]

LAYMAN

Can we even “will” to believe such radical claims of Hell or other forms of metaphysical punishment when our intuition says it is a hoax?

UNLESS SAYING IT IS A HOAX IS ANOTHER FORM OF SELF DECEPTION.