Pascals Wager

[Charlemagne_II]

cho pilo
**
“But this is what I am afraid of.”**

**
My impression is that this isn’t really a straightforward presentation of the “wager” argument at all. Maybe he provides that elsewhere in another of his written ‘thoughts’. This quoted one seems to be a rather eloquent and moving expression of his own inner struggles. **

You have completely misread the passage. Back up and start over. The passage in quotes is the atheist speaking to Pascal, not Pascal speaking about an inner struggle within himself.

 

[cho_pilo]

Have you read the pensees, in particular 233 in its entirety? You seem to be dodging that question. Maybe it makes no difference to your concern, because I provided a quote that is out of context to rest of the wager argument.

Here’s 233 in entirety, and what seems like its continuation 234:

*233. Infinite–nothing.–Our soul is cast into a body, where it finds
number, dimension. Thereupon it reasons, and calls this nature
necessity, and can believe nothing else.

Unity joined to infinity adds nothing to it, no more than one foot to
an infinite measure. The finite is annihilated in the presence of the
infinite, and becomes a pure nothing. So our spirit before God, so our
justice before divine justice. There is not so great a disproportion
between our justice and that of God as between unity and infinity.

The justice of God must be vast like His compassion. Now justice to the
outcast is less vast and ought less to offend our feelings than mercy
towards the elect.

We know that there is an infinite, and are ignorant of its nature. As
we know it to be false that numbers are finite, it is therefore true
that there is an infinity in number. But we do not know what it is. It
is false that it is even, it is false that it is odd; for the addition
of a unit can make no change in its nature. Yet it is a number, and
every number is odd or even (this is certainly true of every finite
number). So we may well know that there is a God without knowing what
He is. Is there not one substantial truth, seeing there are so many
things which are not the truth itself?

We know then the existence and nature of the finite, because we also
are finite and have extension. We know the existence of the infinite
and are ignorant of its nature, because it has extension like us, but
not limits like us. But we know neither the existence nor the nature of
God, because He has neither extension nor limits.

But by faith we know His existence; in glory we shall know His nature.
Now, I have already shown that we may well know the existence of a
thing, without knowing its nature.

Let us now speak according to natural lights.

If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible, since, having
neither parts nor limits, He has no affinity to us. We are then
incapable of knowing either what He is or if He is. This being so, who
will dare to undertake the decision of the question? Not we, who have
no affinity to Him.

Who then will blame Christians for not being able to give a reason for
their belief, since they profess a religion for which they cannot give
a reason? They declare, in expounding it to the world, that it is a
foolishness, stultitiam; [28] and then you complain that they do not
prove it! If they proved it, they would not keep their word; it is in
lacking proofs that they are not lacking in sense. “Yes, but although
this excuses those who offer it as such and takes away from them the
blame of putting it forward without reason, it does not excuse those
who receive it.” Let us then examine this point, and say, “God is, or
He is not.” But to which side shall we incline? Reason can decide
nothing here. There is an infinite chaos which separated us. A game is
being played at the extremity of this infinite distance where heads or
tails will turn up. What will you wager? According to reason, you can
do neither the one thing nor the other; according to reason, you can
defend neither of the propositions.

Do not, then, reprove for error those who have made a choice; for you
know nothing about it. “No, but I blame them for having made, not this
choice, but a choice; for again both he who chooses heads and he who
chooses tails are equally at fault, they are both in the wrong. The
true course is not to wager at all.”

Yes; but you must wager. It is not optional. You are embarked. Which
will you choose then? Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see
which interests you least. You have two things to lose, the true and
the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your
knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun,
error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather
than the other, since you must of necessity choose. This is one point
settled. But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in
wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain,
you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without
hesitation that He is. “That is very fine. Yes, I must wager; but I may
perhaps wager too much.” Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of
gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one,
you might still wager. But if there were three lives to gain, you would
have to play (since you are under the necessity of playing), and you
would be imprudent, when you are forced to play, not to chance your
life to gain three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and
gain. But there is an eternity of life and happiness. And this being
so, if there were an infinity of chances, of which one only would be
for you, you would still be right in wagering one to win two, and you
would act stupidly, being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one
life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances
there is one for you, if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy
life to gain. But there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life
to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss,
and what you stake is finite. It is all divided; where-ever the
infinite is and there is not an infinity of chances of loss against
that of gain, there is no time to hesitate, you must give all. And
thus, when one is forced to play, he must renounce reason to preserve
his life, rather than risk it for infinite gain, as likely to happen as
the loss of nothingness.*

 

[cho_pilo]

For it is no use to say it is uncertain if we will gain, and it is
certain that we risk, and that the infinite distance between the
certainly of what is staked and the uncertainty of what will be gained,
equals the finite good which is certainly staked against the uncertain
infinite. It is not so, as every player stakes a certainty to gain an
uncertainty, and yet he stakes a finite certainty to gain a finite
uncertainty, without transgressing against reason. There is not an
infinite distance between the certainty staked and the uncertainty of
the gain; that is untrue. In truth, there is an infinity between the
certainty of gain and the certainty of loss. But the uncertainty of the
gain is proportioned to the certainty of the stake according to the
proportion of the chances of gain and loss. Hence it comes that, if
there are as many risks on one side as on the other, the course is to
play even; and then the certainty of the stake is equal to the
uncertainty of the gain, so far is it from fact that there is an
infinite distance between them. And so our proposition is of infinite
force, when there is the finite to stake in a game where there are
equal risks of gain and of loss, and the infinite to gain. This is
demonstrable; and if men are capable of any truths, this is one.

“I confess it, I admit it. But, still, is there no means of seeing the
faces of the cards?” Yes, Scripture and the rest, etc. “Yes, but I have
my hands tied and my mouth closed; I am forced to wager, and am not
free. I am not released, and am so made that I cannot believe. What,
then, would you have me do?”

True. But at least learn your inability to believe, since reason brings
you to this, and yet you cannot believe. Endeavour, then, to convince
yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the abatement of
your passions. You would like to attain faith and do not know the way;
you would like to cure yourself of unbelief and ask the remedy for it.
Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all
their possessions. These are people who know the way which you would
follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured. Follow
the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the
holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally make you
believe, and deaden your acuteness. “But this is what I am afraid of.”
And why? What have you to lose?

But to show you that this leads you there, it is this which will lessen
the passions, which are your stumbling-blocks.

The end of this discourse.–Now, what harm will befall you in taking
this side? You will be faithful, humble, grateful, generous, a sincere
friend, truthful. Certainly you will not have those poisonous
pleasures, glory and luxury; but will you not have others? I will tell
you that you will thereby gain in this life, and that, at each step you
take on this road, you will see so great certainty of gain, so much
nothingness in what you risk, that you will at last recognise that you
have wagered for something certain and infinite, for which you have
given nothing.

“Ah! This discourse transports me, charms me,” etc.

If this discourse pleases you and seems impressive, know that it is
made by a man who has knelt, both before and after it, in prayer to
that Being, infinite and without parts, before whom he lays all he has,
for you also to lay before Him all you have for your own good and for
His glory, that so strength may be given to lowliness.

1. If we must not act save on a certainty, we ought not to act on
   religion, for it is not certain. But how many things we do on an
   uncertainty, sea voyages, battles! I say then we must do nothing at
   all, for nothing is certain, and that there is more certainty in
   religion than there is as to whether we may see to-morrow; for it is
   not certain that we may see to-morrow, and it is certainly possible
   that we may not, see it. We cannot say as much about religion. It is
   not certain that it is; but who will venture to say that it is
   certainly possible that it is not? Now when we work for to-morrow, and
   so on an uncertainty, we act reasonably; for we ought to work for an
   uncertainty according to the doctrine of chance which was demonstrated
   above.

Saint Augustine has seen that we work for an uncertainty, on sea, in
battle, etc. But he has not seen the doctrine of chance which proves
that we should do so. Montaigne has seen that we are shocked at a fool,
and that habit is all-powerful; but he has not seen the reason of this
effect.

All these persons have seen the effects, but they have not seen the
causes. They are, in comparison with those who have discovered the
causes, as those who have only eyes are in comparison with those who
have intellect. For the effects are perceptible by sense, and the
causes are visible only to the intellect. And although these effects
are seen by the mind, this mind is, in comparison with the mind which
sees the causes, as the bodily senses are in comparison with the
intellect.*
ccel.org/ccel/pascal/pensees.txt

 

[Charlemagne_II]

“The end of this discourse.–Now, what harm will befall you in taking
this side? You will be faithful, humble, grateful, generous, a sincere
friend, truthful. Certainly you will not have those poisonous
pleasures, glory and luxury; but will you not have others? I will tell
you that you will thereby gain in this life, and that, at each step you
take on this road, you will see so great certainty of gain, so much
nothingness in what you risk, that you will at last recognise that you
have wagered for something certain and infinite, for which you have
given nothing.”

This is what the wager offers at the end of accepting the wager. It is not merely a wager, but a state of salvation that has grown out of the wager. One takes the plunge, and realizes the payoff. Nothing insincere about it. In fact, it would be more insincere not to take the plunge, since the reason for not taking the plunge makes no sense whatever … because there is no payoff.

You cannot win if you do not wager. But you have to wager. You either wager there is a God, or you wager there is no God. What is the payoff for wagering there is no God?

Nothing! Or if anything … HELL!

 

[tonyrey]

             *

Pensee 226:

“anticipating” does not always mean foreknowledge!

And you seem to be alluding to Sartre’s eventual renunciation of his existentialist philosophy and turning to Christianity.
(Supposedly Camus had made arrangements for a baptism too shortly before his death.)

That is news to me!

I agree that commitment is inevitable, but it is not clear to what or to what extent.

In the context of this thread to - or not to - belief in God.

This is an issue that is very much alive for me. It may sound proud, but I would gauge Pascal’s stance to be one I was at until about two years ago.
I, too, thought “Well, just close your eyes and jump” - and at the time, it made sense, and I did it. But not for long. My “religious experiment” felt too much like a charade, it was a brute act of will, devoid of heart.

It sounds as if you had a negative attitude rather than being genuinely open-minded…

What Pascal says there simply strikes me as too simplistic.

Either we’re committed to belief in God or we’re not. Belief in God is strong or weak but it is still distinct from unbelief or disbelief.

 

[tonyrey]

Correction:

In the context of this thread to - or not to - belief in God.

should be:
We have either commitment to belief in God or no commitment to belief in God.

 

[cho_pilo]

Originally Posted by Pascal, thought 233Our soul is cast into a body, where it finds
number, dimension. Thereupon it reasons, and calls this nature
necessity, and can believe nothing else.

None of this has been agreed upon with the atheist.

That “our souls are cast into a body” is something that is not universally accepted, yet it is necessary to go with Pascal’s wager.

Atheists usually believe that we are our bodies, or at least that when the body dies, there is nothing more to us, to life.
So from this perspective, it is also meaningless to be concerned about what might happen to one after death.

So firstly, as far as the wager goes, it would need to be established that “our soul is cast into a body”.

Unity joined to infinity adds nothing to it, no more than one foot to
an infinite measure. The finite is annihilated in the presence of the
infinite, and becomes a pure nothing.

That sounds like some atheists reversed.

We know that there is an infinite, and are ignorant of its nature.

This has not been established either.

As
we know it to be false that numbers are finite, it is therefore true
that there is an infinity in number. But we do not know what it is. It
is false that it is even, it is false that it is odd; for the addition
of a unit can make no change in its nature. Yet it is a number, and
every number is odd or even (this is certainly true of every finite
number). So we may well know that there is a God without knowing what
He is. Is there not one substantial truth, seeing there are so many
things which are not the truth itself?

If one doesn’t know what something is, what point is there in saying that it is and that one knows it is?

 

[cho_pilo]

Yes; but you must wager. It is not optional. You are embarked. Which
will you choose then? Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see
which interests you least. You have two things to lose, the true and
the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your
knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun,
error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather
than the other, since you must of necessity choose. This is one point
settled. But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in
wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain,
you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without
hesitation that He is. “That is very fine. Yes, I must wager; but I may
perhaps wager too much.” Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of
gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one,
you might still wager. But if there were three lives to gain, you would
have to play (since you are under the necessity of playing), and you
would be imprudent, when you are forced to play, not to chance your
life to gain three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and
gain. But there is an eternity of life and happiness. And this being
so, if there were an infinity of chances, of which one only would be
for you, you would still be right in wagering one to win two, and you
would act stupidly, being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one
life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances
there is one for you, if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy
life to gain. But there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life
to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss,
and what you stake is finite. It is all divided; where-ever the
infinite is and there is not an infinity of chances of loss against
that of gain, there is no time to hesitate, you must give all. And
thus, when one is forced to play, he must renounce reason to preserve
his life, rather than risk it for infinite gain, as likely to happen as
the loss of nothingness.

For it is no use to say it is uncertain if we will gain, and it is
certain that we risk, and that the infinite distance between the
certainly of what is staked and the uncertainty of what will be gained,
equals the finite good which is certainly staked against the uncertain
infinite. It is not so, as every player stakes a certainty to gain an
uncertainty, and yet he stakes a finite certainty to gain a finite
uncertainty, without transgressing against reason. There is not an
infinite distance between the certainty staked and the uncertainty of
the gain; that is untrue. In truth, there is an infinity between the
certainty of gain and the certainty of loss. But the uncertainty of the
gain is proportioned to the certainty of the stake according to the
proportion of the chances of gain and loss. Hence it comes that, if
there are as many risks on one side as on the other, the course is to
play even; and then the certainty of the stake is equal to the
uncertainty of the gain, so far is it from fact that there is an
infinite distance between them. And so our proposition is of infinite
force, when there is the finite to stake in a game where there are
equal risks of gain and of loss, and the infinite to gain. This is
demonstrable; and if men are capable of any truths, this is one.

This is the passage that is usually referred to as Pascal’s Wager.

1. If we must not act save on a certainty, we ought not to act on
   religion, for it is not certain. But how many things we do on an
   uncertainty, sea voyages, battles! I say then we must do nothing at
   all, for nothing is certain, and that there is more certainty in
   religion than there is as to whether we may see to-morrow; for it is
   not certain that we may see to-morrow, and it is certainly possible
   that we may not, see it. We cannot say as much about religion. It is
   not certain that it is; but who will venture to say that it is
   certainly possible that it is not? Now when we work for to-morrow, and
   so on an uncertainty, we act reasonably; for we ought to work for an
   uncertainty according to the doctrine of chance which was demonstrated
   above.

My problem with PW is that it takes too much at once, too much in one step.
There is no real sense of graduality.

In comparison, in some Eastern traditions, they would expect a person first to gradually come to a point of mundane goodness, for mundane happiness’ sake (which is something people can generally understand and strive for), and only after they have stabilized themselves at that level, begin to endeavor toward higher spiritual topics.

Abrahamic religions, on the other hand, expect people to make an enormous commitment right at the beginning, a commitment they do not understand and do not really know how to act on it on a daily basis.

Abrahamic religions are like enrolling an infant into kindergarden, grade school, highschool and college all at once, before the child even began attending to kindergarden.
So from the beginning on, the child already feels the pressure of being successful at college - even if that is still far away in the future, and all the requirements for it yet need to be fulfilled.

Although this perspective in Abrahamic religions is understandable - they have no notion of (serial) reincarnation, and are strictly limited to this one lifetime. With such an outlook, it indeed seems all or nothing, now or never.
With such an outlook, it is also easy to come to the point of presuming certainty about God.

(There is a parallel to this in those Western Buddhists who do not believe in reincarnation - they believe they will attain nirvana in this lifetime for sure, and it seems this also leads them to believe they have already attained it, even with very little practice and sins and impurities still in full bloom.)

 

[cho_pilo]

“anticipating” does not always mean foreknowledge!
That is news to me!
In the context of this thread to - or not to - belief in God.
It sounds as if you had a negative attitude rather than being genuinely open-minded…
Either we’re committed to belief in God or we’re not. Belief in God is strong or weak but it is still distinct from unbelief or disbelief.

tonyrey,

I’m not going to reply to your posts here until you reply to my posts #47 & 48.

 

[tonyrey]

tonyrey,

I’m not going to reply to your posts here until you reply to my posts #47 & 48.

Thanks very much for telling me! Sometimes it’s hard to keep track if we’re on several threads at the same time. I’m always grateful when I’m reminded because it’s very rude not to reply without giving an explanation.

 

[tonyrey]

Pascal, thought 233 Our soul is cast into a body, where it finds
number, dimension. Thereupon it reasons, and calls this nature
necessity, and can believe nothing else.
None of this has been agreed upon with the atheist.

 

[tonyrey]

My problem with PW is that it takes too much at once, too much in one step.
There is no real sense of graduality.

But it is a question of all or nothing. Pascal is making the point that there cannot be half measures: either we survive after death or we don’t. The gambler’s stakes cannot be higher: win or lose all!

In comparison, in some Eastern traditions, they would expect a person first to gradually come to a point of mundane goodness, for mundane happiness’ sake (which is something people can generally understand and strive for), and only after they have stabilized themselves at that level, begin to endeavor toward higher spiritual topics.

Abrahamic religions, on the other hand, expect people to make an enormous commitment right at the beginning, a commitment they do not understand and do not really know how to act on it on a daily basis.

The distinction between loving and ignoring your neighbour is clear enough.

Abrahamic religions are like enrolling an infant into kindergarden, grade school, highschool and college all at once, before the child even began attending to kindergarden.
So from the beginning on, the child already feels the pressure of being successful at college - even if that is still far away in the future, and all the requirements for it yet need to be fulfilled.

If you can’t see very far you don’t know where you’re heading. We have to hitch our wagon to a star!

Although this perspective in Abrahamic religions is understandable - they have no notion of (serial) reincarnation, and are strictly limited to this one lifetime. With such an outlook, it indeed seems all or nothing, now or never.
Why postulate many lifetimes when one is enough. Occam’s Razor…
With such an outlook, it is also easy to come to the point of presuming certainty about God.

I agree but it’s also easy to go to the other extreme and presume certainty about God’s non-existence even though there are many factors to be taken into account. Only the fool oversimplifies the issue.

(There is a parallel to this in those Western Buddhists who do not believe in reincarnation - they believe they will attain nirvana in this lifetime for sure, and it seems this also leads them to believe they have already attained it, even with very little practice and sins and impurities still in full bloom.)

There is hardly any limit to what people will believe - which is to be expected when life is such a great mystery!

 

[Charlemagne_II]

This also from the Pensees.

“It is impossible that our rational part should be other than spiritual; and if anyone maintain that we are simply corporeal, this would far more exclude us from the knowledge of things, there being nothing so inconceivable as to say that matter knows itself. It is impossible to imagine how it should know itself.”

Pascal challenges the atheist to prove that his rationale part is material. I have yet to see any such proof, except that the brain is the seat of intellect.

How does an atheist explain how man can conceive the origin of the universe, the future fate of the universe, the possibility of God, the immortality of the soul, without there being some part of man that transcends mere matter … that connects man not only to the vast universe, but to the possibility of Something far more vast than the universe?

If that is all illusion … why does the illusion not only exist, but persist in spite of every effort to crush it?

 

[tonyrey]

This also from the Pensees.

“It is impossible that our rational part should be other than spiritual; and if anyone maintain that we are simply corporeal, this would far more exclude us from the knowledge of things, there being nothing so inconceivable as to say that matter knows itself. It is impossible to imagine how it should know itself.”

Pascal challenges the atheist to prove that his rationale part is material. I have yet to see any such proof, except that the brain is the seat of intellect.

How does an atheist explain how man can conceive the origin of the universe, the future fate of the universe, the possibility of God, the immortality of the soul, without there being some part of man that transcends mere matter … that connects man not only to the vast universe, but to the possibility of Something far more vast than the universe?

If that is all illusion … why does the illusion not only exist, but persist in spite of every effort to crush it?

I love the ensuing silence…

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Silence … because … they are sad?

“What use is it to us to hear it said of a man that he has thrown off the yoke, that he does not believe there is a God to watch over his actions, that he reckons himself the sole master of his behavior, and that he does not intend to give an account of it to anyone but himself? … Do such men think that they have delighted us by telling us that they hold our souls to be nothing but a little wind and smoke – and by saying it in conceited and complacent tones? Is that a thing to say blithely? Is it not rather a thing to say sadly – as if it were the saddest thing in the world?” Blaise Pascal

 

[tonyrey]

I love the ensuing silence…

… in answer to your question…

 

[cho_pilo]

cho pilo;7865802:

I agree with you but Pascal preferred to attack atheism lock, stock and barrel rather than deal with details. He was probably right because his wager is that we have **everything **

to lose - especially an afterlife - by not believing in God.
Then to Pascal, the distinction between loving and ignoring your neighbour was not clear enough.

 

[razredge]

tonyrey;7866130:

Then to Pascal, the distinction between loving and ignoring your neighbour was not clear enough.

I think rather than posing Pascal’s Wager in terms of ‘belief in a deity’ it would be more persuasive if it was ‘behaving and living as if there was a deity’.

As most religions are more concerned with how you live your life rather than what you believe (unless God is a Protestant!) so it would make more sense to be agnostic and act like there is a God rather than just having ingenuine belief in a God as some kind of hell insurance.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

raz

**so it would make more sense to be agnostic and act like there is a God rather than just having ingenuine belief in a God as some kind of hell insurance. **

I’m trying to wrap my head around that notion … you can be an agnostic and act as if there is a God?

You are assuming that "believing “as if” can never become believing “in truth.” That is Pascal’s argument. The more you believe, the more convinced you will be of your belief.

It’s absurd to argue that Pascal believed that an “as if” commitment is where faith ends. You see just the opposite in his writings … that the reasons of the heart will finally prevail, and that the more you love God, the better you will know that He truly exists. What began “as if” becomes “in truth.”

 

[razredge]

raz

so it would make more sense to be agnostic and act like there is a God rather than just having ingenuine belief in a God as some kind of hell insurance.

I’m trying to wrap my head around that notion … you can be an agnostic and act as if there is a God?

You are assuming that "believing “as if” can never become believing “in truth.” That is Pascal’s argument. The more you believe, the more convinced you will be of your belief.

It’s absurd to argue that Pascal believed that an “as if” commitment is where faith ends. You see just the opposite in his writings … that the reasons of the heart will finally prevail, and that the more you love God, the better you will know that He truly exists. What began “as if” becomes “in truth.”

By that I meant being unsure of the existence of God but living in a moral way as if there was a God. Similar to how the original Wager supposes atheists should ignore their reasons to doubt God’s existence and simply believe in Him anyway.

Many atheists argue that if Pascal’s Wager is correct then God values blind belief in a deity without any real reason to do so besides avoiding going to hell more than using reason and basing your lack of faith on the lack of evidence for God.

So posing Pascal’s Wager in terms of behaviour/morality rather than belief would seem to solve that issue.